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Abstract 
Healthcare services are delivered to patients using complex technology systems. Many innovative 
healthcare technologies are produced by industrial suppliers; however, healthcare staff are also 
active innovators of the technologies that they use in their own work. By assuming the role of 
user-innovators, they can create new technologies, procedures, processes and service-designs that 
improve and support healthcare provision. The focus of the research reported in this thesis is the 
phenomenon of user-led innovation of healthcare technology in the UK National Health Service 
(NHS). 
Exploratory research was carried out to develop a detailed understanding of user-led innovation 
within the NHS based on the perspectives of user-innovators. This thesis presents the results of the 
research in the form of four interpretive case studies, that contribute to an understanding of the 
enabling and inhibiting factors affecting user-led innovation. Each case presents an overview of the 
process of user-led innovation which was followed and the context in which it occurred. 
Several distinctive characteristics of user-led innovation are identified and a generic activity model 
of the user-led innovation process is described. Evaluation in user-led innovation processes is 
highlighted to have multiple purposes, beyond objective technology assessment. It is shown to 
support the on-going social-construction of user-developed technologies but also highlights the role 
of evaluation as a resource for exercising political influence within the innovation process. 
User led innovation is established as a theoretically useful and coherently defined mode of 
innovation, distinct from the lead user or open innovation paradigms. The major contribution of the 
thesis is an integrated model of healthcare technology systems that emphasises the role of proto- 
institutions as critical products of user-led innovation. The thesis concludes that in order to 
maximise the benefit of user-led innovation in the NHS, innovation policy and practice should be 
broadened to recognise the role of proto-institutions as a valuable product of user-led innovation. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 1: An introduction to the thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an introduction to the research reported in this thesis and an overview of its 
structure. The focus of the research undertaken is the phenomenon of user-led innovation of 
healthcare technology in the UK National Health Service (NHS). The research was required in 
order to address an imbalance in the existing literature on user participation in technological 
innovation, which is heavily biased towards industrial contexts. This imbalance in the literature 
creates a practical problem for NHS managers and policy makers when attempting to improve the 
scale and scope of user-led innovation in the NHS. This has created a research problem around the 
need to identify and analyse patterns of user-led innovation within the NHS, and understand the 
drivers and constraints that predispose them to be successful or to fail. The research aimed to 
contribute to knowledge of the phenomenon of user-led innovation and to: 
  extend the existing understanding of the characteristics of user-led innovation; 
  define and analyse the processes followed by user-innovators working in the NHS, in order 
to develop their innovations; 
identify the enabling and inhibiting factors affecting progress of user-led innovation; 
  identify the extent to which the NHS provides a supportive context for user-led innovation 
to occur. 
User-led innovation of healthcare technology in the NHS occurs in a complex, organisational 
context. For this reason, it was most appropriate for the research to adopt a case-study approach. 
This thesis presents and reviews four cases of user-led innovation in order to develop an improved 
understanding of user-led innovation in the NHS, its processes and the nature of the technologies 
that it creates. 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
This chapter introduces and justifies the area of research, setting out the research aims, objectives 
and research questions. The final section of the chapter provides an outline of the structure of the 
thesis. 
1.2 An introduction to the issues surrounding user-led 
innovation in the NHS 
The literature on technology users' roles in the innovation process has focused mainly on the 
manufacturing and consumer goods industries (Thomke and von Hippel 2002). As a result the 
models do not automatically apply to user-led innovation of healthcare technologies. However, the 
role of users in the innovation of healthcare technology has a long history. 
Since ancient times surgeons have taken the role of both designer and user of surgical instruments 
(Kirkup 2006) and clinicians have been responsible for innovation in the design of healthcare 
service delivery (Lettl 2005; Lettl, Herstatt, and Gemuenden 2006). The combination of these roles 
stems from their inventive and innovative personalities, combined with a context in which there is a 
high problem pressure and a lack of availability of relevant competences and resources. The ability 
of healthcare staff to develop technological innovations continues to be demonstrated in innovation 
competitions, run within the NHS, where many innovations have been developed by doctors, 
nurses, managers and auxiliary staff, often without the formal involvement of NHS senior 
management and only rarely as a response to central initiatives (NHS Innovations 2004). 
The role of NHS staff in leading innovation has been placed firmly on the political agenda (Darzi 
2008: 59), with clinicians and other NHS staff being encouraged to lead the improvements in 
healthcare. This recent emphasis on staff-led innovation is not new. Since early times, the 
development of healthcare technologies has often been driven by those delivering treatment and not 
simply the product of scientific discover. 
However, since the early 1990s the performance of the NHS in managing innovation has become a 
concern to the UK government. The NHS has been identified as possessing a weak capability to 
innovate. The NHS's ability to exploit the ideas and inventions that it develops has become a focus 
of attention (Baker 1999; Office of Science and Technology 2000; Culyer 1994; DoH 2002,2002, 
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1998). But on a broader scale, the capability to reconfigure itself for the 21aß Century (UK 
Government 2000) has also been raised as a priority. Criticism of the NHS's ability to manage 
innovation has developed into both an organisational and political issue. In particular, its failure to 
adopt new healthcare technologies and practices has received attention: 
But the NHS does not always make best use of innovation. ... Despite some excellent 
work taking place locally, there remains some reluctance within the NHS to adopt new 
products and processes. (Darzi 2007: 40) 
There are several issues that have affected the ability of the NHS to innovate. These issues are 
related to the nature of user-led innovation, complexity of healthcare technologies and the 
structural characteristics of the NHS. 
User-led innovation 
Several significant challenges face the NHS in supporting and managing user-led innovation. There 
is no widely accepted understanding of the phenomenon of user-led innovation that is applicable to 
the NHS, making it difficult to identify how best to develop supportive organisational settings. The 
lack of clarity leads to gaps in understanding of how user-led innovation processes are structured; 
or the impact of management interventions on their progress. User-led innovation is a bottom-up 
phenomenon and operates very differently to the top-down initiatives that represent the normal 
modes of change in the NHS. It also represents a different mode of innovation to many other 
sectors where innovation is the product of team working, rather than the efforts of a single 
individual. Finally, the lack of understanding of user-led innovation means that policy makers and 
managers have little guidance on its potential enablers and barriers. 
These issues are compounded by the difficulty in gaining data about user-led innovation within 
NHS organisations. A difficulty is that until a user-led innovation has reached some level of 
success, it is unlikely to gain visibility within the parent organisation. Support for innovation 
activity is under resourced in the NHS and as a result many innovative ideas may never be formally 
recognised or supported. They may then go unnoticed or simply fail to be developed due to lack of 
resources. This means that it is difficult to understand the scope, scale or potential benefits of 
user-led innovation activity in the NHS. 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
Complexity of healthcare technology innovations 
Much of the work on user-participation in innovation has concentrated on the hard technologies, 
such as physical devices or software. In contrast, within a healthcare context, innovation needs to 
focus on soft technologies such as procedures, processes and service designs. In fact, it is plausible 
that operationally focused staff would be in a strong position to pursue innovation of both the hard 
and soft technologies that they use. This represents a potential strength of user-led innovation to 
develop new technologies that fit an existing organisational context, or for staff to innovate hard 
and soft technologies in parallel. 
The innovation of healthcare technology systems can be driven by a number of factors including: 
  Translation of research-based knowledge into clinical practice (Davis et al. 2003); 
  Invention by users and recombination of existing technologies (Hargadon 2003); 
  Shifts in the paradigm underpinning treatment, for example a shift from a bio-medical to 
bio-psychosocial model of care (Engel 1977); 
  Shifts in the location of healthcare delivery, in particular the shift from secondary to 
primary care contexts; 
  Shifts in the user-groups for which technologies are aimed. Thus, a technology may 
undergo innovation that allows its use to shift from specialist staff to generalist staff, to 
carers, and to patients (Christensen, Bohmer, and Kenagy 2000). 
This range of factors suggests that a challenge when managing user-led innovation is maintaining a 
holistic view of the whole technology system that is subject to change. 
Structural characteristics of the NHS 
Several structural characteristics of the NHS impact on the potential effectiveness of user-led 
innovation. The NHS is an organisation with significant knowledge resources including a high 
proportion of well educated specialist staff. The operational requirements of the NHS mean that 
there is expertise in scientific and management disciplines. Overall, these knowledge resources 
create a potential for innovation activity. Unfortunately, the NHS has a firmly established 
functional organisation structure, based around specialist areas. This has resulted in a tendency for 
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knowledge to reside within knowledge "silos", the boundaries between specialist areas often acting 
to reduce sharing of knowledge across disciplines. 
The ability to drive innovation and change in the NHS depends on staff possessing significant 
organisational power. This power is needed both to access necessary resources and to effect 
change. Distribution of power within the NHS is based on organisational position and the 
possession of specialist knowledge; both senior NHS managers and senior clinicians can exert 
significant power. This situation suggests that senior clinicians are well placed to drive innovation 
and change. Conversely, less senior NHS staff attempting to effect innovation, may lack the power 
needed to address organisational inertia. 
A major structural constraint on user-led innovation in the NHS is the overriding ethic held by 
NHS staff to provide patient care. These values influence the prioritisation of activities, giving 
short term clinical problems higher priority than longer term activities, such as innovation. 
Finally, the NHS is a singularly large, complex, high-budget, influential institution, with political 
and economic sensitivities surrounding it. In practice, the NHS is a loose confederation of 
organisations working both co-operative and un-co-operatively together to provide patient care to 
the UK population. In 2006, it had a budget of £84 million and employed 1.3 million people. As the 
Audit Commission points out: 
It comprises some 600 different organisations, each with its own responsibilities and 
operating to different sets of financial rules and incentives. They interact with each 
other and also contract with independent providers ranging from GPs to private 
hospitals. (Audit Commission 2006: 2) 
1.2.1 Definitions 
This research has adopted a number of specific definitions. 
  Hard healthcare technology: considered as the physical artefacts that support healthcare 
technology systems (e. g. pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and the physical facilities that 
provide the context for healthcare technology systems). 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
  Soft healthcare technology - practices, protocols, processes and formal service designs that 
structure the provision of healthcare, often in conjunction with hard technologies. 
  Healthcare technology: A healthcare technology is any technology for which the purpose is 
the maintenance or restoration of human health. This research makes the assumption that 
healthcare technologies are usually used as part of a wider healthcare technology system 
and rarely in isolation. This definition is discussed further in Chapter 2. Healthcare 
technologies can have a number of purposes: 
- Diagnostic: used in diagnosing a healthcare condition. 
- Therapeutic: used in treating a healthcare condition. 
- Assistive: used to support patients with a healthcare condition. 
- Operational: used in the operational management of healthcare. 
- Informatic: used to mange information relating to healthcare. 
  Users: This relates to the individual or teams responsible for applying a technology rather 
than those benefiting from the application of the technology. For example, the user of a 
medical device is the individual who applies the device, and is not necessarily the 
individual to whom it is applied. For many healthcare technologies, the users will be 
clinicians and other staff in professions related to medicine. In an instance where a 
healthcare technology is "self-applied", the user is also the patient. 
  Innovation: The whole process of developing a novel idea or invention through to gaining 
value from the invention either directly through financial returns e. g. royalty fees, or in the 
context of healthcare the improvement in efficiency or effectiveness of a healthcare 
process. 
  User-led innovation: an innovation that is driven by a user-innovator. In contrast to a 
research-led or supplier-led innovation. A detailed discussion of user-led innovation is 
given in Chapter 2. 
" Research-led innovation: innovation resulting from a formal research project with the 
clearly articulated purpose to invent a new healthcare technology. 
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  Supplier-led innovation; an innovation driven predominantly by a technology supplier in 
response to a perceived commercial opportunity. 
  User-innovator: technology user who innovates a technology that they use in their normal 
work. 
  Innovation team: the team led by a user-innovator involved in a user-led innovation 
project. 
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
1.3.1 Research aims 
The overall aim of this research is to explore the phenomenon of user-led innovation in the NHS. 
To achieve this overall aim the following subsidiary aims were addressed: produce an in-depth 
understanding of the characteristics of user-led innovation in the NHS; identify the processes that 
user-innovators follow in order to develop their innovations; establish the enabling and inhibiting 
factors affecting progress of user-led innovation; and evaluate the extent to which the NHS 
provides a supportive context for user-led innovation to occur. 
1.3.2 Research objectives 
Objectives of the research were to: 
  Review the literature that underpins an understanding of the phenomenon of user-led 
innovation the NHS. 
  Set out an appropriate methodology that will enable rigorous investigation of user-led 
innovation in the NHS. 
5 Carry out an exploratory study into the innovation support provided by NHS innovation 
hubs. 
  Identify and investigate four NHS sites, in order to develop distinctive case studies of 
user-led innovation based on the perspectives of user-innovators. 
  Use the case study findings to establish the enabling and inhibiting factors affecting 
user-led innovation. 
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  Based on the case study findings and theory within the existing literature, synthesise 
models that aid understanding of the nature and process of user-led innovation. 
1.3.3 Research questions 
The research sought to answer four exploratory questions on the nature of user-led innovation in 
the NHS. The questions were: 
  What are the characteristics of user-led innovation projects in the NHS in terms of. their 
purpose, the people involved and the criteria used for judging success? 
" How do user-innovators in the NHS manage and structure the innovation process? 
  What is the nature of the technology created through user-led innovation in the NHS? 
  How and for what purpose do user-innovators evaluate their innovations as they are 
developed? 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis consists of further nine chapters. A brief overview of each chapter is provided below. 
Chapter Two: Literature review 
This chapter focuses on the key concepts that underpin an understanding of the phenomenon of 
user-led innovation in the NHS. It reviews and synthesises the literature underpins this research 
providing a theoretical perspective on: the nature of healthcare technology systems, user-led 
innovation, and the NHS as a context for user-led innovation. 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
Presents an overview of the methodology adopted in the research; it explains and justifies the 
research design adopted for the research. 
Chapter Four: Exploratory study 
Reports on the findings of an exploratory study into the formal support provided to user-innovators 
in the NHS. It reviews both the UK government policy on NHS innovation and the practical 
support given to NHS staff by the NHS innovation hubs. 
Introduction 
Chapter Five: Case Study 1- Leg Ulcer Telemedicine System (L UTM) 
This case reviews the development of a leg ulcer telemedicine system created by a vascular 
surgeon working in a general NHS hospital in the Birmingham. The telemedicine system 
underpinned a significant change in service design and the implementation of a shared-care model 
of leg ulcer treatment. 
Chapter Six: Case Study 2- Electronic Pelvic Floor Assessment Questionnaire (ePA Q) 
This case reviews the development of ePAQ, an electronic questionnaire created for use in a uro- 
gynaecology outpatient clinic. The development of the innovation from an early stage to creation of 
a spin-out company, in parallel with its evolution from paper-based to web-based questionnaire is 
described. The ePAQ system has had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the clinical 
interview between consultant and patient when diagnosing uro-gynaecological disorders. 
Chapter Seven: Case Study 3- Cleft lip and palate study model (CLP) 
This case examines the role of a change in process in the creation of plaster study models used to 
audit the effectiveness of cleft lip and palate. The case highlights the process of user-led innovation 
within a department of a teaching hospital, but also in relation to the wider issue of treatment audit 
across centres within the UK. 
Chapter Eight: Case Study 4- Pain management Service (PMS) 
This case outlines the innovation in the process re-design of a pain management. The services was 
based within an acute hospital and served five primary care trusts. The innovation in service design 
was based around the implementation of a bi-psychosocial model of pain. The case examines how 
the innovation developed from a crisis in service provision to becoming embedded within national 
care guidelines and a model of best practice. 
Chapter: Nine: Research Questions Revisited 
This chapter provides a review of the research findings in relation to the research questions 
identified at the start of the research. 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
Chapter Ten: Conclusions 
The conclusion sets out the main contributions made by this thesis to development of a theory of 
user-led innovation and its implications. Finally, the chapter sets out areas for further research. 
The references section and appendices is presented at the end of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature that underpins an understanding of the phenomenon of user-led 
innovation in the UK National Health Service. The chapter is split into sections that each address 
an aspect of the subject area. 
The first section reviews the technology literature in order to develop a better understanding of the 
scope of the technology concept within the healthcare sector. The review considers perspectives 
from technology studies, social theory and institution theory literature. The second section develops 
a definition and establishes the characteristics of user-led innovation that distinguish it from other 
modes of innovation. The third section reviews the organisational learning and knowledge 
management literature to develop an understanding of the problem of knowledge translation, a 
critical process for ensuring that user-led innovation can draw on multi-disciplinary knowledge 
from within and external to the organisation. The final section assesses the NHS as a context for 
user-led innovation. The section evaluates how culture, organisational structure and policy supports 
and retards user-led innovation. 
2.2 Healthcare technology systems 
Healthcare, and the healthcare services provided by the NHS in particular, are inherently complex. 
There are three related reasons for this. First, the remit of the NHS means that it has to provide an 
extremely broad range of services, from minor treatments delivered by a GP, to treatments 
delivered by multi-disciplinary teams. For example, in the case of cancer treatment, effective 
treatment relies on co-operation between oncologists, surgeons and radiographers, with each group 
applying their own specialist technologies. Second, to meet the individual requirements of patients, 
all of these services have to be customised, to a greater or lesser extent, for each patient treated. A 
central tenet of the UK NHS is that the patient care should be tailored to an individual's needs (UK 
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Government 2000: 17). Consequently, there is a tension when designing healthcare processes 
between providing either standardised or customised services. Standardisation has the potential to 
reduce costs, reduce involvement of specialist staff, increase scope for application of quality 
assurance and implement evidence-based practices. In contrast, customised services will ensure 
that patients are given highly specific treatments, based on direct contact with specialist staff. The 
optimum balance for the NHS is to be able to provide services that enable mass-customisation. 
Finally, organising the technical, human and organisational resources necessary to respond to these 
demands creates further complexity. Consequently, when discussing innovation of healthcare, it is 
almost impossible to separate the technical, social and organisational dimensions of healthcare 
provision. 
To develop an understanding of healthcare innovation it is necessary to apply a working definition 
of a healthcare technology system. Since such systems are not limited to the physical artefacts used 
for diagnosis, therapy or the operation of healthcare services. Healthcare technology systems also 
involve the knowledge and capabilities built up by individuals and organisations over time. This 
section argues, therefore, that the study of healthcare technology innovation must be sensitive to 
both technical development and wider socio-technical issues. 
The concept of healthcare technology relates to an eclectic range of technologies, from sticking 
plasters to systems concerned with the treatment of cancer. The problem in understanding 
healthcare technologies and their innovation, is that a successful technology is not simply defined 
by a specific physical artefact. Individual technical artefacts can have multiple diagnostic and 
therapeutic purposes. For example, in the case of image-guided therapy the technology has the 
ability to diagnose a tumour and then apply therapeutic radiation (Yanof and Kuhn 2006: 140). 
More critically, different groups of users can apply technology differently, while addressing the 
same problem. 
With some image-guided applications, the clinical protocols and technical methods are 
under varying stages of clinical investigation. There may be multiple approaches to 
achieve the same therapeutic objectives and have they can have complex trade-offs. 
Clinical protocols and use of technology may vary between, or even within 
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institutions, and always depend on the presentation of each patient. (Yanof and Kuhn 
2006: 146) 
This demonstrates the extent to which human systems influence the use of technological artefacts. 
In this example, human agency in the form of critical and reflective practice allow the optimisation 
of a treatment. Therefore, healthcare technologies are implemented into, and become an embedded 
and integral part of complex systems for maintaining the health of humans. Human agency is not 
the only factor however in shaping technology. Social structures will also influence the use of 
technology. Institutionalised regulation of healthcare has created jurisdictional, moral and 
administrative governance structures (Webster 2007: 134), that impact on how technology is used. 
While these social structures may be highly formalised, it is also evident that highly localised 
structures influence use of healthcare technology, for example, patient safety sub-cultures 
(Ginsberg et al. 2006: 103). The use of technology is therefore a product of the relationship 
between, and interaction of, structure(s) and human agency. These relationships are discussed in 
more detail later in the section. This section will set out the conceptual basis on which the research 
defines healthcare technology and the implication for its innovation. 
2.2.1 Defining technology 
Before addressing the nature of a healthcare technology, it is useful to consider how general 
definitions of technology impact on an understanding of healthcare technology. The overwhelming 
conclusion of reviews that list definitions of technology (Roberts and Grabowski 1996; Howells 
2004; Orlikowski 1992) is that technology is a complex concept. Many definitions provide only 
partial descriptions, a problem in even using the term "technology" is its multiple meanings. 
Souitas suggested the use of an OECD `Oslo Manual' definition of technology, that suggests it can 
be: 
... interpreted broadly as the whole complex of knowledge, skills, routines, 
competence, equipment, and engineering practice. (Souitaris 2003: 513) 
However, the OECD in a later edition of the Oslo Manual, suggest that the word technological is 
too problematic to use in relation to the study of innovation as: 
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... the word raises a concern that many service sector 
firms would interpret 
technological to mean `using high-technology plant and equipment', and thus not 
applicable to many of their product and process innovations (OECD and EUROSTAT 
2005: 17). 
Despite this ambiguity, there is consensus that technology is concerned with solving problems 
through the application of knowledge: 
... the total knowledge and skills available to any 
human society for industry, art, 
science, etc. (1994: 1583) 
Any tool or technique: any product or process, any physical equipment or method of 
doing or making by which human capability is extended. (Schon 1967) 
Technological knowledge and modes of enquiry are very distinct from, for example, scientific 
knowledge and scientific method. The latter is concerned with discovery of fundamental physical 
truth, while the former is concerned with developing solutions to problems encountered by humans. 
... technological 
knowledge is knowledge of how to do or make things, whereas the 
basic sciences have a more general form of knowing. (Layton 1987: 603) 
Thus technological knowledge is not simply the practical application of scientific knowledge; as 
witnessed by the way technological knowledge precedes scientific knowledge. For example, the 
invention of the steam engine and design of aerofoil profiles both preceded scientific explanation of 
their operation (Vincenti 1990). 
Ellul raises the concern that humans have little control over the path of technological development 
and that there is a deterministic quality to technology: "human beings have to adapt to it and accept 
total change" (Ellul and Bromiley 1989: 136). Technological determinism suggests that creation or 
use of technology will lead to inevitable social change, however this may be a flawed view of the 
relationship between technology and society (Edgerton 1999). When new technologies are 
implemented there is no guarantee that they will be adopted or their use will impose a specific 
social order (Barley 1986). It is however useful to recognise that technological trajectory is not 
easily reversible, for example American society's dependence on the internal combustion engine. 
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This suggests that the problems created by a current technology are the sources of future 
technological solutions (Kranzberg 1986). Thus dependence on the internal combustion engine has 
driven development of bio-fuels. 
A contrasting view to technological determinism, is the view that technology is socially constructed 
and shaped by human interaction (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Bijker 1995; Pinch and Bijker 
1984; Bijker and Law 1992; Garud and Rappa 1994). Several studies have to the body of work on 
social construction of technology (SCOT). Bijker highlights how the development of technologies, 
such as the bicycle, bakelite and fluorescent lighting, is profoundly affected by how the meanings 
associated with a technology develop in an on-going process of social construction, in which 
frames of reference on a technology are created by relevant groups of users. Through a process of 
interpretive flexibility the meanings associated with a technology evolve until finally forming 
rhetorical closure (Bijker 1995; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987). 
Heidegger suggested that technology provides a distinct mind-set, beyond a set of tools (Heidegger 
1977). Thus, a technological world-view has a fundamental influence on the way people act by 
"enframing" or "throwing" them in technology (Ihde 1993; Borgmann 1984). This means that they 
view the world through technology, rather than seeing technology as simply tools with which to act 
on the world. Though Heidegger warned about the de-humanising effect of technology, his 
overarching message is that a technological caste of mind can benefit humanity. Teich (2003) made 
a similar point: 
The tools themselves are not the technology; it is the use to which they have been put 
that marks them out as a technology, and it is people who do the putting to some use 
for some purpose. (Teich 2003: 12) 
Technology is therefore not neutral and will impact on the intentions and purposes of people who 
interact with it (Kranzberg 1986). 
Winner explores technology's lack of neutrality and suggests it has an explicit political role. Using 
large technological systems as examples, he suggests a theory of technological politics in which 
technologies will "demand" or shape social structures (Winner 1985: 27). First, the nature of a 
specific technology cam settle "... an issue in a particular community". Secondly, technologies 
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may require or be "strongly compatible with particular kinds of political relationship". This view is 
echoed in critical theories of technology in which technology is viewed as hegemonic and supports 
the interests of particular social groups (Feenberg 2002). This view of technology draws on 
Gramsci's view of hegemony, suggesting that opposition to an established technology can fly in the 
face of common sense, or prevailing popular and practical beliefs (Kirkpatrick 2008: 75). This 
highlights the extent to which technology can create bases of power that serve the interests of a 
specific social or gender groups (Cockburn 1981). 
2.2.2 Hard and soft technologies 
The discussion so far demonstrates that a working understanding of technology must encompass 
several dimensions. Mitchum, for example, identified technology as having four dimensions: 
knowledge, activity, objects and volition (Mitcham 1994). This definition maintains a useful 
distinction between components of technology based on tangible artefacts; and those based on 
technological knowledge, systems of activity and human decision-making in relation to technology 
application. The distinction between artefacts and the more intangible aspects of technology has 
been categorised as hard and soft technology respectively (Swamidass and Nair 2004). Soft 
technology has been more specifically defined as: 
... systems of thought, practice and action that facilitate the achievement of explicit 
aims. (Bessant and Francis 2005) 
Soft technologies therefore include systems of thought that enable the application of hard 
technology, but also those that enable improvement and change in the application of a hard 
technology. The distinction between hard and soft technologies is useful as it highlights an 
ontological separation between technologies that are physical and those that are knowledge-based. 
This distinction is appropriate to healthcare technology. Within healthcare, hard technologies 
include devices, drugs, facilities etc. Furthermore, and significantly, within the EU medical devices 
directive (Directive 2007/47/EC of the European Parliament 2007) this distinction has been 
recognised. Hence medical device technology encompasses hard technologies; thus a hard 
healthcare technology can be seen as including pharmaceutical technologies and: 
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... any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other article, whether 
used alone or in combination, together with any accessories, including the software 
necessary for its proper application intended by the manufacturer to be used for 
medical purposes for human beings for the purpose of. 
  diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease, 
  diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury 
or handicap, 
  investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a 
physiological process, 
  control of conception, 
  and which does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human 
body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, but which may 
be assisted in its function by such means; (Directive 2007/47/EC of the 
European Parliament 2007: 23) 
Soft healthcare technologies include the practices, procedures and services designs used in patient 
care. These soft technologies would therefore also include knowledge embodied in processes and 
procedures used to support patient care - e. g. surgical procedures, care plans and protocols. Good 
examples of this would be: procedures for carrying out specific key-hole surgery; recommended 
care protocols, for example treatment of leg ulcers(RCN 1998); service design (Moffatt et al. 
1992), national level care guidelines based on health economics (NICE 2005); and, at an 
operational level, application of improvement strategies, such as Lean or 6-Sigma (Eldridge NE et 
al. 2006). 
The implication of the above discussion for the study of healthcare technologies is that it is not 
simply the physical artefact that must be considered. These artefacts are tied into processes for 
delivering care, analogous to manufacturing production systems based on jobbing, flow and mass 
customisation processes. The layout of these processes is subject to innovation, as is their 
management and control. So for example, a surgeon will use a physical artefact, within a surgical 
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procedure (a process), which in turn is within broader system for managing the flow of the patient 
through the healthcare service (a management and control system). 
2.2.3 Socio-technical views of technology 
The distinction between hard and soft technologies highlights the need for including the social 
dimension of technology when discussing healthcare technology systems. Technology must 
therefore be viewed in the context of a socio-technical system (Trist 1981), with technological 
solutions encompassing both machines and social machinery (Teich 2003: 14). Central to this 
understanding of technology is the recognition that the choice of individuals to understand, use and 
apply technology is separate from the physical artefacts of technology. Hence the role of 
technology is subject to processes of social construction (Orlikowski 1992). 
Of particular significance is the argument that the socially constructed nature of technology has a 
fundamental impact on its innovation. In a study of the development of cochlear implants, it was 
found that for two independently developed devices, the perceived purpose of the device affected 
the final design and evaluation (Garud and Rappa 1994). The difference in the two devices was 
explained by the contrasting sets of assumptions built into the teams' respective cognitive frames. 
Similarly, within the NHS the meanings and assumptions associated with healthcare technology 
systems, for example treatment centres, have also been shown to be subject to multiple 
interpretations between government, strategic health authorities and front-line clinical staff (Pope et 
al. 2006). 
The SCOT perspective is recognised as providing a valid perspective on technology, consequently 
it is generally accepted that technology cannot be treated as a given. Instead it is an equivoque open 
to several possible or plausible interpretations (Weick 2001: 148). This suggests that implementation 
of technology cannot be viewed in a deterministic fashion. The role of individuals in making 
choices about the use of technology must be recognised; technology cannot and should not be 
treated as a "black box" (Jones 1999: 125). Therefore, a coherent perspective of technology must 
recognise the relationship between human agency and technology; and conversely the extent to 
which human agency shapes technology. For example, Orlikowski argues for a narrow definition of 
technology but emphasises the strong relationship with both human agency and social structures: 
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In defining my concept of technology, I restrict its scope to material artefacts (various 
configurations of hardware and software). I wish to sustain a distinction... between the 
material nature of technology and the human activities that design or use these 
artefacts... [and] facilitates my framing of the role of technology in terms of a mutual 
interaction between human agents and technology, and hence as both structural and 
socially constructed. (Orlikowski 1992: 403) 
Orlikowski notes the limits of using a single construct for technology when attempting to analyse 
the relationships between humans and technical components: 
... even as we gain in generalisability, we 
have lost the ability to ask questions about 
how artefacts interact with human agents. By aggregating task, technique, knowledge, 
and tools into a single construct - technology - interaction among these constituting 
components and with humans is ignored. For example, we cannot examine how 
different assumptions, knowledge, and techniques can be embedded in different kinds 
of artefacts or practices, and how these have differential consequences for human 
action and cognition. (Orlikowski 1992: 399) 
This is a significant point in relation to healthcare technology showing it cannot be defined only in 
terms of artefacts; much of the power of modem healthcare is in the skills, techniques, practices, 
contexts and methods of organisation. Most importantly, the reflexive nature of the healthcare 
professions means that even clearly defined healthcare processes are subject to customisation for 
each patient. It is these factors that increase the complexity of healthcare technology and its 
innovation. 
A healthcare technology system therefore comprises two significant technological sub-systems: 
  Hard technology - considered as the physical artefacts that support healthcare technology 
systems (e. g. pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and the physical facilities that provide the 
setting for healthcare technology systems) 
  Soft technology - including the practices, protocols, processes and formal service designs 
that structure the provision of healthcare, often in conjunction with hard technologies. 
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The distinction between these two sub-systems is important, as hard and soft technologies are 
ontologically distinct. The four modes of reality suggested by Fleetwood (Fleetwood 2004) are 
useful in understanding the distinction between hard and soft technology. Hard technology can be 
regarded as a synthesis of the materially, ideally and socially real. In addition to their material 
existence independent of individuals or communities, hard technologies are mediated by a limited 
range of interpretations that apply to the technology. Hence, a heart-lung machine is clearly a 
materially real entity; however, mediated by accepted interpretations that it has a specific purpose 
within specific surgical procedures. In contrast, soft technologies are social entities and have no 
physical existence. Instead, they are better understood as socially real and have "not one iota of 
materiality" (Fleetwood 2004: 201). Soft technologies are distinct from physical machinery and are 
closer in their mode of existence to skills, rules, social structures and institutions. 
By making this distinction between hard and soft technologies, it is possible to analyse a healthcare 
technology system without running the risk of aggregating the interaction between physical 
artefacts and human interaction. The above discussion highlights that hard and soft technologies are 
not simply two ends of a spectrum. They are two distinct types of technological entity. 
Technological systems will to a greater or lesser extent include both classes of technology. 
The implication of understanding healthcare technology in these terms is that it is necessary to 
understand the role of human agency in healthcare technology systems and consequently how 
structural factors enable or inhibit human action 
Orlikowski's rationale for narrowly defining technology in terms of only physical artefacts was that 
she was concerned to highlight the interaction between human agency, social structures and 
technology. This was done through application of structuration theory (Giddens 1984). 
Structuration theory attempts to fill a perceived gap in social theory by explaining the duality of 
structure and agency, emphasising the: 
... reciprocal interaction of human actors and organisation structure. The central idea is 
that human actors or agents are both enabled and constrained by structures, yet these 
structures are the result of previous actions by agents. (Sarason 1995) 
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Structuration theory has however been described more as a meta-theory (Weaver and Gioia 1994) 
and does not directly address technology, however its utility is that: 
.. it tells us what sort of things are out 
there in the world, not what is happening to or 
between them. (Craib 1992: 108) 
Orlikowski has however led the application of structuration theory specifically to the study of 
technology (Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski 2000). She highlights that structuration theory is helpful 
in four ways to understanding technology. It addresses: 
  the extent to which human agency impacts upon technology use and purpose, suggesting 
that technology is a product of human agency; 
  the extent to which technology acts as a structural influence on human agency; 
  the influence of other social structures on the use of technology; 
  the impact of technology on social structures. 
The relationship between technology, social structures and human agency is summarised in 
Figure 2.1. 
Institutional Properties 
Institutional consequences 
of interaction with technology 
Institutional properties 
influencing humans 
in their interaction with technology 
hnology 
Technology as a product 
of human action 
/ 
Technology facilitating and 
constraining human action 
Human Agency 
Figure 2.1: Orlikowski's structurational model of technology (Orlikowski 1992) 
21 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
Orlikowski's model highlights that the socially constructed roles and meanings associated with a 
technology are subject to interpretive flexibility (Orlikowski 1992; Pinch and Bijker 1984). It also 
models the process through which technology and its users undergo a mutual adjustment over time 
(Leonard-Barton 1988). In the context of healthcare technology systems this iteration between the 
scope and role of technology has been demonstrated in the case of specific medical technologies 
during their development and use, for example, cochlear implants (Garud and Rappa 1994), 
cataract surgery (Mina et al. 2004; Metcalfe, James, and Mina 2005). The fundamental point to 
note here is therefore that the agency of developers and users of technology inevitably impact on 
both soft and hard technology. 
When applying Orlikowski's model to healthcare technology several problems emerge which are 
rooted in the assumptions that underpin structuration theory: 
" social structures are only instantiated as a result of ongoing human agency 
  they have no independent existence; 
  human actors exert free choice in what they do; and, 
  past events have little impact on the ongoing process of structuration. 
In order to address the problems these assumptions create, a brief discussion of countervailing 
views of agency is necessary. 
2.2.4 Human agency 
The concept of human agency recognises that individuals have the capacity to act independently of 
their social context. The extent to which individuals have free choice to act has been contested; for 
example, Giddens' takes the view that most of the time individual human beings are purposive 
actors, acting with full knowledge of what they do and why (Held and Thompson 1989: 253). 
However, to suggest individuals have total free choice or conversely their actions are wholly 
controlled by social structures, via a deterministic causal mechanism, has been criticised as overly 
simplistic. Instead, it has been suggested that an individual's agency is conditioned (Bhaskar 
1989: 94) by wider social structures, which in turn are themselves elaborated or reproduced over 
time (Archer 1995: 157; 2003: 3). 
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An individual's actions can be disaggregated into three elements of agency: iterational, projective 
and practical-evaluative (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). These elements are of particular relevance 
to understand how agency relates to technology. The iterational element is concerned with theories 
of practice and reflects the reactivation of past patterns of thought and action, routinely or 
habitually incorporated in practical activity (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 971). The projective 
element in contrast can be viewed in terms of strategic thought applied to use of the technology 
through generation of possible future trajectories of action. Finally, the practical-evaluative element 
is concerned with the capacity to make practical judgement in response to non-routine, evolving 
situations. In relation to technology, this can be compared to craft skill. Human agency in relation 
to technology can therefore be separated into three areas. Where technology is used on a habitual, 
unconscious basis; where strategic choices about its future use are made; and where, using acquired 
skill, technology is applied in new ways in response to a new situation. These three elements of 
agency underpin the development of capability to use hard technology. 
The healthcare sector is one that has grown progressively over several hundred years. The way the 
sector operates at any time is a product of not just human agency but structural influences built into 
the healthcare technology system. For example, the use of hospital buildings built in the early 
twentieth century for twenty-first century healthcare, places a significant constraint on the layout of 
service provision. Similarly, the adoption of new procedures is dependent on strong, clinically 
backed evidence and economic tests of efficacy. No individual actor can legitimately act outside 
these norms of practice. The existing range of technologies available in the sector also limits the 
extent to which a new technology may be implemented. Any new technology must fit into the 
existing technological architecture or have the resources available to replace existing architectures 
of healthcare. The service design of healthcare is another structural constraint on healthcare 
technology innovation. The introduction of new technologies may require radical reconfiguration 
of a service, including changing location, layout, facilities, job roles ands skill requirements. 
As discussed above the extent of choice available to human actors is constrained. This is 
particularly the case when examining professional roles in healthcare. The strong professional 
identity of healthcare professionals is a major constraint on the way that they act. This identity is 
built into the professions at the level of training, professional codes of conduct and even in 
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legislation. For example, doctors who have taken the Hippocratic Oath have their freedom to act in 
extreme circumstances greatly constrained, for example in the area of palliative care. While such 
actors have the choice as to whether to enter the profession, or not, the rules of the game are such 
that if someone wants to have a healthcare career within the NHS they must follow accepted 
patterns of behaviour in the way they pursue their career. 
The limits to how an individual is either able to make choices or is constrained in how they act with 
regard to technology, suggests that extension of Orlikowski's structurational model of technology 
to healthcare technology requires further clarification of the nature of both human agency and 
institutions. Human agency needs to be considered to enable a better understanding of how soft 
technologies are developed and maintained in relation to hard technologies. The nature of 
institutions needs consideration, as several institutions exist within the healthcare sector that enable 
or inhibit the creation and implementation of hard and soft technology. 
Conflation of agency and structure 
A number of scholars have been critical of structuration theory's conflation of structure and agency 
(Archer 1995: 132; Bhaskar 1989: 36; Willmott 1997; Archer 2003: 2). Barley and Tolbert 
summarise these concerns about conflating structure with action: 
Conflation concerns the problem of reducing structure to action (or vice versa) and the 
difficulty of documenting the existence of an institution apart from activity. Unless 
institutions and actions are analytically as well as phenomenologically distinct, it is 
difficult to understand how one can be said to affect the other. (Barley and Tolbert 
1997: 99). 
Other writers have suggested that for both agency and structure there is a clear distinction. Carter 
and New suggest that: 
... each [structures and agents] possess distinct properties and powers in their own 
right (often referred to as sui generic properties and powers). (Carter and New 2004: 5) 
Based on this discussion it is critical to note that social structures are ontologically distinct from 
human agency. 
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Impact of the historical development of technology 
Giddens' account of structuration theory also underplays the role of time in the process of 
structuration. The current configuration of a technology is deeply coupled to its historical 
development. During a technology's development contemporary assumptions, values and 
knowledge are embedded into the technology itself. Even many years later, these embedded factors 
will continue to influence human activities. When considering the relative roles of both hard and 
soft technology it is important to recognise the historical basis on which their trajectories are built 
(Clark 1985). Technology is however capable of embodying accepted ways of working, for 
example in the design of computer software. Orlikowski suggests that: 
Technology is built and used within certain social and historical circumstances and its 
form and functioning will bear the imprint of these conditions. (Orlikowski 1992: 411) 
This is very well illustrated in the way in that technology systems embody legacy elements that are 
the result of influence by organisational structures and technology users. It was observed during 
World War Two that artillery crews would pause for several seconds before firing motorized 
weapons. It reportedly required a veteran to explain that this pause was for "holding the horses" 
(Morison 1966), this was a routine that had been vital in the past but had been followed 
unquestionably, despite the phasing out of horses in the artillery. In his example, though the hard 
technology had evolved, the soft technology still embodied practices from many years earlier. 
Similarly, the continued use of the QWERTY keyboard in the face of improved designs has been 
argued to be due to the establishment of the soft technology of touch typing technique (Gould 
1997). 
In healthcare, this is a central consideration as hard technology, such as devices and even facilities, 
impacts on how patient treatment can occur. Thus, any new technology must fit within the existing 
infrastructure of hard and soft technologies. For example, in implementing new angioplasty 
techniques for treating heart attacks there is a need for changing both the skills of staff and the 
infrastructure in which they operate (Department of Health 2008; Nugent 2008). Similarly, the 
established soft technologies involved in healthcare are often deeply embedded in institutions 
associated with specific professions and professional healthcare education. For example, it was 
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reported that endovascular techniques for treating intra-cranial aneurisms were slow to be adopted 
until neurovascular surgeons training was changed, stroke units evolved and evaluation of the 
technology accepted by the profession; all these factors representing structural barriers to the new 
technology (Wilson 2006). Similar institutional factors have been suggested as affecting adoption 
of minimal invasive surgery techniques for hernia repair (Darzi and Mackay 2002). This implies 
that any action taken by healthcare workers in relation to technology is conditioned by the history 
of both hard technology and associated institutions. It is for this reason that an analysis of 
healthcare technology must include related institutions and must also explicitly recognise the 
temporal linkage between structure and agency (Archer 1995: 65). 
Institutions 
The discussion so far demonstrates that systems of healthcare technology consist of social 
structures, human agents, and hard and soft technologies. To support an understanding of the 
structural elements of a technology system it is useful to utilise the concept of institutions: 
... multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social 
activities and material resources. (Scott 2001: 40) 
Technology has a significant temporal component and so in building a model of a healthcare 
technology system it is useful to recognise the role of institutions in this development over time. In 
common with technology, institutions are social structures that retain aspects of this history: 
... institutions are accretions of past practices and understandings that set conditions on 
action. Unless an institution exists prior to action, it is difficult to understand how it 
can affect behaviour and how one can examine its implications for action or speak of 
action's subsequent affects on the institution. (Barley and Tolbert 1997) 
Institutions attain a high degree of resilience over time (Scott 2001: 48) and so even where a 
technology was developed in the distant past, its impact can be carried within an institution. The 
nature of institutions is such that they: 
are relatively resistant to change.. . tend to be transmitted across generations (Scott 
2001: 49). 
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Interaction with technology can act to reinforce structural properties over time. This suggests that 
in using a technology individuals will often unconsciously be reinforcing institutions through their 
interaction with technology. This is 
... often not reflected on by users, who are generally unaware of their role 
in either 
affirming or disrupting an institutional role status quo. (Orlikowski 1992: 411) 
The adoption of an institutional perspective on technology also highlights the legal, moral and 
cultural elements that interact with technology. It is for these reasons that this research adopts 
institutions as the principle social structure of interest in this research. 
Institutions have an existence separate from human agency and can be defined as: 
... social entities characterised by their self-regulating nature ... 
[comprising] relatively 
widely diffused practices, technologies, or rules. (Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips 2002) 
Institutions operate on a basis of not just shared norms and values, but also shared knowledge and 
belief systems (Scott 2001: 39). Institutions include formal organisations, such as an individual 
hospital, to entities that act across several organisations such as professions. An institution may not 
relate directly to any formal organisation. An example of this is evidence-based medicine. This is a 
coherent set of practices, technologies and rules, that is not linked solely to one formal 
organisation. However, as an institution it creates forces that influence many aspects of the medical 
practice. Finally, communities of practice represent an important category of institution (Orr 1996). 
Unlike professional bodies, a community of practice lacks formal structure, or even formal 
recognition (Brown and Duguid 1991). Within healthcare however, the strength of communities of 
practice, for example around a specific clinical service, are of relevance to the process through 
which services innovate. 
Pillars and carriers of institution 
It is useful to apply a model of institution that links the various elements of institution and the 
mechanisms through which they are carried. Scott presents a review of institutional theory and then 
develops a comprehensive model of the elements and carriers of an institution (Scott 2001). He 
identifies three pillars to institutions: regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive. 
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Each of the three elements of institution are embedded in organisations via various carriers 
(Jepperson 1991: 150). Scott suggests four categories of carrier: symbolic systems, relational 
systems, routines and artefacts. Table 2.1 illustrates the typical pillars and carriers that underpin 
institutions. 
Table 2.1: Pillars and carriers of institutions (Scott 2001: 77) 
Pillars Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Carriers 
Symbolic Systems Rules, laws Values, expectations Categories, 
At ifications, schema 
Relational systems Governance, power Regimes, authority Structural isomorphism 
systems systems 
Routines Protocols, operation Jobs, roles, duty Scripts 
procedures 
Artefacts/objects Comply to Comply to convention Possessing symbolic 
specifications value 
All four carriers underpin an understanding of how institutions impact upon healthcare. Healthcare 
is an area in which symbolic systems are common and include: rules and laws used to regulate 
healthcare practices; values and expectations of professional practice; and shared cognitive frames 
held by staff working in healthcare. Similarly, the relational systems in healthcare are also 
important carriers. Governance systems, such as those for primary and acute healthcare services, 
are pervasive in the sector, while authority systems in healthcare are dominated by those possessing 
specialist knowledge. This has resulted in authority being gained not just through formal 
governance systems but also through possession of specialist knowledge (Rushmer et al. 2004). 
Many organisational routines in healthcare are based around standardised protocols and operating 
procedures, such as those defined by regulatory bodies. The expected norms of professionalism 
often define the scope and content of healthcare workers' jobs and roles. Hard and soft 
technologies are ubiquitous and critical components of healthcare services and as such is an 
important category of artefact to consider when looking at the relation between innovation and 
institutions. 
Scott's model of institution highlights the potential for varying levels of analysis (Scott 200I; 83). 
These could range from a world system through to the level of an organisational sub-system. Thus, 
the influence of institutions can be considered at both the macro and micro level; the potential for 
recognising institutional forces acting at multiple levels may also need to be considered. For 
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example, within public healthcare technology systems there is a need to recognise forces exerted by 
high level institutions such as governments and regulatory bodies. Conversely, even at a micro- 
level there will be strong institutional forces perhaps created at a very local level within a single 
organisation such as a hospital. Institutions may therefore take very different forms depending upon 
the level of analysis. 
For example, Table 2.2 illustrates an institutional analysis of the organ transplant technology 
systems within an organ replacement service (Stahl, Vacanti, and Gazelle 2007). This shows the 
institutional structures that impose regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive influences on the 
operation and development of associated services. 
Table 2.2: Pillars and carriers of institution: as applied to organ transplant technology 
systems, adapted from (Scott 2001: 77) 
Pillars Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Carriers 
Symbolic Systems Legal controls on organ Ethical codes of Accepted knowledge- 
transplant and conduct for organ base for organ 
replacement replacement. replacement 
technologies and their technologies considered 
use. suitable for human use. 
Relational systems Professional/legal codes Accepted models of governance for organ 
of practice. transplant services. 
Routines Standardised Established job roles Local communities of 
procedures for organ and skill-sets of staff practice within organ 
transplant services. involved in transplant transplant services. 
services. 
Artefacts/objects Medical technologies Organs for transplant Evidence base 
meeting requirements that match agreed and underpinning use of 
set by regulatory accepted standards, organ replacement 
authorities. technologies. 
Proto-institutions 
An institutional analysis can also consider the evolution of institutions over time. The extent of 
acceptance and influence of institutions develops over time. It has been suggested that institutions 
in their early stages of evolution can be viewed as proto-institutions: 
practices, technologies and rules that are only narrowly diffused and only weakly 
entrenched, but that have the potential to become widely institutionalised (Lawrence, 
Hardy, and Phillips 2002). 
This is an important concept in relation to healthcare technologies as it provides a means of 
understanding the structural qualities of healthcare technology systems and process through which 
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they become accepted. For emerging healthcare technologies a proto-institution will be 
representative of the structures that support the technology and allow it to be implemented within 
an organisation. Diffusion of the technology will be contingent on diffusion of the proto-institution. 
2.2.5 Institutions and hard and soft technology 
Technologies are not neutral in their relationship with either institutions or human agency. Barley's 
study of the implementation of MRI scanners demonstrated that despite the relatively fixed 
functionality of MRI scanners, the effects of both structure and human agency led to very different 
implementations of the same technology, in two apparently similar settings (Barley 1986). This 
suggests that to understand the innovation process of a healthcare technology system it is important 
to be clear about the status of soft technology encompassing the knowledge, skills, routines and 
processes that develop from users' interaction with technology, conditioned by institutional 
context. 
For this research, both technological competence and capabilities are used to define the scope of 
soft technology (Boisot 1998: 5; Savory 2006). Technological competences are concerned with 
enabling the use of a hard technology to a required level of performance. These relate to single- 
loop levels of learning (Argyris 1976) and include: 
  Explicit, codified knowledge associated with the technology, its design and operation. 
  Procedural knowledge and competence in the actual implementation of the technology 
(Zander 1995) 
  Embodied knowledge, skill and expertise held predominantly by individual gained through 
use and experience of a hard technology (Blackler 1995; Zuboff 1988: 36) 
  Tacit knowledge held by communities using and applying technology (Orr 1996; Wenger 
1998) 
In contrast, technological capabilities embody double-loop learning in order to developing strategic 
skill in applying, improving and integrating technology. Technological capability includes: 
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  Dynamic capabilities required to select adopt and abandon technology (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000; Helfat and Peteraf 2003; Kogut and Zander 1992; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 
1997; Leonard 1995). 
  Performance improvement capabilities, organisational process to support the on-going 
improvement of the technology and its application (Pisano 1996; Pisano, Bohmer, and 
Edmondson 2001) 
A soft technology over time will take on institutional properties. For example, this is illustrated in 
the way continuous improvement (CI) programmes becomes established within organisations 
(Bessant, Caffyn, and Gallagher 2001). In the early stages, CI is a set of piecemeal, poorly 
coordinated activities. In contrast, a mature CI capability is embedded within the whole 
organisation's structure and culture. 
It is particularly useful to consider soft technologies in institutional terms when studying their 
innovation. Soft technology can exist at various stages of institutionalisation. For a newly 
developed soft technology a very low level of institutionalisation will have occurred. The 
institutional features of such a soft technology are embryonic and can best be viewed as a proto- 
institution. Over time the soft technology will diffuse more widely, with its institutional structures 
becoming more established, accepted and adopted. 
This has been demonstrated in healthcare areas such as cataract surgery and hip replacement 
(Metcalfe and Pickstone 2006). In these cases, soft technologies developed around the new hard 
technologies of replacement lenses and implantable hip joints. Early on these developed as proto- 
institutions, having limited organisational prominence. It was only over of time that they became 
more widely institutionalised. In the case of cataract surgery, it was necessary for resistance from 
existing institutions to be overcome, before the new technology was fully diffused and 
institutionalised. Some elements of the proto-institution develop into major institutional structures. 
For example, a proto-institution of cataract surgery included a small group known as the 
International intra-Ocular Club, this eventually developed into an important professional group for 
cataract surgeons, the European Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgeons. 
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Soft technologies represent a fourth sub-system within healthcare technology systems. They are the 
product of human agency, change over time and though their widespread institutionalisation lead to 
institutional change. In short, soft technologies are the technological competences and capabilities 
built up around hard technology. 
2.2.6 Section summary 
This section has drawn on three streams in the research literature: technology studies, social theory 
concerned with the relationship between structure and human agency; and institutional theory. It 
concludes that in understanding healthcare technology it is important to recognise the socially 
constructed element of technology, especially in terms of a specific technology's accepted meaning 
and purpose. The frame of reference adopted by a group of users on a technology is therefore 
crucial not only to it use, but also its ongoing development. Thus innovation of healthcare 
technologies is not a purely objective process. The section highlights the scope of healthcare 
technology to be beyond just hard technologies such as medical devices. The development of 
technology is also concerned with soft technologies, the competences and capabilities that enable 
effective use had technologies. The section considers the role of institutional structures in relation 
to technology and recognises the extent to which institutional structures support the use of the 
technology and its development. The implication of this section is that technology forms an 
intrinsic component of institutions. Finally, the section concludes that during innovation of 
healthcare technologies, proto-institutions are created that represent the critical elements of 
institution necessary for effective implementation of a technology. 
The following section reviews the literature in order to produce a working definition of user-led 
innovation. 
2.3 User-led Innovation in the healthcare sector 
This section uses the innovation literature to develop a working definition of user-led innovation 
that is applicable to the healthcare sector. The section concludes by defining user-led innovation in 
the context of the healthcare sector, describing the typical characteristics of user-led innovation 
projects and defining key terms associated with this definition. 
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2.3.1 Defining innovation 
Broad based definitions of innovation highlight the breadth of the innovation concept and 
differentiate it from other processes, such as invention. Schumpeter defines innovation in terms of 
the actions required to introduce a new or qualitative change in a product; or new pattern of 
organisation such as a production process (Schumpeter 1934). This definition assumes the main 
unit of analysis to be the firm, rather than industry sector, and the innovation process to include 
activities from invention through to the production of a new product or implementation of the new 
process. It does not specifically relate to public-sector organisations. More recently, the OECD 
have defined the term innovation as: 
... the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or 
process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business 
practices, workplace organisation or external relations. (OECD and EUROSTAT 
2005: 47) 
The OECD definition mirrors that of Schumpeter but in common with Rogers, stresses that the 
novelty of the product or process is assumed at the level of the firm or individual, rather than to an 
industrial sector or the world (Rogers 2003: 12). The definition does not preclude its application to 
public-sector organisations providing services. An innovative product or process may already be in 
existence in the context of some other organisation. The OECD definition takes a pluralist view of 
what constitutes an innovation including changes to products, processes, marketing methods and 
organisational methods. This definition provides a useful framework for looking at innovation in 
the NHS as in many cases the innovation will often be a combination of product, process and 
organisational structure. 
The emphasis of both these definitions is on the implementation of the novel ideas. This implies 
that an invention, will not be classified as an innovation until it has been successfully implemented. 
However to study innovation processes it is important to recognise that an invention that is yet to 
be implemented might be viewed as a nascent innovation. The timescale may mean that the 
invention will be perhaps several years from becoming recognised as an innovation. Conversely, 
nascent innovations, such as patented technologies that are never commercialised, may in time be 
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recognised as failed innovations. Failed innovations are still instructive about the innovation 
process and the actors that play a part in that process. 
The concept of innovation has however become overloaded and can refer to both to both outcome 
and process. It is important to be able to characterise innovation in terms of products or processes; 
as well as the process through which these are developed. 
2.3.2 Innovation as an outcome 
The first characterisation of an innovation is as an outcome. Innovations can range from the 
relatively minor, representing incremental improvements, or can be radical new breakthroughs, 
including new technologies (Freeman 1974). At an industry level a distinction has been drawn 
between continuous and discontinuous innovation (Tushman and Anderson 1986; Moore 2005; 
Bessant 2005). Continuous innovations improve, while preserving, the current way of doing things, 
in contrast discontinuous innovation result in disruption to the status quo. For continuous 
innovation organisational learning is a central to the innovation process allowing steady 
improvement of products or process; often with established organisations well placed to drive the 
innovation process. In contrast, disruptive, dis-continuous or break-through innovations are often 
associated with new-entrant firms, while established firms are severely challenged (Christensen 
2000). Types of technological innovation can be seen as lying along a continuum between 
incremental and radical change. In the case of products, incremental innovation is likely to occur at 
the level of individual components, while more radical innovation will tend to take place at an 
architectural level (Henderson and Clark 1990). 
The distinction between continuous versus discontinuous perspective is useful for product or 
process innovations, but within a healthcare context, innovation is rarely based around a single 
artefact or process. Innovation in the delivery of health services is better viewed as a process of 
technological innovation that focuses on a technology system rather than a single technology. Lettl 
et al point out that radical innovation is multi-dimensional phenomenon linking technology, 
market, organisational change and environmental alterations (Lettl, Herstatt, and Gemuenden 
2006). Drejer highlights that a feature of service innovation is the interplay of organisational, 
external relationship, formalisation and ad hoc innovation (Drejer 2004). Tether does however 
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warn that service innovation can be more subtle often proceeding incrementally and through less 
obvious means including human skills and or inter-organisational co-operation (Tether 2004). 
Within a healthcare setting interpretation of what constitutes an innovation has resulted in the 
development of various categories. At a crude level, distinction is made between technological 
innovation and service improvements (HITF 2004). In a review of innovation studies, four 
categories of innovation were identified: organisational practices (comprising service and climate 
innovations); new organisation structures; new technologies; and new roles (Lansisalmi et al. 
2006). The review found it surprising that only 13% focused on new technology. The review 
authors however may be missing the point about the nature of healthcare technology. The concept 
of the technology complex (Fleck and Howells 2001) illustrates that the distinction between 
technological and organisational innovation is blurred. From this perspective focusing on either 
technical innovation or organisational innovation, is likely to give only a partial view. 
Bower has discussed the distinction between embodied (e. g. pharmaceutical products, medical 
devices) and disembodied (e. g. surgical procedures) innovations in the context of health care 
(Bower 2003). She highlights that where both embodied and disembodied innovations combine, 
complex innovations are the result; resulting in changes at the artefact level and the professional 
practice level of the technology. Metcalfe et al. reinforce this point and note that: 
... no innovation takes place or diffuses in isolation and the determinants of success for 
new medical procedures often reside on the development of complementary 
techniques, drugs and devices. (Metcalfe, James, and Mina 2005) 
Christensen has highlighted how innovation in hard technologies has enabled their use by less 
specialised staff (Christensen, I. 3ohmer, and Kenagy 2000), this has been suggested as having a 
disruptive impact on existing healthcare technologies. Christensen cites several examples ranging 
from open heart surgery requiring specialist surgeons to relatively simple procedures, such as 
patients' self-management of diabetes, that have undergone such innovation. These innovations 
have led to both changes in the required performance of hard technology and the user group 
concerned with implementing it. He cites four main levels of use for health technology: medical 
specialists; primary care staff and GPs; nursing staff; and patients. For each of these levels of use, 
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hard technologies are created to satisfy the wider needs of the soft technology operated by the user 
group. Thus, for medical specialists diagnostic devices are likely to be highly accurate, precise and 
provide a sophisticated user-interface; while for self-care situations the corresponding device is 
likely to have simple interface with minimal instrumentation, for example heart defibrillators 
designed for use by laypeople (Little and Katzman 2006: 489). The trajectory of innovation will 
vary for both hard and soft technologies, according to the user group at which it is targeted. 
2.3.3 Process models 
The second characterisation of innovation is as a process. Since it was recognised that the 
innovation process could not be treated as a black box (Rosenberg 1982), various process models 
of innovation have been developed. In reviewing these models several authors have linked these to 
generations of model (Hobday 2005; Forrest 1991; Marinnova and Philliore 2003; Rothwell 1992), 
with each generation having a distinct emphasis. First and second generations were concerned with 
viewing technological innovation in terms of either a technology push (Bush 1945)or pull (Kamien 
and Schwartz 1975). Third-generation models recognise the close coupling of innovation activities, 
through a logically sequential, though not rigidly continuous interaction between research and 
customer demand (Rothwell and Zegveld 1985: 50). Fourth-generation models concerned the 
iterative process of interaction and collaboration between technology suppliers and customers 
(Kline and Rosenberg 1986; Rogers 2003; Rothwell and Zegveld 1985). 
The most sophisticated process models however were concerned with increased strategic and 
technological integration (Rothwell 1994). The integration of the processes has lead to the 
recognition of the role of national systems of innovation (Lundvall 1992; Howells 1999; Freeman 
1995); evolutionary models (Metcalfe 1995; Metcalfe, James, and Mina 2005; Mina et al. 2004; 
Tether and Metcalfe 2003) and distributed models (Coombs, Harvey, and Tether 2003; von Hippel 
2007). 
Linear 
The merit of linear models of innovation is in simplicity of description. For this reason, 
stakeholders in innovation projects may accept it as a reliable model of what is involved in 
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innovation, creating a blind-spot to the true complexity of the process. This is reflected in Rogers' 
six-phase model of diffusion, which, he is careful to note, is affected by serendipitous events and so 
should be used as a: 
... general guide to the process from which many innovations will deviate (Rogers 
2003: 158) 
It is also worth noting that linear innovation processes often result from application of clearly 
defined innovation strategies. For example, linear processes have been applied in areas such as: 
new product development (Cooper 2000; Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt 2000); information 
systems planning and development (Ward and Daniel 2006; Ward 1990); and the pharmaceuticals 
industry (Northrup 2005: 54). 
Linear models have however been generally discredited as lacking sophistication. In particular, the 
issue of parallel and recursive activities means that the process is better characterised as a 
nonlinear, dynamic system than a simple linear model: 
When innovation work begins, the process does not unfold in a simple linear sequence 
of stages and sub-stages, Instead, it proliferates into complex bundles of innovation 
ideas and divergent pathways of activities by different organizational units.. . the 
process diverges into multiple, parallel, and interdependent paths of activities. (Van de 
Ven 1999: 10) 
Criticism has been targeted at the normative and deterministic character of process models of 
innovation. The use of linear models is however widespread as a means of proving a basic 
blueprint for technological innovation activities. It has been suggested that linear models have 
continued to guide public policy, principally because they lend themselves to easy statistical 
measurement; at best representing: 
... a theoretical construction of industrialists, consultants, and business schools, 
seconded by economists. (Godin 2006) 
37 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
Distributed innovation systems 
More relevant to user-led innovation is the recognition of its distributed and systemic nature. It has 
been identified that innovations are created by innovation systems rather than discrete processes 
(Edquist 2001). The national and regional systems of innovation literature adopt a macro view of 
innovation processes and highlight the importance of an infrastructure of institutions to support 
innovation (Freeman 1995; Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992). Within industrial sectors, sectoral 
systems of innovation are based around networks of relationships (Malerba 2004) or technological 
fields (Carlsson et al. 2002). Metcalfe et al highlight that in the case of the healthcare sector: 
... the changing private vs. public nature of the institutions involved in the innovation 
process reflects a fundamental aspect of science-industry collaborations ... institutions 
involved in the delivery of health services also appear to be fundamental components 
of the innovation system. 
Coombes et al highlight however that innovations often need to draw expertise from across 
different sectors or technical disciplines; and so even the use of industrial sectors defined by SIC or 
patent classes may define unsatisfactory boundaries or units of analysis (Coombs, Harvey, and 
Tether 2003: 1146). 
The distributed models of innovation highlight the iterative and non-deterministic quality of 
innovation processes; with the actions of individuals and institutions in the process being 
unpredictable. 
2.3.4 Barriers to innovation 
The barriers to innovation can be categorised as either internal or external factors (Piatier 1984). 
External factors include market and government related barriers; but also technical, social and 
inter-organisational barriers. Internal barriers include people related, structural and strategy related 
barriers. It has however been noted that studying the barriers to innovation is intrinsically difficult 
as failed or disappeared innovators and their innovations are often not counted (Hadjimanolis 
2003: 569). 
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The innovation barriers research has been concerned with innovation at a relatively high level. In 
contrast, users involved in healthcare innovation may face several specific barriers. Lettl suggests 
that two significant barriers are cognitive barriers (barrier of not knowing) and a lack of willingness 
(barrier of not wanting) impede users from generally taking part in innovation of radical new health 
technologies (Lettl 2005: 170). It is not unreasonable to also assume that even for incremental 
innovations, both a lack of either technical knowledge or motivation will impede innovation 
processes. Organisational context has been noted as a source of significant barriers. For nursing 
staff developing innovations, it has been suggested that there is a need for: 
... strong consistent leadership that `clears the way' for creativity.. . an effective 
innovation pipeline... incorporating systematic processes in order for innovations to be 
delivered... [and the right] behavioural traits and collective mindsets. (Hughes 
2006: 100). 
Other factors affecting the potential for users to be involved in innovation is the close proximity of 
interdisciplinary know-how and also resources of time, funds and people (Lettl, Herstatt, and 
Gernuenden 2006: 259). 
2.3.5 Technology transfer 
Universities have been identified as significant and vital institutions within national innovation 
systems (Nelson 1990). The role of universities is however not purely as a source of innovation in 
isolation, but as a member of a triple-helix of relationships, spanning universities, government and 
industry (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000). The recognition of the importance of IP developed 
within universities and other public sector research establishments (PSRE), has led to efforts to 
manage the IP more effectively and to gain revenues for the PSREs. In the USA, this led to the 
Bayh-Dohl Act of 1981, that enabled universities to own and profit from IP (Mowery, Sampat, and 
Ziedonis 2002; Nelson 2001). Similarly in the UK increased efforts have been put into technology 
transfer from PSREs (Baker 1999; Office of Science and Technology 2000; DTI 2004). The result 
of these measures has been that university technology transfer offices (UTTO) have been created in 
many universities, with the prime purpose to: 
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facilitate technological diffusion through the licensing to industry of inventions or 
intellectual property resulting from university research. (Siegel, Waldman, and Link 
2003) 
This emphasis on identifying and commercialising new technologies can be viewed as 
underpinning a purely technology push approach to innovation. Even within a university context, 
this has not been seen by all writers as always beneficial with the overall returns from the 
exploitation of university IP being disappointing (Colyvas et al. 2002). The result however has 
been that there are now explicit mechanisms through which PSREs are able to exploit IP through 
patenting, licensing and creation of spin-out companies. It has been noted that patents have no 
intrinsic value until a suitable business model has also been identified (Chesbrough 2003: 161). The 
evaluation of the success of UTTOs in technology transfer has however been highlighted as 
problematic (Bozeman 2000) due to the difficulty of identifying appropriate measures of the impact 
of transfers. 
Table 2.3: Distinction between innovation in Universities/PSREs and NHS Organisations 
(Savory 2006) 
University/PSRE NUS Organisation 
Context Research and invention is Operational focus with 
primary purpose invention a byproduct of 
Development of published work practice 
improves professional status Innovation is problem oriented 
Experimental and risk tolerant Highly regulated and risk averse 
Evaluation criteria for Quantity of patents and licenses Improved operational efficiency 
innovation Improved technical human Improved quality of care 
capital Value of income stream from 
Prestige and reputation technology licenses 
Political kudos 
Technology Hard technologies Closely coupled hard and soft 
technologies 
Proximity of R&D effort to Distant Close to the context of use 
context of use Multidisciplinary teams drawn Operationally focused 
from specialist research staff individuals and teams 
Mechanisms for diffusion Market mechanisms Diffusion of soft technology 
and adoption of technology 
The creation of technology transfer offices has also taken place in the UK NHS. However, Savory 
has suggested that treating the NHS as simply another public sector research establishment, without 
recognizing its unique characteristics and distinct differences from universities and research 
institutes (see Table 2.3), can lead to the use of a sub-optimal model of innovation management 
(Savory 2006). The implication of this is that the un-critical application of the UT1'O model 
undermines the development of a systemic approach to NHS innovation management. 
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2.3.6 Closed and open innovation 
A alternative perspective has been proposed that highlights the shift from a closed to an open 
innovation paradigm (Chesbrough 2003). This shift signals a rejection of the assumption that 
innovation stems from an organisation's internal R&D process; the predominant model of 
innovation practised by large corporations in the 20th Century. Instead, it is suggested that 
organisations recognise that the ideas and technologies that underpin its products are as just as 
likely to be found outside an organisations as within. The principal cause for this shift in paradigm 
is that in comparison with the early 20th Century, knowledge is now more widely distributed. 
Knowledge to underpin innovation is no longer created only within an internal R&D organisation, 
staffed by the main experts in a specialist field. The open innovation paradigm acknowledges a 
change in the emphasis in how innovation occurs. It is now common for organisations to seek 
suitable knowledge and technology from external sources. 
This has had an impact on the importance of intellectual property (IP) and the mechanisms used for 
managing and exploiting it. It is now common for companies to explicitly search externally for 
potentially useful knowledge and technology and where appropriate to negotiate the purchase or 
licensing of relevant IP, for example Proctor and Gamble's "Connect and Develop" strategy 
(Sakkab 2002). The paradigm emphasises the need to match up an organisations' own IP with 
complementary assets from other sources (Teece 2000: p135; 1986; Teece 1998). 
The open innovation perspective has much in common with Mode-2 knowledge creation (Gibbons 
et al. 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2003). Mode-2 
knowledge creation emphasises that new knowledge, and consequently potential innovation, can be 
created outside the domain of traditional scientific research. 
The growth of the `knowledge' industries has not only led to an increase in 
`knowledge' workers and a proliferation of sites of `knowledge production, but has 
also tended to erode the demarcation between traditional `knowledge institutions such 
as universities and research institutes and other kinds of organisations. Novel 
`knowledge' institutions are arising - in small and medium-sized high-technology 
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companies... management consultancies and think-tanks... corporate universities. 
(Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001: 15) 
The Mode-2 perspective highlights the scope for different forms of knowledge production, 
highlighting the scope for knowledge workers to engage in innovation activity, in particular 
technology users as participants and leaders of the innovation process. 
A second aspect of the shift towards open innovation has been the increased democratisation of 
innovation. This shift recognises that the source of ideas underpinning innovation can also be from 
an organisation's customers. This has been seen as a shift from supplier-centred to user-centred 
innovation in which lead-users are important contributors to the innovation process (Hippel 
2005: 122). This highlights the distinction between innovation in which users rather than 
technology suppliers are active in the innovation process (Voss 1984). For example, GE Plastics 
were proactive in gaining important insights into new products through collaborative development 
with key customers seen as lead-users of their technologies (Thomke and von Hippel 2002). This 
was achieved through a combination of knowledge sharing and the provision of tools for the 
customer to use. This has shifted the emphasis of innovation study from one where R&D is the 
primary focus, to one where involvement of lead-users, either individually or in groups, has been 
made. Hippel highlights that lead-users are a distinct group from suppliers as users hope to benefit 
from the use of an innovation rather than gaining a benefit from selling the innovation (von Hippel 
2007). Examples of where users have taken on lead-user roles include: the fields of scientific 
instruments (Hippel 1988), sports goods (Luthje 2004; Franke and Shah 2003) and surgical 
equipment (Lettl 2005). 
Figure 2.2 shows how the nature of innovation has shifted from the closed to open innovation 
paradigm. The result of this shift has been an increase, not only in the absorption of knowledge and 
technology from outside the organisation, but also the increased participation and control by 
technology users in the innovation process. The extreme situation is represented by user-led 
innovation, where users take on the prominent role in defining and managing the development of 
innovation. 
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Figure 2.2: Differentiating supplier-led, lead-user and user-led innovation 
The open paradigm is important as it represents the basis on which over several centuries much 
innovation in healthcare has developed. This is most clearly identified in the case of innovation of 
surgical tools and techniques, where as the principal users, surgeons have often led the innovation 
process. The open innovation paradigm also highlights the limitations of expecting innovation 
activity to take place within a single organisation. The challenge in user-led innovation is to ensure 
that innovations developed by users have timely input from other specialists, in order to ensure 
successful innovation. In the context oC healthcare this implies that even where a user, such as a 
clinician, invents and develops an innovation, there may he a point where the project needs to he 
augmented with other technical and business skills. User-led innovation can be a powerful 
mechanism I'or allowing the "voice olthe user" to he embedded in the innovation process, 
however, there will be a point where the "voice of the engineer" or "voice of the business 
specialist" needs to established. 
2.3.7 Role of users in healthcare innovation 
In healthcare technology, Loll has suggested that surgeons take on the role ot'originators, 
cleveloopers, entrepreneurs and marketers. The entrepreneurial role is characterised as: high problem 
pressure, user as inventor, high degree of innovativeness, missing competences and resources. 
These factors leading to the innovator selecting, forming and co-ordinating an innovation network 
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(Lett12005). The context of the innovation is also important with some inventive users having 
access to supporting factors, for example, close access to interdisciplinary know-how e. g. in 
teaching hospitals, or resources for research such as time, money and personnel. While other users 
with lower levels of access to resources, depend on intrinsic motivation spending their own time 
and resources on developing ideas. 
The implementation of novel technologies in health care settings is a complex one. This complexity 
lies not just in the technical nature of many healthcare technologies but also in the practice of 
healthcare professionals using the technology. Edmondson et al studied the implementation of an 
innovative device used in open-heart surgery and the extent to which well established 
organisational routines were modified to use the new technology (Edmondson, Bohmer, and Pisano 
2001). The study concluded that crucial to the implementation was the role of surgical staff as 
leaders in changing the way operating theatre teams worked together. Authority structures, 
psychological safety and team stability were all found to affect the ability of a team to develop the 
new organisational routines needed to support technology implementation. This example of 
healthcare innovation highlights the need to consider the organisational aspects of technology in 
particular the organisational routines built up around existing and new technology; and the way that 
certain routine need to be disrupted or unlearned (Orlikowski 2000). 
It is common for clinicians to be closely involved with technological innovation either in isolation 
from the wider healthcare industry or in some form of partnership, for example with manufacturers 
of medical devices. User-led innovation in healthcare is likely to take a very different form to other 
sectors due to the complex institutional framework in which healthcare products must be developed 
and implemented. 
User-led innovation in the healthcare sector 
Some examples of user-led innovation in healthcare have been presented in the literature (Hughes 
2006; Lettl 2005; Lettl, Herstatt, and Gemuenden 2006; Metcalfe and Pickstone 2006). 
Unfortunately many examples of user involvement are based around lead-user involvement or other 
forms of participation in supplier-led innovation, (for example, (Shah and Robinson 2006,2007). ) 
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Metcalfe et al describe an example of a major innovation in healthcare, the development of intra- 
ocular lenses (OLC) to treat cataract (Metcalfe, James, and Mina 2005). This case recognises the 
extent to which user-led innovation can underpin significant healthcare innovations; the 
development of effective cataract treatment. The innovation 
... radically transformed the conception, design and delivery of a major medical 
service, the removal of cataracts combined with their replacement by a functioning 
lens. (Metcalfe, James, and Mina 2005: 4) 
The study highlighted how the clinicians concerned did not simply invent a potential solution, the 
original surgeon and the subsequent network of other clinicians, acted to complete the innovation 
process by addressing many procedural, organisational and institutional issues. The subsequent 
innovation process 
... was achieved by the creativity of individual inventors combined with the 
transnational medical-industrial complex that has changed radically the innovation 
system in this field of ophthalmic medicine. A procedure originally based around 
pioneering 'hero-surgeons' deploying `craft technique', has evolved into a `routine, 
quasi factory' procedure capable of being effected in a local medical centre by 
clinician nursing staff, whose education and training has correspondingly changed. 
This indeed is a fundamental transformation of a service activity and its skill base. 
(Metcalfe, James, and Mina 2005: 4) 
Their work highlights that user-led innovation is concerned with not just changes in technology but 
also the technological capability required to makes use of technology, often in the face of 
professional hostility. This can entail radical change of organisations and institutions. 
Innovation diffusion in healthcare 
An integral part of the innovation process is diffusion to adopters of the innovation. Only through 
diffusion can an invention be effective in terms of profit or less tangible benefits such as general 
good to humanity. Innovation diffusion is critical part of the overall innovation process and relies 
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on four crucial elements: the innovation, communication channels, time and social systems (Rogers 
2003: 11). 
Adoption rate can be affected by an innovation's characteristics, including: relative advantage; 
compatibility, complexity, trialability; and observability (Rogers 2003: 15). But also, the 
characteristic of the adopter, with early adopters having very different characteristics to laggards of 
technology (Rogers 2003: 283). Within a healthcare context other specific factors affect adoption 
including: existence of homphilious groups; the pace of innovation/re-innovation; norms, roles; and 
social networks (Cain and Mittman 2002). 
The adoption of healthcare innovations can be problematic. It has long been recognised that a 
major factor in adoption in healthcare technology is not the: 
... performance characteristics but the way in which various actors in the 
organisational system assess its likely impact on them and their perogatives. 
(Kimberly and Evanisko 1981) 
A major source of this resistance are the boundaries between professional groups that may operate 
using distinct knowledge bases and research cultures. These can make the transfer of innovations 
across multi-professional organisations, such as hospitals, very problematic (Ferlie et al. 2005). In 
the context of health devices, it has also been suggested that critical factors affecting adoption are 
the subjective expected value of the device and the level of evidence provided to support its 
effectiveness (Roback et al. 2007). 
In a systematic review of literature on healthcare innovation adoption it was acknowledged that 
interpersonal influence and opinion leadership were critical to adoption, but acknowledge that it 
was unclear how clinical and nonclinical social networks served as channels for the social influence 
and the reinvention and embedding of complex service innovations (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). 
Structuration theory and technological innovation 
In the area of innovation some application of structuration has been attempted with respect to the 
innovation process (Jones, Edwards, and Beckinsale 2000) and to the relationship between 
organisation identity and innovation (Nag, Corley, and Gioia 2003). The application of 
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structuration theory to innovation studies is limited, with little or no explicit use of structuration 
theory, for example, Giddens is not directly referenced in several key works (Hippel 2005; Rogers 
2003; Rothwell 1994; Tidd and Hull 2003) on user or service oriented innovation. 
The advantages of taking a structuration view of innovation over either an individualist or a 
structural view of innovation have been noted (Slappendel 1996). Slappendel emphasises that much 
innovation research has either focused on the individual or has been concerned with structural 
influences on innovation. She suggests that innovation research should take an `interactive process 
perspective' of innovation, that recognises both the deterministic and volunteristic aspects of social 
systems'; recognising the 'various levels of analysis and clarifying the connections' between action 
and structure; link action and structure with `different phases in a temporal sequence'; applying 
theories of the action-structure relationship, such as structuration theory. This highlights the need to 
recognise the link between structure and agency within the user-led innovation process. 
2.3.8 Section summary 
Based on the discussion in the section, his research defines user-led innovation in the context of the 
healthcare sector in terms of the following characteristics: 
The innovation is instigated by the users of a healthcare technology. These users take on 
the role of user-innovators and may be clinicians, staff in professionals allied to medicine 
or staff responsible for the operation of healthcare organisations. 
  The innovation occurs within the context of a healthcare technology system comprising 
both hard and soft components. 
  The innovation is a response to a problem perceived by the users in the course of their 
work. The problem, in turn, creates an opportunity for the user to develop a viable solution. 
  User-led innovation projects are controlled predominantly by the users instigating them. 
Industrial partners and other stakeholders may be enrolled into the project but the majority 
of power in decision-making lies with the user-innovators. 
  User-led innovation projects may sometimes need to address institutional change as a part 
of their development. 
47 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
  User-led innovation takes place within an open innovation network of staff, or may be the 
work of a limited group of staff. User-led innovations may be developed at a very local 
level, however these innovations may rely on the wider network for knowledge, resources 
and innovations. 
Based on this definition several terms are suggested as useful for describing user-led innovation 
projects. 
User: the user of a healthcare technology. This may be a healthcare worker but may also be a carer 
or a patient. 
User-innovators: A user-innovator is a user who takes a prominent role in developing a healthcare 
technology innovation. 
Innovation team: User-led innovators may form teams that use staff from within and external to the 
organisation support the innovation project. Team members may not be direct users of the 
technology. 
Industrial partners: As part of the technology transfer process associated with user-led innovation, 
industrial partners such as device manufacturers may be enrolled into the innovation team. 
Invention: User-led innovation will be based on ideas or inventions by the user-innovator. 
Product: The result of a user-led innovation process may result in a new product such as a device 
or new service design. 
2.4 Innovation as a process for knowledge translation 
It has long been recognised that the invention of new technologies is not simply the preserve of 
specialists, working within the bounds of their own specialism. Adam Smith noted that it is the case 
that inventions can be the combination of previously disconnected bodies of knowledge. 
All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions 
of those who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been made 
by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the 
business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or 
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men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; 
and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the 
most distant and dissimilar objects. (Smith 1981: 76) 
By making this point, Smith is highlighting that a significant challenge for inventors and innovators 
is to absorb knowledge from other specialisms and to apply them in their own. This is not simply a 
challenge for individual "philosophers or men of speculation", it is also a problem at the level of 
the organisation. It is now accepted that innovation will inevitably involve combining previously 
separate technologies and bodies of knowledge, innovation as a process of bricolage (Garud and 
Karnoe 2001: 23). The ability to absorb and apply knowledge is therefore a prerequisite for an 
organisation that seeks to facilitate technological innovation. Conversely, to gain value from 
innovation, especially with respect to a user-led innovation, it is necessary to facilitate the 
subsequent diffusion of knowledge from the organisation, in order to ensure the diffusion of the 
innovation to other contexts. 
An organisation's ability to apply knowledge from outside has been termed absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zahra and George 2002), or hybridisation (Howells 2004; Howells 
1997). In the healthcare sector, knowledge translation is a term used for describing the 
transformation of research knowledge into practical healthcare situations (Davis et al. 2003). 
Knowledge translation is a useful term in relation to the study of user-led innovation as it 
encapsulates the processes required for knowledge to be generalised or diffused away from an 
original context; transferred between contexts; and then re-applied in a new context. The capability 
to translate knowledge is however not easily defined by organisational procedures. In contrast, the 
absorption of knowledge can be seen as critical and dynamic organisational capability, representing 
complex organisational learning. This suggests that an organisation's ability to absorb, re-create 
and subsequently diffuse knowledge associated with technological innovation can be viewed as a 
knowledge translation capability (Savory 2006,2006,2009). 
The section will review the key concepts from the knowledge management literature relevant to 
knowledge translation. It then sets up discusses the problem faced by user-led innovation in order 
to both absorb and diffuse knowledge relating to technological innovation. 
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2.4.1 Knowledge translation: the knowledge management problem 
The ability to combine an organisation's internally developed knowledge with externally sourced 
knowledge has been described as a combinative capability (Kogut and Zander 2003,1992). This 
capability is concerned with combining knowledge into organisational and technological 
opportunities from: the organisation's existing information and know-how; internal learning e. g. 
reorganising, accidents and experiments; and external learning e. g. acquisitions, joint ventures, new 
people. In their account of combinative capability, Kogut and Zander highlight the inherent 
difficulty in transferring knowledge and emphasise the need to codify knowledge so that it can be 
applied to new contexts. However, despite the scope for codifying knowledge it was recognised 
that knowledge is built on prior knowledge, making the adoption of proximate technologies easier 
for organisations than those that are completely foreign to an organisation. This preference for 
technologies closer to the familiar, reinforces the path dependence of capability development. The 
theory of combinative capabilities is a useful starting point for considering how technological 
capability is built from the translation of existing knowledge. However, Kogut and Zander raised 
the question of what social fabric needed to exist in order to support the learning of a new 
capability. 
Absorbing knowledge 
The process of absorbing knowledge requires both the transformation of imported knowledge and 
reconfiguration with internally generated expertise leading to the organisation developing: 
... highly elaborate and structured knowledge tailored to its concept of 
innovation... social and cognitive and change is fundamentally qualitative and 
incremental in nature. (Howells 1997) 
Leonard highlights the need for a mutual adaption between technology and the user (Leonard- 
Barton 1988). This is based on the need to combine the knowledge associated with the technology 
and the knowledge existing with the users. On a wider scale, at the level of an industry or society in 
general, this mutual adaption can be seen in terms of changes to technological frames or 
transformations through an actor-network (Bijker 1995). Actor-network theory in particular 
stresses that the various stakeholders using a technology will each modify or hybridise knowledge 
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as the technology is applied and re-applied (Law 1999). This highlights that the absorption of 
knowledge is based on re-creation of knowledge and so a translation capability must be concerned 
with knowledge creation as well as knowledge transfer. Leonard has set out a useful framework for 
considering the development of technological capabilities based on the activities of problem 
solving; implementing and integrating, experimentation and importing knowledge (Leonard 
1995: 8). These four activities provide a useful basis for understanding the key activities required to 
import and re-configure knowledge. 
Transferring knowledge 
While there is a point at which knowledge translation involves re-creation of knowledge, several 
mechanisms for transferring knowledge also need to be supported. These mechanisms are based on 
the need to transfer abstracted, codified or tacit forms of knowledge. 
Boisot described the transformation knowledge undergoes as it is moved from its original domain 
to a new situation using the I-space model (Boisot 1998). He highlighted abstraction, codification 
and diffusion as three potential processes for supporting knowledge transfer. His model provides a 
basis for understanding knowledge translation. 
Abstraction: Abstraction is concerned with the extent to which knowledge is situated in a specific 
context. While tied to a very specific, concrete situation knowledge has a low level of abstraction. 
Through processes of abstraction however, knowledge can be transformed so that it has a more 
general application. For example, within the car industry, knowledge of car suspension dynamics 
can be abstracted away from the context of Formula 1 racing into general principles. General 
principles regarding suspension dynamics are valuable as the knowledge they encapsulate is in a 
form that can then be applied into a new local context e. g. saloon cars through a process of 
assimilation into a new context. Abstracted knowledge has therefore been stripped of detail that is 
only relevant to a specific context. The role of abstracted knowledge in knowledge translation is 
critical. Abstract knowledge provides the: 
... ability to represent phenomenon in terms of a limited number of `essential' 
elements, rather than in terms of their `concrete' features. (Arora and Gambardella 
1994) 
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Therefore, the ability to abstract knowledge from its original context enables the stickiness 
(Szulanski 2000,1996; von Hippel 1994) of technological knowledge to be reduced. Typical 
examples of abstracted knowledge include scientific laws, generalised heuristics and best practices 
such as clinical care guidelines. 
Codification: Boisot identifies knowledge codification as a process that supports the process of 
knowledge abstraction. This process is concerned with the extent to which knowledge is made 
explicit (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Polanyi 1958). Typical examples of codified knowledge 
would be drawings, technical specifications, patents, text books and mathematical formulae. 
Codified knowledge exists separately from the human actors who create the knowledge. Codified 
knowledge is therefore knowledge that has been separated from tacit understanding and placed into 
a form that can be accessed by others. Access to codified knowledge is of course contingent on 
possession of relevant skills, hence to access a mathematical model of car suspension dynamics 
mathematical ability is required. The embedding of knowledge in hard and soft technologies, for 
example design knowledge embedded within CAD software (Blackler 1995) can also be seen as a 
knowledge codification mechanism. Knowledge abstraction clearly depends on effective processes 
of codification. 
Knowledge diffusion: Diffusion is the third process identified by Boisot to explain knowledge 
transfer. Diffusion is concerned with the extent to which knowledge transfers away from it original 
context. While abstraction and codification can aid the process of diffusion, it is still plausible that 
abstracted and codified knowledge remains only in its original context. An example of this might 
be where knowledge is kept secret for commercial purposes. In the context of innovation, however, 
knowledge diffusion is necessary either as a source of knowledge for inventors or as a mechanism 
for enabling the diffusion of subsequent innovations. Thus publishing a book, filing a patent or 
presenting information at an academic conference are all mechanisms for diffusing abstracted and 
codified knowledge to new situations. Unfortunately, for effective transfer, diffusion processes 
must also address tacitly held knowledge. 
The extent to which tacit knowledge is capable of being transferred has been the subject of much 
discussion. At one extreme the view is that by definition, tacit knowledge cannot be made explicit 
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(Polanyi 1958). Others have taken the view that it is possible for tacit understanding to be re- 
created by others. For example, the process of socialisation, for example through apprenticeship 
enables tacit understanding to be shared (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). The social linkages between 
people within and external to an organisation will also enable knowledge conversion, Communities 
of practice are can be viewed as the prime unit of analysis when considering the informal structures 
that support organisational learning (Wenger 1998). They are relevant to an understanding of a 
knowledge translation capability as they will inevitably be a source and destination for translated 
knowledge. A KTC must be able to span several communities of practice within and outside an 
organisation to be effective. The main strength of communities of practice as a unit as analysis, is 
their emphasis on situated learning, this in turn allows the development of localised, specialist 
knowledge. This has been suggested as a key source of innovation (Lave and Wenger 1991; Tyre 
and von Hippel 1997). 
The linkages between individuals, teams, departments or divisions are central to the transfer of 
knowledge within organisations. These links can vary between strong, formal relationships; and 
weak, highly informal relationships. Though intuitively it can seem that strong links will be most 
effective for sharing knowledge, both strong and weak links have been found to have strengths 
(Hansen 1999). Strong linkages are most effective for transfer of complex knowledge, though are 
relatively costly to maintain. Weak linkages however are more effective for transferring simple 
forms of knowledge and can be maintained for lower cost, for example, less need for frequent 
contact or reciprocal arrangements. Strong links can inhibit wide searches for information by 
restricting searches to established communication channels (Henderson and Clark 1990). It has also 
been suggested that loose inter-personal ties are least likely to transfer redundant knowledge i. e. 
knowledge already accessible to a group (Granovetter 1973). The implication for a knowledge 
translation capability is that an optimum situation is to have strong ties where there is a clear need, 
while organisational support for promoting weak ties is also needed, for example knowledge 
mapping, databases on intranets etc. 
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2.4.2 Section summary 
This section has discussed the relevance of Boisot's learning cycle to knowledge translation and 
highlights the problems faced by individuals, groups and organisations in developing an effective 
knowledge translation capability. Savory has discussed the basis of a knowledge translation 
capability and highlighted the need for effective processes to: 
  strategically scan for the existence of relevant knowledge outside the 
organisation; 
  maintain internal and external linkages for transferring knowledge; 
" absorb knowledge from outside the organisation; 
  and, diffuse knowledge out of the organisation. (Savory 2006) 
This suggests that a challenge facing user-led-innovation projects and the user-innovators leading 
them, is the development of effective knowledge translation mechanisms to support user-led 
innovation, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: The knowledge translation problem 
2.5 The NHS as a context for user-led innovation 
Receiving context 
must transform 
knowledge to make it 
useful to new context 
The nature of innovation in any organisation is complex. In the case ofthe NI IS and its hospitals, 
innovation can take many forºns making it a particularly complex context für innovation. One 
Source of this complexity is the range of specialist groups and the diversity of services that are 
provided. It is suggested that to understand innovation in hospitals it is best to treat hospitals as 
healthcare technology system hubs providing complex services, rather than more simple 
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organisations delivering production functions, based on collections of technological and bio- 
pharmacological capacities and or information systems (Dj ellal and Gallouj 2005). Treating a 
hospital as a healthcare technology system hub allows the complex interrelationships to be 
recognised. It would be easy to see hospital innovation simply in terms of medical innovation of 
hard technologies, including biomedical/bio-pharmacological substances and medical devices; or 
soft technologies such as care protocols, diagnostic or therapeutic strategies. Similarly, innovation 
goes beyond the application of information technologies to healthcare. Within their own model of 
hospital innovation, Dj ellal and Gallouj stress the innovation of services as the main unit of 
analysis, rather than a specific technology. They suggest that innovation results in the extension, 
specialisation, intensification or recombination of a service's constituent technologies. These 
changes to a service will result at the component and architectural levels of technology (Henderson 
and Clark 1990). By maintaining a focus on the service however, a link is maintained between the 
technology and its implemented use in the organisation. The implication of this is that while it is 
useful for pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers and even universities to 
consider medical innovations from the perspective of specific hard and soft technologies, to 
understand innovation in hospitals it is imperative that a broader view is taken. 
2.5.1 Culture 
The existence of an appropriate culture has been suggested as important to innovative 
organisations. Many large organisations such as 3M, Microsoft and Hewlett Packard have 
innovative cultures linked to charismatic and innovative leaders. These leaders have influenced 
values and practices supporting innovation over a long period (Deschamps 2003). The presence of 
an innovation culture may be a pre-requisite to encouraging technological innovation in the NHS. 
This raises the question of whether the NHS does have an innovative culture? Any attempt at 
characterising the culture of the NHS is prone to generalisations simply because of the size and 
diversity of the organisation. Several observations can, however, be made. 
The primary base of power in the NHS is medical knowledge, and because of this doctors in 
particular hold significant power (Worthington 2004). This places them in a position to set strategic 
direction or set agendas. Other healthcare professionals such as nurses and paramedics hold lower 
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levels of power and influence, these groups do however have power to block or resist change. The 
powerful position of doctors leads to scientific method being the primary process for validating 
knowledge. This has implications for technological innovation as evaluation of technology tends to 
be based on a search for scientific fact. This may be limiting as epistemologies based in the social 
sciences carry less credence (Jones 2001). Thus despite the need to recognise the socio-technical 
dimension of technology, NHS decision-making is underpinned by a knowledge validation process 
based on a positivist epistemology. Though alternative epistemologies have been used in clinical 
settings (Reason and Bradbury 2000), they remain marginal. This strong positivist worldview is 
illustrated by a statement from a senior manager at the NHS Modernisation Agency, who 
commented that information needed to be presented to clinicians: 
... in a format that is easily understood and statistically valid, which appeals to 
doctors. (Rogers, Silvestor, and Copeland 2004) 
It is revealing from this statement that in order to drive improvements to organisational rather than 
medical operations, NHS decision making requires scientific levels of proof. As increasingly 
recognised in the management literature, this may lead to a myopia in which only the measurable is 
managed, or even believed. 
The cultural propensity for scientific knowledge leads to initiatives being led by scientific method. 
For example, the NHS has since the early 1990s placed emphasis on evidence-based clinical 
practice. This approach to clinical practice is concerned that where research data is available it 
should drive clinical practice. There have also been moves to develop evidence-based policy in the 
NHS. Both these initiatives are an attempt to transfer scientifically validated knowledge into 
clinical practice and policy making. While there has been some criticism of evidence-based policy 
on the grounds that research results are often too context specific to be widely generalised (Black 
2001). Evidence based policy in the NHS has attracted specific criticism on the grounds that policy 
requires a more pluralist and diverse approach and to recognise that policy often requires 
compromises between competing view-points (Marmot 2004). Evidence based initiatives are an 
example of the predominantly positivist culture in the NHS rooted in the dominant views of the 
medical profession. 
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While emphasis on scientific knowledge and the division of the organisation on functional 
specialisms has allowed the enhancement of patient care through practitioners gaining specialist 
skills; innovation has been impeded by rigidity; pecking orders; strict demarcation; tribalisism 
between staff; and departmental silos (Rushmer et at. 2004). While the source of many innovations 
may be the combination of diverse disciplines, the NHS's predominantly functionally based 
structure acts against such innovation. 
The NHS has a strong culture of professional autonomy because of the NHS's structure based on 
functional specialisms (Worthington 2004). This structure should provide an effective setting for 
innovation to occur, as professional staff have some control and discretion in how they approach 
their work. There are, however, a number of factors that may stop individuals pursuing certain 
innovations. There is an increasing requirement for new practices to be rigorously tested prior to 
being approved by regulatory authorities at national and regional levels. This carries with it a 
significant bureaucratic overhead that can potentially retard innovative activities. While there are 
parallels between the culture of hospitals and universities in terms of levels of professional 
autonomy, the main purpose of healthcare organisations is the delivery of patient care. The 
operational demands made on staff means there is little time to spend on innovative activities. 
In order to develop a thriving innovation context in the NHS, account needs to be taken of its 
culture. As outlined above the NHS's culture is complex and heterogeneous; complex because of 
the web of power relationships; heterogeneous because of the diversity of disciplines and roles. In 
addition to its size, the NHS also experiences a high rate of change initiated mainly by central 
government. Perhaps the most acute driver of change is technology. The rate of technological 
change has implications for the organisation in terms of both resourcing new technology and the 
development of skills to use it. The past twenty years have seen a succession of initiatives in the 
NHS, these have resulted in change fatigue becoming endemic in staff. For these reasons, an 
approach to managing innovation in the NHS must be sensitive to the diverse cultures and 
recognise that for an organisation experiencing rapid change any solutions are likely to be only 
transitory. 
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2.5.2 Structure 
Until the 1990s, the NHS was organised as a single, large professional bureaucracy (Harrison and 
Wood 1999; Mintzberg 1993). Since then there have been a number of structural changes to its 
operation that have both enhanced and constrained potential for technological innovation. As part 
of the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 an internal market was formed within the NHS. This 
made an explicit split in the NHS between purchasers and providers of health services. During the 
1990s, this was developed into a system of primary and secondary care trusts. Though the emphasis 
on an internal market was abandoned, as it failed to integrate the NHS or promote widespread 
partnerships (Greener 2004), the system of trusts has continued to develop. Primary care trusts 
remain as commissioners of services from acute trusts. While the element of competition between 
trusts has been reduced, there is still a strong internal cost accounting structure. This has an impact 
on innovation as while service delivery crosses boundaries e. g. between primary and acute trusts, 
investment in new technology takes place at the trust level. This has an effect that where 
investment in innovative technology is born by a primary trust, the most significant impact on 
efficiency and effectiveness may be gained by acute trusts. 
The centralised purchasing function that existed in the NHS before the 1990s has continued to 
operate, though in a modified form. In 1991 the purchasing function was reorganised as a special 
health authority called NiS Supplies. The aim of the authority was to achieve best value for money 
for the NHS. In April 2000 NHS Supplies was developed into the NHS Purchasing and Supply 
Agency (PASA), an executive agency of the Department of Health. PASA acts as a strategic 
advisor to the NHS on procurement. The agency oversees a complex supply chain to the NHS that 
includes pharmaceuticals, equipment and consumables. The impact of purchasing policy impacts 
on the diffusion of innovation into the NHS. While efforts are made to ensure that purchasing 
decisions are made at an appropriate level, the agency has a role in assessing individual products 
for use in the NHS PASA operate a list of approved products for use in the N lS. This list is based 
on providing value for money but has become a de facto standard for approval of products used in 
the NHS. Even for products based on innovations originating within the NHS, the acceptance of the 
product onto the PASA list is a major step in gaining widespread NHS use. The latest development 
has been the move to privatise PASA. This development will not however ameliorate the problem 
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of a single agency acting as the main gatekeeper for the new technology adopted by the NHS. 
Marketing of new technology into the NHS will still be problematic, even for those technologies 
developed initially within the service. 
While NHS purchasing policy has been concerned with the most effective approaches to 
purchasing technologies used in the NHS, there has also been a move to ensure their cost 
effectiveness. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was set up in 1999 with the 
aim of national guidance on economic use of resources in relation to patient care. Initial criticism 
of NICE suggested that it did not assess new technologies in a completely objective manner and it 
was suggested that: 
NICE has effectively become an advocacy mechanism by which lobbies of specialists 
and their supporters in the pharmaceutical industry extract more public money from 
the NHS. Instead of challenging the pharmaceutical industry to show value for money, 
NICE has become their "golden goose. " (Cookson, McDaid, and Maynard 2001) 
It is suggested that one of the main purposes of NICE is now to ration the use of health 
technologies in the NHS (Maynard, Bloor, and Freemantle 2004). This is based on the need for the 
NHS to contain spending on new technologies and balance effectiveness and cost. As such NICE is 
a primary gatekeeper, arbitrating on the adoption of new technologies. Successful diffusion will 
depend on explicitly satisfying an objective assessment of a technology's performance. The main 
basis of this objective assessment being based upon value for money, measured specifically in 
terms of cost of quality adjusted life year (QALY) (Raftery 2006). However, success may also be 
dependent on gaining the backing of powerful groups of clinicians, patients or health industry 
organisations. 
Changes in the role of managers, creation of trusts and the development of agencies such as NICE 
and PASA are not the only changes that impact on NHS innovation. They do however demonstrate 
that the range of changes that are going on in the NHS can, when combined, have unforeseen 
consequences for promoting or stopping innovative activity. 
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2.5.3 Policy 
The organisational context in which innovation occurs in the NHS is strongly affected by policy. 
Like any public sector organisation, these policies are driven not just by the organisation itself but 
also the political forces of government. There have been a number of policy initiatives that have 
lead to change in the NHS, though not always with the specific aim of generating an innovative 
culture. Key reports and policies included: 
" "Supporting research and development in the NHS". (Culyer 1994); 
 " Policy framework for the management of intellectual property within the NHS arising 
from research & development". (DoH 1998) 
  "Creating knowledge creating wealth: Realising the economic potential of public sector 
research establishments. A report by John Baker to the Minister for Science and the 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury" (Baker 1999); 
  "The Government response to the Baker Report: `Creating Knowledge, Creating Wealth: 
Realising the economic potential of public sector research establishments"' (Office of 
Science and Technology 2000); 
  "The NHS Plan, A plan for investment, a plan for reform" (UK Government 2000); 
" "The NHS as an innovative organisation, a framework and guidance on the management of 
intellectual property" (Doll 2002); 
a "Better health through partnership: a programme for action" (HITF 2004); 
  "Agenda for Change - Final Agreement" (DoH 2004). 
There had been a number of explicit efforts to improve the rate of innovation in the NHS. These 
can be seen as furthering one of two potential goals. The first goal has been to capture and protect 
commercially valuable intellectual property produced within the NIIS, and then to exploit it 
through licensing or the creation of spin-off companies. The second has been to operate a culture of 
process re-design and continuous improvement within the NHS, so that innovations developed in 
one part of the NHS are shared throughout the service. The aim of supporting and exploiting MIS 
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innovations can be seen as either to produce healthcare products for the global healthcare market or 
to diffuse them within its own internal market. 
The drive to protect and exploit IP produced within the NHS can be seen as part of a broader move 
to commercialise IP developed in all public sector research establishments (PSRE). Suggestions for 
improved flexibility in the management of R&D in the NHS were set out in the early 1990s. The 
Culyer report highlighted that R&D occurred needed to be seen as a core activity throughout the 
NHS and not just in teaching hospitals (Culyer 1994). The Baker report also set out a rationale for 
why and how increased commercialisation of NHS R&D could occur (Baker 1999; Office of 
Science and Technology 2000). A number of other subsequent initiatives were then made to 
manage IP in the NHS better (DoH 2002; DTI 2004; HITF 2004). The emphasis of these initiatives 
was on establishing a clear process for identifying, protecting and exploiting IP. The ultimate aim 
of these initiatives is to establish income streams from innovations originating in the NHS. This 
income could then be used to improve patient care. 
The move to generate innovation that acts to re-design NHS processes or contributes to continuous 
improvement can be seen as part of a modernising agenda. The general focus of this drive has been 
on the identification and promulgation of best practices. The NHS Modernisation Agency was 
proposed in 2000 to support change management, mirroring similar initiatives in the private sector 
(UK Government 2000). It had a role in promoting continuous improvement of services. The 
agency was not however charged with managing innovation in technologies such as medical 
devices. 
The policies on NIlS innovation were clearly demarcated between innovation of services and 
innovation of technology. There was no apparent recognition that the two are linked. This division 
was articulated in the DoH guidance in management of intellectual property in the NHS: 
An innovation can be used to improve the health service in one of two ways. First, 
after suitable evaluation, it could be freely disseminated across the NHS by knowledge 
management processes. Second, the evaluation may show that it is best treated as an 
invention... It may not be clear until after evaluation which path an innovation should 
follow. NHS bodies will need to have in place a management process to comply with 
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Research Governance responsibilities, with an identified lead person able to respond 
professionally to employees. The formal audit process carried out by NHS bodies to 
review their R&D outputs, commonly called `technology audit', may also identify IP 
that is a `good practice' innovation which needs to be evaluated and disseminated 
freely when appropriate. Plans are being put in place to capture these innovations 
which have no commercial value but the potential to improve health and to save 
expenditure by the NHS. (DoH 2002) 
This two pronged approach to innovation resulted in service improvement becoming the preserve 
of the modernisation agency, while commercially valuable innovations were the preserve of a 
separate agency (Savory 2006). NHS Innovations, was responsible for overseeing the creation of a 
number of technology transfer offices, known as NHS innovations hubs (DoH 2002) to support the 
protection and commercialisation of NHS IP. In 2005 the two agencies were brought into the same 
body, the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement (NHS Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement 2005) but the separation of service and technology innovation was maintained. 
2.5.4 Section summary 
This section has reviewed the NHS as a potential context for innovation by considering its culture, 
structure and the policy frameworks under which it operates. It has then considered the historical 
development of what became the overriding model of innovation within the NHS, based on the 
technology transfer processes. The section highlights that the NHS context may be poorly served 
by the uncritical use of established models of technology transfer because of their over-emphasis 
on hard technology; understating the need to manage innovation of soft technologies. For a further 
discussion of these issues, see also Savory (2006). 
2.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature relating to user-led innovation in the NHS. The existing 
literature on user-led innovation was limited and though the wider innovation literature has some 
relevance, the review highlights the need to address two specific questions about the nature of 
user-led innovation and the processes through which it occurs: 
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  What are the characteristics of user-led innovation projects in the NHS in terms of: their 
purpose, the people involved and the criteria used for judging success? 
  How do user-innovators in the NHS manage and structure the innovation process? 
The chapter also highlighted the complex nature of healthcare technology, raising questions about 
the nature of the technologies produced through user-led innovation processes and the extent to 
which hard and soft technologies are affected. This suggested the third research question: 
  What is the nature of the technology created through user-led innovation in the NHS? 
Finally, the assessment and validation of new healthcare technologies is an essential part of the 
healthcare technology innovation process. In order to be adopted by the NHS, or other healthcare 
systems, it is necessary that technologies created through user-led innovation are shown to be 
effective. Ultimately, the adoption and implementation of new technologies created through 
user-led innovation processes depends upon successful validation. This leads to the fourth research 
question: 
  How and for what purpose do user-innovators evaluate their innovations as they are 
developed? 
The following chapter describes the methodology and its rationale, developed to investigate the 
four research questions. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
User-led innovation in the NHS is a new area of study. The role of users in innovation have been 
the focus of research in other areas, such as new product development, but the theoretical basis for 
understanding user-led innovation is still being developed. This research was exploratory and 
aimed to build a theoretical foundation to aid understanding of user-led innovation in the complex 
context of the NHS. A major challenge in the research was to build an understanding of how the 
micro-level processes that enable innovation of healthcare technology systems were related to 
macro level factors, such as healthcare policy, professional bodies and the wider healthcare 
industry. The methodological approach taken in the research had to be appropriate for exploratory 
research into a complex socio-technical system. This chapter discusses the rationale for the choice 
of methodological approach and then presents an overview of the adopted research design. 
An overview of the research design is shown in Figure 3.1. The figure shows the relationship 
between the preliminary research stages and the main research in which four case studies of 
user-led innovation were developed. 
3.2 Methodological framework 
The area of user-led innovation in the NHS is characterised as novel and an expanding area of 
research. For this reason, it was important that during the course of the research, the methodology 
adopted must be adequately flexible and capable of evolution. The research did not set out to prove 
a specific a priori theory or hypothesis established from the start. Instead, the research was 
concerned with exploring specific research questions and then through analytical generalisation 
(Gill and Johnson 1997: 120; Yin 2003: 32), develop theory that would aid the explanation. This 
suggested the use of an inductive or grounded approach; an approach benefiting from flexibility 
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and a potential to provide both explanations and new insights (F. asterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe 
2002: 47). 
Phase 1: Research definition and design 
Design Data Collection 
Literature Review Protocol 
C Formal ica an Approval 
elect and negotiate access 
to case sites 
Phase 2: Data collection and analysis 
Exploratory Study ).. 
Develop case studies 
Interviews Summar om me Case Study 1 
Summarie Review Documents 
Interviews Smma om me u Case Study 2 
Review Documents Summarie 
Case Study n 
Interviews Summar Combine Eomp ee 
Review Documents 5ummane Case stud 
Cross-case analysis and conclusions 
Cross Case Develop Theory Develop Policy Complete Cross Analysis Implications Case Conclusion 
Figure 3.1: Overall design of the research process 
The role of existing theory to the research was however still important. Some relevant theory had 
been developed; however, its application to user-lcd innovation in the context of public-sector 
healthcare was in its early stages and limited. Within the research literature there has been some 
disagreement about whether researchers should either enter the research process without theoretical 
preconceptions; or whether the researcher needs to start with a clear theoretical framework. Within 
grounded theory (Glaser Barney and Strauss Anselm 1967), an emphasis is put on the discovery of' 
theory as a product of the analysis of field data, researchers being discouraged from engaging with 
65 
User-led Innovation In the UK National Health Service 
the existing theory base prior to commencing fieldwork. Malinowski has however suggested the 
difference between being burdened with preconceived ideas and arriving with an idea of what to 
look for (Stake 2000: 449; Malinowski 1922). This research took the position that it was unrealistic 
to enter a situation without any pre-conceived theory and so a purely grounded approach was 
unrealistic. Instead, it was recognised that existing theory had an important role and that research 
on micro phenomena should: 
be informed by more general macro theories on the nature of organisations and 
social processes within them. (Walsham 2002: 106) 
Theory therefore had three roles in the research: as an initial guide to data collection; as part of an 
iterative process of data collection and analysis; and as a product of the research (Eisenhardt 1989). 
An important factor considered in developing the methodological framework for this research was 
the basis on which the social and technical are understood; in ontological terms what are the 
assumed beliefs about the nature of social and technical reality underpinning the research? On the 
basis of this ontological position a further question concerns how valid knowledge of social and 
technical reality could then be developed; the epistemological basis for the research. 
The nature of reality has been the subject of much philosophical discussion and an important 
distinction has been made between aspects of reality that are independent of the observer and those 
that are based on human subjectivity. John Locke made the distinction between primary (objective) 
and secondary (subjective) qualities (Locke 1689). The extent to which belief in the primacy of 
either objective or subjective views of the world has now been widely debated within both the 
general field of philosophy and sociology. 
Table 3.1 Alternative stances on knowledae and reality. adapted from (Waisham 2002: 104) 
E istemolo : Positivism Ontolo : External realism 
Facts and values distinct and scientific knowledge 
consists only of facts 
Reality exists independently of our construction 
of it. 
Non-positivism Internal realism 
Facts and values intertwined; both are involved in 
scientific knowledge, 
Reality-for-us is an inter-subjective construction 
of the shared human apparatus 
Normativism Subjective idealism 
Scientific knowledge is ideological and inevitably 
conductive to particular sets of social ends. 
Each person constructs his or her own reality 
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It has also been the subject of discussion in specific fields concerned with researching socio- 
technical systems, such as information systems. Walsham notes that it is important for researchers 
to be clear and explicit about the philosophical stance they assume in their research, suggesting that 
both an ontological and epistemological stances need to be explicitly stated, see Table. 3.1 
(Walsham 2002: 104). 
It was noted in the previous chapter that healthcare technology systems have both objective and 
subjective elements. For this reason, it was believed that this research would be limited by adopting 
either a purely external realist or purely internal realist position. Instead, a position was adopted 
that recognised both the objective and subjective dimensions of reality, a position adopted within 
critical realist research (Carter and New 2004). Fleetwood highlights that four categories of reality 
are of relevance the: 
  materially real: relating to entities that exist independently of individual and 
communities; 
  ideally real: relating to conceptual entities; 
  socially real: relating to social practices; 
  and artefactually real: relating to entities created by human action. (Fleetwood 
2004: 32-35) 
This ontological perspective complements approaches adopted in the study of information systems 
information systems research, in which it has been recognised that three distinct types of 
knowledge are relevant (Lyytinen and Klein 1985). These are based on the work of Habermas who 
identified three knowledge interests: technical, practical and emancipatory (Burrell 
1994); (Habermas 1971). Technical interests are based upon a scientific knowledge, practical 
interests based on historical-hermeneutic sciences and emancipatory interests on critical theory. 
Each of these interests has been the focus of positivist, interpretive and critical approaches to 
research. Within information systems it has been suggested that an over emphasis on positivist 
research methodology can lead to partial view of the phenomenon studied. Orlikowshi and 
Barroudi suggest that: 
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The quest for universal laws leads to a disregard for historical and contextual 
conditions as possible triggers of events or influences on human action. The design 
and use of information technology in organisations, in particular, intrinsically 
embedded in social contexts, marked by time, locale, politics, and culture. Neglecting 
these influences may reveal an incomplete picture of IS phenomena. (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi 2002: 63) 
From this position any research into user-led innovation must recognise that to gain a full 
understanding of the phenomena multiple lenses are needed, that make the researcher sensitive to 
not simply process and structure, but other issues including meaning and power relationships 
(Flood 1999: 94). 
3.3 Case Study Methodology 
The main approach used for guiding this research has been a case study methodology. This section 
will outline the rationale for adopting a case study methodology and critically review potential 
problems with its use in relation to user-led innovation in the NHS. 
3.3.1 Role of case study research 
A case study can be described as: 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident. (Yin 2003: 13). 
Yin supplements this definition with the comment that case study is a research strategy that covers 
the, logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis. 
Benbasat et al have suggested case study research strategies have the following characteristics 
(Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead 2002: 82). 
  The phenomenon of interest is examined in a natural setting. 
  Data are collected by multiple means. 
  One or few entities (person, group, or organization) are examined. 
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  The complexity of the unit is studied intensively. 
  Case studies are more suitable for the exploration, classification and hypothesis 
development stages of the knowledge building process, the investigator should have a 
receptive attitude towards exploration. 
  No experimental controls or manipulation are involved. 
  The investigator may not specify the set of independent and dependent variables in 
advance. 
  The results derived depend heavily on the integrative powers of the investigator. 
  Changes in site selection and data collection methods could take place as the investigator 
develops new hypotheses. 
  Case research is useful in the study of 'why' and 'how' questions because these deal with 
operational links to be traced over time rather than with frequency or incidence. 
  The focus is on contemporary events. 
Case study research is important when the phenomenon can not be studied out of context for, 
example through experimental methods (Yin 2003: 13). The research needs to focus on a specific 
instance of a phenomenon and the various interactive processes that affect it (Bell 1993: 8), or for 
"sticky, practice-based problems where the experiences of the actors are important and the context 
of action is critical" (Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead 2002: 80). The case study approach allows the 
researcher to adopt a holistic view of the context and to "... retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events" (Yin 2003: 2). In addition to where the phenomenon is closely 
coupled to its context, it has been suggested that case research is beneficial where the research and 
associated theory is exploratory and in its early, formative stages (Roethlisberger and Lombard 
1977). Case studies are important where research in the area is still exploratory and needs to focus 
on "... understanding the dynamics present within single settings" (Eisenhardt 1989). Much 
exploratory research in the fields of information systems and innovation studies has been done 
using case study methods (Walsham 2001; Suchman 1987; Bessant 1993; Howells 2004; Jones 
2001; Leonard 1995). The method has allowed data to be considered from a wide range of sources 
including interviews and documentation. 
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An important issue in case study research is the extent to which the findings of a case can be 
generalised. Case study research does not follow a sampling logic, as in statistical generalisation, 
where the research seeks to generalise from a sample to the wider population. Instead, case 
research is concerned with analytic generalisation as distinct from statistical generalisation (Yin 
2003: 32). Analytic generalisation represents the process of generalising from empirical 
descriptions to theory and has received the attention of several social science and information 
systems researchers (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser Barney and Strauss Anselm 1967; Klein and Myers 
1999; Lee and Baskerville 2003; Strauss and Corbin 1998; Walsham 1995,2002; Yin 2003). 
Walsham highlights the potential of four categories of generalisation that may be gained from case 
studies: development of concepts; generation of theory; drawing of specific implications; and 
contribution of rich insight (Walsham 2002: 110). 
3.3.2 Multiple case methods 
An important strategy for selecting cases in order to support the generalisation of case findings to 
theory is the adoption of a theoretical sampling approach to case selection. In contrast to statistical 
sampling; the aim of a theoretical sampling strategy is to: 
... replicate previous cases or extend emergent theory, or they may be chosen to fill 
theoretical categories and provide examples of polar types. (Eisenhardt 1989) 
In replicating cases, the emphasis is on theoretical replication where the events reported in the case 
provide support to an emerging theory. The emerging theory may "... predict similar results ... or 
predict contrasting results but for predictable reasons" (Yin 2003: 47). An issue to consider when 
identifying a case study site is the extent to which the site is either typical or unusual in its 
characteristics. This is important because the type of site selected will impact on how the findings 
of the case are generalised. For this reason, the choice of site is not restricted to only the typical. 
Yin suggests that when selecting case sites for single case studies, it is appropriate to apply one of 
several different rationales: the critical case, extreme or unique cases; representative or typical 
cases; revelatory cases; and longitudinal cases (Yin 2003: 40). This highlights that case study 
research can focus on not just the typical but also the particular. In a similar approach, Stake 
suggests that cases can be categorised into three types: intrinsic cases where the primary aim is 
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better understanding of that particular case; instrumental cases where the purpose is to gain insight 
into an issue or redraw a generalisation; and a collective case study in which an instrumental case is 
extended to multiple cases (Stake 2000: 437). The value of studying particular cases is that it gives 
the opportunity to gain a deep understanding of what is "... perceived to be the case's own issues , 
contexts and interpretations" (Stake 2000). One possible selection strategy can be to compare 
successful and unsuccessful user-led innovation projects. This strategy is however difficult to 
operationalise. First of all, the distinction between success and failure is not always clear. Criteria 
for project failure and success can be viewed as based on multiple factors, many of which will be 
subjective and dependent on the view point of the observer(s) (Fortune and Peters 2005: 14). This 
makes the judgement of whether an innovation is a success or failure difficult to make, until the 
project has been studied in some depth. Secondly, the problem of identifying user-led innovations 
in the NHS is more difficult when trying to identify failed innovation projects. There are likely to 
be great many projects that have failed at an early stage, or anonymously after a period of 
development. Similarly, there are likely to be many that at a local level have been successful but 
remain unpublicised, as they have not diffused away from their original area of development. 
Finally, degree of success achieved is based on a variety of criteria e. g. sales of a commercially 
produced device, cost savings within the NIIS, improvements in quality of patient care. 
Detailed case study research creates the opportunity to gain a deep understanding of the 
phenomenon, through the development of thick description that supports understanding of the 
"... subtleties of changing interpretation" (Walsham 2002: 103). Taking an approach that is open to 
the idiosyncrasies of a particular case, results in an increased scope for emergent issues to arise, 
grounded in the data collected (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Use of research methods, such as 
surveys, would not be as effective in allowing the detail of the innovation process to be understood. 
A potential strategy for developing a rich understanding of a phenomenon, such as an innovation 
process, is to adopt a process theory based approach. This emphasises patterns in events, in contrast 
to variance theory in which explanations are based on causal relationships between independent 
and dependent variables (Mohr 1982). Based on this, narrative strategies of qualitative process 
research (Langley 1999) can be used to construct from data a story that emphasises the chronology 
of events, as well as the concepts, understanding and ultimately theory linked to the data collected 
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(Ferlie et al. 2005; Golden-Biddle and Locke 1997). Such a strategy is potentially problematic due 
to the fluid characteristics of process phenomena (Pettigrew 1992), and the difficulty in isolating 
units of analysis in an unambiguous way (Langley 1999). Thus in researching a process, it is 
necessary to recognise the relevance of both variables and events. For example, with an innovation 
process there will be a number of events triggered by actors that are seen as significant, however, 
contextual variables such as the prevailing norms and values will also impact on the process. Such 
a strategy does risk "death by data asphyxiation" (Pettigrew 1990) due to large data sets required, 
in turn leading to the problem of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant data (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). It is also made more complex due to the possible non-linearity of an innovation 
process (Van De Ven 1992). 
An important part of the development of a rich description is the iteration between theorising and 
observation. This has been described as an interplay between researcher and data: 
Analysis begins with the first interview and observation, which leads to the next 
interview or observation, followed by more analysis, more interviews or fieldwork, 
and so on. It is the analysis that drives the data collection. Therefore, there is an 
interplay between the researcher and the research act. Because this interplay requires 
an immersion in the data, by the end of the inquiry, the researcher is shaped by the 
data, just as the data is shaped by the researcher. (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 42) 
The rational for using a multiple case approach, over a single case approach, was that it would be 
difficult to identify a single case that adequately addressed the research problem. The research 
problem recognised that the activities underpinning user-led innovation are wide ranging and so 
taking a multiple case approach was more likely to yield a broader perspective on the phenomenon. 
The problem addressed in this research lacked any existing or well formulated theory but suggested 
that user-led innovations are not extreme events, but relatively common. However, the research 
proposition suggests that user-led innovations are varied and do not follow precise processes. This 
suggested that a single case would be less sensitive to the variety of ways that user-led innovations 
develop. 
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In contrast, a multiple case research design provided broader basis for investigating user-led 
innovation. The cases developed would be vital for identifying differences as well as similarities 
between innovation projects. Multiple cases have potential to inform the prediction of similar 
results; and the prediction of dissimilar results, but for predictable reasons (Yin 2003: 47). 
3.3.3 Triangulation of data 
An important benefit of adopting a multi-case research design is that the development of multiple 
viewpoints on specific phenomenon are developed. For a research design where all cases share 
similar context, for example the NHS, the cases provide specific perspectives on common areas of 
interest. In this way, perspectives on major institutions will yield a range of insights into their inter- 
relationship. This could be viewed as a form of data triangulation (Denzin 1978) in which multiple 
sources of data are used to develop a converging line of enquiry (Yin 2003: 99). The use of several 
data sources within each case (various informants, documents etc. ) allow details of a specific case 
to be triangulated. This is an important strategy as in developing an understanding of when and 
why decisions were made, it is useful to be able to compare accounts in both interviews and 
documentary evidence. 
It should be noted however that where a participant's account does not triangulate with another 
source e. g. an account given in a publication, it does not immediately mean that either account is 
false. The differences in the accounts of events provided to researchers may be incomplete due to: 
time constraints in data collection; complexity of events; limits of the research participants' 
memories; differences between written and oral communication conventions; or participants' 
reticence to supply a full account. It is also plausible that the perspective of participants changes 
over time. While triangulation is a useful tool, it is important to recognise its limitations, especially 
where assessment of a truth is based on repeatability of an observation across several sources. 
This suggests that research can adopt an interpretive position on the nature of fact. Stake highlights 
that while much qualitative research is concerned with using multiple perceptions to clarify 
meaning and to verify the repeatability of an observation, another important function if to clarify 
meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen (Stake 2000: 443). This is a 
position advocated in information systems research where Walsham notes that: 
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... I take an interpretive study to mean that multiple perspectives are provided 
by 
participants, and thus that the interesting data study cannot be `triangulated' to provide 
a `true' interpretation, since whose truth should be chosen? The interpretive researcher 
filters participants' statements and actions through a lens of his or her own 
subjectivity, and then produces a `story' about the events that have occurred and some 
reasons for them. The purpose of the story, again, is not to tell `the truth' about the 
case study but to tell a `truth', namely the researcher's own thoughts and ideas 
concerning the phenomena at issue. (Walsham 2001: 7) 
This shows that the concept of triangulation has been dismissed in interpretive research, as an 
interpretive approach is based on different assumptions to positivist approaches, making 
triangulation simply not possible (Orlikowski and Baroudi 2002: 67). The role of multiple cases 
should therefore be seen as allowing a range of perspectives to be developed, on a range of 
phenomena, rather than simply as a basis for triangulation data. 
3.3.4 Sources of evidence 
A benefit of a case study approach is the opportunity to combine data from several information 
sources. Yin defines six categories of information source relevant to case study research: 
interviews, documentation, archival records, direct observations, participant observations and 
physical artefacts (Yin 2003: 86). The case approach therefore has a substantial benefit and 
relevance when investigating phenomena such as user-led innovation projects. 
The use of interviews has a central role as it provides potential for several important forms of 
evidence. Interviews are important in developing a narrative of how a project progressed. They are 
useful for gaining participants' perspectives on issues and themes within the research. In the case of 
research that reviews a project, the interview is an opportunity for participants to reflect upon the 
actions of themselves and others. For members of staff involved in user-led innovation, an 
interview with a researcher may be the first time that they have been actively questioned about their 
involvement in a project. The participant may experience the interview in a range of ways 
including seeing the interview as: 
  time and space to reflect deeply; 
74 
Methodology 
  an opportunity to present a revised and generally positive view of the project; 
intimidating and potentially problematic if the participant says the wrong thing; 
  surprising that an outsider is interested in their role in the project; 
an opportunity to provide a candid view to an outsider. 
The researcher's perception of the participant's view of the interview may change the way the 
interview is conducted. This may take the form of coaxing a participant to talk, to reining in an 
overly verbose participant. However, it is not possible for the researcher to understand fully the 
way the participant experiences the interview; however, it is likely the researcher will gain clues 
from the participant's body language and the way that they answer questions. 
Recruiting key members of staff to the research is central to its success and the extent to which it is 
achieved will have an impact on the perspectives portrayed of the case site. Gaining access can be 
viewed as a process requiring negotiation and renegotiation (Burgess 1984). The negotiation of 
access will take place through a mixture of formal and informal processes. 
The use of project documentation is a valuable source of data for building case studies of user-led 
innovation. Within the healthcare sector, it is common practice for research to be published. For 
many innovative projects, aspects of the projects have been periodically described in published 
accounts. For example, it is common for clinicians to publish accounts in academic journals as well 
as more professionally oriented journals such as the British Medical Journal. The accounts given of 
projects are vital for several reasons. First, they provide narratives of stages of the innovation. 
Second, they record perspectives and views held by project members on the role and function of a 
specific aspect of the innovation. Finally, they provide an important perspective on the background 
to the source of knowledge underpinning an innovation. It is common for a research article to 
acknowledge the work of other research groups explicitly in similar and allied areas. This can 
provide a useful viewpoint on where an innovation lies in relation to an overall technological 
trajectory. 
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3.3.5 Critical review of case study strategies 
A case study methodology was adopted for this research as it provided the most appropriate 
strategy investigating the research problem, however such a strategy could be criticised as having 
some inherent weaknesses. The key criticisms that can be made against a case study methodology 
is that they: lack scientific rigour, provide a poor basis for scientific generalisation, are time 
consuming and result in lengthy documents. However, the preceding discussion has addressed each 
of these criticisms as alternative approaches such as survey or experimental methods have limited 
application to the research problem. 
The use of a survey based approach was discounted for two reasons. First, the research was 
exploratory and placed emphasis on rich detail and understanding the context in which innovations 
occur. A survey would have been unlikely to give this level of insight. Second, the development of 
a sampling frame for user-led innovation in the NHS would be problematic. The occurrence of 
user-led projects is difficult to ascertain due to their lack of visibility, even within their own 
organisations. Even if a sample was identified, it would be difficult to define precisely the full 
population to which the sample related. 
Experimental approaches were also discounted, primarily, because it would be impossible to 
separate a user-led innovation project from its context. It would be unrealistic for example to define 
two projects, one as experiment and the other as control. The exploratory nature of the research 
meant that it was not possible to define an innovation experiment in terms of a small number of 
causal relationships. It was also noted that even if a survey was devised, the findings of such a 
survey would have little utility in building theory of user-led innovation. 
The case studies developed in this research were based on a retrospective review of each user-led 
innovation project. The length of time available for the research meant that it was not possible to 
carry out a single, longitudinal case study of a specific project. Even if time was available, it would 
also be difficult to identify user-led innovation projects due to their typically fuzzy early stages. 
Walsham notes that the mode of interaction of the researcher with a case study site can take several 
forms (Walsham 2006). He suggests a continuum between an outside researcher and an involved 
researcher. Ile characterises the outside researcher as neutral to the situation. The involved 
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researcher is closely related to the case site, indeed, to the point of consciously and explicitly acting 
to change the situation being studied, as may be the case within an action research project. For this 
research, the researcher was to maintain a neutral position in relation to the context of all the case 
sites and had contact only through the interviews with participants. 
Overall, the decision to adopt a research strategy based on multiple case studies was underpinned 
by the following advantages. The development of rich accounts of the progress of the various 
projects would allow deeper insights to be developed, than would be the case if quantitative 
approaches were adopted. The development of multiple cases would be valuable in allowing 
multiple perspectives to be taken of the phenomenon of user-led innovation, both within and across 
cases. The adoption of an interpretive approach to the case studies also encourages the recognition 
of emergent themes in the research, strengthening the opportunity for theorising. 
3.4 The Research design 
This section will describe the approach taken to the research and detail how the case study material 
was collected, analysed and presented. 
The design of the multiple case study method adopted for this research drew on Yin's case study 
method (Yin 2003: 50). The design was based on three phases concerned with: research definition 
and design; preparation, data collection and analysis; and finally cross-case analysis and 
conclusion. In common with Yin's model the research design incorporated feed-forward and feed- 
back loops that allows the experience gained from each case study to be fed into other parts of the 
research. The overall design of the research is shown in Figure 3.1. 
During the conduct of an individual case study, it is inevitable that the researcher will gain insights 
into the research problem. Such insights needed to be recognised and so three mechanisms were 
embedded in the design. First, through a feed-forward loop the conduct of subsequent case studies 
could be altered. This meant that during subsequent cases the researcher could focus on any 
emergent themes. Second, in the light of a new insight, previous case studies would be reviewed 
and the interpretation of the data from interviews or documents adjusted. Finally, new insights into 
the research problem could lead to adjustments to the research design. 
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3.4.1 Research definition and design 
The initial phase of the research design was concerned with preparation for the research, within 
practical constraints. When selecting a suitable research method a number of constraints needed to 
be considered. The constraints were linked to two areas: the difficulty of researching innovation 
projects generally and researching innovation projects specifically in the NHS. 
User-led innovation projects have a number of characteristics that create difficulties for 
researchers. The first of these is that it is difficult to identify user-led innovation projects early in 
their development. By their nature, they are bottom-up projects which will often take place with 
little formal support. They can be invisible in the organisations in which they develop. They are 
therefore not likely to be identifiable until they reached a level of maturity or have developed 
external linkages, for example to industrial partners, sources of funding. For many user-led 
innovations in the NHS, it was only when entering innovation competitions that they became 
visible to the NHS organisation itself, or observers from the outside. A second factor affecting the 
visibility of user-led innovation projects is the extent to which they are kept confidential. Many 
projects are kept secret in order to protect commercial interests and intellectual property rights. 
This can make it difficult to identify projects or even gain participation of project teams in 
research. Only when the period of secrecy has passed would it be possible to gain access. 
Unfortunately, by the time the project becomes public many of the interesting early stage project 
processes have come to an end. 
Within these constraints, several objectives were set for case study design. 
  build narratives of how innovation projects took place in the NTS; 
  develop models of the actual processes followed that would allow an interactive process 
perspective to be taken to viewing the case studies (Slappendel 1996); 
  develop a model of the perspectives taken by NHS staff to the innovation process 
(Souitaris 2003: 524); 
  identify emergent issues that impact on the NHS innovation process. 
Based on these objectives Phase I of the research established three units of analysis on which to 
base the research design. The phase then included a literature review and an exploratory study. The 
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phase was complete once the data collection protocol had been delined, ethical approval gained, 
formal access to NF IS staff agreed and case sites selected. 
Units ofAnah'sis 
The emphasis ofthe research was on individual user-led innovation projects, however, 
understanding the broader context of government and NHS policy was critical. For this reason, 
three levels of analysis were identified for the research (see Figure 3.2). The first level (Level 1) 
was concerned with NHS policy and is tightly coupled to government policy. Possible data sources 
included both NHS and government documents. The second level (Level 2) was related to the 
management of innovation within the NHS, particularly in terms of the innovation management 
services that are made available for managing innovation projects. 'T'hese services may be provided 
from within the NHS (e. g. the NHS based innovation hubs), by UTTOs or by private companies 
offering innovation management services e. g. private NHS Innovation hubs. The third level (Level 
3) was concerned with specific innovation projects carried out in the NI-IS. 
Level 1 High level influences 
on user-led innovation Government NHG 
Innovation Innovation 
Policy Initialises 
Healthcare 
Govemnront Professional 
Health Policy Bodies 
Level 2 NHS level, nffuencec 
on user-led innovation NHS 
Innovation Technology 
NHS Servr: e 
policy at trust transfer improvement 
level 
support 
supputf 
Private sector NHS 
technology Technology 
transfer transfer 
support support 
Level 3: Case level analyst, 
of user-led innovation 
Innovation Innovation Innovation 
project 1 protect 2 prolert 3 
Innovation Innnvation 
project 4 prLgecl5 
Literature 
Review 
Exploratory 
Study 
Case study 
Research 
Secondary 
Data 
Primary 
Data 
Figure 3.2: Levels of analysis used within the data collection 
The three levels of analysis guide the data collection relating to the cases studies. All the inndlividual 
case studies will be based on primary data collected at Level 3. The collection of relevant data at 
Level I and Level 2 will however help provide contextual information relevant to the individual 
cases. The research was therefore based On a multiple case study design, with the individual cases 
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contributing an understanding of innovation processes in the NHS. For each case, the unit of 
analysis is the innovation project however for the overall study the unit of analysis is innovation 
processes in the NHS. 
Ethical and research approval 
The proposed fieldwork for the research was to involve the interviewing of NHS staff. For this 
reason under the terms expected for the management and governance of research within the NHS 
two parallel processes were followed in order to gain ethical and R&D approval. Ethical approval 
for research is required for any research carried out with participation of patients of NHS staff or 
on NHS premises. The process for gaining ethical approval is defined by the NHS Central Office 
for Research Ethics Committees (COREC). The process for gaining approval was set out in a set of 
operating procedures (COREC 2004) based on defined governance arrangements (COREC 2001). 
Ethical approval for this research was granted by the Eastern MREC (multi-centre research ethics 
committee) based in Cambridgeshire. 
An integral part of gaining ethical approval was defining a robust system for gaining the informed 
consent of research participants. Specifically within the NHS, there is a formal requirement for 
research participants to give informed consent when agreeing to take part in research. This is now 
also seen as good practice in all academic research (Economic and Social Research Council 2005; 
Oates 2002: 213). The process of gaining informed consent is a useful part of the negotiation 
process for the researcher, as it makes clear to the participant what their role is in the research and 
their rights with respect to how their data is used. The formal process of negotiating access is 
crucial in making sure that both researcher and participant are clear about their relationship. The 
process of gaining informed consent does not however guarantee the recruitment of participants. 
Two documents were used for managing the consent process. The first is a Participant Information 
Sheet/Consent Form (PIS/CF), this is shown in Appendix 2. The PIS/CF clearly sets out details of 
the project. The participant completes the PIS/CF to record specific points of consent. The use of 
the PIS/CF was valuable as it ensured that all participants were fully aware of the basis on which 
they participated. The second part of the consent process was for participants to approve a 
summary of their interview. This was done using the Participant Interview Summary Approval 
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Form (see Appendix 3). This was used to record that the participant had read and approved the 
interview summary. This confirmed that all data in the summary could be published and placed in 
the public domain. 
In addition to gaining ethical approval, local R&D approval had to be gained from each NHS trust 
in which participants were to be recruited. This was in accordance with the research governance 
procedures in the NHS. Approval processes were defined by each NHS trust and were not 
consistent across all trusts, but typically involved the researcher submitting the standard NHS R&D 
Form to the R&D department of the relevant trust. 
Exploratory Study 
An important part of Phase I of the research was the completion of an exploratory study that had a 
number of objectives. First, to identify key issues related to the management of innovation in the 
NHS, as understood by staff responsible for supporting innovation activity. Second, through the 
development of relationships with innovation managers in the NHS it would be possible to 
understand the networks of relationships and the mechanisms available for gaining access to 
innovation projects. Third, it would be possible to identify potential cases suitable for more detailed 
case study work. Finally, through the initial contact with NHS innovation managers it would be 
possible for the researcher to be acclimatised to the culture of innovation in the NHS. 
The exploratory study was based on unstructured interviews with staff involved with innovation 
management in the NHS. Six NHS innovation managers were interviewed. All the managers 
worked for innovation hubs supporting the NHS. Two of the managers worked for innovation hubs 
set up as limited companies, independent of the NHS, but contracting services to NHS trusts. Four 
of the managers worked for hubs that were integral to the NHS. Interviews were unstructured but 
were focused on several themes: 
  The role of innovation hubs in the MIS 
  Significance of user-led innovation 
  The process used for managing user-led innovations 
  Extent to which the NHS has an innovation culture 
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  Problems encountered in the NHS when developing innovations 
In addition to the interviews with innovation managers, additional information was also gained 
through informal contact with NHS trust R&D managers and attendance at healthcare innovation 
related conferences and events. 
The informal contact with NHS innovation staff was a very useful part of the exploratory study. 
Several benefits were gained that supported the subsequent research. First, the researcher was able 
to gain a clearer view of the key concerns that technology transfer managers in the NHS have 
regarding management of innovation. In particular the main problems that they perceived in 
managing innovation and how their normal mode of operation addressed these issues. Second, the 
researcher was able to gain a better understanding of the language used within NHS innovation 
management and key concepts that guided technology transfer practices. Third, through the 
informal conversations during the workshop the researcher was able to gain a view of the work of 
the managers, via their comments and anecdotes. Fourth, the exploratory study was instrumental in 
building a base of contacts for further research, including invitations to NHS innovation 
conferences. In particular, the exploratory study yielded several suggestions for potential case study 
sites. Two of which were ultimately followed up in the main study. 
An unexpected outcome form the exploratory study was that the researcher became known within 
the community of NHS innovation hubs. Despite the size of the NHS, the relatively small number 
of innovation hubs means that the community of NHS technology transfer managers is relatively 
small. By engaging with this community early on in the research, the researcher was able to make 
contact with staff from six NHS innovation hubs. The exploratory study helped the researcher build 
positive relationships with the hub managers; which in turn reduced problems in gaining access to 
case sites. 
Data collection protocol 
For the main study, the data collection followed the protocol given ethical approval by COREC. 
All interviews with the project participants followed a semi-structured format. The interview 
schedule is shown in Appendix 1. The schedule was designed to ensure that interviews covered 
main issues around how the innovation started and developed. It sought to gain the participants 
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perspective on the innovation project and identify factors that affected the project. An important 
outcome of the interview was to gain a narrative view of how the project proceeded from the 
participant's point of view. 
Selecting Cases 
The primary selection criteria for cases studied in the project was that they were recognised as 
having achieved some level of success. This in line with the assumption that: 
A common feature of an innovation is that it must have been implemented. (OECD 
and EUROSTAT 2005: 47) 
This implies that where activity fails to result in an implemented change, it is not an innovation. 
Therefore, selecting cases that have achieved some success enables identification of innovations; 
avoiding selection of cases sites that, though involving scientific or technological progress, are not 
cases of innovation. It is however possible for innovation activities to be pursued by an individual 
or team that fail to result in an innovation. 
While it may also be useful to consider cases that have been unsuccessful in creating an innovation, 
as noted earlier in this chapter, the identification of failed innovation projects is problematic. The 
subjective and observer-dependent nature of failure means that it is difficult to categorise a case as 
either successful or unsuccessful. This is problem is made more acute in the broad range of 
potential parameters that may be used in assessing innovation success, beyond simply whether an 
innovation is implemented. 
For these reasons, an initial screening considered only projects that had received some recognition, 
for example by winning or receiving a commendation when entered into national or regional 
healthcare innovation competitions. This was a useful criterion for identifying innovation projects 
that shared similar characteristics. Projects passing this criterion were likely to have been either 
locally implemented or have reached a critical point where the underlying concept of the 
innovation have been proved to work (i. e. reached proof of concept). This criterion was also a 
proxy for projects in which the innovation team had reached a point of wishing to gain wider 
networks of relationships with industrial partners or groups within the healthcare community. The 
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result of selecting the case sites in this way was that the selected cases can be seen as typical 
examples of successful projects, potentially improving the generalisability of the research (Gomm, 
Hanimersley, and Foster 2000: 79). 
In addition, a number of secondary criteria were used for identifying potential innovation projects 
for the study. 
  The project should be a user-led innovation project, driven by one or a team of NHS staff, 
though not necessarily from the same NHS organisation. 
a The innovation should be based in problems identified by the user-innovator (practice- 
based) rather than the result of a direct R&D initiative. 
  It should have been developed primarily in a hospital rather than some other institution e. g. 
a university. 
  Involve a degree of NHS service re-design rather than only being concerned with 
development of a hard technology e. g. a medical device. 
  The project involved innovation of both hard and soft technologies and was not purely an 
organisational innovation. 
The final selection of cases was based on two comparative dimensions. The first dimension was the 
scope of the innovation. The project had the potential to lie on a continuum between those that had 
an impact limited to a single element of a care process, while the other had an impact on the whole 
care process. The second dimension was concerned with extent to which the IP associated with the 
innovation had a potential commercial value. Using these two dimensions, four comparative case 
sites were identified. These are illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
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Gaining access and recruiting participants 
Once a potential case site had been identified, formal R&, 1) approval from the trust was sought 
before formally contacting potential participants. The first participant recruited for each case site 
was the user-innovator. The user-innovator then identified other staff who had been involved in the 
project. 
Co-ordinating recruitment ol'participants to the research posed several challenges. First, 
convincing the user-innovators of the value of'the research. Second, identifying other staff with 
relevant experience of the project, these members of'stal may have had smaller, less prominent or 
very specific roles in the project. Yet, these participants could provide valuable insights into the 
project. As the research unlölded, it was sometimes necessary to extend participation progressively. 
'['his was often because potential participants were suggested during interviews, to illuminate 
specific aspects olthe case. A challenge tier the researcher was recognising the point where 
extending participation in the research would no longer he beneficial to the research. 
At an informal level, negotiation of access depended on participants satisfying themselves that 
participation was worth while and served their own interests. NI IS staff, and consultants in 
particular, have little slack time and so fitting in an hour long interview was not always easy. The 
informal contact with the researcher when negotiating access did help satisfy participants that the 
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research served their own interests. It was clear that for several participants motivational factors 
included: 
  Feeling it was important that the experiences of their project were recorded; 
  Belief that participation may produce some publicity for the project; 
  Talking to a researcher allowed a participant to project a view on an issue that they felt 
strongly about. 
Other motives for participating include altruism, self-interest, peer pressure and pressure from 
senior members of project team. In the light of these reasons, it is clear that participation was never 
free of bias, however, the researcher was aware of the various motivating factors affecting 
participants. 
The problems in gaining access to relevant NHS staff at the case sites were significant. The 
projects studied had typically taken place over several years, and so it was common for some of the 
participants in the project to have changed jobs, or even left the organisation. The local R&D 
approval process would typically take from six weeks to several months to complete. Due to this 
delay, it was not unusual for contact with the user-innovator to be lost; often taking several weeks 
to regain contact and then arrange interviews with participants. Under these circumstances, though 
a more comprehensive study could be potentially done by the inclusion of a wider range of 
participants, the problems in gaining access would have imposed significantly greater delays in 
carrying out the research. For this reason, for all the case studies, participants were drawn from 
staff associated with projects for which a realistic chance of gaining access existed. The researcher 
is satisfied that in all the cases, a satisfactory range of relevant staff involved in the projects were 
recruited to the research. 
The interviews associated with each case were done usually over the period of a few weeks. The 
five sets of case site interviews were done over a period of eighteen months. The timing of each set 
of case interviews was dependent on when the case site was identified and then the speed at which 
access was negotiated. 
Interviews for the research were carried out at the sites where the participants worked. It was 
common for several participants to be interviewed in a day, when they worked on the same site. 
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The limited availability of members of staff meant that on several occasions interviews were based 
over a period of weeks. 
3.4.2 Data collection 
The primary source of data was collected through interviews with user-innovators and other staff 
who had worked on the projects. The conduct of the interviews followed the protocol discussed 
earlier in this chapter. The interview schedule proved to be the primary structure for each 
interview. However, due to the differences between projects and the different roles of participants it 
was common for the interview to address specific questions to varying degrees of detail. As the 
research progressed the range of topics discussed within the interview also evolved. In particular, 
the researcher supplemented the question on the interview schedule with questions relating to 
themes that emerged during the fieldwork. These themes included: 
  Extent to which innovation was in response to clinical or economic problems. 
  Explanation of how the project team formed and evolved. 
  Sources of funding for the project. 
  Role of innovation and technology transfer support initiatives e. g. innovation hubs. 
  Extent to which innovation activities are an integral part of participant's role. 
  Manner in which the innovation has been evaluated. 
" Impact of NHS governance on the project. 
  Impact of the project on design of service delivery. 
" Assessment of how and to what extent diffusion of innovation has occurred. 
The addition of these themes is a result of the iteration between data collection and theory building 
taken in the research. As the researcher gained a greater understanding of the phenomenon of 
user-led innovation in the NHS, research questions were modified and awareness of relevant issues 
deepened. 
Interviews were planned to take place during a period of approximately forty five minutes. In the 
event interviews ranged in length from between thirty five minutes to two hours. It was generally 
87 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
the case that once participants started to talk about their involvement in projects they were 
enthusiastic to discuss their involvement. 
Most of the interviews with research participants were recorded using a small digital, voice 
recorder. Of the eighteen interviews, three were not recorded; instead the interviewer made 
contemporaneous notes, which were then written up more fully straight after the interview. 
Secondary sources of data were also identified that provided additional data for each case. For most 
of the cases, the innovation team had usually produced a range of publications in academic, 
medical and professional journals that outlined aspects of the innovation projects. In addition, other 
publications were often available that provided detail of the historical development and context of 
the innovation. For example, for the innovation described in Chapter 5, there were several 
publications that detailed the development of leg ulcer treatment during the 1990s and the adoption 
of shared-care models. 
3.4.3 Data analysis 
Analysis of the data collected in the main study was analysed in two stages. The first was at the 
level of the individual case study. The four cases were then considered together in a cross-case 
analysis. Data analysis was based on three complementary processes: induction, deduction and 
"inspiration" (Langley 1999). 
Inductive processes were used to develop theory from the data collected in the cases. This involved 
reducing and then displaying the data in some form, followed by drawing conclusion on the data 
(Miles and Huberman 1994: 11). The initial stage was the development of project narratives (Stake 
2000: 439), These provided a provide a focused description of the case from the perspective of the 
researcher, though based on the aggregation of the perspectives of the participants. In addition to 
the project narratives, other techniques were used to enable the analysis. Cognitive maps were 
useful for mapping the perspective of participants on their innovation projects (Eden 1988; Eden 
and Ackermann 2004; Huff 1990; Swan 1997). Process maps were used for establishing phases in 
the projects, key activities and decision points. Influence diagrams were used where appropriate for 
establishing the inter-relationships between issues within cases. Finally, force-field diagrams were 
used to summarise the key enabling and inhibiting factors affecting the projects (Lewin 1951). 
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The literature review carried out to underpin the investigation of the research questions, led to the 
synthesis of the theoretical models discussed in Chapter 2. These models were used in a deductive 
fashion in analysing the case studies. Through comparison, it was possible to recognise how the 
reality of the cases matched with the synthesised model. The discussions both individual cases and 
the four cases together was informed by this process of compassion. 
The final analysis process was based around the researcher becoming immersed in the research data 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998: 47) and the recognition that analysis can lead to sudden insights. Critical 
insights do not necessarily flow from only codified patterns ofanalysis and the roots of'such insight 
may be the result of inspiration, insight and creativity (Langley 1999; Potter 2002: 85). 
Case level analti'sis 
Data from the interviews was analysed through several stages. The purpose of the stages was to 
analyse systematically data from individual interviews, through the development of'themes and 
issues, backed up where necessary with verbatim quotations. The summaries of all the case 
interviews were then aggregated, before being developed into the final case study. This process is 
shown in Figure 3.4. 
(Interview 
Summary 1ý 
Interview 2 (Interview 3 
Summary2) (Summary 3 
Interview ni 
(Summary n) 
C Secondary Data sources 
Auxiliary data 
analysis 
techniques 
Aggregated 
Summary 
1 
Finalised Case 
Study 
Figure 3.4: Development of interview data into completed case study 
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The first stage was to convert data held in interview notes or recordings into an initial summary. 
The interview summary provides a written account of the content of the interview. Its purpose was 
to present only the views and perspectives of the participant to which it related. No additional 
analysis was included; however, the researcher ordered the summary around themes and issues 
raised in the interview or of interest to the researcher. The researcher would also include any 
queries or additional questions raised in reviewing the interview. For this reason, the summary was 
not simply a transcript of the interview. It represented the data that the researcher perceived as 
being useful to the research. Once the summary had been produced, it was returned to the 
participant who then had the opportunity to add, amend or remove material from the summary, 
before authorizing the summary to be used within the research. Participants would also be given the 
opportunity to answer additional questions or supply supplementary information. Once the 
participant had approved a finalised version of the summary, it could be used in the next stage of 
the analysis process. 
The second stage of the analysis process involved aggregating all the interview summaries into a 
single summary. This aimed to allow data relating to common themes to be combined, while 
maintaining any multiple perspectives identified within the case. Quotations from participant 
interviews were retained in the single summary to provide a link with base data and introduce the 
voice of the research participant into the final case study (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1993). The 
summary also incorporated material from secondary data sources, such as published articles about 
aspects of the innovation project. An important part of the aggregation of the summaries was the 
use of various analysis techniques that allowed the ordering of concepts and viewpoints emerging 
from the analysis. 
The final stage of the analysis was to develop a completed case study of the innovation project. The 
final case study provided a comprehensive account of the innovation process and comprised the 
following sections: 
  Background to the technological context of the innovation 
  Overview of the innovation 
  Identification and mapping of the innovation process followed 
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" Discussion of the innovation process followed 
  Discussion of the organisational context ofthe innovation 
  Key emergent themes and issues raised by the innovation project 
Once the case study of the innovation project was complete, the themes raised could then be used 
within the cross-case analysis. 
3.4.4 Cross case analysis and conclusion 
The cross case analysis used a similar analytical framework to the analysis of the individual cases. 
Figure 3.5 summarises the way three streams of analysis contributed to the research. 
Case 1 CE2 Case 3 Case 
ýr ývº 
Inductive Emergent themes 
Stream 
Deductive Improve plausibility of 
Stream theoretical models 
Creative 
Stream Build explanation 1 
Figure 3.5: Process of cross-case analysis 
The inductive process of analysis continued by combining the emergent themes raised in each case. 
This served to identify commonality between the cases, but also highlighted their differences. This 
phase of analysis was particularly relevant to the exploratory questions set at the start of the 
research relating to the nature of user-led innovation and the processes that it follows. 
['he deductive stream ofanalysis continued through the consideration of the extent to which the 
theoretical models reviewed in Chapter 2 provided a plausible explanation cif the four cases. 
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The creative stream of analysis was vital in extending the analysis to the building of explanations 
(Yin 2003), based on the case data. This was of particular relevance in relation to the development 
of the role of proto-institutions in the innovation diffusion process. 
3.5 Reflection on process 
The following section discusses some issues raised within the research process. 
Gaining participation of the innovation team 
Participants were recruited to the research on the basis of their involvement in specific innovation 
projects. Once an innovation project had been identified as a potential case study, the leader of the 
project was contacted and requested to take part in the research. The project leader would then 
nominate other staff members who would be able to contribute to the research. In some cases, all 
relevant members of staff were identified early on, however, in some cases participants were 
identified and recruited later in the research. 
Getting participation of members of staff in the research was generally relatively straightforward. 
Many of the members of staff interviewed were keen to discuss projects that they were clearly 
proud of being involved with. 
A less obvious factor that prompted participation was that in some cases there was an implicit 
expectation by some of the key innovation project staff placed upon other members of staff to 
become involved in the research. On more than one occasion, it was clear that members of staff had 
agreed to participate because a senior member of staff had suggested that they had a duty to take 
part. For a least two of the case studies, the researcher felt that an important motive for 
participating in the research was to gain further publicity for the respective innovation project. 
More generally, it was common for key members of innovation projects to exert an expectation on 
other staff to participate. 
Gaining participation of relevant members of staff was in some cases problematic. The problem for 
several of the case studies was that due to the fact that the innovation activity had occurred over a 
number of years it was common for some of the potential participants to have left the organisation 
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or even moved to a different country. Unfortunately, due to the constraints of cost and time placed 
on the research, it was not possible recruit staff who had subsequently moved to other institutions. 
Sequence of interviews 
The difficulty of arranging and coordinating interviews, meant that it was not possible to maintain a 
consistent pattern of interview sequences for each case site. During the research, the interviews for 
each specific case, did not follow a consistent sequence. For some cases, interviews took place first 
with key members of staff followed by secondary members of staff; other cases involved the 
interview of secondary staff first, followed by the key members of staff. One of the cases involved 
the interviewing of someone who at the time, the researcher perceived to be a key member of staff, 
but was in fact less influential in the case study. 
A second problem in sequencing interviews was that it was not always possible to identify all the 
suitable staff at an early stage. It was common for participants during interviews to suggest other 
members of staff who were relevant to the case study. For some of the case studies this meant that 
the list of the research participants increased as the research progressed. 
The interview sequence was important because the researcher would gain an understanding of the 
project during the course of interviews. This meant that the interviewer had to be aware that their 
own initial impression of the project, gained from an early interview, did not overly dominate or 
influence their understanding of subsequent interviews. 
For the reasons set out above, it was not always possible to sequence interviews using a specific 
logic. However, several sequences could have been considered: 
  interview key members of staff first, followed by staff who had a more secondary role 
within the project; 
  interview secondary members of staff first followed by the key members of staff involved 
in the project; 
  interview staff, based on their involvement chronologically in the project. 
On reflection, the researcher felt that there was offen value in interviewing secondary staff before 
interviewing the key members of staff. This was because it was common for secondary staff to give 
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detailed accounts of the sequence of events at specific stages of the projects; while key members of 
staff had forgotten much of this specific detail. By interviewing the secondary staff first, it was 
easier to cross-check accounts. 
Recording of interviews 
Several advantages to recording the interviews were identified. First, by recording the interview, 
the interviewer was able to maintain a more conversational style, without the interruption of having 
to make extensive notes. The interviewer was also able to concentrate more on the line of 
questioning during the interview, this was a great advantage given the semi-structured format of the 
interviews. Second, the interviewer was able to analyse participants' comments more carefully 
when listening to a recording of the interview. This meant that certain nuances of speech or the use 
of specific terms by participants, were reliably recorded making them available for later analysis. 
Third, during a long account of the project given by a participant, it is not always appropriate to 
interrupt the participant. This means that it is difficult to clarify exactly what was said at the time of 
the interview. The availability of good quality recording of an interview allows the participant's 
words to be carefully scrutinised. This was also invaluable when taking verbatim quotes. 
The recording of interviews has been criticised by other researchers (Walsham and Sahay 1999). In 
particular, the suggestion that by recording an interview, the participant is made self-conscious of 
what he or she says. This can lead to reluctance to comment on sensitive issues or political 
situations. 
It was not felt by the researcher that either of these two issues had a significant impact on the 
interviews. All participants in the research were given the option not to be recorded during the 
interview, with only two participants opting not to be recorded. The researcher felt that for all the 
other participants, recording of interviews was seen as inconsequential, or even normal. Several 
participants when asked whether they were unwilling to consent to being recorded commented that 
they expected the researcher to record the interview. This is a reflection that within the healthcare 
sector and clinical research in particular, recording of interviews is common place. The researcher 
believes that for many participants, though initially aware of the recording process, after only a few 
minutes they were oblivious to the recording. This was probably helped by the voice recorder being 
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small and discreet. For many of the interviews, the researcher was surprised at how candid many of 
the participant's comments were. The researcher felt that despite recording the interviews, 
participants still felt free to comment about even delicate political situations within innovation 
projects. The impression given by many of the consultants interviewed during the study was that 
they were unconcerned about expressing their views. However, for more junior staff it was 
impossible to judge fully the extent to which they felt free to express their views. 
A potential problem with recording the interviews was the time needed to analyse them. It was 
common for analysis to take a significant amount of time and though much detail was gathered, 
some of this detail was not always relevant. 
Participants' revisionist accounts of the process 
This research could not be carried out by using longitudinal case study methods. The nature of the 
projects was such that early stages were carried out in an unofficial manner. In many cases, the 
NHS trust with which they were associated was not even aware of their existence. 
The approach taken in the research was is to identify innovation projects that have reached a 
specific point in their progress and to take a snapshot view of the project and the perspectives of the 
innovation team members. This provides less opportunity to identify how views of the team have 
developed over time. It also risks producing revisionist accounts of the events affecting the project. 
Unfortunately, for the case sites chosen there was no practical means of carrying out a longitudinal 
case study, except perhaps for the later stages of the project. Potential differences in the way 
participants recollect significant events during the project can however be ameliorated by 
triangulation between participants' accounts. 
The risk of revisionism in the accounts given by participants is a real one and is the most difficult 
one to reconcile. It is inevitable that in building case studies from participants' recollections of 
projects that the participants will emphasise, under emphasise or even disregard certain events. For 
these case studies, however, the researcher has set out to identify the factors affecting user-led 
innovation in the NHS. But this reason, the use of what may be revisionist accounts of projects is 
still legitimate. Part of the function of the case study interviews was to allow participants to reflect 
on their projects, often for the first time in any formal way. 
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It was obvious that for many of the team members, the opportunity to review a project with an 
external observer was often seen as both novel and useful. It was clear that for many of the 
participants, it was the first opportunity they had ever had to reflect on their project and discuss the 
decisions that they made. It was not unusual for participants, at the end of an interview that had far 
exceeded their planned timescale, to comment that they had found the interview enjoyable, 
interesting and useful. The use of snapshot views has a value as it enables participants to reflect on 
long term developments of a project. The identification and explanation of critical events and 
processes is of particular value for both researcher and participant. Several participants commented 
at the end of their interviews, that it had been an enjoyable process, and it was clear to the 
researcher that the participants were often very careful organising their thoughts and making sense 
of how the project progressed. 
For these reasons, the accounts given by participants must be treated as revisionist views. By 
incorporating hindsight to their understanding of events during the projects, the accounts have 
significance in that they give not simply a narrative of events, but a critical appraisal, in which the 
participants are actively making judgements about the factors that enabled or hindered the progress 
of their projects. The cases therefore give a valuable perspective on the projects. 
Withdrawal of participants 
A crucial factor in developing the case studies was the willingness of individual projects to be 
scrutinised. For one case study, this external scrutiny did cause a problem. The innovation project 
was at a crucial stage where it wished to gain industrial partners to develop the project further. The 
project team took part in interviews with the researcher, however, over the following few months 
the team decided to withhold their consent to have their interview data used in any published work. 
The reason given for this was that it compromised the project during a difficult period of 
negotiation with external partners. For this reason, the case study was not used in this research. The 
example does however highlight the difficulty of gaining data regarding projects at sensitive points 
in their development. This creates a difficulty for researching such projects. While the sensitivity of 
various commercial issues may diminish over time, it is unlikely that participants will maintain a 
consistent view of events, with the risk that when reflecting back on such periods participants will 
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provide revised interpretations and perspectives on events, actions and even values. The case in 
question was withdrawn from this research, however, it is hoped that once the commercial 
sensitivity issues have been ameliorated by the passage of time then study of the case can be 
continued and subsequent research findings published. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided a rationale for adopting an interpretive, multiple case study research 
methodology. It has outlined the research design and described its implementation. The principal 
concern in developing this methodology was to ensure that the research enabled the exploratory 
study of the phenomenon of user-led innovation. The methodology adopted a theoretical sampling 
strategy as it represented a systematic research framework, yet maintained a level of flexibility in 
order to be sensitive to the emergence of unforeseen factors within specific case studies. The 
following five chapters report the findings of the exploratory study and the four case studies. 
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Chapter 4: NHS Innovation Hubs and Support for User-led 
Innovation 
This chapter presents the findings of the exploratory study. It explains, from the perspective of 
NHS innovation managers, how high-level policy initiatives have to a greater or lesser extent 
conditioned the formal support available to NHS user-innovators. First, the chapter outlines the 
policy frameworks that affected NHS innovation support and development of the innovation hubs. 
The chapter then presents two distinctive examples of innovation hubs, Trustech and Medipex. 
These are used to show how specific hubs addressed the challenge of supporting innovation 
projects. This evidence provides a view of the practical support given to NHS user-innovators and 
the perceived challenges to successful management of user-led innovation. 
The exploratory study set out to explore issues around user-led innovation in the NHS at NHS 
policy level and organisation wide support. Its focus was on the services available to support 
innovation in the NHS, in particular the NHS innovation hubs. These represented the formal 
mechanisms available to NHS staff for supporting innovation activity. The basis on which this 
support operated was important as this represented part of the context in which NHS innovators 
pursued their projects. The study also gave insight into the paradigm in which staff responsible for 
innovation support operated. 
The findings presented in this chapter are based on data collected in face to face and telephone 
interviews with hub managers. These followed a semi-structured format using a common set of 
guiding questions (see Appendix 4 for the interview schedule). Additional data was collected 
through contact with hub staff at NHS innovation hub events. 
The informants for the exploratory study comprised: 
  CEOs of four NHS innovation hubs; 
" technology transfer managers from five MIS innovation hubs; 
" two NHS trust R&D managers; 
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 a clinician responsible for founding a major healthcare innovation awards competition 
(Medical Futures) and conferences aimed at supporting medical innovation; 
  and, press releases and media articles. 
The two hubs are distinctive examples for a number of reasons. Both were well established but 
constituted in different ways. Their difference was in part, due to their development from existing 
technology transfer organisations being a funded body and a private company respectively. One 
hub was created as an integral part of the NHS, and the second as a limited company. These two 
contrasting hubs provide a useful basis for understanding the challenges experienced by all NHS 
innovation hubs. 
The views of the managers were important as the NHS innovation hubs represent the official 
mechanism for managing intellectual property and technological innovation within the NHS. The 
hubs were set up as a result of the recognition that advisor organisations were needed to support 
innovation in the NHS (DoH 2002: 15). 
4.1 Innovation in the NHS: The context 
At the start of the research in 2005, the NHS was in a state of flux about how to support innovation. 
A series of policies had been implemented in the NHS over the previous decade that impacted on 
how innovation was to be managed. However, the formal management of innovation and 
associated lip was still relatively unstructured. Technology transfer out of the NHS was already 
happening, but support for innovation varied greatly from trust to trust. It was common within 
teaching hospitals for technology transfer services to be provided by university-based technology 
transfer offices (UTTO). These were often well developed and resourced. For example, 
Addenbooke's hospital in Cambridge, had a close relationship with Cambridge University's 
UTTO, Cambridge Enterprise. Similarly, the Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals NHS Trust had a similar 
relationship with ISIS, Oxford University's UTTO. Technology transfer services were also 
provided in some specific areas, such as biotechnology, by public and private sector organisations. 
In other examples of innovation projects, individual NHS staff members managed their own 
projects, negotiating directly with private sector partners. Some of these self-managed projects had 
been commercially successful. 
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4.2 Purpose and development of the NHS innovation hubs 
4.2.1 Innovation in the NHS 
Several underlying assumptions about the nature of innovation underpinned the foundations of the 
innovation hubs. The management framework for managing IP in the NHS (DoH 2002: 11) 
differentiated between "good practice" innovations and inventions that represented significant IP. 
Good practice innovations required evaluation and dissemination freely within the NHS through 
knowledge management processes. The assumption was that these had no commercial value but 
had the potential to improve health services and save expenditure by the NHS. Significant IP 
generated from NHS based research or through the delivery of patient care, was the main focus for 
the hubs and was to be exploited on a commercial basis. 
It was this distinction between innovation of practices and inventions that defined the work of the 
hubs. The assumption was that a judgement could be made between treating an innovation as a 
"best practice" or treating it as an invention. The preferred route for best practice innovations was 
referral to the NHS Modernisation Agency. NHS innovation hubs were then expected to handle IP 
associated with significant inventions. This type of IP was to be exploited in three potential ways: 
" outright sale of the IP to an existing company; 
  licensing or assigning the IP to an existing company in return for fees and royalties; 
  licensing or assigning the I? to a spin-out company set up specifically to exploit the IP in 
return for fees, royalties and shares. (DoH 2002: 15) 
The ultimate aim of exploiting innovations was two fold. First, improvements in patient care gained 
from widespread diffusion of service innovations, i. e. through the diffusion of "best practice". 
Secondly, generating financial revenues from the commercial exploitation of IP. Figure 4.1 shows 
the range of ways in which IP in the NHS could be developed further in order to gain value from 
the innovation. 
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Figure 4.1: Innovation development paths 
4.2.2 Mission and aims of the hubs 
When the hubs were devised, the DoH proposed a formal list of the services that needed to be 
provided including: 
  Identification of IP through technology audits; 
  Training for NI IS employees in the importance and understanding oi' IP; 
  Evaluating IP and initiating additional R&D to produce evidence of clinical 
application; 
  Registering the [P; 
" Commissioning the product into prototypes; 
  Advising on and exploiting the II' through licensing or through the setting up 
of companies; 
  Collaborating with universities and other third parties in the exploitation cif IP 
generated jointly with trusts. (1)ol1 2002: 15) 
4.2.3 Creation of the hubs 
I'he hubs were established between 2001 and 2004. Those created early on tended to develop from 
established advisor organisations. Several of the later hubs developed as new organisations drawing 
their staff from either UT] ( )s or private sector technology transfer companies. 
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Most of the staff employed by hubs were drawn from scientific and healthcare backgrounds. This 
gave them the required expertise to understand the relevance of complex technologies. Their role 
required them to face inward to staff within the NHS and outward to building relationships with the 
wider healthcare industry and potential sources of innovation funding. 
The NHS hubs were set up on a regional basis. Some were based on existing technology transfer 
organisations while others were set up from scratch. Depending upon the region, the hubs often 
served more than one NHS trust, The hubs were coordinated by NHS Innovations, a part of the 
Department of Health. All but one of the hubs were set up as integral parts of the NHS, employing 
staff on NHS contracts. They provided services to NHS trusts either through annual contracts or 
providing specific services. 
4.2.4 Funding 
The hubs were funded from several sources as shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Sources of funding for NHS Innovation Hubs 2003/2004 Source: (NHS 
Innovations 2004) 
Hub Employee 
s 
(FTE) 
Number 
of trusts 
served 
Grant Funding 
PSRE Doll Other ERDF RDA BEP 
North 7 2 " " " . " 
North West 
Trustech 
8 4 " . " . 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
edi ex 
5 3 . . 
East Midlands 5 2 " . " 
West 
Midlands 
3 3 . . 
London West 3 1 . . . . 
London North 
Central 
2 1 . . " 
London East 4 1 " . . 
London South 1 1 " . " 
East* 3 
South East* 5 
South West* 3 
'The East, South East and South West hubs were still to be formally created in 2004. 
The hubs operated in a competitive market for technology transfer services where inventors had a 
level of freedom to choose from whom they drew advice and services. From the perspective of the 
hubs, there was an inequality in funding as compared to other technology transfer companies. This 
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was most significant in the number of staff available to them. As new entrants to this market, they 
had to compete with established technology transfer companies possessing reputations and greater 
resources. The hubs were operating from a weaker position. 
Hubs were able to gain an additional stream of income raised by providing various services to NHS 
trusts. Royalty income from successful projects provided a small but potentially longer term source 
of finance. So it was a priority for hubs to pursue projects that had significant long term 
commercial value. This made activities such as licensing and creation of spin-out companies, in 
which they would have a direct financial interest, a critical area of activity for ensuring their long 
term viability 
A major concern for the hubs was their long-term funding. They were able to access some short 
term, start-up funding, but the expectation was that they would become self-funding over time. 
However, most hubs believed it would be challenging to become completely self-funding in the 
medium term because of the long lead time required to establish and gain income from innovative 
technologies. Many of the technologies managed by the hubs were still at an early stage of 
development and were unlikely to provide significant revenues for several years. 
A major source of the hubs' income was grant funding. These were for limited periods of time and 
had to be bid for on a periodic basis. Application for grants required significant effort and staff 
time, but only provided medium term certainty for the hubs. Their behaviour would therefore be 
driven by the terms of grant schemes. 
A further complication to becoming self-funding was the difficulty in gaining income from service 
improvement. There were no clearly defined mechanisms for allowing the hub to generate income 
from these types of innovation. This was exacerbated by the difficulty in quantitatively assessing 
the benefits of service improvement, often dispersed over several parts of the NHS. 
4.2.5 Service provision 
Two categories of services were provided by the hubs. The first was concerned with identifying 
and exploiting I? as and when presented to a hub. These services were instrumental in nature and 
aimed principally to exploit any innovations identified through "pearl-searching" strategies. These 
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activities mirrored those provided by other university and private-sector technology transfer 
companies. 
  Innovation Auditing 
m Providing financial support for activities such as proof of concept via an internal 
development fund 
  Support for gaining IP protection; 
  Guidance on regulatory approval processes; 
  Accessing prototyping and industrial design expertise. 
  Product Development 
  Advice when gaining access to finance 
  Advice when choosing industrial partners 
  Advise inventors on potential sources of grants from external bodies 
The second category was concerned with proactively generating a culture and environment 
conducive to innovation. Typical services in this category included: 
" Networking 
  Management Support 
  Seminars/Workshops & Conferences 
  Innovation Advice & Information 
a Providing common points of contact 
  Matchmaking with potential partners external to the NHS 
4.2.6 Identifying Innovation projects 
The hubs developed several ways of identifying potential innovations on which to focus their 
support. The aim was to identify innovation projects early on, so that they could be offered support, 
advice or access to funding. 
First and most importantly was undertaking of innovation audits. This was one of the key IP 
activities identified by the DoH as requiring the support of hubs (DoH 2002: 15). During an 
104 
NHS Innovation Hubs and Support for User-led Innovation 
innovation audit, hub staff assessed commercially viable ideas and inventions in NHS 
organisations. 
Second, innovations were identified by holding regional innovation competitions. These enabled 
hubs to "flush" out a relatively large number of innovations that would not otherwise be identified. 
The annual competitions run by each hub typically attracted one hundred and fifty entries, of which 
70%-80% were classified as service improvement innovations, with a small proportion relating to 
devices. 
The third activity was raising the awareness of NHS staff to the importance of innovations and 
existence of innovation support services. Emphasis was placed on highlighting the benefits and 
importance of protecting NHS IP. Typical activities to support this was through leaflets, workshops 
and other information dissemination activities. The mature hubs found that after two or three years 
of awareness raising activity they built up a reputation for their work. This resulted in an increase 
in the number of inventions presented to the hubs from word of mouth recommendation. As a result 
the hubs received contacts from NHS staff who had developed innovations, but felt that that they 
were not getting support from their managers. The hubs believed that the process of raising 
awareness was crucial to their success and NHS innovation in general. Hubs were acutely aware 
that the large majority of staff in the associated NHS trusts were unaware of the how to progress an 
innovation or the support available to do this. In contrast, staff who had experienced hub services 
were generally enthusiastic and felt that they had been well supported. 
The hubs were concerned about giving clear guidance on how staff should act to protect 1P, so that 
its value was not lost to the NHS. Typical guidance provided to staff with an idea or invention that 
they considered novel was based on: 
  contacting a senior manger, the NHS trust R&D department or innovation hub, to discuss 
protection of the A' and how to proceed; 
" ensuring that a confidentiality agreement was in place prior to holding discussions with 
third parties. 
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It was emphasised to staff that they should not discuss the idea with external organisations, 
collaborators or colleagues, until the idea was properly protected. They were directed not to publish 
any details of their ideas in academic journals or at conferences. 
Some hubs found that the identification of innovation through technology audits proved to be 
inefficient in identifying important IP in the NHS. Instead, it was found more fruitful to use 
informal networks and contacts. First contact with inventors was often the result of asking a general 
question "who are the most innovative people around here? " Through subsequent discussions, both 
the innovations and innovators would be identified by word of mouth allowing access networks of 
inventors and projects. Innovators would sometimes reveal other projects that they were working 
on and suggest other staff you involved in other innovation projects. 
The financial potential of innovations was assessed by calculating their market value, based on the 
opinion of hub staff and external advisors e. g. from the NHS and industry. Inventions were 
assessed in terms of their novelty and the status of any associated IP, including relationships with 
existing patents or licences. 
Finally, the hubs were aware that a number of innovations were not presented to them because the 
NHS staff involved would work directly with private organisations. This created a risk that IPR 
was not being correctly assigned to the NHS. It was unclear how the hubs could resolve this 
problem without the risk of destroying motivation to innovate or even driving innovation 
underground. 
4.3 Trustech and Medipex: Two established NHS innovation 
hubs 
Two established and successful NHS innovation hubs, Trustech and Medipex, were included in the 
exploratory study. At the time of the exploratory study in 2005 many of the other hubs had only 
just been or were yet to be established. Though sharing similar aims, the two hubs contrasted in 
that Trustech was established as an integral part of the NHHS, while Medipex was a private 
company. 
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4.3.1 Backgrounds 
Trustech 
Trustech was one of the first hubs to be created. Based in Manchester, it had its origins in an 
organisation called ManIP, which supported technology transfer of biotech and general healthcare 
technologies. This was set up to provide innovation support and management services, to both 
universities and NHS trusts in the North West of England. Man1P was primarily supported by 
funding from the DTI's Biotech Exploitation Platform Challenge (BEP). This was a technology 
transfer scheme launched in 1996 that aimed to bring: 
... together universities, research organisations, NHS Trusts and other organisations to 
create a network ... provide specialist advice in developing and managing IP... protect 
and exploit research outputs and [provide a] platform for packaging complementary 
technologies in bioscience. (Barnes 2000) 
As a BEP organisation, ManIP's main function was to carry out technology audits to identify 
promising new technologies. Once these were selected, ManiP advised on protection of associated 
IPR and supported the innovation through a conventional technology transfer process. 
ManIP developed from a BEP to formally become in 2001 the NITS innovation hub Trustech. It 
employed several of ManIP's staff and became a fully integrated part of the NHS, employing nine 
staff drawn from a range of relevant specialisms. 
Medipex 
Medipex Ltd was based in Leeds and served as the NHS innovation hub for Yorkshire and 
Humberside. It was the first NHS innovation hub set up as a limited company and unlike other hubs 
that grew from BEPs had its roots in a company, Medilink Ltd. Medilink provided a number of 
services to the healthcare industry including SME's. These included support for protecting IPR, 
technology transfer and market access services to medical technology businesses across Yorkshire. 
Medipex was created as the result of an agreement to form a consortium with the Sheffield and 
Leeds NHS trusts. Medipex operated with fewer sources of funding than other NHS based hubs 
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being financed by PSRE stage 1 funding and some Department of Health funding. It did not receive 
funding from other sources, such as regional development agencies (NHS Innovations 2004). 
The hub was set up with a strong private sector ethos drawing staff from private rather than public 
sector backgrounds. The board of directors was made up of people with predominantly private 
sector experience in the healthcare industry, particularly with technology start-ups and spin-off 
companies. The board also had non-executive directors drawn from each of the trusts in the 
consortium. Several factors informed the decision to create the hub as a limited company. Primarily 
it was believed that by staying separate from the NHS it could resist the NHS's tendency to form 
rigid bureaucracies. This would allow it to remain a small, autonomous, innovative organisation 
and engender staff loyalty. Private company status carried greater freedom to set up spin-off 
companies. Medipex believed its independence from the NHS gave it a greater private sector focus, 
enabling it to understand and interact with the wider healthcare industry and markets. It believed 
itself to be more market focused than other agencies, such as university technology transfer 
companies. 
4.3.2 Missions, aims and services provided 
The mission and aims of Trustech and Medipex were very similar. For example, Trustech's mission 
was to provide innovation management services to north-west NHS trusts and universities 
underpinned by five aims: 
Promote awareness of the value of IP 
  Identify, protect and develop innovation 
  Generate revenue for self-sustainability 
0 Become recognised as a regional centre 
  Integrate with regional and national organisations (Deed 2002) 
The emphasis of the first two aims was on technology transfer out of the NHS, with the aim of 
exploiting IP. The last two however, exemplify the importance perceived by the hub in becoming 
visible both within the NHS and external to the NHS. In particular, the need for the hub to develop 
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trusted relationships between the NHS and the wider healthcare industry on a regional, national and 
global scale. 
The focus of both hubs was on the commercial exploitation of innovations rather than service 
improvement innovations. The hubs tended to pass service improvement innovations on to other 
agencies, such as the NHS Modernisation Agency. Service improvements represented a large 
proportion of the innovations presented to the hubs, making up approximately eighty percent of 
those presented. 
Both hubs provided similar services, offered on a contractual basis and included the following. 
  General advice and raising awareness about IP management for NHS staff. 
" Innovation Auditing: Identification, assessment and exploitation of IP. 
  Training and education about protecting and exploiting IP 
  Advice on construction of IP exploitation strategies. 
" Advice on sources and ways of accessing funding 
  Access to expert legal, financial and commercial advice 
  Evaluation of IP and initiation of further R&D. 
" Provision of proof of concept funding. 
  Commissioning of prototypes. 
  Identification of potential commercial partners. 
a Management Support to NHS trusts, for example, assistance in management of IP 
portfolios. 
a Creating a common point of contact and support networking between NHS and private 
sector organisations. 
Providing these services was the main source of income for the hubs, apart from any external 
funding from DoH or development agencies. 
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4.3.3 Technology transfer processes followed by the hubs 
I'he technology transfer processes followed by both hubs were not rigid and the processes were 
customised for each prcýject based on each innovation's characteristics. Despite this variation, it 
was evident that the processes operated by the two hubs did share some common features. 
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Figure 4.2 Trustech commercial exploitation process (Deed 2002) 
Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the processes and relationships that Trustech sought to develop. Its 
commercial exploitation process illustrates its role as a relationship builder between innovators, 
investors, development support organisations, industrial partners and ultimately customers. The 
process was structured around a development pipeline, though this was demonstrated more 
explicitly in the process operated by Medipex. 
Medipex's presented the process model shown in Figure 4.3 as an illustrative model of the 
exploitation process based upon an innovation pipeline. However, it does give more detail of the 
relevant stages and activities underpinning technology exploitation; though Medipex acknowledged 
that it was not comprehensive and understated the iterative nature of the process. The process was 
based upon three stage gates that acted as decision points for reviewing the progression of the 
project. Each of the three stage gate reviews were carried out by a dedicated committee, focusing 
on finance, project appraisal and marketing respectively. Each review was concerned with the 
extent to which the project had captured, assessed and developed II' and whether it continued to 
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present a benefit to the NI IS. All the committccs aimed to provide supportive and constructive 
criticism to the project team. 
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Figure 4.3 Medipex commercial exploitation process (Medipex 2004: 10) 
The ultimate aim of the innovation process for Medipex was the establishment of licensing 
agreements with established device manufacturers or the creation of spin off commpanies. Creation 
of spin-oft'conmpanies was a particular locus for Medipex, because it was already structured to do 
this. 
4.3.4 Initiatives developed 
The aims of both Trustech and Medipex were very similar, and both hubs were conscious oI tlic 
need to extend their activities resulting in development of number of additional initiatives. 
Technologe opportunities workshops: A proactive approach to identifying potential areas of 
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staff working with groups of NHS staff to identify specific problems that technological innovation 
might solve. The development of technology opportunities workshops marked a shift in emphasis 
from reactive "pearl-searching" to proactive innovation activities. 
Relationship brokering: Both hubs became well known within the healthcare industry. This 
meant that medical device companies with technologies that would benefit from NHS 
development, started to use the hubs as a conduit for forming relationships with NHS staff. 
Entrepreneurship and innovation fellows: The hubs were aware that successful innovation was 
contingent on the NHS developing a more widespread innovation culture. One strategy pursued in 
response to this by Medipex, was the active development of entrepreneurial skills within the NHS. 
The hub aimed to operate staff development activities that would support entrepreneurship. One 
idea was to establish a system of innovation fellows who would be funded to work on innovation 
activities. Unfortunately, lack of funding hindered implementation of this scheme. 
Knowledge mapping: The hubs were conscious of the benefits of mapping the location of staff 
holding specific skills and knowledge. A long term aim of some of the hubs was to develop a 
database that mapped knowledge in the NHS. Though slow to develop, this project became 
operational through a collaboration between Trustech, Medipex and a third hub. 
4.4 Factors inhibiting user-led innovation in the NHS 
Developments at NHS policy level towards innovation and the creation of the NHS hubs, were 
recognised by NHS innovation managers to be improving the context for user-led innovation in the 
NHS. The exploratory study however, identified several factors that inhibited this innovation. 
These are shown in Figure 4.4. Four groups of inhibiting factors were highlighted in the 
exploratory study: 
  structural barriers to innovation; 
  limitation to the existing innovation support services; 
  presence of an anti-innovation culture; 
  and the behavioural characteristics of NHS clinicians. 
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Figure 4.4: Enabling and inhibiting factors affecting user-led innovation in the NHS 
4.4.1 Structural barriers to innovation 
Despite the policy initiatives, several structural barriers to user-led innovation remained in the 
NHS. Some of these related to the way that user-led innovation activity was recognised, 
encouraged and enabled within the NHS, while others related to getting NHS-developed 
innovations widely adopted within the service. 
The primary barrier was perceived to be the emphasis on operational performance of NHS 
organisations. The key performance indicators used to assess NHS trust performance were' 
predominantly concerned with operational output measures, such as waiting times. This meant that 
even where a trust did demonstrate successful innovation it was unlikely to impact directly on their 
assessed performance or secure subsequent funding. This made the senior management teams of 
trusts more focused on short-term improvements that would have a direct impact on the 
performance indicators to which they had to work. This was exacerbated by the competition for 
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funding between NHS organisations, in turn creating barriers to knowledge flow between specialist 
centres. This emphasis on operational performance meant that there was no significant NHS 
funding available for development of innovations. The size and complexity of the NHS and the 
services that it provided created a significant barrier to user-led innovation. While top-down 
initiatives could force change across the NHS, in contrast, user-led innovation teams needed 
significant skill and political power to achieve change. 
A major challenge for user-innovators in the NHS was getting their innovations adopted back into 
the NHS. At a regulatory level it was necessary to fund significant development and trialling of 
new technologies. This was costly and required development of private-sector partnerships; in turn 
requiring NHS innovators to gain significant business and management skills. Once an innovation 
had gained regulatory approval there was no guarantee it would automatically be adopted into the 
NHS. A number of gatekeeper organisations such as the Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA) 
evaluated and effectively controlled use of new technologies. PASA in particular created a barrier 
to adoption of NHS-developed technologies. As the main purchasing arm of the NHS, it operated a 
list of products for which acceptable purchasing contracts had been negotiated. This essentially 
created a de facto standard set of technologies available to the NHS. Unfortunately, PASA was 
mainly concerned with purchase cost and little weighting was given to factors such as 
effectiveness. This created a situation where the assessment of NHS-developed technologies by 
PASA was based predominantly on purchase cost, even where the technologies had already 
enabled significant service improvement within the NHS. 
Overall, the NHS was an operationally focused organisation that was passive in both encouraging 
user-led innovation activity and adopting the technologies created by NHS staff. 
4.4.2 Limitations in existing innovation support services 
The existing innovation support services in the NHS were limited. While there were some services 
available, often from UTTO and private technology transfer organisations, the majority of NHS 
staff had little access to innovation support services. The development of a network of NHS hubs 
was at an early stage and had limited capacity in comparison with the overall size and requirements 
of the NHS. The prevailing model of innovation support was based on technology transfer through 
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commercial exploitation of IP, drawing funding from a complex range of sources. Though this was 
appropriate in many cases its emphasis on technology push was limited and possibly 
counterproductive for the NHS as a whole. Effort was put into maximising the commercial 
exploitation of IP often identified through "pearl searching" processes rather than proactive 
innovation support. The emphasis on commercially exploitable IP was oriented more towards hard 
than soft technology innovation. This created technology evaluation processes predicated on the 
needs of hard technology and led to the development of separate routes for device vs service 
improvement innovations. 
This overriding model of innovation management was adopted and developed from existing 
university technology transfer organisations, a model designed for exploiting IP developed in 
universities and PSREs. The findings of the exploratory study question whether the UTrO model 
of innovation management is optimal for the NHS (Savory 2006). 
The problem identified by government was not that innovation fails to occur in the NHS, but that 
exploitation of inventions was not always as effective as it could be. The application of the UTTO 
model however failed to support user-led innovation. The hubs were conscious that explicit models 
of innovation management based on pipelines provided only a guiding framework for their work, 
with the detail of their work contingent on the characteristics of individual projects. 
The underlying assumption when setting up the hubs has been that it was appropriate to assume 
that the NHS shared characteristics with universities and PSREs. However, the NHS has unique 
characteristics that make it distinct from universities and research institutes. Specifically it has an 
operationally focused, user-led innovation culture, rather than one driven by research activity, as in 
universities and PSREs. For this reason, the slavish application of the U]TO model represented a 
potentially sub-optimal approach. 
4.4.3 Anti-innovation culture in the NHS 
Within the NHS, there was an organisational culture that under-valued innovation activity. There 
were few financial or other incentives for staff to engage in innovation. Staff were generally 
unaware of the available innovation support and often so operationally focused that little priority 
was given to innovation projects. It was common for staff roles to have no explicit expectation to 
115 
User-led Innovation In the UK National Health Service 
engage in innovation activities. Few resources were available for supporting innovation projects 
developed by staff, unless part of major NHS-wide initiatives. These factors all led to innovation 
projects being both under resourced and very slow in development. 
4.4.4 Behavioural characteristics of NHS clinicians 
The characteristics of clinicians working in the NHS, and to a certain extent other staff in 
professions related to medicine, can act to inhibit successful innovation. NHS clinicians, especially 
those who have achieved consultant status, have significant professional autonomy. This created a 
risk that innovation was limited by the views of a single or small group of clinicians: 
Clinicians are an entirely autonomous and independent group and at the same time, 
they are fragmented and sceptical. (Goldberg 2006) 
Clinicians can be a rich source of innovation; but can also be reluctant to relinquish control of their 
projects at the point where additional skills are required. It also implies that an innovation 
developed by one clinician may not be accepted by all clinicians in that specialism. The 
independence of clinicians can slow project progress: 
Of the most successful healthcare innovations that stemmed from clinicians, almost all 
of them took ten years or more to migrate from the innovators' imaginations before 
they even enter the commercialisation process, which adds another 7-10 years to the 
development life cycle before patients can benefit. (Goldberg 2006) 
Finally, the progress of projects can be impeded by NHS staff basing decisions on flawed views of 
NHS processes. These false assumptions can be crucial especially when the size and ease of access 
to the NHS as a market is overestimated. 
4.4.5 Internal and external markets for NHS innovations 
The dilemma for innovation management in the NHS was that for the majority of innovations, 
some sort of private sector involvement was needed to supply funding and skills for development 
of the innovation. Unfortunately, private sector involvement does not guarantee adoption of the 
product by the NHS. Despite NHS origins products will still face the barriers presented by PASA 
or NICE. Figure 4.5 shows potential adoption routes for NHS-developed innovations. While 
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service innovations may be directly diffused within the NI IS, product based innovations use market 
mechanisms. 
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4.5 Summary of the exploratory study 
The findings of the cxpk ratory study show that support liar technology transfer out of the NITS was 
well defined, though based upon a narrow approach to innovation management. With respect to 
user-led innovation, the emphasis of the hubs was focused on commercially exploiting II' 
developed within NHS trusts. This was an important role, however, it meant that the hubs' main 
concern was hard technology, such as devices. 't'hough aware of' the large number of service 
improvement innovations generated within the NI IS, the core processes operated by the hubs 
provided only limited support for their development. While the hubs were aware oC this imbalance, 
their funding constrained the ways in which they could extend the support they provided. 
The exploratory study raised issues about the" role ofinnovation hubs in supporting NI IS 
innovation. The hubs relied on short to medium term funding for their continued existence. The 
need to secure long term income streams led hubs to locus only on those innovations that had 
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potential to develop into commercial products, license agreements and possibly creation of spin-out 
companies. Through these initiatives, the hubs would gain longer term, more stable income 
streams. Unfortunately, this also meant that it was less likely that NHS specific, service oriented 
projects would be supported. 
The exploratory study concluded that at a formal level, user-led innovation was recognised as 
important and needing support. The study highlighted the shared view of government, NHS trusts 
and the NHS innovation hubs on the nature of user-led innovation and the formally accepted 
processes implemented for managing them. However, innovation support was shown to be limited 
and based on narrow assumptions about the nature of user-led innovation in the NHS. The findings 
reinforced the need for detailed research into specific cases of user-led innovation, in particular to 
understand the perspectives of user-innovators on their own projects. The four case studies 
described in the following chapters go some way to developing a view of how user-innovators see 
the challenges in their projects and in particular: 
  How specific user-led innovation projects actually proceeded? 
  How and when user-innovators sought support for their projects? 
  What enablers and barriers to project progress existed? 
  How user-innovators understood the purpose of their projects, particularly in terms of what 
constituted successful innovation and for whom the innovations were targeted? 
All four of the case studies in the following chapters are presented in a common structure. After an 
initial introduction, each case has the following sections: 
Data collection for the case: This section briefly describes how the data for the case study was 
collected. It gives a brief overview the participants interviewed and general information on the 
conduct of the interviews. Secondary sources of data used in the case are also described. 
Background: The background section provides a view of the technical area in which the 
innovation took place. It provides a brief introduction to the main issues affecting NI IS provision 
of services in the specific technical area. Significant technical developments in the innovation area 
produced within or outside NIIS are described. 
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Overview of the innovation: The overview section describes the innovation, its purpose, use of 
technology and degree of implementation and diffusion. 
Innovation process: This section describes the process through which the innovation was 
developed and the key activities and events that marked its progress. 
Organisational context: The organisational context of the case provides information about the 
organisational setting of the innovation and additional detail about key stakeholders in the 
innovation. 
Emergent themes: This section discusses issues that emerged during the course of the research. It 
highlights the various themes that had a significant impact on the user-led innovation process, by 
either enabling or inhibiting the progress of the project. 
Summary: The summary section summarises the main issues raised within the case that inform an 
understanding of user-led innovation within the NTIS. 
119 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
Chapter 5: Leg Ulcer Telemedicine System (LUTM) Case 
Study 
5.1 Introduction 
This case is concerned with the service re-design of the leg ulcer clinic of a general NHS hospital. 
Central to the service re-design was the development of a leg ulcer telemedicine system (LUTM) 
that supported both clinic and community-based staff in delivering effective leg ulcer care. The 
service re-design was driven by a consultant vascular surgeon, supported by a small team of staff. It 
is distinctive as it illustrates how both innovation of hard technology in the form of a telemedicine 
system and service re-design, can take place through user-led innovation processes. The innovation 
process adopted a pragmatic approach, based around prototyping and multiple approaches to 
technology evaluation. The result of the project has been a radically revised design of the leg ulcer 
service, that has demonstrated a significant improvement in efficiency. The revised service 
represented a proto-institution of leg ulcer care with the potential to create a step-change in leg 
ulcer care throughout the NHS. 
5.2 Data collection for the case study 
The data for this case study was collected through semi-structured interviews and a review of 
literature associated with the project. The first interview was with the consultant vascular surgeon 
who had driven much of the project. Two further interviews took place with the Specialist Vascular 
Nurse associated with the leg ulcer clinic and the Research Nurse who had been involved in the 
clinical trial of the telemedicine system. All the interviews took place on the same day and 
clarification of queries raised in the interview was done by email and during a second visit to the 
clinic. 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format using the standard interview schedule (Appendix 
1). The interviewer made contemporaneous notes during the interviews. The interviews were not 
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recorded. All participants appeared relaxed and comfortable about discussing the project during the 
interviews. The researcher felt confident that the participants' responses were based on thoughtful 
and genuine responses to the questions and did not appear evasive of any issues. All participants 
seemed to take part in the interviews enthusiastically and seemed to enjoy being given the 
opportunity to reflect on the project. 
Additional data for the case was collected from a book written by the Vascular Surgeon that 
describes the project from his point of view. Though this source may give a revisionist view of 
some of the events in the project and provide a post-hoc rationalisation of events, the book is an 
important data source as it provides an understanding of how the Vascular Surgeon understands the 
process of user-led innovation. 
An external evaluation report produced by Connecting for Health was an additional source of data 
for the case (NHS Connecting for Health: Integrated Service Improvement Programme 2006). 
Published literature by staff at Good Hope on the innovations written (Hayes and Dodds 2003; 
Dodds 2005; Dodds 2002; Samad et al. 2002; Samad, Hayes, and Dodds 2002). Other secondary 
literature on leg ulcer care were also reviewed for the case (Angle and Bergan 1997; Ghauri et al. 
2000; Grey, Harding, and Enoch 2006; Simon, Dix, and McCollum 2004; Moffatt et al. 2004; 
Franks and Bosanquet 2004; RCN 1998; Moffatt et al. 1992). 
5.3 Background to leg ulcer treatment and service organisation 
The treatment of patients with leg ulcers is provided through services where the majority of 
patients require treatment based on relatively well established procedures. Within the core 
treatments there continues to be advances in surgical techniques and specialist leg ulcer bandage 
technology that have an impact on speed of patient recovery. 
Leg ulcers are a common disorder affecting over one percent of the population at some point during 
their lives (Angle and Bergan 1997). The risk of leg ulcers increases with age and they affect 
mainly older people. The majority of leg ulcers are related to poor circulation in the legs with 
approximately seventy percent being venous in character. Other forms of leg ulcer occur due to 
other factors such as diabetes. Leg ulcers are usually symptoms of underlying health problems and 
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treatment of the underlying cause can accelerate their healing. However, leg ulcers are painful, 
debilitating and often slow to heal, sometimes taking years if not carefully managed. These factors 
make their care important especially where elderly patients are living alone or have additional 
health problems. Recurrence of a leg ulcers is a significant problem with recurrence rates of up to 
fifty percent (Ghauri et al. 2000). 
Before any treatment can be carried out a patient must be assessed to ascertain the type of leg ulcer 
and to develop a care plan. The assessment of leg ulcers requires a range of investigations. These 
can include: 
  clinical history of the patient; 
  family history of patient; 
  history of the ulcer; 
  physical examination; 
  size of the ulcer 
  measurement of blood pressure and weight; 
  urine analysis; 
  measurement of blood flow using doppler ultrasound 
  bacterial swabbing of the ulcer to check for infection. 
Several of these investigations may be repeated during the care of the ulcer. As with many medical 
conditions, the diagnosis is based on objective measurements and the application of experience 
gained from treating other patients. The implication is that successful care of leg ulcers is more 
likely where specialist staff are involved in the assessment, treatment and monitoring of patients 
(Simon, Dix, and McCollum 2004). 
Treatment follows two main care paths. The first is based upon care in the community by nursing 
staff who regularly monitor the ulcer and use appropriate dressings to aid healing. The second route 
is through various forms of surgery. The surgical techniques aim to either improve circulation in 
the area of the ulcer, or treat the ulcer directly by techniques such as skin grafts (Angle and Bergan 
1997). The paradox for many cases of leg ulcers is that while the best treatment methods are widely 
122 
Leg Ulcer Telemedicine System Case Study 
available, the decisions for selecting and giving treatment must be made in a timely manner by 
either specialist staff or non-specialists given access to specialist knowledge. The key problem in 
this respect is managing knowledge across a multi-disciplinary team of health professionals 
working within hospital and community settings. 
In common with other areas of the NHS, a major constraint is matching the high demand for 
services, with limited resources for delivery of services. In the case of leg ulcers demand for 
treatment services is high, with waiting time for access to specialists within a vascular department 
of a hospital being several weeks. Geographical location of vascular departments is limited to main 
hospitals because of the limited availability of specialist staff and capital cost of equipment. 
5.3.1 Leg ulcer care services 
It has been estimated that the cost of leg ulcers to the NHS exceeds £400m per year (Simon, Dix, 
and McCollum 2004). The main components of this cost are the time spent delivering community- 
based nursing care to the patient and the cost of specialist dressings. Reduction in treatment costs 
are most easily gained from improvements in healing rates. The human cost of leg ulcers is also 
very great. They are unpleasant, inconvenient and reduce quality of life for both patients and their 
carers. There is therefore a strong rational for improving leg ulcer services on both social and 
economic grounds. 
Since the early 1990s there have been a number of changes that have affected the processes and 
structures that support leg ulcer services. Figure 5.1 shows the range of factors that have lead to 
performance improvement in leg ulcer services. 
Advances in technology have affected care directly in three ways. First, advances in medical 
imaging have allowed better diagnostic techniques to be developed. Most importantly, the 
widespread use of doppler ultrasound equipment has enabled precise measurement of blood flow as 
part of the diagnostic process. This technology requires skilled operators and so tends to be only 
based within vascular care department of hospitals. The technology provides the data required to 
make a diagnosis of the cause of a patient's leg ulcer. Second, advances in surgical techniques have 
impacted on both the prevention and treatment of leg ulcers. For example, skin graft techniques 
that are relatively quick and low cost can improve recovery rates. Finally, for the majority of leg 
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ulcers, use of specialised bandages has improved recovery rates. These bandages require 
specialised nursing skills to be most effective. 
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Figure 5.1: Multiple influences affecting the improvement of leg ulcer services 
The availability of these technologies means that care of leg ulcer patients can be very effective. 
The challenge however is the co-ordination of the various services required to apply the most 
appropriate treatment plan for a specific patient. Leg-ulcer patients are normally cared for by 
community-nursing staff as out-patients. Community-based staff are rarely specialists in leg ulcer 
treatment and care plans need to be developed in collaboration with specialist stall'based in 
hospital clinics. Effective treatment for leg ulcers requires the co-ordination of resources between 
acute and secondary care. 
In addition to technological changes, the process oftreatinent has been carefully reviewed and 
improved. With the increased emphasis on evidence-based practice, especially in nursing, there has 
been a steady improvement in how nursing stall have adopted new treatment measures based on 
proven effectiveness. The clinical guidelines issued by the Royal College of Nursing in 1998 
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described the practices seen as most effective in assessing and treating leg ulcer patients (RCN 
1998). These represented the "best practice" in leg ulcer treatment at the time. 
The organisation structures that underpin leg ulcer services have evolved during the 1990s. Trials 
of new service designs (Ghauri et al. 2000; Moffatt et al. 1992) provided compelling evidence that 
healing rates can be improved significantly by the development of community-based clinics, 
staffed by nursing staff with a specialism in leg ulcers. The basis of these clinics is that expertise in 
care of leg ulcers is made more available at the community level improving both the assessment 
and treatment practices used. Streamlined processes for referral of patients from the community 
clinic to specialist hospital departments also improved access to more specialised services. Leg 
ulcers services over the period can be regarded as having gone from ad hoc community based care, 
with specialist services based only in hospitals, to a "hub and spoke" model of care where services 
are integrated across primary and secondary care organisations. 
5.4 Overview of the innovation 
The innovation was developed at Good Hope Hospital, a medium-sized general hospital in 
Birmingham. The innovation occurred at a time when NHS policy on IP exploitation in NHS trusts 
was not well developed and there was no significant support for technology transfer offered to 
NHS staff. The innovation was not centrally planned and was the result of work done by a vascular 
surgeon in the hospital, supported by nursing staff in his department. 
Until the late 1990s vascular surgery at Good Hope was part of the general surgery department. In 
1999, a new dedicated vascular department was formed with its own outpatients' clinic. Part of this 
clinic specialised in leg ulcer treatment and served patients referred by GP from an area with a 
mixed urban-rural population of 450,000 people. The leg ulcer clinic had originally been organised 
by a specialist vascular nurse who had set up many of the structures and processes from scratch. 
Unfortunately, as the clinic had grown it had developed a number of operational problems. The 
original process followed in the leg ulcer clinic is shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Original Leg Ulcer Clinic process 
The innovation has resulted in a redesign of the leg ulcer clinic and its processes. This was in 
response to the problems in the clinic itself and other leg ulcer care delivered in the community. 
The redesign of the clinic was based around three distinct but related innovations: setting up of a 
one-slop shop clinic design: implementation of a telemedicine system; and improved scheduling of' 
the clinic, through use of a computer simulation. These changes represent continuous innovation in 
both soft and hard technologies associated with the clinic and took place a period of several years. 
5.4.1 Problem addressed by the innovation 
The problem addressed by the innovation at Good I lope can be described at three levels (see 
Figure 5.3) 
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Figure 5.3: Clinical problems addressed by LUTM 
The first level was at the level of the leg ulcer clinic and was concerned with the operational 
problems of dealing with patients. The clinic had problems with long queues and delays during the 
clinic. This was exacerbated by the need for patients to attend the clinic three times in order to gain 
a full assessment and consultation for their condition. The delays in the clinic placed additional 
pressure on staff and lowered their morale. 
The second level was concerned with the coordination of care between the specialist clinic staff 
and community-based staff including GPs and nursing staff. I listorically there was a poor level of 
communication between the hospital and community staff. This meant that referral to the clinic was 
slow and that the subsequent care plan could not be easily adjusted in response to a patient's 
profess. The community-based staff had poor access to the necessary specialist knowledge. A 
specific problem was that after patients attended the clinic, the care plan was often changed by 
community-based staff without any communication with the clinic. It was therefore unclear 
whether the care plans were actually löllowed and if they were changed it was not possible for the 
clinic to know what changes to the plan had occurred or why. These communication problems 
were, however, not just one-way. 
"The community nursing teams often had problems getting Inl rmation from the 
hospital about their patient's visit, the results oftests and the reasons liºr the 
management plan etc. It is very difticuh for nurses to contact each other during the 
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day. Communication was mainly by letter which was given to the patient to pass on - 
a situation fraught with difficulty. " (Research Nurse) 
The third level was concerned with the overall efficiency of the leg ulcer service. This was 
ultimately concerned with reducing the mean time for healing leg ulcers presented to the service. 
This could be achieved through ensuring that the service managed an effective model of shared- 
care between the clinic and the community-based staff. The service also had to ensure that care 
plans adopted evidence-based practices and were adequately responsive to patient progress. 
One-stop-shop Clinic 
The first change to be instigated was the reorganisation of the clinic using a "one-stop shop". These 
changes were made primarily to allow for care plans to be established quickly and during one visit 
to the hospital. Originally, patients would be referred to the clinic by GPs once initial 
community-based care had failed to lead to satisfactory healing. The clinic would then make an 
assessment of patients, usually over three visits, based on assessment by specialist nurses, 
radiography staff using doppler ultrasound and by consultants. In addition, location of radiography 
staff in their own department, in a separate part of the hospital from the clinic, created logistical 
problems as leg ulcer patients would need to be accompanied by clinic staff who would redress the 
patient's leg ulcer after ultrasound assessments. The one-stop shop design brought radiography 
staff physically into the clinic area, closer to the patients and specialist nursing staff. The 
reorganisation of the clinic allowed a patient's assessment to be completed and the care plan 
established during one hospital visit. Patients could then be returned to community-based care with 
mechanisms for monitoring their progress. The outcome of this reorganisation was that the clinic 
process was more patient centred, resulting in significantly reduced queues and delays in the clinic. 
This also resulted in a more even workload which in turn placed less stress on the nursing staff. 
Many of the changes made in implementing the one-stop-shop clinic were relatively simple 
changes and could be regarded as "quick wins". However, communication between hospital and 
community-based staff continued to be a problem and it was clear further improvement were 
possible. 
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Leg Ulcer Telemedicine System 
The Leg Ulcer Telemedicine System (LUTM) was developed to enable a model of shared care 
across secondary and primary care organisations to be implemented. This system's primary 
purpose was to improve information and data managemnet between the hospital and community- 
based staff. At the core of the system was a secure patient record system with an intuitive and easy 
to use interface. The system maintained records of patients' care plans and information relating to 
their progress and recovery. The system stored all the data required to support the treatment of the 
patient including test results, notes and high quality, digital, colour images. Facilities were included 
for analysing data and monitoring progress such as: wound measurement, healing graphs and other 
analysis of progress and treatment outcomes. The system supported messaging between users of the 
system, for example between community and hospital based staff. The system operated using the 
NHS network allowing access to authorised staff, irrespective of their location within the NHS. The 
system acted as both a database and a communication medium. 
The LUTM software was written by the Vascular Surgeon in his spare time. The initial 
functionality testing of the system was achieved with the collaboration of a local GP. The system's 
actual impact on the clinic was assessed using a randomised clinical trial of the system. The 
vascular surgeon worked hard and enthusiastically to ensure that staff in the clinic and in the 
community worked with the LUTM. While only a small proportion of the community-nursing staff 
used the system initially, support from both the vascular surgeon and specialist nurses in the clinic 
helped to ensure that problems were solved quickly. The trial had two important benefits. First, it 
provided hard evidence that the LUTM actually improved healing rates. The second benefit 
however was in embedding the LUTM into the day to day work of nursing staff. On completion of 
the trial, the use of the LUTM had to be stopped. This resulted in protests from nursing staff who 
had recognised the effectiveness of the system and had changed their own working practices to 
make use of it. This was evidence of not just the effectiveness of the system, but that it was 
successfully implemented. 
The system resulted in a number of benefits in the clinic. The development of an integrated, 
electronic, wound care record overcame the problems previously experienced with patient records 
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dispersed between the hospital, GP/community staff and the patient. The system's facility to allow 
electronic referral allowed much faster access to the clinic by patients. This was partly due to 
community nursing staff being able to refer directly to the clinic without the intervention of a GP, 
which in the past had incurred a delay. During the course of caring for a patient, the community- 
based staff benefited from remote access to expert advice via the system. Evaluation of the system 
in the context of the one-stop shop clinic, has suggested that use of the system has lead to faster 
wound healing (Dodds 2002). This has in turn led to reduction in both number of hospital visits and 
treatment cost. The average number of clinic appointments has dropped from five to two per 
patient. 
The contribution of the LUTM to improved treatment practices has had specific benefits. The use 
of digital images has allowed the monitoring of care to be shifted from the clinic. Images can be 
taken in the patient's own home and the images allow an automatic analysis of the wound healing 
i. e. by measurement of wound area. The clarity of the images also allows clinic staff to assess 
wounds remotely through being able to make a judgement on wound colour and texture from the 
images (Samad et al. 2002). The improved availability of data has also allowed better evaluation of 
care processes. 
The LUTM has been successful because it has automated existing clinical processes and it has 
enabled a new shared-care process to be implemented. In 2004, the LUTM system received the 
NHS Innovation Award for Service Delivery 2004. 
Care Pathway Simulator 
The third innovation was to address the problem of patient flow through the clinic by introducing 
an optimised model for scheduling the clinic. To optimise the scheduling of the clinic the Vascular 
Surgeon wrote a computer simulation of the clinic, the Care Pathways Simulator (CPS). This 
simulator then enabled the team to re-think the scheduling of the clinic by understanding the 
bottlenecks within the existing system. 
The CPS was initially developed by the Vascular Surgeon to support the redesign of the clinic 
scheduling template. He wrote the CPS software because he was unable to find commercial 
software that addressed the needs of clinicians/NHS managers wishing to re-design service 
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operations. The Vascular Surgeon perceived the available software to be neither patient-centred nor 
capable of modelling complex healthcare processes providing a highly customised service. The 
software addressed this by matching the complexity of the problem with the need to be usable by 
NHS staff. 
The way in which the CPS tool was used developed over time. Initially the Vascular Surgeon 
created it as a design tool. Over time however, the CPS was used as a design testing tool and then 
as a teaching and learning tool. He felt that its value was in its ability to educate people to the 
dynamics of healthcare processes and to become more aware of bottlenecks that restrict wider 
system performance. He felt the CPS tools were valuable, as generally, "... the NHS does not think 
in terms of bottlenecks" (Vascular Surgeon). The simulator later became available to other NHS 
trusts under a software licence. 
5.4.2 Result of implementation 
The redesigned process within the leg ulcer service is shown in Figure 5.4. The result of the three 
innovations has been the improvement of the overall leg ulcer treatment delivered jointly by the leg 
ulcer clinic and community-based staff. At the heart of this improvement is the implementation of 
the shared-care model of leg ulcer treatment. 
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Figure 5.4: Revised Leg Ulcer Clinic process 
5.5 The innovation process 
This case does not describe a single innovation, but a series of linked innovations that occurred 
over a period of'time. The individual innovations can he seen as part ol'a wider prograninic of 
change in the clinic. An account of the project has been given by the Vascular Surgeon in a book 
aimed at helping other clinicians lead innovation in healthcare systems (Dodds 2006). 
The Vascular Surgeon suggested that the development followed three stages: innovation, 
investigation and implementation. This view however, fails to highlight some ofthe processes 
underpinning the user-led innovation process. This discussion of the project will therchwc consider 
six distinct areas of activity from which the innovations were created. The overall process is shown 
in Figure 5.5. 
The project was driven primarily by the Vascular Surgeon, supported by a small team of staff who 
maintained ownership of the project throughout its development. As the project progressed, further 
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members of staff were enrolled to the project. The project was a nationally recognised success, 
receiving the HITEA Best Use of IT in the Health Service award in 2005, yet 
"... there was no national directive, no business case, no project board, no management 
involvement, no external financial support, no special training and no service 
improvement experts. There was just us. " (Dodds 2006: 4) 
It was within this context that the innovation process operated. This was not a tightly structured 
innovation management approach, but a contingent one based on the needs of the project. 
5.5.1 Assimilation and sensemaking 
The early part of the project was concerned predominantly with the team making sense of the 
situation, assimilating the clinic problems and recognising the need for change in the clinic. 
A critical activity for the project was the absorption of knowledge about developments in the 
treatment of leg ulcers. There were several published studies reviewing models of leg ulcer 
treatment within the medical research literature during the 1990s. While the technology of leg ulcer 
treatment was relatively stable, these studies represented incremental improvements in the existing 
treatments and the services in which they were offered. The Vascular Surgeon had a long standing 
interest in the area and had tracked the developments over several years. 
In addition to absorbing knowledge from outside the organisation, the project team developed an 
understanding of their workplace through experiencing day-to-day operation of the clinic. This 
gave the clinic staff a better view of the clinic's operational problems, than might be gained by an 
outsider observing the clinic. This tacit understanding of the clinic operation was a valuable 
resource for the team. 
The first significant event in the project was at a monthly department meeting. The Vascular 
Surgeon encouraged staff to do a SWOT analysis on the clinic. This helped make problems and 
failings of the clinic explicit, opening up discussion about the potential for change. The Vascular 
Surgeon suggested that the analysis had several functions including: 
"... to get the whole team talking about where the anticipated problems lay; to agree on 
where the priorities were; and to decide who was going to do what. "(Dodds 2006: 11) 
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This meeting signified the point where the team took ownership of the problems in the department 
and identified the need to address the problem of how best to improve service quality for patients. 
It was at this point that Vascular Surgeon explicitly took a lead role in addressing problems in the 
out-patient clinic and leg ulcer service. Thus while the Vascular Surgeon had a long standing 
research interest in the cause and treatment of leg ulcers, it was only after this meeting that he 
formally assumed leadership of the process of service improvement. 
5.5.2 Constructing the problem/solution 
The second area of activity was concerned with the Vascular Surgeon and his team using their 
knowledge and experience to construct a clear, shared definition of the problems facing the clinic 
and then to identify potential solutions. 
The Vascular Surgeon has described this as following a rational decision making process based 
upon: data collection, statement of a problem, option creation, option selection and prototype 
creation. This perhaps represents an idealised process that belies some of more subtle interactions 
that took place. 
As part of the data collection, a significant amount of hard clinical data was collected. This data 
concerned the sequence and impact of clinic processes and the patients' path through them (Dodds 
2006: 7). The data collected helped in gaining an objective and shared understanding of the problem 
to be solved and its root causes. It also informed an understanding of the possible solutions that 
would be appropriate and acceptable to stakeholders. 
However, a by-product of the data collection was that staff in the clinic and community were sent a 
clear signal that the Vascular Surgeon was keen to implement change. The Vascular Surgeon noted 
that during the data gathering there was a positive reaction to his active listening technique (Dodds 
2006: 8). He reflected that the process provided a clear signal to staff that he was prepared to learn 
in order to change (Dodds 2006: 7). 
This stage was critical not just in gaining objective data, but also in creating a participative culture 
of innovation within the team, 
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The agreement of the problem allowed potential solutions to be identified, specifically: the redesign 
of the clinic into a one-stop shop; implementation of a telemedicine system; and measures to 
improve clinic scheduling. The decision on the telemedicine option was complicated by whether to 
develop an in-house solution. This was resolved once the Vascular Surgeon had carried out an 
external search for existing solutions. Though he was conscious of the danger of "reinventing the 
wheel", his conclusion was that the existing commercial telemedicine systems were not suitable as 
they were not aimed at specialist nurses, they had no objective data supporting their success; and 
they were prohibitively expensive (Dodds 2006: 23). 
5.5.3 Development 
The development of all three solutions followed common pattern. Though the project included 
three different types of innovation, a similar approach was taken to all based upon a combination of 
iterative prototyping. Most notable however, was the explicit use of a PDSA (Plan-Do-Study-Act) 
cycle of improvement (Cleghorn and Headrick 1996). Figure 5.5 shows the development and 
proofing activities as separate, though interlinked parallel activities. 
The development process was generally based around the creation of an initial prototype followed 
by review and revision. In the case of the one-stop shop clinic, the initial redesign was then 
modified during a period of continual improvement, while for the telemedicine system the software 
was treated as an evolutionary prototype (Crinnion 1991), with each iteration being used within the 
clinic. This approach to development was summed up in the Vascular Surgeon's pragmatic 
approach: 
"It is better to achieve something easily and quickly that has tangible benefit and 
which moves you along the path towards your goal than to give up because you can't 
see a whole solution. " (Dodds 2006: 24) 
The prototyping approach was also seen as vital in allowing the team to learn as they proceeded 
through the project. 
It is worth noting that the Vascular described himself as risk averse and valued knowledge that he 
perceived as "tried and tested". It is in this spirit the project approached the activities around 
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validating the innovations in service design and the telemedicinc system itself'. In conjunction with 
the development activities, three distinct evaluation approaches were used to validate the 
innovation. 
5.5.4 Proofing 
A pluralist approach to validating the innovation was adopted. 'hhe first was based around gaining 
scientific proof, principally through use of clinical trials. The second was based on data collection 
within a PDSA improvement cycle; a less rigorous approach than a clinical trial but with the 
advantage of flexibility and fast response to emergent issues. The final approach was based around 
encouraging the take up and use of the innovation. Based on the use of'tlic innovation, staff would 
themselves make a judgement on the effectiveness of the innovation. The purpose of the proofing 
activities was to produce validation data acceptable to the various stakeholders. Figure 5.6 
summarises the role of these approaches to evaluation of the leg ulcer clinic innovations. 
Objective scientific 
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Aim: to gain reliable 
repeatable results 
Method: Clinical trial 
ýý. r ýý 
Clinic 
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ýý 
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Figure 5.6: Three approaches to validating clinic innovations 
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Objective scientific evaluation was seen as the prime method of gaining validation for aspects of 
the innovation. The emphasis of this evaluation was on gaining objective, reliable and repeatable 
data on the clinic innovations. For example, a specific study was set up to validate the use of digital 
imaging to assess the size of an ulcer (Samad et al. 2002) and a substantial two year clinical trial of 
the LUTM system to compare the LUTM's performance against the existing paper based system 
(Dodds 2002). The results of these trials provided evaluation data for both internal use and for 
presenting results to the wider healthcare community. In addition to the clinical trails, the 
innovation has also been externally evaluated in 2006 as part of the Integrated Service 
Improvement Programme 
Evaluation of the innovation also took place on an on-going manner within the PDSA improvement 
cycle that was operated. For these purposes, a mix of data was accepted for use in evaluation. This 
data ranged from hard data collected through aggregation of data from the LUTM database to 
professional judgement of the Vascular Surgeon and other staff based on their experience of 
working within revised clinic processes. This type of evaluation was oriented to informing the 
improvement process, rather than gathering strictly objective data. 
Through the process of use of the LUTM during the feasibility study and clinical trial, individual 
members of staff made a personal assessment of the system. This lead to staff, with the support of 
the Vascular Surgeon or clinic nurses, changing their normal working practices to make use of the 
system. This could only have occurred where subjective evidence of effectiveness was accepted by 
the staff. In practice, the development of trust in the system and its fit with existing or modified 
practices grew from use of the system, rather than scientifically-based metrics of the system. 
The trust that developed was based on a tacit understanding of the innovation and recognition of 
how it fitted into an individual's personal practice. The level of trust was demonstrated' at the end 
of the LUTM clinical trial, when the system was withdrawn from use; due to the terms of the 
clinical trial. Even before the scientifically validated evidence of the system's performance was 
published, staff were disappointed in its removal and the need to revert to what they saw as a less 
effective way of operating the leg ulcer service. For these staff validation of the system's 
effectiveness was gained through their own personal use of the system. 
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The case suggests that during the evaluation of user-led innovation, a pluralist approach to 
evaluating the resulting technologies is adopted. The epistemological basis for evaluation ranges 
from scientific objective knowledge to participatively-based knowledge (Reason 1999). 
5.5.5 Local acceptance 
The innovation of the LUTM was such that there was no single point in time when local 
implementation occurred, or when it was accepted in the service. Instead, the local adoption of the 
LUTM was gradual. This was in contrast to the creation of the one-stop shop clinic or changes to 
its scheduling, which were step changes in organisation. These changes only affected hospital- 
based staff. However, the LUTM required acceptance by both the hospital-based and community- 
based staff working in the leg ulcer service. The process followed to gain acceptance of the LUTM 
by both secondary and primary care staff is a distinctive characteristic of this case. 
The success of the LUTM relied on staff in both the clinic and the community making effective use 
of the system. The Vascular Surgeon was able to lead and support clinic staff in using the LUTM 
from an early stage. It was however more challenging to get community-based staff using the 
system because of their remoteness from the clinic and the required change in their ways of 
working. The most important group of community staff that needed to accept the system were 
community-nurses. Acceptance by GPs was seen as less important. Use of the LUTM by 
community nurses was necessary to ensure an integrated channel of communication between clinic 
staff who assessed the patient and agreed a care plan, and the staff administering the care plan 
directly with the patient. This communication would be wholly mediated by the LUTM. 
Through out the changes in the clinic, a regular newsletter was sent to staff to keep them up to date. 
This went some way to engaging community staff in the process. The primary approach used for 
gaining acceptance of the LUTM however was recruitment of a small number of community nurses 
to the project. 
The community nurses recruited early on in the project were generally staff who dealt with 
relatively large numbers of leg ulcer patients. The demographic profile of a community nurse's 
area often determined the number of patients they had to attend to, areas with high populations of 
over-70s having the highest rates. For nurses attached to GP clinics with relatively young patients, 
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occurrence of leg ulcers was generally much lower and hence less of a concern. The Vascular 
Surgeon reflected that many of the community nurses recruited early on in the project exhibited 
"early adopter" traits. Those recruited later were often those with fewer leg ulcer patients or who 
needed encouragement to gain the IT skills necessary to operate the LUTM. The later recruits to 
the project had often heard about the advantages of the system by word of mouth from the "early 
adopter" staff. The main mechanism for gaining acceptance of the LUTM was the support given by 
the clinic nurses. The Research Nurse was responsible introducing community nurses to the LUTM 
in the community setting. While the Specialist Vascular Nurse often invited community nurses to 
spend one or two days within the clinic. 
Not all community nurses opted to use the LUTM. This was probably because they did not have a 
critical mass of leg ulcer patients to make adoption worthwhile. The Research Nurse however 
believed that a significant number nurses rejected use of the LUTM due to insufficient IT skills 
and/or they did not see use of computer as a part of their professional role. 
Adoption of the system by a specific GP clinic was not always automatic. It was common for some 
groups to receive training on the LUTM system but then never to use the system. For example, in 
the case of the GP practice used to do an initial technical feasibility study, despite one of the GPs 
being an advocate of the system, the practice nurses did not adopt the system. The Research Nurse 
suggested that this was not just because they felt the system had been imposed upon them, it was 
also due to them being a small, very part-time staff with their own interdepartmental 
communication problems. Their part-time work meant they also had insufficient time to practice 
use of the system. 
Adoption of the system by GPs was seen as less important. This perhaps reinforces the view that 
the LUTM system was seen by both consultants and GPs as a system to support nursing care rather 
than the work of doctors. It also highlights a process-view of ulcer care that defines the role of 
GP's as concerned with commissioning the process, but not integral to the care process itself. 
Local adoption of the innovation was therefore based principally on staff gaining positive 
experiences of the LUTM and recognised how it fitted into their own work. The LUTM benefited 
community nurse because it enabled: 
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  access to specialist advice and knowledge; 
  access to specialist nurses; 
  access to a vascular consultant via the messaging system within the LUTM; 
  ability to bypass GP's when referring patients; 
  an increase in the speed of communication between all relevant staff. 
Adoption of the LUTM within the hospital was predominantly by nursing staff; use by other 
consultants in the Vascular Department was very limited. This was mainly due to the system being 
seen as a "nursing system", rather than a consultant's system. This can be attributed to many 
consultants seeing the treatment of leg ulcers as a routine problem with routine solutions that do not 
require their further input. This is despite the fact that the LUTM's success was based on active 
engagement of the Vascular Surgeon in providing direct advice to community based staff via the 
system. 
5.5.6 Wider diffusion 
Limited adoption of the LUTM system in the wider NHS has been through gradual diffusion. The 
publicity gained by the project has prompted interest from predominantly specialist nursing staff in 
other NHS trusts. These staff visited the clinic and then championed the adoption of the LUTM in 
their own hospitals. Adoption of the LUTM software has been predominantly in the neighbouring 
trusts. 
The LUTM was not adopted by any private sector organisations or healthcare providers outside the 
UK. While the software was made available through a licensing scheme, no major partnerships 
with large software providers to the healthcare industry have been sought. This has meant that 
maintenance and further development of the LÜTM software has remained under the control of the 
Vascular Surgeon. 
The level of wider adoption in other trusts is disappointing, especially when the number of 
potential NIlS sites exist. The benefits that were demonstrated at the Good Hope clinic could be 
repeated in all the other leg ulcer clinics in the NHS. This would create a large cost saving for the 
NHS and a significant improvement in the care of leg ulcer patients in general. 
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5.6 Time dynamics of the innovation process 
The LUTM project took place over several years, starting with the re-organisation of the Vascular 
Department in 1999. The results of the two year clinical trial on the LUTM system were published 
in January 2004. Subsequent diffusion of the LUTM to other trusts took place over the following 
year. This five-year period represented a steady, consistent effort by the Vascular Surgeon and the 
clinic nurses to develop and implement the system. The project developed at a steady pace and 
there were no significant periods where the project progress slowed or stalled. It was clear that 
throughout the project the Vascular Surgeon spent significant amounts of his own time on 
developing the project. Other clinic and community-based staff were generally able to work on 
implementation within the constraints of their normal working hours and were supported in doing 
this by their line managers. 
5.7 Key team members 
The development of the innovation was lead by a range of staff with the consultant vascular 
surgeon and two clinic nurses taking the most significant roles. 
5.7.1 Vascular Surgeon 
The Vascular Surgeon was the principal driver of the innovation. His role was pivotal in the whole 
of the project and his experience, knowledge and attitudes shaped its development. The Vascular 
Surgeon was articulate, self-confident, dedicated, hard-working and visionary. 
A distinctive feature of the project was the Vascular Surgeon brought a multidisciplinary approach 
to the project, fusing knowledge of medicine and computer science. In addition to his medical 
training, he had a degree in computer science and had worked as a professional software developer. 
In addition, the Vascular Surgeon had an interest and commitment to the use of continuous 
improvement approaches within the NHS, such as lean thinking. Using these two specialisms, he 
could design and implement the clinic changes and write the necessary software. These skills made 
him capable of leading the process re-design in the clinic. 
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In common with other NHS consultants, the Vascular Surgeon had a large degree of autonomy in 
his work along with a degree of organisational power. These factors meant that he was relatively 
unrestricted, compared to many NHS staff, when acting to restructure the clinic processes. This 
base of power enabled him to implement changes that were not directly under his control. For 
example, when implementing his computer software on the hospital's IT systems, his expert 
knowledge as a qualified software developer and his status meant that the IT department allowed 
him to proceed, with very little resistance or controls imposed. The Vascular Surgeon suggested 
that this agreement was simply because he demonstrated that he spoke the "same language" as the 
IT staff. 
The Vascular Surgeon suggests that his approach to innovation was based on the need to achieve 
three high level goals: improve the quality of healthcare service; improve the performance of 
healthcare services; and improve the quality of working life of healthcare staff. In the account of 
the project he gives in his book (Dodds 2006), he suggests that these goals drove the progress of 
the project. His belief was that any innovation process in the NHS would only be successful when 
addressing all three of these goals. It is unclear whether this represents a revisionist view of the 
project but is plausible that the Vascular Surgeon guided his actions using a set of heuristics based 
on these core beliefs about innovation in the NHS. 
5.7.2 Clinic nurses 
There were two nurses based in the leg ulcer clinic who played a central role in the project: the 
Specialist Vascular Nurse and a Research Nurse. These two nurses played a significant role in 
implementing the LUTM system and gaining participation in the project by community-based staff. 
The Specialist Vascular Nurse had experience of general and vascular surgery; post-graduate 
nursing qualifications; and nursing research projects. Her clinic role was to co-ordinate the work of 
clinic staff and act as a point of contact for community-based staff. She was encouraged in her role 
to engage in innovation activities and enjoyed involvement in research projects. 
The Research Nurse had been recruited to the clinic on a part-time basis, to carry out commercial 
clinical trials on leg ulcer dressings and to oversee the implementation of the LUTM. She also 
worked as a nurse trainer within the hospital and at the local university, She was interested in 
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promoting evidence-based practice and supported community nurses when carrying out research 
projects, as part of post-graduate nursing qualifications. 
The involvement of the Specialist Vascular Nurse and Research Nurse were important for several 
reasons. First, they brought a nursing perspective to the project that the Vascular Surgeon would 
have been unable to provide. Second, they provided an important link with community-based 
nursing staff. In this role they were both able to provide information, training and general support 
to community -baaed staff. This was crucial to its implantation. Finally, their interest in evidence- 
based practice meant that they were capable and committed to operating the necessary clinical trials 
on the LUTM. 
5.8 Emergent themes 
Several enabling and constraining themes are raised by the case. Figure 5.7 shows how these issues 
act to enable or retard progress of the innovation. 
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5.8.1 Enablers 
Two contextual themes contributed to the purpose and motivation behind the project. At a micro- 
level the operational issues around the leg ulcer service gave staff the motivation to engage with 
change. At a wider level, the modernising forces acting generally in the NHS helped create an 
environment for innovation activity. 
The intrinsic motivation of staff to drive change was based in a professional concern to improve 
patient care but as noted by the Vascular Surgeon the motivation for nursing staff was also their 
own concern for "personal growth and greater responsibility" (Dodds 2006: 17). Their 
entrepreneurial skills were also important, for example, the ability to negotiate resources or link 
research projects. 
Central to the project was the leadership style of the Vascular Surgeon. His strong personality, skill 
set, pragmatic approach and vision strengthened the project and instilled the confidence of other 
team members in the project. He was motivated explicitly by the challenge to effect change and 
improve the running of the clinic. Similarly, the innovation team was strengthened by the 
combination of perspectives brought together from nursing and community-based staff. 
"... a nurse tends to see a whole person in a patient and the wider aspects of personal, 
social and psychological health in their therapeutic relationships. He/she looks in 
depth at how symptoms of illness affect the person and how they may be able to help. 
A doctor on the other hand is more concerned with the particular set of symptoms that 
the patient presents with and a solution to the immediate problem. It was very 
important to get the wording and the emphasis right in the electronic documentation in 
order to satisfy the needs of nurses. They need to know that quality of life issues have 
not been sacrificed in the technical wizardry. " (Research Nurse) 
The role of clinic nurse was important in linking and embedding the use of the LUTM into the 
everyday practice of community-based staff. 
"When recruiting patients into the trial I met the district nurse at the patient's house in 
order to explain the project to them and gain their consent. In meeting the district 
nurses and getting to know them and their `patch' I gained valuable insight into the 
146 
Leg Ulcer Telemedicine System Case Study 
intricacies and difficulties of their work. They in turn were invited to visit us in the 
out-patient vascular clinic to gain a similar insight. This was useful in building up 
relationships and bridging the `Primary/Secondary Care divide'. " (Research Nurse) 
The work of clinic staff was vital in the process of building knowledge of the work of the 
community-based staff and conversely building the knowledge base of community-based staff of 
how the clinic worked. This was a central factor in ensuring the acceptance of the LUTM system. 
5.8.2 Barriers 
In contrast, the barriers to the project from other clinicians and nurses ranged from ambivalence, to 
professional resistance to the LUTM. For example for some community-based staff, the use of 
computers was seen as peripheral to their work as a nurse. A common attitude was that they: 
"... came into nursing to carry out `hands-on' nursing not to sit at a computer. " 
(Research Nurse) 
This was seen as symptomatic of a more general apathy towards the use of computers in nursing 
and the lack of IT skills held by many community-based nurses. The Research Nurse suggested that 
the reasons why some district nurses were reluctant to adopt the system was they tended to work in 
"fire fighting mode" and they had no time to take on work over "basic chores". The LiTTM system 
was seen by these staff as a non essential chore that simply added to their workload with no 
guarantee of added value. However, for some adopting groups the benefits of the system was a 
major force in getting them to overcome computer literacy problems 
It is also evident that the NHS trust provided little explicit support for the project showing little 
commitment to supporting innovation activity. The innovation did however occur before a 
significant infrastructure for innovation support to NHS staff had been put in place in the NHS. 
Though the Vascular Surgeon was vital to the project, the case raises the issue of whether his 
dominance contributed to the limited diffusion of the innovation. The Vascular Surgeon maintained 
control over the project when licensing the LUTM software to other trusts. The question remains 
whether the involvement of an industrial partner, with a different perspective on exploiting the 
initial LUTM concept, might have improved levels of diffusion to other parts of the NHS 
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5.8.3 Creation of a proto-institution 
One of the most notable aspects of this case is the extent to which the Vascular Surgeon and his 
team made radical changes to the leg ulcer service. This change represents not just a modification 
of the process of care but also the institutional framework in which the processes occur. This new 
model represents a revised institutional framework for the treatment of leg ulcers; its limited 
diffusion to other similar clinics suggesting it to be a proto-institution. The case therefore illustrates 
how user-led innovation can lead beyond innovation of hard technology but also innovation of the 
institutions that impact on technology use. 
Table 5.1 illustrates five examples of how institutional carriers have been modified in developing 
the resulting proto-institution. 
Table 5.1: Key differences between the existing institutional framework and the emergent proto- 
institution 
Institutional Category of Existing Institutional Proto-institution 
carrier carrier framework 
Relationship Relational Clearly defined organisational Integrated process that cuts across 
between system boundaries and roles. organisational boundary. 
secondary and 
primary care 
trusts 
Role of GPs Relational GPs maintain control of patient GPs delegate control to 
system referral and oversee care plan community nurses 
Nursing role Routines Generalist skill set with little Nursing role emphasises 
(community) direct contact with secondary care communication with secondary 
staff. ICT skills given low priority. care staff. Increased use of ICT 
Low expectation of ICT use. and encouragement to engage in 
research active. 
Nursing role Routines Little scope for leading service Encouraged to improve treatment 
(Leg ulcer change. through EBP supported by LUTM. 
clinic) Few mechanisms for influencing Direct access to community nurses 
practice of community nurses to influence patient care. 
LUTM Artefact Role of ICT in leg ulcer service ICT given a central role as both a 
poorly defined. communication medium, 
knowledge base and system for 
creating clinical evidence. 
LUTM controlled by and for 
nursing staff 
The most important shift was in the relationship between the primary and secondary care trusts. 
Before the changes, the two trusts had very clearly defined boundaries and formal lines of 
communication. The treatment of leg ulcer patients was based on referral by GPs to the hospital 
and then on completion of an assessment, care would be passed back into control of the community 
staff. The relational system between the two trusts was characterised as having clear boundaries 
with responsibility for care passing from one side of the boundary to another. In the proto- 
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institution created in the boundary was blurred. There was much greater interaction of staff 
between the trusts at both a formal and informal level. 
Related to the change in the relationship between the trusts was a shift in the role of GPs in the 
system. Previously the GPs had maintained control of the process holding the responsibility for 
referral and tracking of patient's progress, In the new proto-institution, much of this responsibility 
was delegated to community-nurses. 
The proto-institution reflected a modification of the role of community nursing staff. Previously 
this role had emphasised a generalist set of caring skills. In the proto-institution the role of 
community nurses was enriched to include an expectation of ICT skills and usage, with the aim of 
improving their communication with clinic staff. This in turn enabled staff to gain the specialist 
skills need for their patients. Part of their new role was to engage in the development of evidence- 
based practice, for example through running research projects or responding to emerging clinical 
evidence. 
The role in the leg ulcer clinic of specialist nurses was also modified in the proto-institution. The 
new role was enlarged to include support of the community-based staff. This implied use of ICT in 
the form of the LUTM, for which they were given responsibility and ownership. This role also 
extended to contributing to the building of a knowledge base to support evidence-based practice. 
The LUTM was the central technological artefact that underpinned the proto-institution. It was 
important, as previously ICT had no significant role in supporting patient care. The LUTM enabled 
communication across the care process and acted as a knowledge repository. Its ownership by the 
nursing staff in both the clinic and community was vital to its acceptance, while allowing both GPs 
and some hospital consultants to reduce their involvement in the leg ulcer service. 
The role of both formal and informal institutions is central to understanding the user-led innovation 
process in the clinic. The agency of staff, in particular the Vascular Surgeon, took place within 
frameworks set by various existing institutions. Some of these frameworks imposed limits on the 
agency of staff, while others actively empowered or supported the agency of staff. 
The two formal organisations that had a fundamental influence on the innovation were the primary 
and acute care organisations that the leg ulcer service worked across. These influenced the project 
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through the regulative function they served. The root of the problem in leg ulcer care was caused 
by the discontinuity created by a single process being delivered across two organisations. The two 
organisations were both operationally focused and had very little resource to invest in research or 
innovation activities to bring about long term improvements in efficiency or effectiveness. It was in 
this context that the user-led innovation developed, with little centralised support or governance for 
the innovative activity. The project was separate from the formal strategies and plans of both 
organisations, but this separation enabled the team to operate autonomously. The agency of staff to 
make changes to the clinic processes were not limited by the "unofficial" nature of the project; for 
example relocation of specialist staff into the clinic area was negotiated by the Vascular Surgeon. 
The primary and acute organisations can be characterised as setting institutional constraints on the 
innovation through creation of regulative structures; these were however overcome through agency 
of the staff. 
Professional organisations and the professions that they served were important institutional 
influences on the project. The Vascular Surgeon had a dual set of skills in medicine and computer 
science, both legitimised by professional qualifications. This allowed him to work legitimately in 
the areas of both vascular surgery and software development. 
Change in the role of nurses in the service was supported by existing institutional structures. The 
nurses' professional bodies set out the expectation that they combine the role of carers with that of 
reflective practitioners involved in systematic improvement of clinical practice. Many of the clinic 
and community nurses were enthusiastic and skilled in operating clinical trials of new approaches. 
This enthusiasm was often based in their pursuit of further professional university-based 
qualifications. 
However, two institutions exerted significant normative and social-cognitive influence on the 
innovation process. First, the institution of evidence-based medicine (EBM) has influenced the 
innovation process. EBM is an institution that has a strong influence on all aspects of modem 
medicine. It comprises a coherent and widely accepted set of methodologies for developing 
scientifically validated knowledge to inform patient care. The role of EBM has been crucial in 
validating the telemedicine system through the conduct of clinical trials, this approach to evaluating 
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clinical technologies is widely recognised as legitimate, providing "gold standard" evidence of its 
effectiveness. The design of the LUTM has also been influenced by EBM. Much of the data stored 
in the LUTM is used to provide information that itself supports an evidence-based approach to 
development of leg ulcer care. The institution of EBM has therefore been an enabler of change and 
a source of legitimation. 
A second important institution is the community providing leg ulcer care services. This is a 
community of practice made up of staff from many organisations providing leg ulcer treatment. 
Loosely connected and geographically dispersed, the community is unified by their engagement 
with the professional and academic discourses on leg ulcer treatment. The Good Hope case 
highlights how the user-led innovation relied on reconfiguration of technologies and processes, 
many of which had been developed over a long period of time. The LLTTM system made use of or 
built upon many ideas already in the discourse of leg ulcer treatment. From an institutional 
perspective, this community of practice provided legitimate knowledge on which to base the 
innovation. 
The proto-institution of leg ulcer treatment is central feature of the Good Hope clinic and the 
smaller number of other clinics it has been licensed to. The LUTM encapsulates many of the 
features of the proto-institution and so it's diffusion to other sites has potential to institutionalise the 
knowledge created within the project. Unfortunately, the project is at a crucial stage where the 
proto-institution has been proved to be effective, yet until widely institutionalised it will have little 
impact on the effectiveness leg ulcer treatment in the wider NHS. This suggests that a critical point 
in user-led innovation is when a proto-institution has been developed. At this point, the path of the 
project may need to shift to enable the wider diffusion of a proto-institution, for example, through 
creation of industrial partnerships or even a change in leadership with the project. 
5.8.4 Innovation as bricolage 
The approach taken to innovation this case suggests that user-innovators are often in a position to 
either apply existing technologies or where necessary, create new technologies that fill perceived 
gaps. The Vascular Surgeon "borrowed" much from the general discourse on leg ulcer care. This 
meant that in reorganising the clinic he relied on developments that had been tested elsewhere. In 
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other cases however, he developed original solutions, most notably in the case of the LUTM and 
the care pathway simulator. The process of user-led innovation in this case illustrates the process of 
innovation as bricolage (Garud and Karnoe 2001). 
The decision on whether to adopt an existing technology or whether to create a new technology 
was very much down to the Vascular Surgeon, with the resulting innovation a hybrid of existing 
and new technologies. For example, he consciously adopted soft technology, such as the shared- 
care model, and hard technology, such as digital cameras and other computer hardware. In contrast, 
he consciously rejected existing telemedicine systems and process improvement software, as they 
did no adequately fit the solution he was building, writing his own software to fill the gap. 
5.9 Summary 
This is a complex example of user-led innovation which demonstrates many important attributes of 
user-led innovation and the processes through which it occurs. The innovation had several foci: 
computer software, clinical procedures and knowledge management processes. At its heart was the 
LUTM system itself, a software system. The success of this hard technology however is coupled 
with the transformation of the processes of leg ulcer care across both the hospital and community- 
based organisations; it is an example of an innovation that has dramatically improved the 
effectiveness of processes crossing between secondary and primary care organisations. User-led 
innovation in the case has been holistically focused on the whole technology system, rather than 
simply focused on a single device or procedure. This is illustrated in the development of the CPS in 
which the software was used by staff to support their learning about the system in which they 
worked. 
The case demonstrates that to understand the complexity of user-led innovation it is necessary to 
recognise that both hard and soft technologies are the focus of innovation. Their innovation is 
conditioned by structural factors such as organisational structures, professional roles etc. however; 
user-led innovation can lead to alteration and renewal of these institutional structures. The case has 
demonstrated that the innovation resulted in the localised formation of a new institutional structure, 
the proto-institution of leg ulcer care. This new structure (see Table S. 1) defined new: relationships 
between organisations; staff; skill sets; and norms for communication and knowledge sharing. It is 
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apparent that the proto-institution was of equal importance to other aspects of the innovation such 
as the LUTM and raises the issue that diffusion of the proto-institution is equally as critical as 
diffusion of hardware and software. 
The case illustrated a range of approaches to both development and evaluation. Evaluation in 
particular was shown to be done in a range of ways, to serve multiple purposes. But most starkly is 
the organic nature of the process. Furthermore, the processes of development and evaluation have 
also been shown to be critical to the local adoption of the innovations. The process though 
idiosyncratic and dominated by a single individual has achieved a level of acceptance and use that 
centrally planned innovations may well have failed to achieve. 
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Chapter 6: ePAQ Case Study 
6.1 Introduction 
This case study outlines the development of an electronic questionnaire system to support the 
assessment of patients' symptoms prior to clinical interviews between consultants and patients in 
uro-gynaeocology clinics. The project was innovative because for the first time a simple to use 
computer-based questionnaire was developed that could be with uro-gynaecology patients. The 
resulting system was innovative in that it also incorporated a questionnaire builder, allowing 
questionnaires for other disorders to be easily created, maintained and incorporated into the system. 
An unintended outcome of the project was that the questionnaire prepared patients for the 
conversation they had during the clinical interview. The use of the questionnaire by staff in the 
primary care setting has also improved the process of triaging and referring patients to the uro- 
gynaecological department. The system has resulted in the development of a new commercial 
service designed to allow the questionnaire to be used by other NHS hospitals. 
6.2 Data collection for the case study 
The data for this case study was collected through eight semi-structured interviews and a review of 
literature associated with the project. The sequence of the interviews was defined by the 
availability of staff. The interviews took place over a number of weeks with clarification of queries 
raised in the interview done by email. Table 6.1 lists the participants interviewed for this case 
study. 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format using the standard interview schedule (Appendix 
1). All interviews were recorded with the interviewer making additional contemporaneous notes 
during and immediately after the interviews. All participants appeared relaxed and comfortable 
about discussing the project, however the researcher sensed that some participants, predominantly 
relatively junior members of staff, seemed uneasy about being critical of the project. This may have 
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made their accounts of the project slightly skewed. On the whole, the researcher felt confident that 
the participants' responses were based on thoughtful and genuine responses to the questions. All 
participants seemed to take part in the interviews enthusiastically and seemed to enjoy being given 
the opportunity to reflect on the project. 
Published literature by staff associated with the project was also reviewed for the case (Bradshaw 
et al. 2006; Hiller, Bradshaw et al. 2002; Hiller, Radley et al. 2002; Radley and Brown 2005; 
Radley and Jones 2004; Radley et al. 2006). 
Table 6.1: List of narticinants in the ePAQ case study 
Participant Abbreviation 
Consultant Uro- Consultant A Consultant A started working at the Royal Hallamshire 
gynaecologist Hospital in Sheffield in 2000. Consultant A was the user- 
innovator who created and developed the innovation. 
Senior Consultant Uro- Consultant B Consultant B was the senior uro-gynaecologist in the 
gynaecologist department. Consultant B had used ePAQ for several years 
and had acted as a champion for the project. 
Systems Development SDM The SDM was the System Development Manager for the 
Manager Department of Obstetrics, Gynaecology and Neonatalology". 
His main roles were to oversee the maintenance and operation 
of existing information systems in the department; develop 
new systems both in-house, or using outside suppliers; and to 
look at the management of data within the directorate. 
Senior Sister The Senior Sister became involved in the ePAQ project when 
the system was first brought to the Uro-gynaecology 
Department and used with patients prior to them meeting the 
consultant. She had responsibility for the introduction of the 
use of ePAQ in the clinic. This involved training both staff 
and patients in how to use the system and managing the 
patient consent process. 
Research Nurse The research nurse was brought into the project in 2003, at the 
point where clinical trials of the ePAQ were being carried out 
in GP practices and health centres, though some of the trial 
was based in the hospital clinic. She had worked on the 
project for 1 day a week, mainly during phase 2. 
Scientific Computing SCG The Scientific Computing Group (SCG) was a section within 
Group the Medical Physics Department of the Royal Hallamshire 
Hospital. The Medical Physics Department had a general 
interest in development of imaging and instrumentation 
technologies. The Scientific Computing Group, as well as 
being involved in computing applications for instrumentation, 
had a history of being involved in the development of 
applications for use within the hospital, primarily based 
around Access databases for administrative systems. 
Software House SUD The SHD was the founder and director of Illuminaries Ltd, the 
Director (SHD) company chosen as the industrial partner on the development 
of ePAQ system. 
Technology Transfer TTM The TTM worked for Medipex Ltd., the NHS innovation hub 
Manager that provided technology transfer support to the project. 
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6.3 Urogynaecology and patient administered questionnaires 
Urogynaecology is the "... branch of medicine concerned with the urological problems [such as 
urinary incontinence] of women. " (Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary) An important area of 
urogynaecology is pelvic floor medicine, which is concerned with symptoms of bowel and/or 
urinary dysfunction. 
A characteristic of pelvic floor disorders is that specific symptoms have a number of interrelated 
causes. For example, urogenital prolapse may cause a variety of symptoms including: constipation; 
anal and urinary incontinence; and sexual dysfunction. In order to understand fully a patient's 
problem the clinician needs to ask the patient a comprehensive range of questions. Unfortunately, it 
is common for patients, many of whom are elderly, to find it embarrassing to discuss the symptoms 
associated with pelvic floor disorders. Consequently, clinical interviews are complicated by 
patients' reticence to discuss intimate details, especially with a male doctor. It is therefore common 
for patients, due to embarrassment, to provide incomplete accounts of symptoms during a clinical 
interview. This raised concerns about the reliability of data gained from patients during clinical 
interviews. 
An important theme in urogynaecological interviews is the need for the clinician to make both 
objective and subjective assessments. The subjective assessments are often based on the need to 
asses the extent to which a symptom affects a patient's quality of life (QoL), as it is common for 
patients to react to certain symptoms differently. For example, sexual dysfunction may be 
unimportant to a woman who is no longer sexually active. 
The diagnosis of uro-gynaecological problems relies on clinicians gaining detailed information 
from the patient, so that the nature of the problem and the extent to which it is troublesome to the 
patient are established. The clinician is able to develop an appropriate treatment plan only on the 
basis of a reliable assessment of these two factors. Figure 6.1 shows the relation of clinical 
interviews within the overall process of uro-gynaecological treatment process. 
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Figure 6.1: Clinical interviews within the overall process of uro-gynaecological treatment 
Referral of patients to hospital urogynaccology clinics is normally by the patient's GP. It is 
however conunon for other primary care staff to refer patients, for example incontinence nurses. 
Unfortunately, due to the range of symptoms that patients present with, it is not always possible for 
primary care staff to identify precisely the best specialism to which to refer the patient. This means 
that patients are not always referred directly to the urogynaecology clinic. This has caused the 
referral process to be inefficient. 
Once referred to an uro-gynaecology clinic diagnosis requires both a medical and quality of life 
assessment. An initial consultation will usually involve tests, such as an uro-dynamics analysis and 
bladder scan. It will then involve the patient having a clinical interview with a consultant. Several 
options exist for treatment ol'patients including surgery counselling and community-based 
interventions such as physiotherapy and. 
The effective handling of the clinical interview is central to a successful diagnosis process of all 
gynaecological conditions. The sensitive nature of the symptoms is however problematic with 
some patients hiding and not discussing symptoms due to embarrassment. The impact of symptoms 
on quality of life also varies between patients. For example, in the case of incontinence, some 
patients may perceive the quality of life as greatly affected by the symptoms; while others will cope 
well and feel quality of life is unaffected. Quality-of-life assessment is an important part of a 
patient's assessment as it informs choice of treatment strategy. 
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6.4 Overview of the innovation 
The development of ePAQ representeds an emergent innovation project that, over several stages, 
developed an initial concept along several related paths (see Figure 6.2). The innovation was 
developed by Consultant A, a consultant uro-gynaecologist at the Royal liallamshire Hospital in 
Sheffield. Consultant A devised the initial idea and then led the subsequent development. 
Prolapse Questionaire 
Computer-based Questionnaire 
Questionnaire Builder Software 
Tool 
Capability for creating and 
supporting other questionnaires 
Web Interface 
L Managed Service 
) 
Figure 6.2: Innovation created by the project 
6.4.1 Pelvic Floor assessment questionnaire 
------ --- -- 
structured Triage and Clinical 
interview service 
Revised primary-secondary 
care relationship 
The first development was a questionnaire for gathering symptoms of prolapse. The questionnaire 
was to be administered to patients prior to a clinical interview with a consultant uro-gynaccologist. 
The questionnaire was notable as it represented a way of gathering accurate, valid and reliable data 
that was often difficult to elicit during an interview. The use of questionnaires to elicit information 
about symptoms was not novel, however the development of a questionnaire for prolapse was a 
new development. The questionnaire combined questions relating to medical and QoL factors 
relating to prolapse. 
At the start of the innovation process Consultant A perceived the purpose of'the paper-based 
questionnaire in very simple terms. The original intention ofthe questionnaire was to try to assess 
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and monitor patients during their treatment. Its value was to identify what was bothering the patient 
most and diagnosing underlying problems. By developing the questionnaire, Consultant A was 
attempting to augment the data collected within clinical interviews. He felt that the data collected 
using the questionnaire was different to the inherently unreliable data collected in a clinical 
interview. 
The questionnaire was then combined with several other questionnaires produced by staff at other 
hospitals. The resulting questionnaire covered the core areas of pelvic floor medicine and 
represented a comprehensive data collection instrument to support clinical research into pelvic 
floor symptoms, and the effect of surgical interventions. The questionnaire had colour-coded 
sections and was very large, amounting to about 40 sides of A4 paper. It was used with patients in 
the hospital clinic and by post. However, it had little clinical value, as it was oriented to collecting 
valid and reliable data for research outcomes. 
... it was of no use whatsoever as a clinical tool, you could not read it 
during the 
course of the clinical interview, it would be like trying to read a novel while talking to 
a patient. Then after that you have a pile of data that is on paper, while where you 
really wanted it is on the database. (Consultant A) 
6.4.2 The computerised questionnaire 
The second stage of development was of an electronic version of the questionnaire, used on a touch 
screen computer. The electronic pelvic-floor assessment questionnaire (ePAQ) used a complex set 
of rules for routing the patient through the questionnaire. The advantage of ePAQ was that it was 
quick to complete, as irrelevant sections of automatically bypassed. In addition, the software could 
rapidly analyse and present the results to the consultant, in a clear summarised form. An example 
of the report relating to how symptoms relate to a patients quality of life is shown in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3: Summary report from ePAQ® indicating impact of symptoms on quality of life 
A comprehensive help system had been incorporated into ePAQ. This provided the patient with 
information on pelvic-floor symptoms and disorders, while they were completing the questionnaire. 
Consultant A found that an unanticipated outcome of using the questionnaire was that it improved 
the experience of the clinical interview for the patient, making them better prepared to discuss 
intimate issues. Consultant A was surprised by the extent to which patients found the questionnaire 
helpful, empowering and enjoyable. 
... I 
did not expect it to he as good and helpful to patients as it worked out, I suppose I 
was doing it from my clinical practice and okay, if it is good for my clinical practice, 
it is good for my patients, but I was not quite [expecting how the questionnaire was]... 
empowering patients and making them better prepared for the clinical interview, that 
was slightly unexpected and the enjoyment of the questionnaire unexpected as well... 
and now getting onto health ecnomics... potentially using this online, before the 
patient even gets to my clinic, that had not occurred to me before. (Consultant A) 
Nursing staff involved with using ePAQ highlighted its impart on the patient's experience ol'the 
clinical interview. Patients were generally very anxious women and the ePAQ provided a means of' 
acclimatising; the patient to the type ol'questions likely to he asked in the clinical interview. The 
ePAQ modified the consultation process so that nurses had an opportunity to explain to patients 
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what and why certain issues would be discussed during the clinical interview, allowing patients to 
think about these issues in advance of the interview, The ePAQ enabled patients to communicate to 
the consultant that they did not want to discuss certain issues. 
Nursing staff believed ePAQ significantly reduced the anxiety of patients during clinical 
interviews. Use of ePAQ was important in helping patients understand the inter-relationship 
between various symptoms and medical issues. This lead to patients experiencing the clinic as 
addressing the "whole problem" rather than individual issues. Patients were better placed to 
provide information about their symptoms, first via the ePAQ and then during the interview. The 
ePAQ was therefore not simply a system for gathering information on symptoms but aided the 
patient in expressing their symptoms precisely and comprehensively to clinicians. 
The use of ePAQ was also accepted in the primary care setting where staff, including GPs and 
practice nurses, were better placed to refer patients directly to the ePAQ, shortening the patient 
journey. The success of ePAQ in the primary care sector was reported to be because patients were 
generally happier and more candid when talking about uro-gynaecology problems to practice 
nurses, with whom they had already built up a good relationship. 
6.4.3 Development of the questionnaire builder 
The development of the electronic questionnaire was predominantly in-house and had taken the 
form of a prototyping process. It became clear that the questionnaire had two weaknesses. First, it 
was difficult to maintain, making it difficult to extend or modify. Second, the questionnaire could 
not easily be modified for use in other areas of health in which sensitive information needed to be 
elicited from patients, such as the area of mens' health. In response to these two issues, the 
questionnaire was reverse engineered so that it could be split into two distinct parts, the 
questionnaire itself and a software-based questionnaire builder. The questionnaire builder allowed 
a rule-based questionnaire structure to be applied easily when building other clinical 
questionnaires. This stage of development was taken over by a software house in partnership with 
Consultant A. 
The redevelopment of the software in this way then allowed further refinement of the questionnaire 
system. This resulted first in the development of a web-based interface for the system. This was an 
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important development as it allowed the questionnaire to be administered to patients away from 
hospital clinics for the first time. The web-interface enabled patients to complete the questionnaire 
at home and for the results to be accessed by clinicians at an early stage in the referral process. 
The development of the web interface for the questionnaire also opened up an opportunity for 
providing the electronic questionnaire application as a managed service. This entailed running the 
software on a server operated by the software house. NHS trusts could then buy into the service, 
without the need to invest in either extra equipment or operational costs. 
6.4.4 Service changes 
The use of the electronic questionnaire has had two effects on the service provided. First, the 
consultation process between the patient and the consultant has been modified. The use of ePAQ 
has changed both the nature and role of the clinical interview, by preparing patients emotionally 
and providing them better information prior to the interview. This has made the clinical interview 
more focused and open. The likelihood of patients hiding symptoms out of embarrassment has to 
some extent been ameliorated. 
Second, the relationship between primary and secondary care has been modified by enabling more 
effective triage of patients into the uro-gynaecology clinic. The availability of the ePAQ within 
community clinics and on the internet has bridged the divide been primary and acute services. 
Referral of patients by primary care staff can take place earlier and more reliably when supported 
with the ePAQ. 
6.4.5 Clinical problem. 
Despite the organic development of the ePAQ project, it is possible to define the clinical problems 
addressed by ePAQ. At the start of the project, the clinical problem was narrowly focused but by 
the end, the clinical problems addressed by the innovation could be viewed on three levels 
addressing: medical informatics for urogynaecology; clinical practice of urogynaecology staff; and 
supporting the clinical interview with urogynaecology patients. Figure 6.4 shows the main 
dimensions to the clinical problem addressed by ePAQ. 
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Figure 6.4: Clinical problem addressed by EPAQ 
6.4.6 Extent of the innovation's Implementation 
The ePAQ was successfully implemented into the uro-gynaecology clinic at the hospital and at 
several community clinics. A web-based ePAQ service has also been introduced. The eI'AQ system 
has been recognized as important and in 2006 was winner of the I-lealthcarc IT award. 
6.5 Stages in the innovation process 
The innovation process tüllowed by ePAQ's development can be split into three phases. The first 
phase was concerned with developing the initial paper-based questionnaire. The second phase 
involved the development of the electronic questionnaire (ePAQ). The third phase can be seen as 
where the ePAQ development was shifted frone within the hospital context to an industrial partner, 
Illuminarics Ltd. It was during this phase that the ePAQ system was re-engineered as a robust piece 
of'software that could be operated on a standalone computer or as a web-based application. In 
addition, the industrial partner was in a position to provide a more formalised support mechanism 
for the system. 
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Figure 6.5: Three phases of the ePAQ innovation process 
6.5.1 Phase 1: developing the questionnaire 
The idea liar the innovation started off when as a registrar, Consultant A began research into quality 
of life measurement in routine clinical practice. I-le felt that while Qol indicators were used in 
clinical research, including clinical trails, they were not used effectively in guiding the decisions 
made by clinicians in their day to day treatment of patients. 
On becoming a consultant, he identified that in his area of urogynaccology, the main challenge was 
to embed objective measures ol'patient's symptoms and quality of life assessments, within clinical 
practice. Ile recognised that many outcome measures for treatment had been developed for research 
and were accepted as accurate, valid and reliable. They provided an opportunity to gain good 
quality data about patients. Consultant A then used these ideas to develop a questionnaire for 
women with prolapse. This was later ternned the Sheffield Prolapse Questionnaire. Consultant A 
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felt that the questionnaire was limited but represented a good idea, as there were no other existing 
instruments for measuring symptoms. 
The Sheffield Prolapse Questionnaire was narrow in scope and focused only on prolapse. 
Consultant A was conscious that the area of pelvic floor medicine had many aspects, with women 
often presenting with a number of symptoms. These might include prolapse, incontinence and 
sexual problems. For this reason, it was a natural step to develop the questionnaire so it would 
cover a wider range of conditions relevant to pelvic floor medicine. Consultant A combined the 
Sheffield Prolapse Questionnaire with two other questionnaires; one that was developed to assess 
bowel and urinary tract symptoms; another questionnaire assessed sexual function. 
The result was the development of a comprehensive questionnaire for assessing pelvic floor 
symptoms. It was limited as its length made it time consuming for the patient to complete, and it 
was difficult for the clinicians to analyse quickly. However, the initial phase represented the 
development of a questionnaire that collected valid and reliable data, suitable for supporting 
clinical research. It was however too awkward to use as a clinical tool. 
6.5.2 Phase 2: developing a computer-based questionnaire 
The second phase of development involved the refinement of the questionnaire from a paper format 
to a computer-based format. 
Initial idea 
Consultant A believed that the second phase of the project was based on a "eureka moment" that he 
had while entering data from the paper-based questionnaires onto a computer database. The insight 
he realised at that moment combined a number of principles that focused the next phase of 
development. The principles were based on: 
  Create an opportunity to apply technology by allowing the patient to enter the data 
themselves. 
  Develop a higher level of interaction between the patient and the questionnaire. First by the 
use of screening questions that would allow parts of the questionnaire to be bypassed, 
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based on the response of the patient. Second, allowing patients to identify areas that they 
would prefer not to talk about during the clinical interview. 
  Implementation of a help system that would allow the patient to gain information about 
terms used in the questionnaire. This would allow the questionnaire to have a role in 
informing the patient about pelvic floor disorders and treatments. 
  Automation of the questionnaire analysis. This would allow faster analysis and would 
allow the results to be produced as scores or in graphical format. Rapid analysis would then 
allow the clinician to consider the questionnaire result as part of the clinical interview. 
Improved presentation of the results would make the information more accusable to both 
clinician and patient. 
It was these principles that drove the next phase of development and underpinned a wider vision for 
the questionnaire. 
... it could be a very good model for healthcare assessment in other areas: men's 
health... and other tricky areas... such as drug and alcohol addiction. (Consultant A) 
Evaluation of the principles and vision for the progress of the project were not formerly evaluated; 
but adopted due to Consultant A's conviction that they represented the way forward for the project. 
I absolutely knew this was a good idea... I just sat there thinking this has got to be a 
good idea and I did visualise the simple, user-friendly instrument [suitable for]... even 
a little old lady who has never used a computer before. (Consultant A) 
Based on the vision that Consultant A had developed for the questionnaire the development process 
proceeded based on a prototyping approach, During phase two distinct prototypes were developed. 
The development team for the first prototype was small, but was then extended to produce the 
second prototype. 
Developing the idea through prototyping: Prototype 1 
The first prototype was the product of medical student's project, suggested by Consultant A. The 
student was a self-confessed "computer geek" and was enthusiastic to carry out the project with the 
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aim of developing an electronic version of the pelvic floor questionnaire. Consultant A defined a 
minimal specification for the system: 
  one question per screen; 
  help page links; 
 a specific look and feel; 
 a simple unified structure; 
and report generating facility at the end. 
During the project, the medical student carried out a literature review of some existing online 
questionnaires. Consultant A felt that based on this review, it was: 
... clear that in healthcare it [online interviewing] has not taken off, it has not worked, 
it has not become universal for one reason or another. (Consultant A) 
In contrast, several critical factors aided the project's success. 
... what we did with the ePAQ, with the simplicity of approach... one question per 
page... designed to work with a little old lady... uniformity of approach... focusing 
on turning a research outcome measure into a clinical tool and making it user-friendly, 
feasible and useful was what we were doing felt right and I did not feel anything else 
out there really did that... certainly not in my field. (Consultant A) 
Consultant A requested approximately 6 weeks support for the medical student from the Scientific 
Computing Group (SCG), a software development group based within the Medical Physics 
Department of the hospital. The purpose of this support was to develop a suitable computer 
database to underpin the electronic questionnaire. A post-doctoral software developer was 
assigned, though no charge was made for his time. The motive for providing the support was that 
the SCG were interested in building development capability within their department specifically for 
medical questionnaires. They thought the opportunity to build a generic questionnaire database 
would be useful to them in the future. 
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The result of the student project was the first working prototype of the electronic questionnaire 
(ePAQ) and was produced with minimal cost and resource. Despite this Consultant A felt that the 
initial prototype: 
... translated these ideas into reality, fairly quickly actually, and very effectively, I 
would say as at the end of the day we had a working model. (Consultant A) 
The initial prototype embodied many of the key features of the later versions. Two trials were then 
carried out using the prototype. 
The first trial was on a maternity patient group, who represented a coherent group of potential 
users. The group compared use of the paper and electronic versions of the questionnaire. The ePAQ 
was received very positively. 
A second trial of the ePAQ was carried out in the hospital's clinic. This trial focused on issues to 
do with whether the system was: difficult; too long; upsetting; enjoyable; and whether it helped 
support communication with the doctor. The results of this study were of some surprise: 
... I was not expecting it to be quite so positive from the patients themselves. They 
were actually enjoying using it, and they felt it helped them communicate, and felt it 
improved the clinical episode... never mind my views on it, I obviously thought it was 
great as I was getting all this wonderful data... but they actually thought it was a 
positive experience. (Consultant A) 
This showed ePAQ's potential for improving the communication in clinical interviews between 
patient and consultant. Typical comments specifically focused on how ePAQ was helpful in getting 
patients to think about their condition and to communicate better during the clinical interview. 
The development of the first prototype was very informal. It is unlikely that the wider hospital 
management were aware of the development, and the project was not part of any centrally planned 
initiative. However, it was crucial in establishing proof of concept for ePAQ. The validity of the 
first prototype was assessed through gut feeling, professional judgement and rigorous trial based on 
formal research protocols (Radley et al. 2006). 
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Prototype 2 
Based on the success of the first prototype, Consultant A gained several small grants from external 
organisations, such as pharma companies. This was used to fund a second phase of prototype 
development. This phase followed a more formal process in which a development effort by the 
SCG was charged for and the development team enlarged to include other specialists. 
The role of SCG staff continued but with the software developer's time being formerly 
commissioned and paid for by the external funding. The developer was an enthusiastic member of 
staff who spent a significant amount of time, outside of normal working hours, developing the 
software; this unpaid effort significantly subsidised development costs. 
The development team was extended to include a medical statistician and a professor of medicine 
(who was also a GP). The extended group was important in highlighting the wider potential of 
ePAQ and identifying how it could be developed to encompass other existing quality of life 
questionnaires. The development of the second prototype required implementation into the normal 
operation of the hospital department and so nursing staff joined the development team. 
The second prototype used a touch screen and provided a better user interface. It was then used in 
an extended clinical trial based in both the hospital clinic and the community, supported by a 
research nurse. The research nurse was responsible for recruiting patients to the trial and supporting 
practice nurses in the use of the ePAQ. During this trial, it was found that the interface was 
intuitive to use and it was rare for additional training to be needed for staff or patients. 
The results of the extended trial established the repeatability and reliability of the ePAQ and 
validated its use in both primary and secondary care settings. It confirmed that it was suitable for 
day-to-day clinic use. The trial also clarified the role of the ePAQ; 
  as a diagnostic system that could be used effectively as a supplement to normal clinical 
interviews, eliciting more reliable information from the patient and subjecting them to 
lower levels of embarrassment; 
  as an audit tool to allow the monitoring of the patient's condition pre and post procedure 
condition and response to treatment. 
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Summary of Phase 2 
The prototyping approach to the development of ePAQ resulted in a robust, validated and well 
conceived electronic questionnaire system. By the end of this period of development, ePAQ had 
been implemented in the hospital clinic and was integrated into the day to day operation of the 
clinic. 
Consultant A was however aware that in order to diffuse the system into other hospital departments 
the ePAQ system needed to be developed further. In particular, the software needed to have a 
robust system for its maintenance and support. It also had to have a legitimate status with hospital 
IT departments. 
... if I wanted to give the software to another unit, they would not 
be interested in 
taking something that my Sheffield IT department had developed. A trust IT 
department would not let anything like that on the system, it would not happen. 
Similarly, I don't know what the liabilities are, but you do not have to have much 
imagination to think what if?... who was going to guarantee the software?... who was 
going to maintain the software?... when something goes wrong, who is going to 
answer the phone? (Consultant A) 
Consultant A felt that by developing ePAQ with an established software house, the system would 
be legitimised in the eyes of potential users. It was this imperative that drove the third phase of the 
development. 
6.5.3 Phase 3: developing a web-based questionnaire 
Phase 3 of the ePAQ project was where a shift occurred to the involvement of organisations 
external to the NHS. This was a much more externally focused phase of the project. Key events 
were the involvement of an NHS innovation hub, creation of a spin-out company and partnership 
with a private sector software house. The ePAQ system itself was reverse engineered and rewritten. 
A new business model for the system has emerged that had potential to support the growth in user 
adoption. 
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Decision to outsource development 
The third phase of development was initially planned to be carried out in-house within the SCG, by 
appointing a research assistant over a two to three year period. The objective was to consolidate on 
the development already completed, re-engineer the prototype to allow its routine use within 
clinical settings and to develop the underlying database structure so it could be easily adapted to 
other clinical areas. Despite the involvement of senior hospital trust managers and high level 
support in the trust for the project, no development funding could be agreed, resulting in the halting 
of any in-house development. The only option was for the project to involve external partners in 
the development of ePAQ. 
It was at this point that Consultant A approached the local NHS innovation hub, Medipex Ltd. 
Medipex then played a crucial role in the project. First, by establishing the formal ownership of 1P 
related to the project. This was a complicated task due to various parties having had a stake in the 
development effort. Ownership of IP in the project was unclear and rested between Consultant A, 
the trust, the software developer and other third parties. The second role was to search for a suitable 
business partner to engineer the software. The partnership with Medipex was important as it 
contributed a significant level of business planning expertise to the project. 
After some negotiation, a local software house, Illuminaries Ltd was identified as a partner for the 
project. Consultant A believed several criteria were important to the decision. The first was that the 
company was located close to the hospital. Consultant A wanted to work closely with someone in 
Sheffield, rather than in another part of the country. Second, the company had existing links to the 
NHS and the hospital projects. Finally, Medipex were recommended the collaboration. 
As a result of searching for a partner a spin-out company was formed, ePAQ Systems Ltd, that 
would control the future development ePAQ. The company represented a partnership between the 
hospital trust (40%); Medipex (5%); Consultant A (40%), and Illuminaries Ltd (15%). The new 
company owned the IP rights associated with ePAQ comprising: the questionnaire; the software; 
any new future questionnaires. 
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Role of I! luminarie.. in developing ePAQ 
The involvement of Illuminaries signalled a change in the way the development of cPAQ 
progressed. Their involvement marked a greater emphasis on software engineering of the system, 
to ensure its scalahility and reliability. The focus of the development, while maintaining the clinical 
perspective, emphasised the need to produce industrial strength software. Most importantly, the 
Illuminaries' involvement led to the innovation taking on a different trajectory. Illuminaries used 
the second prototype developed by the SCG as a throwaway prototype and proceeded to reverse 
engineer the system. Figure 6.6 shows how the development proceeded. 
Prototype 2 
I Re-engineered ePAQ system 
Pelvic Floor Questionnaire) 
ePAQ Engine 
ý-º( Interface r---N Web interface 
Questionnaire builder 
Version control 
Question sequence logic 
New Service 
Packages 
-ý 
Hosted Service 
Questionnaire design 
upport and distribution 
Figure 6.6: Developing on from the throwaway prototype 
Once development of ePAQ had been taken over by Illuminaries the type of development and its 
direction changed. The first stage of Illuminaries' development focused on the reverse engineering 
of the prototype. This was done for two reasons. '['he first to separate out the questionnaire from the 
sequence logic that had been hardcoded into the ePAQ system. Second, through reverse 
engineering the system could migrate to a more robust and scalable software environment. 
The result of the reverse engineering was that the ePAQ system was redeveloped into discrete 
components. A questionnaire builder was developed that would allow several distinct 
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questionnaires to be developed with their own sets of questions and sequence logic. The interface 
design was reviewed and redeveloped, ultimately leading to a web-based version of ePAQ. 
The involvement of Illuminaries also resulted in the innovation taking a new trajectory. When the 
development was done within the hospital, the primary driver for development was the ePAQ's 
operation from a clinical perspective. In contrast, Illuminaries introduced a second focus based on 
the concern to implement and support the system across several sites. This was a concern for 
Illuminaries as they were only a small software house, with relatively little resource available for 
software support. Consequently, development of ePAQ focused on scalability. This development 
would ultimately result in ePAQ being offered as a hosted-service, in which hospitals would 
purchase its use using servers hosted and controlled by Illuminaries. This represented the point 
where ePAQ became a commercial service rather than simply a software package. 
Illuminaries took a significant development role in applying the ePAQ concept to other specialist 
areas. While Consultant A had recognised the scope for abstracting the EPAQ concept to other 
areas, the development of the questionnaire builder and the hosted service opened up the potential 
for this to happen. This was an important development for Illuminaries as it would then offer the 
opportunity to offer a service to specialist groups allowing them to develop their own 
questionnaires, which in turn could be licensed for use at other sites via the hosted service. 
An area of development that was not pursued in Phase 3 was the integration of the ePAQ system to 
any NHS systems. While it was possible to develop interfaces with hospital patient administration 
systems, it was decided that this would have reduced its portability. Patient administration systems 
were not standard to all hospitals, making the development of a single, universal interface to all 
systems very difficult to develop. By maintaining ePAQ as a stand-alone system, the complexity of 
implementing the system into other sites was much reduced. 
6.6 Time dynamics of the innovation process 
The three phases of the ePAQ project extended over several years. The first phase, involving the 
development of the paper-based questionnaire, started when Consultant A was a Registrar and was 
completed after he had become a consultant uro-gynaecologist. This extended period of time did 
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not reflect a continual level of effort and it likely that project progress was halted for extended 
periods of time. The second phase of development involved a small group and took place over a 
period of months, mirroring the pattern of a student project. Initial software development support 
lasted six weeks and indicates that the phases were characterised by periods of intense 
development, punctuated with periods of trialling and review. Clinical trials of the software 
typically took place over several months (Radley et al. 2006) and so pace of development was 
constrained over these periods. The final phase of development involved reverse-engineering of the 
prototype created in Phase 2, and took several months. However, the development has continued 
for several years and is on-going. 
6.7 Organisational context 
The development of the ePAQ took place primarily in the Gynaecology Department of the Royal 
Hallamshire Hospital in Sheffield. The hospital is a well established teaching hospital and part of 
the Sheffield Teaching Hospitals Trust. Development was supported by other departments in the 
hospital, in particular the Scientific Computing Group (SCG) based in the Medical Physics 
Department. It is useful to review the context of these departments both in general terms and in 
relation to the ePAQ project. 
6.7.1 The Gynaecology Department 
The department was based in a new building in the hospital. Its day-to-day operation was well co- 
ordinated and the department's clinic generally ran smoothly, rarely running behind schedule. 
Several factors were suggested that contributed to this. Consultants maintained a high level of time 
management ensuring that patient consultations started and ended on time; relationships between 
nurses and other staff working in the `clinic were good; leadership of the department was well 
respected by both consultants and nursing staff; and generally the department operated successfully 
as a multi-disciplinary team with well educated, motivated staff willing to address change. 
The department was generally very receptive to change with most staff having positive attitudes to 
change. This was underpinned with a culture that valued evidence-based practice. The existence of 
clinical nurse educators, governance sisters, an evidence-based practice group, and a supportive 
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matron, had allowed all nursing staff to be supported in using EBP principles. Most nursing staff 
were undergoing continuous professional development, for example, Level 3 professional nursing 
qualifications. All these factors acted to create a culture open to learning, change and 
implementation of new technology 
The department's culture was important in ensuring successful implementation of ePAQ. The 
general reaction of nursing staff to ePAQ was positive, with staff recognising that it could improve 
patient care. The general sense was that they needed to move ahead with such improvements, 
despite implications for staff workload. The implementation of ePAQ increased staff workloads 
because it added an extra diagnostic test with extra time required to introduce patients to the 
system, train them in its operation and then to support them in answering queries. The process 
added around 15 minutes of staff work to a consultation. 
Despite the workload implications, the implementation of ePAQ took take place in an enthusiastic 
and altruistic culture. The arrangement of meetings for management of the project was usually 
outside of normal working hours and participation of staff in the project was often based on them 
giving their time freely. 
6.7.2 Attitudes towards consultant's leading innovation 
The department's culture was supportive of the innovative activity of consultants. Consultant A 
was encouraged to engage in innovative activity in a formal sense through research; an activity that 
was an explicit part of his contract. His position as a consultant in a teaching hospital also gave him 
a level of credibility and status outside organisations. This made it easier for him to obtain 
unrestricted research grants and other sources of funding. Over the early years of the project this 
has exceeded £100,000. 
At a less formal level, Consultant A was supported by the department and the wider hospital's 
openness to innovation. Since he moved to the hospital seven years earlier, he has found the 
department very supportive of his "... funny ideas and innovation activities" (Consultant A). 
Consultant A felt his position as a consultant in a teaching hospital gave him a privileged position, 
a lot of autonomy and status in the eyes of outside organisations such as pharmaceutical companies 
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and charities. He believed that it would have been more difficult to pursue the project at a non- 
teaching hospital, where he felt he would have had less support or freedom to act. However, even 
as a consultant in a teaching hospital he still had a significant pressure on his time from both 
clinical and administrative duties. 
Consultant A's activities were also supported by the senior consultant in the department 
(Consultant B). Consultant B acted as a champion for the ePAQ project and was important in 
ensuring time was made available for Consultant A to work on the ePAQ project. Consultant B 
recognized the enormous amount of time required to develop an innovative technology and had to 
deal with the problem of how much NHS resource should be made available: 
... for me, in my lead gynaecologist hat... with the NHS taking some of the funding... 
who gets the cash benefit? Is it the developer? Is it the hospital? How much NHS time 
do you give someone in their job plan, for these [activities] ... the NHS will benefit 
financially. So is it reasonable to say that two hours a week is devoted to ePAQ or 
other projects or not, that is an issue, I don't have a definitive view on that... these 
things are developed by enthusiasts and inevitably, they spill over. (Consultant B) 
Consultant B believed that some of the time spent on the ePAQ project was accounted for as 
administration time or as professional activities. 
6.7.3 Support from the trust 
There was very little explicit, formal support for the ePAQ project. This was predominantly due to 
the emergent nature of the project. Consultant A saw the project as carried out by: 
... a bunch of enthusiastic amateurs... it was not on my job plan to create an electronic 
questionnaire:.. it was done in my spare time... it was a medical student project... 
nobody said your medical student must do this project... it was not commissioned by 
anyone except me, saying. I have got this idea... and I think that is quite a good way 
of doing things... but you can only go so far with that approach. (Consultant A) 
Despite aspects of the projects being discussed at various trust committees, it was not until a 
relatively late stage that the project was formerly recognised by the hospital or seen as any sort of 
176 
ePAQ Case Study 
strategic project. It appears that the trust management were not conscious of the project despite 
interacting with the project at various points, for example: approval by the ethics committee; 
awarding the medical student a best paper prize for his work on the project; and the managing the 
internal charging of the postdoctoral software developer's time. The lack of recognition, while 
limiting the support available, did however ensure the team's autonomy. 
6.7.4 Trust support for IT projects 
The normal path for development projects like ePAQ would have been through the trust's IT 
Department. At the time however, the CfH programme meant that the IT department had no spare 
capacity, and so in common with other small-scale projects were not able to provide any 
development support. 
The implication of CfH was that only systems which needed emergency action were given priority 
by the IT Department. For example, an accident and emergency system had to be revamped in 
order to comply with national targets on minimal waiting times. Consequently, because ePAQ did 
not fit in with national targets, it was given very little priority by the trust or the IT Department. 
The trust had no explicit mechanism for managing portfolios of innovation projects that were being 
developed "bottom-up" in the trust. The evaluation of non-Cf I IT project proposals emphasised 
risk reduction more than any other factor. Projects were given a higher priority if they addressed a 
clinical risk, rather than other benefits such as cost reduction or improvement in patient care. 
The emphasis on risk reduction meant that the potential efficiency and effectiveness benefits of 
ePAQ were not really taken into account, In addition, the ePAQ project had very little relevance to 
CfH programme. 
... ePAQ is so specialised, too small-scale for the National Programme for IT [Cf I] to 
pick up on that need, they are looking at national requirements... they are looking at 
connecting up primary and secondary care and looking to connect records, I think 
ePAQ would be well below the type of thing they would be looking at... the strategic 
Health Authority might be the level it might get picked up at some stage. (Systems 
Development Manager) 
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6.7.5 Role of the trust's IT Department 
During the period around 2002, the IT Department's capacity for taking on projects was stretched 
due to the CfH programme. The result of this was that the resources in the IT department were 
devoted to work on key priorities. This created a period of "planning blight" in which projects that 
did not fit with the CfH programme were given low priority. 
The trust's IT department was well regarded and there is little doubt that it would the necessary 
capabilities to develop the ePAQ project. In particular, they had a good balance between technical 
skills and the capability to provide a IT service. The ePAQ project was however only one of many 
small scale projects that the IT Department had to allocate resources to. The hospital has a 
proliferation of small, independent IT systems, many of which are not part of a conscious portfolio. 
It was probably very difficult for the IT Department to take a strategic view of many of these 
projects. 
... the problem is that there will be a lot of systems 
being used that the IT Department 
have no idea about, again it comes down to Access databases, a lot of the time. There 
will be systems that have grown from very simple systems that somebody knocked 
together in a couple of hours and over time have progressed into a system that people 
rely on... people just grow these things because there is no one developing in a 
focused way, if somebody needs it they will do it. (Software Development Manager) 
6.7.6 Scientific Computing Group (SCG) 
The lack of available support from the IT Department meant that a less formal route for the project 
was adopted. From the perspective of Illuminaries, the trust was a relatively passive partner in the 
ePAQ project, despite having a substantial stake in the spin-out company that was ultimately 
created. Their primary involvement was to allow staff to spend time on the project. The SIiD 
believed that a possible reason for this was the lack of fit between the ePAQ project and other IT 
projects that were pursued: 
... it was a research project that has somehow spun out into this commercial thing. 
(SHD) 
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It was for this reason that the SCG took a significant development role in the project. 
The SCG took on projects on an ad hoc basis, and had sufficient autonomy to allow work on new 
embryonic projects. The work of staff in the SCG was not rigidly accounted for, for example, there 
has never been any attempt to log their work under specific job numbers. It is perhaps for this 
reason that they had the organisational slack necessary to take up the ePAQ project in the first 
place. In some cases, projects had been brought to the SCG as there has been no development 
capacity in the IT department available. In these cases, the SCG has carried out the work, charging 
the work back to the "customer" department. The type of work taken up by the group was often 
experimental in nature and it had become common practice for them to develop small application 
systems used in the hospital. 
It was not unusual for them to become involved in developing systems in the hospital, 
possibly without senior managers being aware of the project. (SlID) 
The approach taken to software development within SCG differed from the IT Department. The IT 
Department operated a more managed environment, compared to the Medical Physics 
Department's more organic and ad hoc approach. The diversity of projects taken on by the SCG 
meant that it was not possible to organise common sets of development tools and methods. The 
approach taken had the advantage of allowing end users to be closely linked with the development 
of software. 
... the advantage of the ePAQ project 
is it is custom-designed for a particular job by 
the people who were using it, so there is very little problem with ePAQ about people 
saying, why does it do that, if I'd done it I would have done it differently, because the 
people who use it certainly here, are the people who either consciously or 
subconsciously evolved it. (Software Development Manager) 
The SCG can be characterised as lacking a strict methodological approach but also likened to a 
"skunk works" department, working on innovation projects that were yet to be formally recognised. 
The structure and culture of the department was aligned to this type of development project. This 
was in stark contrast to the formal environment of the IT Department, which had a greater 
responsibility for day to day provision of large scale IT services and strategic IT project 
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development. The SCG's separation from the IT Department was an important factor in allowing 
the ePAQ system to develop. 
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Figure 6.7: Enabling and inhibiting factors in the ePAQ innovation 
6.8.1 Motivation to innovate and entrepreneurship 
The motivation for Consultant A to pursue the innovation was based on several factors that related 
to his professional identity and personal values. Many of these values were shared by the NHS staff 
who worked with him on the project. The wish td improve the care of individual patients, the care 
processes and the NHS in general were strong motivating forces and represented the ethical factors 
driving the innovation. In addition, all the NHS staff in the team evidently saw solving innovation 
problems as an attractive challenge. 
Though commercial success could have been a motivating factor for Consultant A, it appears 
unlikely to have been the primary driving force for the project, reflecting the view that it was rare 
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for clinicians to make significant fortunes from their innovation. Consultant B noted that the 
motivation of Consultant A was principally: 
... a wish to 
be at the fore of something... tobe a leader of ideas on the stage of play... 
most doctors who make fortunes make it from things other than medicine. (Consultant 
B) 
In fact, Consultant A demonstrated a reticence to focus purely on commercial success and relished 
professional recognition. 
... basically, I enjoy it, I 
love it, it is good fun, I get national recognition, I get to go to 
conferences and talk about it, I get e-mails from Australia. It is getting a bit more 
serious now with it being commercial, up until recently, it was just a bit of a hobby. 
Although you think that this is the ultimate aim. Actually the journey there can be 
more fun than arriving... my god, that great idea I had a few years ago is now a 
commercial reality, now what do I do? I suppose the next thing to do now is to turn 
that commercial entity into something that is profitable and viable. That is likely to be 
more stressful and slightly less fun... I am hoping that ultimately it will become 
viable, and I will be able to relax a bit and let others get on with it. We have a few 
people around the UK who are really enthusiastic about it, and maybe they will take it 
forward and it won't be me just banging on about it, it will be somebody else banging 
on about it... that will be really nice and I'll be able to say I have done all the hard 
work and I can start focusing on something else. (Consultant A) 
Consultant A exhibited many entrepreneurial traits that contributed to the project's success. In 
particular, his skills in negotiating resources from within and outside NIIS trust were important. 
Within the trust he as able to justify both his own time and that of other staff on the project to line 
managers. He was also able to negotiate funding from external organisations such as charities and 
pharmaceutical companies. Of equal importance were the professional networks that he maintained 
that enabled access to knowledge but strong marketing opportunities. 
Consultant A's philanthropic perspective on the project did however differ to that of a conventional 
business entrepreneur, in particular, his attitude to commercialisation of the innovation. 
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... people don't see it as a commercial thing, that word commercial always grates with 
doctors, because we work in this wonderful institution called the NHS, which is kind 
of free, money is actually a dirty word in medicine, and we are all slightly 
embarrassed about talking about money or private practice... now we are becoming 
more commercially aware... there is a slight feel good factor because I did this not for 
commercial reasons, but because I thought it was a good idea for me and my 
patients... (Consultant A) 
Though this attitude did change during the project, it continued to cause some concern to the 
industrial partners. For example, the director of Illuminaries noted that at certain points in the 
project: 
... he [Consultant A] would give it away to his mates almost to get a ground swell and 
then say we can then start charging them. (Software House Director) 
However, by the end of the project Consultant A recognised that the commercialisation process 
was important and vital to the long term prospects of the project: 
... I was always slightly allergic to the word `commercial' as I 
felt it meant for profit, 
where as what I meant was `commercially viable', that you could give or sell to 
somebody, something that you would be able to use... for me setting up the company 
was to make sure the project was viable, not for me to make a profit. (Consultant A) 
6.8.2 Pluralist approaches validation 
The validation of the ePAQ system took place in a number of ways. Formal clinical trials validated 
both the questionnaire and the user interface. However, other factors such as peer acceptance and 
gaining the routine use of ePAQ by staff were both powerful validation mechanisms. Other 
mechanisms were employed to validate and legitimise the innovation such as alignment with NICE 
guidelines and use of established software quality assurance accreditations. 
Peer acceptance of ePAQ was significant factor validating ePAQ and legitimising its use. 
Publishing of peer reviewed articles was successful strategy for gaining acceptance of ePAQ. 
Consultant B believed that the publications related to ePAQ (Radley et al. 2006; Bradshaw et al. 
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2006; Hiller, Radley et al. 2002; Hiller, Bradshaw et al. 2002; Radley and Jones 2004; Radley and 
Brown 2005) were important in creating kudos for the project, rather than generating a formal 
research profile for Consultant A and others in the team. 
... publications and getting 
it accepted by others... people from outside the hospital 
were big steps... peer review validated the technology, getting it taken on by other 
people is peer review acceptance. (Consultant B) 
In addition to positive peer review, the reaction of staff and patients using the system was critical in 
validating ePAQ. Based on their experiences with sitting with patients, nurses in particular, were 
aware that the use of ePAQ improved the engagement of patients and their overall experience of 
the clinical interview. The first hand experience of nursing staff made them strong advocates of 
ePAQ and contributed to the validation of the system. 
The acceptance of ePAQ has been helped by linking its advantages to guidelines set out by NICE. 
The NICE guidelines on incontinence care (NICE 2006) could be used to justify the use of ePAQ. 
... a very useful political thing which 
has helped rather to our surprise, has been the 
NICE guidelines on incontinence... we have used the ePAQ to sort of justify the 
NICE guidelines, (Consultant B) 
The final strategy for validating the technology was to have the system re-written by an accredited 
software house. Illuminaries had a number of accreditations that recognised its quality assurance 
processes and its processes in for developing software using Microsoft products, including 
IS09001 The accreditation was useful to Illuminaries when putting together a public tenders, as it 
often represented "a box to tick". Though it was felt that many healthcare clients did not see 
accreditation as a high priority. Accreditation may however have been a necessity for gaining 
acceptance for ePAQ. 
6.8.3 Industrial partnerships 
An important part of the ePAQ project was the decision to collaborate with an industrial partner. 
The decision to develop software using a partner in the private sector can be seen as a strategy to 
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assure the longer term stability of the project and to avoid it being sidelined by higher priority 
national projects, such as the Cf I programme. 
Several other operational advantages have also been suggested in the case of the ePAQ project. 
First, small development projects within the hospital were not subject to any significant project 
management processes. By outsourcing development, the project gained not just software 
development skill but also project management expertise. In turn, software houses were better 
placed, through establishment of maintenance contracts, for providing long term maintenance and 
software support services, than the hospital's IT department. 
6.8.4 Focus on innovation diffusion activities 
A critical enabling theme within the project was the extent to which the ultimate diffusion of ePAQ 
was maintained as a focus of activity. The recognition of the need for industrial partners, such as 
Medipex and Illuminaries, is indicative of the long term perspective adopted during the project. 
This has in turn led to recognition of external markets outside the NHS, as well as highlighting the 
need to abstract the ePAQ concept to other specialist areas. 
One of the most difficult aspects of the diffusion process is the extent to which the inventor, 
Consultant A, should continue to maintain control over the project. The director of Illuminaries was 
clear about the need to broaden the pool of ideas during the development stage and highlighted 
that: 
... if the system is going to grow, the inventor has to 
let go because they can't do it all 
and therefore you have to let other people do that, as soon as you let other people do it, 
they are going to have their own ideas, and some of these can be bloody good ideas 
and you really have to encourage that... in a sense [Consultant A] has let go to a 
certain extent. (Software House Director) 
It was clear that in time Consultant A would take less of a role in the commercial development, 
despite having a strong emotional attachment, a high level of knowledge and a wide range of 
contacts. 
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... you know, rightly or wrongly, I developed this, this is my idea and have driven it to 
the point where it is potentially a very successful project, I have brought all the money 
in, and an international list of potential clients... clearly the best person to take it 
further forward... that could be a significant impediment to its further development... 
I would like to get to the point where I can say it has gone but still be involved, but not 
quite so intensely, perhaps have somebody else market it, somebody else sell it. 
Because at the moment, I seem to do everything: R&D, marketing, talking about it, 
planning all the meetings, and so forth... I would not mind if somebody else would 
help me take it on. (Consultant A) 
6.8.5 Institutional constraints and the centralisation of NHS software development 
The ePAQ project has had to contend with significant organisational inertia and institutional 
constraints. Lack of easily accessible development funding meant that Consultant A had to invest 
significant time in bidding for research funding or negotiating funding from charities. This was 
made more difficult by the lack of interest shown by the trust in the project and lack of senior 
management support. 
Within the context of software development, there were significant institutional constraints on the 
project. The emphasis on risk reduction meant that projects focusing on other aspects of healthcare 
services were given less priority. In addition, the nationally set priorities for software set by the 
Connections for Health programme dominated planning of software development within the trust. 
This lead to the IT strategies of the trust being aligned only to these projects; in contrast, small 
projects were often allowed to develop with little guidance, support or controls. 
6.8.6 Mixing clinical and commercial perspectives 
The SHD was very conscious of the difference in perspective taken by clinicians to software 
development compared to that of software engineers. The difference in perspective was a cause of 
conflict in the project. 
... it is difficult working with doctors because they think they know everything... you 
can't go and cut people open without having absolute confidence in yourself... I have 
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done a lot of work with doctors over the last fourteen years and they are pretty much 
all the same to a greater or lesser extent that they are all supremely confident that they 
know everything and it that includes how to write computer software at times.., so 
they can be challenges from our point of view because we are saying really lets do it 
like this, and we have had heated discussions on certain matters throughout the last 
couple of years. (SHD) 
Typical sources of conflict included areas such as software engineering best practice, user interface 
design or data protection principles. The SHD felt that Consultant A was not always fully aware of 
the implications of some decisions, reflecting that: 
... it can be difficult, because they have an idea about how they want something. 
Actually, it should not be like that because technologically we can't do it like that ... or 
because of best practice in software engineering, or user interface design or data 
protection... we have argued endlessly with him [Consultant AJ over issues of data 
protection for the web facing version, what we can and can't hold on the server. (SHD) 
6.9 Summary 
The ePAQ case provides a detailed account of how a user-led innovation project develops from the 
work of a single NHS employee, to a software product supported by a commercial company. The 
case has tracked the development through three distinct stages and illustrates the extent to which 
both the team and the development methods adopted have grown organically. The organic 
development enabled the project to benefit from access to a range of staff from both within and 
external to the host organisation. 
The case also highlights the informal nature of user-led innovation and exemplifies how am 
innovation may be invisible to the wider organisation and its senior management. This case study 
exemplifies how the pressure placed on the trust by top-down government initiatives, such as the 
Cf[I programme, impedes the trust's ability to mange locally developed, innovative, IT projects. In 
this case it contributed to the trust taking a disinterested view of the ePAQ project, despite it having 
part ownership of the IP developed during the project. 
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The case illustrates the role that institutional structures play in setting normative limits on user-led 
innovation process. The case illustrates how the values and norms of NHS staff were challenged by 
the innovation process. This conflict was particularly apparent with respect to the user-innovator's 
philanthropic motives juxtaposed against commercial imperatives. The philanthropic values were 
strongly aligned with the professional expectations of the user-innovator's profession. 
Finally, the case shows the way in which the purpose of a technology develops over the course of a 
user-led innovation project. Implicit in his development is the way the attributed meanings and 
significance of the innovative technology changes over time. The focus of the project was the 
electronic questionnaire, a hard technology. However, the major benefit of the innovation was 
improvement in the way clinical interviews were conducted. In this respect, innovation of the soft 
technology of clinical interviewing was the central part of the case, prompting the parallel 
development of a proto-institution that supported an improved institutional structure for supporting 
clinical interviews. 
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Chapter 7: Cleft Lip and Palate Study Model Case Study 
7.1 Introduction 
This case study is concerned with a process innovation developed by a technologist working within 
a teaching hospital in the NHS. The innovation concerned the development of a new technique for 
producing a plaster study model of a patient with a cleft lip or palate. The study model provides a 
physical representation of a patient's mouth and face, prior to surgery. Study models enable 
surgeons to maintain records to assess the results of surgery on a patient over a number of years. 
The development of the study model technique had potential to underpin a wider system of cross- 
centre evaluation of cleft lip and palate surgery. 
At one level the innovation is an example of incremental development of a technique, however, the 
innovation is distinctive because it is also relevant to the wider innovation of cleft and lip palate 
surgery in general. The case study is therefore useful in illustrating the role of micro-level 
innovation of processes in relation to macro level initiatives in the NHS. 
The case study illustrates that though the user-led innovation of a micro-level process can be 
viewed as occurring successfully, at a macro level the improvement can be seen as providing only 
limited support to the wider goals of the organisation. The use of the technology of plaster study 
models is shown as having limited utility to a wider goal of allowing the auditing of surgery across 
several hospitals. This is partially due to the difficulties in diffusing the innovation, but is probably 
more likely to be due to it being a sub-optimum technology for the purpose. 
The case study identifies a number of emergent issues that relate to user-led innovation in the NHS 
including: motivation of NHS staff to innovate; the impact of formal innovation support on staff 
behaviour; the extent to which the roles of staff need to be flexible and open to change, in order for 
innovation to occur; the means by which process innovations are evaluated by innovators; and the 
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extent to which rigidity in the use of a technology can lead to user-led innovations becoming self- 
limiting. 
7.2 Data Collection for the Case Study 
The data for this case study was collected through two semi-structured interviews and a review of 
literature associated with the project. The first interview was with the Senior Chief Technologist 
(SCT) in Maxillofacial Laboratory. The SCT had been responsible for developing the innovative 
technique for producing study models. A second interview was done with the Plastic Surgeon with 
whom the SCT worked. The interviews took place several weeks apart due to delays in setting up 
interviews. Clarification of queries raised in the interviews was done by email. 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format using the standard interview schedule (Appendix 
1). The researcher made contemporaneous notes during the interview with the SCT. The interview 
with the Plastic Surgeon was recorded using a digital voice recorder. Both participants were 
enthusiastic in talking about the project and the interviews substantially exceeded the planned time 
for the interviews. The body language of the Plastic Surgeon during the interview, suggested to the 
researcher that the interviews was prompting the Plastic Surgeon to reflect and consider the project 
in more depth than he had previously done before. The Plastic Surgeon seemed to find the 
interview useful in enabling him to reflect upon the project. The reaction of the two participants 
during the interviews gave the researcher confidence that the views given were valid and reliable. 
There was no specific published literature on the innovation itself, though a PowerPointTM 
presentation on the new technique, produced by the SCT, was made available to the researcher. 
Secondary literature on the use of study models and the evaluation of cleft lip and palate surgery 
was reviewed for the case (Ali, Mossey, and Gillgrass 2006; Atack et al. 1997; Mars et al. 1992; 
Roberts, Semb, and Shaw 1991; Sandy et al, 1998; Shaw et al. 1996; Williams et al. 2001). 
7.3 Background to Cleft Palate Surgery evaluation 
A cleft palate is a congenital condition in which the soft palate at the rear of the roof of the mouth, 
or the hard palate at the front, fails to develop fully during the early stages of an embryo's 
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development. This can result in a cavity in the roof of the mouth. A cleft lip is the condition in 
which the upper lip or gum fails to develop fully, resulting in an opening or notch. 
In the UK, 600-700 children per year are born with a cleft lip or palate (CLP). The condition may 
run in families but cases also occur without anyone else in the family having one. Babies with cleft 
palate may in extreme cases have difficulty breathing. Babies with cleft lip may have difficulty 
feeding and need additional help. For children who undergo cleft palate surgery, it is likely that 
their speech and hearing will develop normally, however, normal teeth development may be 
affected. In addition to physical development, attention is also needed for caring for the child's 
psychological needs. 
CLP surgery is now based on well established procedures and can be carried out from within weeks 
of birth, to when the child has reached their late teens. Early stage surgery occurs within the first 
few months or years of a baby's life and involves the repair of the lip or palate. Bone grafts may be 
carried out on children between nine and ten. Later corrective surgery on children in their late teens 
may be needed to correct other features, such as jaw alignment. The treatment of children with cleft 
lip or palate is long term, extending over many years. Treatment is now generally safe and reliable. 
Due to the range of associated issues, it is now the norm for treatment to be given by a multi- 
disciplinary team. This will typically include the following staff: 
  Surgeon (plastic, oral and maxillofacial) 
  Cleft Nurse 
  Orthodontist 
  Paediatrician 
  Speech and Language Therapist 
  Psychologist 
  Geneticist 
During the 1990s, there was a surge of interest in the development of strategies to improve the 
outcome of treatment for CLP patients (Roberts, Semb, and Shaw 1991). It had been recognised 
that the primary surgery undertaken on patients was crucial, as if it was poorly performed, facial 
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growth and dental development would be compromised (Mars et al. 1992). An important aspect of 
the perceived problem at this time was that there was inadequate data to provide clear guidance on 
what and when a specific technique should be used: 
It is also evident that a wide range of surgical techniques exist to correct this anomaly 
but with no clear-cut guidelines for optimal timing or method. As a result, when the 
outcome with one technique appears disappointing, surgeons are likely to make 
modifications to, or radical departures from, their current regimes. These changes are 
often made with little data or rationale. (Atack et al. 1997) 
Due to the range of surgeons carrying out the procedures, on a large, diverse population of patients, 
it was difficult to obtain scientifically valid data on the best protocol to use for a specific patient. 
This highlighted the need to apply a more rigorous audit system to underpin an evidence-based 
approach to cleft surgery. 
In 1996 a study was started that would review and make recommendations on the standards of 
clinical care for children with congenital cleft lip and or palate. The study was to be supervised by 
the Clinical Standards Advisory Group (CSAG) and the resulting report made a number of 
recommendations (Sandy et al. 1998). The underlying assumption behind these recommendations 
was that cleft care would be improved by concentrating the national provision of services, so that 
care would only be carried out by a small number of specialist teams equipped with all the 
necessary clinical skills. The report made several important recommendations: 
" The number of CLP treatment centres in the UK should be reduced from 57 centres to 
between 8-15 centres. This would allow expertise and resources to be concentrated. 
  NHS commissioners should clearly specify the expertise required in treatment teams to 
achieve process quality standards and clinical outcomes. Only centres providing the 
required specification should be commissioned. 
  NHS trusts should concentrate their CLP services in collaboration with purchasers and 
practitioners. 
  Clinicians should agree on a common database for all CLP patients. Information on all 
CLP patients should be made available for comparative studies. 
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  Training of specialist CLP clinicians should follow agreed training pathways and take 
place within specialist centres. 
The emphasis of the recommendations centred on the need for an improved information system to 
allow auditing and improvement of services provided. By concentrating activity, it was hoped that 
the knowledge created through the experience of carrying out CLP procedures, would be used more 
effectively. Nationally it had been found that CLP services were provided by 75 surgeons, working 
in 59 centres. This lead to an average caseload of less than one unilateral cleft palate per surgeon, 
per year. On this basis, it was very difficult for individual surgeons to understand the effect of any 
specific surgical protocol. It had also been suggested that a minimum case load was required to 
maintain competence and proficiency (Shaw et al. 1996). It was proposed that instead of the total 
number of procedures being spread across a wide range of centres, in which practitioners would do 
a small number of procedures per year, a smaller number of practitioners would carry out a higher 
volume of procedures each year. This was done to concentrate the work of CLP surgery, enabling 
specialist skills to be developed and facilitate the systematic building of an evidence base to inform 
future surgery. 
In 2002, the recommendations of the CSAG guided the reorganisation of CLP services in the UK. 
This was done in the context of other critical reviews of the existing system for organisation of 
cleft palate services in the UK (Williams et al. 2001). The restructuring resulted in the reduction of 
CLP service provision to just nine centres. 
During facial development, sections of the palate drift apart and the width between various 
structures in the mouth are used as indicators of growth. A physical record of the palate has 
traditionally been kept using a plaster impression. Measurements include features of both soft and 
bony tissue. It is not crucial for the image of the face and the palate to be integrated. The traditional 
approach to measurement has used point to point dimensions rather than volume-based 
measurements. The method of measurements has been institutionalised by ortho-dentists who use 
tables of measurements based on specific dimensions. 
The assessment of the effectiveness of a specific CLP procedure relies on the availability of data 
collected over several years. This includes data before the procedure was carried out and then at 
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various points in time afterwards. Data would often need to be collected over durations in excess of 
a decade. Central to the data collection was a study model, a 3-dimesional model of the topology of 
a child's palate and lip. Study model are typically plaster casts made directly from impressions 
taken of a patients mouth. Use of plaster study models was widespread, though has been 
augmented with 2D photography (Ali, Mossey, and Gillgrass 2006; Atack et at. 1997). However, it 
is normal for study models to be produced in order to audit the progress of treatment. This has 
traditionally been done by dental or plastic surgeons taking moulds from babys' mouths; the mould 
then being passed on to the maxillofacial technologist to complete. 
Other technologies have started to be used for modelling the topology of a cleft palate, notably 
photography and other imaging techniques. These techniques however are still lacking in detail, 
often with shadowing of the images making them less useful than a traditional plaster model. The 
main imaging problem is that the tissues of the face are soft and so will not always be easy to 
image. Imaging of the palate could be done using a CT scan or an MRI scan. This is however not 
practical as it would be necessary to anesthetise babies to carry out the imaging. CT scans are also 
suitable, due to the burden of x-ray dosage. Some new technologies such as 3d surface photography 
imaging techniques such as 3dMDFACE are however now becoming available. 
The cost of plaster models is also very low and so alternative technologies need to provide 
significant benefits to merit any extra costs. Overall, a computer-based 3D model would be 
preferred, as this would allow easy and accurate measurement of key dimensions. 
This case study is concerned with the technology that supports the auditing of treatment of patients 
with CLP. Figure 7.1 shows the relationship of audit technologies within the wider system of CLP 
services in the UK. This case is concerned with the relationship between three main sub-systems: 
the organisations that govern and deliver CLP services; the system of treatment technologies 
comprising surgical techniques and surgical protocols; and the audit technologies available that 
allow the long term evaluation and improvement of the treatment technologies. 
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Figure 7.1: Audit technologies within the CLP service 
7.4 Overview of the innovation 
'I'hc inumation was centred on the development ol'a new process für producing a study model from 
a CLI' patient. The new process was developed at Addenbrooke's hospital in Cambridge. The 
process was new, however, it represented a development of an existing process, combined with it 
technique demonstrated at a conference attended by SCI'. 
The innovation used a technique by which the mould taken from patients was made up of three 
layers of material, rather than a single material that was used in the existing process. The new 
process used silicon putty for moulding the internal details of the mouth. Alginate was then used to 
take the moulding of the external face detail. Fast setting impression plaster was used as further 
layer to provide the supportive base tör the two other materials. By using this combination of 
materials, it became possible to increase the extent of the moulding to cover the lips, nose and eyes. 
Once the mould had been used to cast the final plaster study model it was possible to produce a 
study model that showed the complete topology of the palate, lips and face in one model (see 
l iw. wure 7.2). 
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The new study model process allowed better study models to be produced for monitoring the 
progress of an individual patient over the period of their treatment. The improved model improved 
the opportunity for comparing the outcomes of surgery between patients treated by the 
Addcnbrookes CLP clinic, but also potentially for carrying out cross-centre comparisons as part of 
aC LP audit. 
For over seven years, the innovation provided a cheap method ofmodelling the face of the patient. 
The cost for the procedure was small, requiring 20 minutes of the technologist's time in theatre, 
followed by about two hours laboratory time. It was a low risk procedure, using standard materials 
that had been in general use for many years, with no significant side-effects. 
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7.4.1 Clinical problem 
The innovation in this case study can be viewed as addressing a clinical problem at three levels of 
analysis (see Figure 7.3). The first is to view the innovation in terms of how the day-to-day process 
of producing plaster study models was changed, through the innovation of a procedure carried out 
in the operating theatre. This innovation involved a change in method, materials and the roles of 
staff involved. The second perspective is to see the innovation in terms of a addressing how best to 
collect topographical data of a patient's palate, lips and face. At this level, the innovation has 
enabled more data to he collected that previously. The final level of analysis is concerned with a 
much broader process of innovation; the innovation of the evaluation system for CLP surgery in the 
UK. 
Evaluation of 
of services 
Collection of palate, lip 
and face topology data 
an Concern of -- I 
Technoloist / Production of accurate 
- ----- -1-T j plaster study models 
Figure 7.3: Three levels of clinical problem 
7.4.2 Perceived purpose and market 
The development of the innovation was based upon the need to solve a problem that confronted the 
two members of staff at a local level. The innovation developed primarily as an improvement to the 
way they worked; neither member of staff consciously developed the process with a view to its 
application outside of Addenbrooke's. They were not intending to develop a process that would be 
commercialised in any way. They had not actively considered whether they would transfer the new 
process to other CLP services. 
While the innovation sought to address clinical problems at three levels, The two members of staff 
involved in the innovation focused on different problems. The plastic surgeon was more concerned 
with the problem of evaluating CLP service, while the technologist was primarily concerned with 
the production of plaster study models. The supportive role of the Plastic Surgeon in the innovation 
was rooted in his strategic view of the need to evaluate C'LP services. In contrast, the bottom-up 
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innovation of the process of making the study model emerged from the technologist's motivation to 
improve the current way of working. 
7.4.3 Extent and result of implementation 
The process innovation has been completely integrated into the work of the CLP service at 
Addenbrookes. It is now a "normal" procedure and where appropriate is used for producing study 
models. In this respect, the process innovation can be regarded as fully implemented locally. There 
are however, three aspects of the innovation that would suggest the benefits of the innovation have 
not been fully realised. 
First of all, though the centre continues to develop a comprehensive set of study models of its 
patients, it is yet to implement a system for analysing the data held in the study models. This is a 
longer term issue, as auditing of the surgical outcomes will have to be done over a long period. 
Second, the process innovation has not been diffused to other cleft services. This means that the 
quality of study models produced in other centres is likely to be, at best incompatible, or in the 
worst case, inferior to those from Addenbrookes. This will make auditing outcomes across centres 
less reliable. Ideally, all centres would produce the study models in a uniform manner. 
Third, a key mechanism for the diffusion of the technique would be that it is reintroduced into the 
practice of surgeons or other technologists. This might naturally happen once the technologist has 
refined the process and "packaged" the process into form that facilitates its use by other staff, either 
at Addenbrookes or other CLP centres. This might include the development of a specific set of 
tools or codification of the process, to help surgeons or technologist master the technique. The 
packaging of the process in this way would also make it easier to include within CLP clinician 
training. 
The outcome of innovation has addressed the clinical problem, of making better plaster study 
models. Unfortunately, the innovation has only partly addressed the other two clinical problems. In 
hindsight, the problem of collecting accurate study model data for comparison across centres, has 
not been wholly addressed and the continued use of plaster study models has not made the precise 
measurement of the topology of the mouth any easier. At some point there will have to be a process 
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for digitising the plaster study models; a process that will incur significant costs in terms of staff 
time and equipment costs. Other candidate technologies such as 3D scanning may have provided 
better solutions than the use of plaster models. 
This case provides an example of where continuous improvement of processes may prevent 
innovation, due to the tendency to create a rigidity in thinking, in this case not to question the role 
of the plaster study model. This resulted in the team not following a rational search for the solution 
of the problem of gaining topographical data. 
The project has taken a fairly introspective view of the problems. It has operated mainly within the 
scope of the existing technologies used by the staff. There was no process for formally evaluating 
other candidate technologies, especially those from other sectors where topographical modelling is 
carried out, such as the automotive design industry. 
7.5 Stages in the process 
Figure 7.4 shows an overview of the process followed in developing the innovation. The 
development was gradual and organic rather than following a specific project plan. It is therefore 
difficult to identify clear stages in the development process. The process can be viewed as 
following three distinct phases: a negotiation of the setting, iterative development of the problems 
and solution; and post development activities. 
7.5.1 Negotiation of the setting 
The innovation stemmed from the recognition by the SCT and the Plastic Surgeon that the quality 
of impressions used to make study models during reconstruction surgery was poor. It was felt that 
that they did not meet the "gold standard". Together they accepted that the reason for the poor 
quality of moulds was that the surgeons had a lack of experience in using the mould materials and 
lacked the expectation that the final moulding could be more detailed and precise. The surgeons 
therefore underestimated the precision that could be achieved and the subsequent benefits that 
could be gained from improved study models. 
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Figure 7.4: Innovation process for the CLP study model technique 
7.5.2 Iterative development of the problems and solution 
SCT refines 
process 
It was during these activities that the SCI and the surgeon discussed the scope for modifying the 
procedure: 
while standing around waiting for the putty to set we talked about other ways of 
doing the procedure. (Plastic Surgeon) 
The SCI 'was probably the key driver of the innovation at this point, however the Plastic Surgeon 
took a supportive role: 
encouraging him [the SCT] on from the sidelines. (Plastic Surgeon) 
Over a period of time, the SCT developed a new procedure for taking moulds ofbabys' mouths. 
Originally, the mould only produced an impression of the palate. A significant feature of the 
revised method was to make an integrated impression that incorporated the palate, lips, nose and 
eyes into one moulding. The resulting study model provided a more precise representation of the 
topology of the face. 
One example of the iterative development of the process has been the change in position of tape 
applied to the patient's eyes during the process, The procedure was changed so that the inner 
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canthus of the eye is left visible, previously the whole of the eye was covered in tape when making 
the mould. This allowed a precise datum on the face to be created for taking measurements of 
subsequent changes in the patients face. 
In addition to the innovation of the process, the SCT also developed tools to support the new 
process. One such item was a hook, that could be used to help remove the set mould from the 
mouth of the baby. The hook had been named a "Nowakian Hook" after the SCT. By carrying out 
the procedure himself, the SCT was better placed for designing auxiliary tools, such as the hook. 
7.5.3 Post development activities 
Diffusion activities 
The technique used for making the study model is now a routine procedure at Addenbrookes. The 
surgeon reflected that they had probably forgotten that it was a novel process; 
... the sad thing is that it has become such a routine 
for us, we do not even think about 
it. (Plastic Surgeon) 
It is now as routine as other processes, such as use of 3D photography. It is perhaps for this reason 
that the innovation has not been actively promoted and then taken up by any other cleft palate 
centres. 
The technique of producing the study models has been presented as some events attended by either 
surgeons or maxillofacial technologists. The surgeon does regret however, the lack of adoption of 
the technique. The SCT had produced a computer presentation of the technique, but probably due 
to his self-effacing nature had not written any articles that may have been published in relevant 
journals. 
The surgeon reflected that at a meeting of the Cranial and Facial Society, a group attended by many 
cleft palate surgeons, a presentation referred to the Addenbrookes Study Model system. Several 
positive comments came from the floor that confirmed interest in the technique. There was no 
subsequent adoption of the technique by any of the other cleft palate centres. The surgeon suggests 
... may be just the inertia of things, you go to a meeting and then go back to 
office ... and it has gone and you carry on as before. (Plastic Surgeon) 
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The first time the techniques was given wider publicity was when the Healthcare Science Group 
within Addenbrookes included the technique in an exhibition for Health Science Week. This was 
staged in the concourse within the hospital. It was at this event that the SCT met a representative 
from Cambridge Enterprise (the Cambridge University TTO). As a result of this meeting the SCT 
was encouraged to enter the innovation competition run by Health Enterprise East (the local NHS 
innovation hub). The encouragement to enter the competition came from Cambridge Enterprise. 
The driver for diffusion of the technique does remain however as there is a strong argument for all 
the cleft palate centres using a standard method of data collection, including the process of making 
study models. 
The SCT felt that the adoption of the procedure in other CLP Centres was less certain. This was 
based on the uncertainty around the role of technologists carrying out internal procedures, even 
under close supervision. This grey area of practice while being supported in the teaching hospital 
environment of Addenbrookes, may not occur in other hospitals. Legal and regulatory issues may 
create a barrier to further diffusion. 
In the future to aid diffusion of the technique the senior cleft consultant will take the idea to 
conferences. The SCT also intends to demonstrate to local group of the Institute of Maxillofacial 
Prosthetists and Technologists. He may present to national level event of the institute, though 
nothing is planned. The SCT felt less comfortable about writing up the innovation, for example as a 
journal article. 
Linking to the wider innovation network 
The cleft palate centres created in 2002 were all committed to doing an inter-centre audit of 
outcomes. This was yet to be organised (as at June 2007) for cases of new born babies compared to 
their development at five years old. The study models created at Addenbrookes represent a 
valuable resource for this audit, however, the data was yet to be analysed, The use of a plaster 
mould is sub-optimal as a CT or MRI scan gives more accurate data in a digitised form. The 
Plastic Surgeon acknowledges that the plaster impression is " ... a poor man's CT scan" 
(Plastic Surgeon). Overall, for the process of comparison of study model data across CLP centres 
would be made easier if the data was held in digital rather than analogue format. 
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There was a huge amount of data in the plaster study models produced over several years, but no 
clear strategy was developed for them to be measured. The aim was to maintain a record of all 
cleft-palate cases, approximately eighty per year. These records would include the study models, 
along with video of procedures, recordings of speech, x-rays and 2D and 3D photographs. This in 
itself was causing some problems, as the infrastructure for archiving this information was not in 
place. Ad hoc arrangements were in place for collecting, recording and archiving the records 
together. There was a risk that data would be lost or poorly archived, meaning that some data was 
prone to be lost over the long term. The archiving problem was rooted in lack of suitable space and 
creation of a dedicated archivist role. The surgeon worried that the task rested with him and that he 
did not have the time to take on the role effectively. 
The analysis of the data in the long term was potentially problematic. In addition to the technical 
problems of digitising the study models, the overhead of time, motivation and expertise to carry out 
the analysis was not currently available. The surgeon hoped that after fifteen years it would be 
possible to review progress of the service at Addenbrookes using the archived data. This was 
however dependent on the availability of staff able to do the analysis. It was probable that this 
would need to be a registrar, who would do the analysis as part of a project done to support their 
career progression. No other resources were immediately available for this analysis work. 
The data collected by the surgeon was potentially complete and precise. This would make it as 
valid as similar data held "fastidiously" in some Scandinavian hospitals. In Scandinavia surgical 
procedures were carefully evaluated and systematically modified over long periods of time. Despite 
the culture of evidence-based medicine in the NHS there was no obvious way of funding the 
archival of data. This problem was exacerbated by the emphasis of data collection in the NHS 
being on management information to support monitoring of targets and performance indicators. 
Attempts had been made to produce computer models from the plaster models. This has been done 
successfully using a CT scanner that was then able to produce images in the portable DICOM 
(Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) image standard. Attempts to digitise the 
plaster impressions using 3D photography had been less successful due to the unsuitable texture of 
202 
Cleft Lip and Palate Case Study 
the plaster surface. The surgeon had not had the time to investigate fully the possible methods for 
digitising plaster impressions. 
7.6 Time dynamics of the innovation process 
The development of the CLP innovation occurred over a period of months of gradual continuous 
improvement activity. The process of continuous improvement was an integral part of the SCT's 
role and the project was pursued during his normal working hours. 
7.7 Organisational context 
The innovation was developed in the organisational context of a major teaching hospital. The close 
relationship between Addenbrookes Hospital and the University of Cambridge meant that there was 
a long history of collaboration between medical research and provision of patient services. 
Technology transfer from both the university and the hospital is well developed and had been 
supported by Cambridge Enterprise, the university's technology transfer office. At the time of the 
innovation, the development of the NHS innovation hubs was still in its early stages. 
The two members of staff involved in the innovation, a plastic surgeon and a maxillofacial; 
technologist, were both members of staff at Addenbrookes. Their roles were very different and so it 
is important to understand their respective perspectives on the innovation. 
7.7.1 Plastic Surgeon 
The Plastic Surgeon had been at Addenbrookes since 1996. He took over what was then a small 
cleft palate service. At that time, it was one of the fifty nine centres in the UK NHS carrying out 
cleft palate surgery. After the restructuring of cleft services in 2002, the centre at Addenbrooke's 
treated eighty babies a year with two surgeons. Despite the patient population still being very 
diverse, the number of operations carried out was sufficient to allow a systematic study of 
outcomes to be done. The centre was in a position to start building a database of evidence that 
would allow the effects of procedures on outcomes to be monitored. Ideally, this review would 
follow patients' development from baby through to aged fifteen. 
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The Plastic Surgeon believed that the challenge for cleft palate surgery, at the time the service was 
restructured, was gaining an understanding of the effectiveness of specific surgical interventions. 
Key variables were how an operation was performed, its sequence relative to other related 
operations and the age of the patient. It was unclear how these variables affected two outcomes: 
cosmetic appearance and facial growth. The Plastic Surgeon was aware of a study in Sri Lanka that 
had concluded that surgery does affect facial growth, while cleft palate without surgery did not 
impair normal growth. There was a national and international interest on the effect surgery has on 
facial growth. The Plastic Surgeon recognised that the sequence of operations was seen as 
important, though different centres took different approaches. In Scandinavian countries, there is a 
long history of evaluating cleft palate surgery. For example, in Gothenburg the sequence of 
operations started at the back operating on the soft palate first, leaving the hard palate open; in Oslo 
repair to the front, hard palate was carried out first. 
7.7.2 Senior Chief Technologist and the Maxillofacial Laboratory 
In common with the other CLP centres, Addenbrookes operated a multi-disciplinary team of 
clinicians. In support of this team was a small and well established maxillofacial laboratory. This 
was small department that provided a technical service to departments including the CLP service. 
The department at Addenbrookes employed two technologists. The Senior Chief Technologist 
(SCT) in the department played a central role in the innovation of the process for making study 
models. They provided a wide range of services to patients from several hospital departments: 
  Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery including the Orthodontics, Cleft Lip and Palate, and Facial 
Deformity (orthognathic) Clinics; 
" Plastic Surgery; 
" Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT); 
  Ophthalmic Department; 
  Oncology; 
  Neurosurgery; 
  Their role was to fabricate a range of prostheses and appliances including: 
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  Facial prostheses; 
  Maxillary and jaw prostheses; 
" Prostheses to improve the contours of the limbs or torso; 
  Silicone implants; 
  Breast and nipple prostheses; 
  Skullplates (in titanium or acrylic; 
" Intraoral splints, for emergency trauma or for elective surgery; 
  Orthodontic braces. 
The department operated very much as a "jobbing shop" and the staff had significant autonomy in 
their work. Through strong relationship with other departments such as the engineering workshop, 
they were able to produce one off components, and were free to innovate the design of components. 
The staff in the department was keen to solve problems encountered in designing and producing 
various prostheses and appliances. The culture of the department encompassed that of the problem 
solving engineer. 
The work of maxillofacial technologists was specialised and supported by their professional body, 
the Institute of Maxillofacial Prosthetists and Technologists. The relationship between the 
professional institutions of the technologists and the clinicians (British Oral & Maxillofacial 
Surgeons) was a positive and mutually supportive one. Technologists needed to be both technical 
and clinical specialists, fabricating devices and then fitting them in either the maxillofacial 
prosthetic clinics or alongside surgical staff during operations. The technologist's role involves 
extensive professional autonomy due to the high degree of patient contact and clinical 
responsibility. The technical specialism grew out of the need for technical support, required by 
dental and medically qualified surgical staff working in oral surgery units after the Second World 
War. It is a specialism that requires technologists to work with a range of materials, within relevant 
regulatory frameworks. 
Maxillofacial technologists have played a role in the treatment of babies with cleft palate for a long 
time. In the past, a key task has been the creation of feeding plates that could be fitted to babies to 
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improve their feeding. This has required the construction of a plate based on a moulding taken of 
the roof of the baby's mouth. With the introduction of other techniques for feeding this process is 
now less common. 
The SCT saw the department as a "back room" area of the hospital but felt that they had significant 
levels of contact with patients, especially when fitting prostheses. This was an activity requiring 
sensitivity and excellent technical and craft skills. For example, making and fitting a facial 
prosthesis required good technical skills in order for the prosthesis to be effective and good 
interpersonal skills when dealing with the patient. 
In the course of the work of the department, they often had to address technical problems and 
develop effective solutions. The solutions were often variations on current methods and as such 
were not sufficiently novel to warrant IP protection. However, many of the improvements provide 
improved patient care, for example the development of improvement fixing methods for prostheses. 
The SCT believed that many of their ideas were not often acted on by the wider hospital. A key 
relationship for the department was with the hospital's engineering workshop. This relationship 
was important in enabling ideas developed by the technologists to be transformed into final 
products. One example of this was the development of stud fixings for prostheses developed by the 
department. These have been developed from conventional clips to a "flattened doughnut" shaped 
stud. The new design of stud had been manufactured by the engineering workshop. 
The method of working in the Maxillofacial Laboratory was very much an in-house process. The 
SCT suggested that this process had, to some extent, reduced the regulatory obstacles to 
innovation, especially as the work is in the context of a teaching hospital. There is a level of trust 
between the technologists, engineering workshop and the clinicians that all necessary measures 
were taken to ensure all devices were made from appropriate materials and designed with a careful 
consideration. This was the essence of the professionalism of the department. The SCT felt that this 
type of working would not be accepted in a private sector organisation, where the costs of meeting 
regulatory controls would be more prohibitive. 
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7.8 Emergent themes 
The innovation of the process for producing plaster study models was affected by a number of 
issues. Figure 7.5 illustrates the main enabling and retarding issues within the case, 
7.8.1 Motivation of staff to innovate 
The innovation was driven by the motivation of two members of staff, the SCT and the 
Plastic Surgeon. For both members of staff their motivation stemmed from their professional 
identities. 
Enablers ºI 4 Barriers 
Crafl skill 
Natural part of SCT's culture of 
professional Identify Maxilofaclal Lack of resource I 
to solve problems Labopratory Motivation for long term, 
to innovate I Regulatory controls cross-centre evaluation flows from Inhibit progress Professional 
Philanthropic Plastic Surgeon'a Identity Institutional support For Innovation 
values Professional responsibility to Improve patient care Emphasis on commercial Lack of resource or 
exploitation in conflict encouragement to 
Process Improvement with clinicians' values 
diffuse non-commercial 
Innovations 
not limited by rigid 
bureaucratic controls 
Organisational IS oriented 
n Willingness to act o 
7n 
of towards management 
, professional Judgement eonaultents information and 
Context of a performance Indicators 
Leading teaching 
hospital Continuous Improvement Specialist department as a barrier to innovation 
highlights concern for Scope for 
system wide evaluation experimentation Cl encourages Iffusion activity 
focus on micro given little 
rather than macroIssues conalderatlon 
^T I 
Functional structure Perception of roles 
strengthens and creates false barriers 
entrenches roles to change 
Role change 
as e perceived 
Innovation barriers 
Full use of organisation's 
capabilities, e. g. craft 
skills, limited by dgid 
roles and 
professional Identities 
Figure 7.5: Enabling and retarding factors in the CLP innovation process 
The SCT was motivated to pursue the innovation as he saw it as a natural part of his role. He felt 
that a distinctive aspect of his work was to identify and solve technical problems. lie was proud of 
many small innovations he had made during the course of his work, many of which he felt were not 
sufficiently novel to require patenting or other IP protection. They were however instances where a 
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problem had been solved through careful engineering. It was clear that the problem solving part of 
his role was important to the SCT. 
The motivation of the surgeon to be involved in innovation work was also based around his 
professional identity. He was primarily motivated by the need to improve patient care. He felt that 
the reward for this should be professional respect and recognition. He has little interest in the 
potential financial gains from innovation, as shown by his involvement in a separate innovation 
project in which he had played a central role. The other project has resulted in a commercial 
product, supported by £l Om of venture capital. In this other project, he has adopted the role of 
ensuring the product had scientific validity and he had no financial interest in the product. His 
innovation work was driven by a philanthropic spirit rather than an economic one. He saw the 
reward for innovation being based around professional recognition, he had joked with the company 
producing the device that "... he would like to be famous one day" (Plastic Surgeon). He felt 
however that the company would never really acknowledge his input into the product. 
7.8.2 Teaching hospital as a context for innovation 
The extent to which the context of a teaching hospital has supported the innovation was raised by 
the SCT. He felt that the culture of the teaching hospital made "experimentation" with the process 
legitimate. This was particularly the case in relation to the impact of regulatory controls on medical 
devices. He felt that this may not have been the case at other hospitals or in private companies. The 
extent to which this is a real factor is unclear. The SCT's experience was predominantly at 
Addenbrookes and not in a general hospital and so this may simply be a misconception. It does 
however raise the issue of whether user-led innovation activity is affected by whether the hospital 
is a general hospital or a teaching hospital. 
7.8.3 Institutional support. 
The philanthropic motivation that underpinned the work of the Plastic Surgeon conflicted with the 
ethos of innovation management in the NHS. The Plastic Surgeon experienced the support for 
R&D and innovation as focused primarily on exploitation of IP. His contact with R&D staff within 
and external to the hospital had made him feel the focus has been wrongly placed on maximising 
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revenue from IP. He felt that external agencies, such as large medical research charities, had placed 
the potential commercial success of an innovation above other factors, such as impact on NHS 
patients. He believed there needed to be a commercial interest to create a pressure to deliver. 
Overall, he believed that the innovation support infrastructure of the NHS was "... thwarting 
innovation" (Plastic Surgeon). In addition, the regulatory framework around innovation, such as 
ethical and R&D approval processes inhibited progress. The Plastic Surgeon reflected "... unless 
you have an enthusiastic registrar whose life depends upon getting a paper... " innovation projects 
would not even get started. He understood that there was a need to protect patients, but the balance 
had gone too far. 
The result of the emphasis on commercial exploitation was that there was no encouragement or 
resources available for the diffusing innovations that had a low commercial value, such as the study 
model technique. This was also reflected in the lack of funding available for activities that would 
underpin cross-centre evaluation of CLP surgery. 
7.8.4 Continuous improvement as an innovation barrier 
The project has highlighted the potentially limited nature of continuous improvement. The pursuit 
of incremental improvement of the process of producing study models may have encouraged a 
focus on micro rather than macro issues. This potentially lead to the wrong problem being 
addressed, where the macro level problem was how to store topographical study model data over 
the long term, rather than the best way of producing a plaster study model. 
Continuous improvement relies on the availability of adequate information systems to supply 
feedback on change. Unfortunately, the information systems in the hospital were oriented to 
management information and measurement of services against performance targets. This emphasis 
meant that there was little scope for investment in systems that would have allowed long term 
evaluation of CLP surgery. This meant that despite improvement in the quality of the study models 
wider systems for archiving and analysing the data held in the models was not considered. If a 
clearer innovation proposal had been developed then these wider systems could have been planned 
and resourced more effectively. 
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Finally, the emphasis on continuous improvement underemphasised the need to diffuse the 
techniques to other specialist CLP centres. While the innovation was adopted and accepted within 
the normal working practice of the department, there was no motivation to drive the wider diffusion 
of the process improvement. 
7.8.5 Role Changes: Innovation in roles taken by staff 
An important emergent theme in this case study was the extent to which the roles of the surgeon 
and the technologist shifted. The role change enabled two aspects of the innovation to occur. First, 
of all the shift in roles fundamentally underpinned the innovation of the process, i. e. the 
technologist carrying out the procedure rather than the surgeon. Second, the shift in role meant that 
the technologist was better placed to apply his experience in refining the process; he was no longer 
a passive observer but was experiencing the procedure himself. This meant that the innovation was 
based on a progressive refinement of the new procedure, rather than it simply being a single shift in 
procedure. It is useful to consider in more detail why the shift in roles was necessary and how the 
shift came about. 
Prior to the SCT developing the new process for producing the study models, the Plastic Surgeon 
would take the palate impressions himself. He was not well equipped to do this, using an NHS 
desert spoon instead of a dedicated tray, for holding the silicon putty when taking the impression. 
The Plastic Surgeon felt he lacked the necessary craft skill to produce a good quality impression. 
The result was that despite the best efforts of the technologists when producing the plaster 
impression from the silicon impression, the results were sub-optimal. The plastic surgeon's goal 
was to be able to keep suitable records to aid decision-making and to demonstrate that the centre 
was serious about keeping audit data. This provided a significant source of motivation for the 
change of role to occur. 
The accepted relationship between maxiliofacial technologists and clinical staff was clearly 
defined. The technologists worked primarily for and to support the work of orthodentists. Their 
work was therefore directed by orthodentists. Traditionally, technologists would not take internal 
impressions, even on patients in their teens. The orthodentist would be responsible for taking the 
impression, which would then be passed to the technologist to cast up. It was not accepted practice 
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for a technologist to carry out internal procedures, particularly on babies under anaesthetic. It was 
however common for technologists to take external moulds from patients. Within this system, the 
technologist would be unlikely to interact directly with the patient. This contrasted with the role 
taken by the technologists in other aspects of their work, where their role required them to interact 
with patients, such as when fitting prostheses. 
The respective roles taken by the Plastic Surgeon and the SCT were an expected and accepted 
feature of their professional identities, common in all hospitals and not just Addenbrookes. It was 
however, a relationship that was based on accepted custom and practice rather than any objective 
breakdown of the work content of the procedure. Two issues were raised by the existing division of 
work implied by the accepted roles. First, the craft skills needed to work with the mould materials 
were held predominantly by the technologist. In addition, the technologist had a full understanding 
of the complete process for making a plaster study model. This deeper knowledge of the process 
enabled him to develop improvements to the process, e. g. developing new tools such as the carrier 
for the silicon putty. Second, the technologist had a higher expectation, of the potential detail that 
could be achieved by plaster study models. 
The renegotiation of roles took place through consultation with other clinicians and service 
mangers. It did not attract any significant resistance when the proposal to allow the SCT to take the 
palate impressions in the operating theatre, under the supervision of the surgeon and other theatre 
staff. Potential resistance to this change could have developed because it was encroaching on the 
work of the maxillofacial/dental surgeons; however, the change of roles was probably more a 
perceived barrier to change, rather than one set in formal regulations. 
The change of procedure was a rather grey area in terms of the regulatory situation. It was not 
wrong for technologist to take moulds, but the context was seen as potentially very sensitive by the 
technologist. In contrast, the surgeon felt that the decision to allow the SCT to take the impressions 
was neither unusual nor controversial. The surgeon reflected that: 
I probably just bludgeoned my way through, not thinking that I was crossing a big 
boundary, I did not think it was an issue.. .I was surprised when someone said that 
technicians [SCI] were not supposed to take models. . it did not appear to me that I 
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was being cavalier or what you would make a fuss about ... I just needed the 
information and as you so often do in hospitals, you suddenly come across someone 
who is a bloody amazing resource, who is just around the corner, and we just said let's 
do it, and it just evolved, without reference to anyone else, and not particularly 
discussing it with each other. (Plastic Surgeon) 
For the Plastic Surgeon, the extended role of the SCT was seen as the logical way of evolving the 
process. By involving the SCT in the actual procedure in the operating theatre, the SCT was able to 
refine the tools and techniques used. He developed new trays for holding the putty in place and 
mastered distributing putty in the mouth, so that an optimum impression of the complete horseshoe 
of the mouth could be taken. 
The SCT however, saw the change as more radical. He perceived the change as quite fundamental 
and initially found the prospect of carrying out the procedure on an anesthetised baby slightly 
daunting. He believed that two factors had eased the change of roles. First, the SCT was a well 
established member of staff with twenty years of experience in the hospital. This position gave him 
a position of authority based on his technical knowledge. The clinicians trusted his judgement that 
the new procedure would have a significant benefit. He felt it unlikely that a technologist who was 
either less senior or was new to the hospital would have been able to suggest such as change. 
Secondly, the procedure would be carried out in an operating theatre in the presence of specialist 
surgical staff. This setting meant that any hazards associated with the procedure were adequately 
addressed. 
The change of role in this case study is a central one, allowing the technologist to apply his 
knowledge more effectively. Whether the resistance to role change constituted a barrier to 
innovation is, however, less clear cut. From the perspective of the technologist, it'was perceived as 
a major barrier. In contrast, the plastic surgeon was much less conscious of it being a significant 
issue and was far more concerned that the process was done in the most effective way. It seems 
likely that the role change was more manifestation of the perceived power differential between the 
technologist and the plastic surgeon. In this case, the technologist's perception was that surgeons 
would be reticent or even hostile about allowing technologists to carry out procedures on 
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anaesthetised patients. In this case, this turned out to be an incorrect assumption. The power of the 
plastic surgeon to effect change made the barrier insignificant; from his point of view. It does 
however suggest that such perceptions can form significant barriers to innovation. 
7.8.6 Validation evaluation of innovation 
From an evaluation perspective process, this case presents a distinctive example. The process of 
producing study models was part of a wider system of evaluation: audit of the results of CLP 
surgery. As such, the evaluation of the process did not lend itself to evaluation through clinical 
trial, as it did not have any direct impact on the effectiveness of any specific patient's treatment. 
Instead, the evaluation of the process has been based much more within a process of continual 
improvement of the process overtime, based on the judgements made by the SCT. The 
development of the process was based closely on a cycle of PDSA approach. 
No explicit evaluation of the techniques was carried out, but the technologist was satisfied and 
confident that they were producing better quality study models. His judgement was based on his 
own experience of producing plaster study model. His belief in the technique is also backed up by 
the judgements made by the Plastic Surgeon, and other clinicians, that the study models will 
underpin an improved basis for planning CLP surgery. This illustrated that the principal form of 
validation for the innovation was professional judgement, rather than systematic evaluations such 
as clinical trials. 
Some external validation of the process was gained when it was awarded a commendation in the 
2005 Enterprise East NHS innovations competition. It is however unclear to what extent the 
process was evaluated, in comparison to other potential solutions to the clinical problems it 
addressed. 
The case highlights an important issue for evaluation of process improvements. The use a PDSA 
approach to improvement, worked well for the innovation of the study model process. Decisions on 
improvements could be made quickly and with minimum level of bureaucratic controls. The 
overriding basis for evaluation was the critical judgement of the staff involved, based on their 
professional knowledge, in contrast to more formal evidence-based approaches. This suggests that 
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while evidence-based approaches are important in healthcare, they may not provide the only basis 
for evaluating process innovations. 
7.9 Summary 
The case highlights how relatively small process innovations develop through user-led innovation. 
The challenge in managing these types is in ensuring clarity of project goals, removing barriers to 
the wider diffusion of innovations that have been successfully implemented locally and providing 
appropriate and timely innovation support. 
7.9.1 Clarity of project goals 
This case illustrates the high level of coupling between high level and more locally oriented goals 
of user-led innovation projects. The multiple levels of clinical problem that the project has sought 
to address can mean that the purpose of the innovation can lose focus. The use of plaster study 
models was in fact a tool constructed to support higher level processes. Maintaining a consistency 
of goal across all levels would be challenging in a highly managed environment; in the context of a 
user-led innovation project there are few controls ensuring that the project consistently addresses 
all relevant goals, 
The case illustrates some important features of where innovation at the micro level can result in 
poor innovation at the macro level. Within the case, the focus of the development effort has been to 
improve the process of making a plaster cast. Unfortunately, due to the problems of using the 
plaster study model in large scale audits, it was probably the wrong thing to put effort into. Instead, 
it may have been more effective to consider the higher level clinical problem of how best to collect 
topographical data of CLP patients. This might have involved a very different investigation and 
development. It suggests that for many user-led innovations care needs to taken that the right 
clinical question is being asked. 
7.9.2 Barriers to innovation diffusion 
The case is an example of a process innovation that exhibited no significant diffusion. The 
characteristics of the innovation can be seen in terms of the knowledge required by the technologist 
to carry out the process, in combination with the tools and materials used in the process. In order 
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for the innovation to diffuse, two processes need to occur. First, the knowledge of the process held 
by the technologist must be codified into a form that allows the process to be taught to other 
surgeons or technologist. Second, any tools developed e. g. the "Nowakian Hook", need to be made 
available for others to use. This would undoubtedly require additional development e. g. to allow 
manufacture or fulfil regulatory controls. By completing these two processes, the innovation can be 
seen as having been "packaged" for wider use. It moves the process to one that is specialised, to 
one that has become more routine and less specialised in focus. 
7.9.3 Support to user-led innovation projects 
The problems of diffusing the user-led innovation, discussed above, suggest that innovators may 
benefit from additional support. The case suggests that specific types of support, at specific stages, 
may reduce the risk that innovation effort is misplaced. In particular, the case highlights two 
possible forms of support. First, the review of whether the right clinical problem is being 
addressed. Second, provision of timely advice to help innovators act to diffuse their innovations 
and to understand better the specific barriers to diffusion. Finally, this case illustrates the problem 
of how the full value of an innovation is not realised because of a lack of staff time to engage with 
the diffusion process. 
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Chapter 8: Pain Management Service (PMS) Case Study 
8.1 Introduction 
This case study reviews the innovation of the Pain Management Service (PMS), a service based at 
Southampton University Hospitals Trust (SUHT). The innovation involved the redesign of services 
to ensure that chronic pain patients were able to access expert help based in the primary and 
secondary care sectors, quickly and precisely. The service innovation resulted in the 
implementation of a bio-psychosocial model of pain to develop a collaborative, managed-care 
system, managed using a multi-disciplinary triage system. 
The new service design represented a complex new set of roles, relationships, processes and 
structures in the PMS. In addition, the case provides an insight into how the actions of staff 
involved in the original innovation acted to diffuse the new model of the PMS service design. 
The case study is important to understanding user-led innovation because it highlights how the 
entrepreneurial action of clinicians and mangers can affect shifts in attitude and changes in 
professional roles to support innovation of NHS services. The case highlights the role of multiple 
approaches to technology evaluation and suggests that service re-design must take a pluralistic 
view of evaluation methods. The case provides an example of how clinicians can act to influence 
professional groups and shift norms of practice in order to diffuse innovation beyond its original 
context. 
8.2 Data collection for the case study 
The data for this case study was collected through three semi-structured interviews and a review of 
literature associated with the project. The first interview was with the Consultant in Pain 
Management (PM Consultant) who had driven much of the project. Interviews were then carried 
out with two of the NHS managers involved in the project. The first, Manager A, was based in the 
pain management service of the hospital, with the PM Consultant. The PM Consultant and 
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Manager A were the two key members of staff at the core of the innovation project team. The 
second manager, Manager B, was based in a primary care trust and was involved, though from a 
primary care perspective. Due to their workload commitments, Manager A and Manager B were 
interviewed several months after the PM Consultant. 
Interviews with the three members of staff followed a semi-structured format using the standard 
interview schedule (Appendix 1). All the interviews were recorded and took place during 2007. 
The interviews were planned to last less than an hour each, however, in all cases the interviews 
extended to up to two hours each. All participants appeared relaxed and comfortable about 
discussing the project during the interviews. The researcher felt confident that the participants' 
responses were based on thoughtful, candid responses to the questions and did not appear evasive 
of any issues. All participants seemed to take part in the interviews enthusiastically and seemed to 
enjoy being given the opportunity to reflect on the project. Notably, the PM Consultant described 
the interview as "interesting". It was clear that during the interviews all participants had difficulty 
in clearly recollecting the chronological order and precise timing of events during the project, as 
several years had passed since the project's inception in 2002. 
Additional data for the case has been gained from the literature on pain and pain management (BPS 
2004; Engel 1977; Loeser 2000; Von Korff, Glasgow, and Sharpe 2002; Waddell 1987). Articles 
produced by members of the team were also considered (Price 2006; Price and Swales 2004), as 
were notes from a presentation at a British Pain Association meeting (Price 2007). 
8.3 Background to pain management services 
The clinical organisation of pain management services is complex as the potential treatment for 
chronic pain includes one or a combination of therapies such as: counselling, drug therapies, 
surgery, physiotherapy and acupuncture. The challenge for a pain service is to ensure that patients 
are referred to the most appropriate treatments in a timely manner, whether provided by specialists 
based in hospitals or other staff based within the primary care sector. 
The British Pain Society (BPS) defines chronic pain as a continuous, long-term pain extending over 
a period of at least 12 weeks. In contrast, acute pain is shorter term and usually associated with a 
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specific cause; chronic pain may be less easily attributed to a specific illness. Chronic pain is 
experienced by a diverse range of patients with conditions such as: arthritis, back pain, damage to 
the nervous system, pain resulting from surgery and cancer. Patients range from children through to 
the elderly. 
Chronic pain is a significant problem in society causing many social and economic problems. The 
BPS proposed several consequences of chronic pain in the UK: 
  untreated pain can affect quality of life for sufferers and carers resulting in 
helplessness, isolation, depression and family breakdown; 
  musculoskeletal conditions have a more negative effect on quality of life than 
cardiovascular, chronic respiratory and gastrointestinal disease and visual 
impairment; 
  two thirds of people with chronic pain surveyed across Europe reported 
inadequate pain control with only 16% saying they had seen a pain specialist; 
  poorly managed chronic pain accounts for 208 million days off work equating 
to £18 billion a year; 
  Currently nearly 4.2% of the working population is on incapacity benefit, 24% 
of which are due to diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective 
tissue, almost two thirds of whom are male. This equates to a cost of £6.7 
billion. (BPS 2004) 
Traditional pain management services have reflected a predominantly bio-medical perspective on 
the treatment of pain. The bio-medical view of pain assumed pain to be related to physical disease, 
rather than illness or disability. The implication of this has been that the structuring of pain services 
was predicated on an assumption that pain should be treated using medical approaches. Hence, pain 
services in NHS trusts were commonly centred on hospitals, with medical specialists in areas such 
as orthopaedics and anaesthetics occupying powerful positions. The consequence of this was that 
the prime means of treatment were based on either surgical or pharmaceutical interventions. 
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However, since the 1970s. following on from work by Engel on the hi0-psychosocial model of 
disease (Engel 1977), a broader approach to the treatment of pain was developed. Figure S. I 
illustrates a bio-psyehosocial model ofpain and suffering developed to inform pain management 
(Loeser 2000). 
Pain Behaviour 
Suffering 
Pain 
Nociception 
Figure 8.1: Bio-psychosocial model of pain (adapted from Loeser (2000)) 
Based on Loeser's model it became clear that pain services needed to take a more holistic view of 
pain and suffering. Part of the reason for the emphasis on the bi-medical view of'pain was in part 
because of the dominance ofcertain professional groups and commercial interests of 
pharmaceutical companies. 
The search for the biologic mechanisms underlying pain has been fuelled in large part 
by the pharmaceutical industry. It has funded much ofthe research and the majority of 
the meetings addressing this topic. The pursuit of mechanisms of pain (usually called 
the neurobiology of pain) currently seems to li)cus almost exclusively upon somatic 
tissues, the peripheral nerves, or the dorsal horns. (Loeser 2000) 
Loeser suggested that other strategies were needed to hell) patients cope with pain, with particular 
attention to the suffering experienced by a patient. 
Suffering, however, cannot he Illund II we examine patients' bodies alone, li)r it exists 
only in the mind. The events that lead to suffering will ditier from one patient to 
another. There are no physical examination clues or laboratory tests or imaging studies 
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that reveal its presence. We must ask the patient and listen to his or her narrative to 
find suffering. Often, just listening to the patient will ameliorate his or her suffering, 
but the data are not objective. One cannot assess suffering in a patient whom one does 
not know. One can, however, help the patient deal with his or her suffering without 
knowing the aetiology or pathology of the disease that causes the patient to suffer. 
(Loeser 2000) 
Waddel applied a similar perspective in relation to chronic back pain and concluded that pain 
services should extend the types of treatment and crucially recognise the patient's role in sharing 
responsibility for progress 
To make this a practical reality, we must consider low-back disability is an illness 
rather than low-back pain as a disease. We all recognize in theory, the need to 
consider the physical, psychological, and social aspects of illness. In practice, we must 
distinguish pain and disability, distinguish the symptoms and signs of psychologic 
stress and illness behaviour from those of physical disease, and direct treatment to 
restoration of function as well as relief of pain. It is unlikely there will ever be a magic 
cure for all low-back pain, so the physician's role as healer must be accompanied by 
his or her more ancient role as counsellor, helping patients to cope with their 
problems. The patient's role must correspondingly change from passive recipient of 
treatment to a more active sharing of responsibility for his or her own progress. 
(Waddell 1987) 
The bio-psychosocial model has been elaborated through combination with collaborative and 
stepped care systems, such as those operated in North America, for example, Kaiser Permante's 
managed care system. Von Korff et al made two important contributions to the structuring of pain 
management services. First, by emphasising the need for pain management services to include 
collaborative models of care where patients, their families and clinicians are all involved in 
decision making. Second, an efficient model of stepped care (see Figure 8.2) is needed where the 
sophistication of interventions is increased only when simpler ones have failed: 
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Interventions are best organised in a stepped fashion - that is, the most complex and 
expensive interventions are given only when simpler and cheaper ones 
have been 
shown to be inadequate inappropriate. (Von Korf', Glasgow, and Sharpe 2002) 
Emphasis of care in acute sector Intensive care 
Emphasis of care in primary secto 
Care management in primary care 
routine assessment and preventive maintenance 
Figure 8.2: Stepped model of collaborative care 
It is in the context of these advances in the organisation of pain management services that the 
changes at the PMS took place. The result being to implement a collaborative, staged-care, pain 
management system based on the assumptions in the bin-psychosocial model of pain. 
8.4 Overview of the Innovation 
The PMS was based in Southampton Universities I lcalthearc'I rust (SUI FF), a secondary care trust 
serving five PCTs. Services used by the I'MS were based across both the primary and secondary 
sectors. Medical and surgical care tending to be based in the secondary sector while other services 
such as physiotherapy were based in the PC"fs. Care tended to he fragmented between trusts, with 
few mechanisms for managing care across trust boundaries. Within the PC'Ts some small scale 
initiatives were started to provide improved services, for example a pain management programme 
that was staffed by primary and secondary care specialists. 'I'hesc initiatives however tended to he 
fragmented and did little to improve the overall performance of pain services. 'These efforts were 
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also impeded by differences in strategic priorities, structures and funding between trusts. This had 
meant that PMS staff had only made minor changes that failed to solve the underlying problems. 
The staff in the PMS believed it to be a cinderella service, but recognised its function as critical. 
There was a proven link between chronic pain and problems such as: family breakdown, loss of 
work or depression, so an ineffective pain service resulted in patients pacing pressure on GP 
practices, the NHS, and the wider economy. Pain management was given very low levels of 
management scrutiny. It was not high on political agendas and had no specific government targets 
set for it. 
From the perspective of the primary and acute NHS trusts, the PMS was perceived as ineffective 
operation. There was very little evidence that the services commissioned by PCTs were either cost 
effective e generating much patient satisfaction. For this reason, the Chief Executive of the trust 
(SUHT) was receptive to proposals for improving the PMS. 
In 2002, the problems in the service all acted to cause a hiatus in the PMS. The service was in a 
long term cycle of periodically hitting a problem and having to close for a period of time. During 
that time, some patients would leave the service and eventually the service would reopen, though 
without changing the PMS itself. It was not unusual for patients referred to the service to have to 
wait two years before being seen. The pressure of work in the service was such that morale of staff 
was very low and there was feeling that problems were dealt with on a fire-fighting basis. The 
problems in the PMS were not unique and it was found that they were common in pain services in 
many other NITS trusts. 
8.4.1 Problem addressed by the innovation 
The innovation in the PMS was in response to an organisational problem rather than a single, 
narrow clinical problem. While there were a number of clinical issues central to the problems 
impacting on the PMS but many other issues were based on organisational issues. The problem was 
complex with various interrelated issues combining to cause serious deficiencies in the PMS. 
Figure 8.3 shows the key relationships between problems experienced by the PMS and their root 
causes. 
222 
Pain Management Service Case Study 
Delays 
Service 
exacerbate ` 
5Hjjgh 
vel of pmiodically 
patient J laintsnosed" 
condition 
Service 
clogged 
Long 
(waiting 
lists 
Low staff over 
morale centralised 
Re-referral 
common 
Some 
Lack of 
treatments 
service 
ineffective 
capacity 
l- 
Inappropriate 
, 
(\ referral 
common / 
Lack of 
discharge 
cnlena 
Poor referral 
criteria 
unrealistic 
expectation 
of PMS 
Lack of 
defined care 
pathways 
chronic pain 
management 
Figure 8.3: Problem relationships in the PMS 
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The most visible problems in the pain management service were well delined in the service. The 
PMS suffered from a very high level of complaints that were disproportionate to its size and made 
the failings of the service prominent in the mind of senior trust managers. 
The cause ofthe complaints was predominantly delays in accessing the service of up to two years. 
This resulted in the physical and mental deterioration o(paticnts by the time they were accepted 
into the service. In addition, the discharge rates from the services were very low, periodically 
prompting the closure of the service to new patients. 't'his in turn exacerbated the problem of 
waiting times. Overall, these problems lead to the service beim; perceived as poor value for money 
by the PCT commissioning services form the I'MS. Several factors were identified that undermined 
the effective operation of the PMS. 
Poorli' dr%iººed care path h'ut's 
Forenxost of these was the absence of'clear care pathways for patients with chronic pain and it was 
common for patients to be referred to more than one speciality at once, though their care was not 
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co-ordinated between the specialities. The absence of clear care pathways lead to imprecise referral 
practices; lack of co-ordination within and between primary and secondary care staff; use of 
ineffective treatments; re-referral of patients between specialists; and lack of clarity as to when a 
patient should be discharged from the service. The lack of clear criteria for discharging patients 
meant that both clinicians and patients had no expectation of when treatment would be stopped. 
The lack of discharge criteria was a significant cause of the PMS becoming clogged with patients. 
Care pathways are an important form of healthcare technology. Webster describes them as: 
... a form of socio-technology 
in as much as they act as tools (even if somewhat 
insensitive ones) to orchestrate and shape the social management of clinical delivery. 
(Webster 2007: 139) 
GPs lacked knowledge ofpain management 
GPs responsible for commissioning services from the PMS generally had a poor knowledge of 
chronic pain management. This meant that they were reticent to treat chronic pain themselves; 
instead referring patients to the PMS. It was common for referral letters to be poorly written, 
omitting critical information required for assessing patients. While many treatments were available 
within the acute sector, there were many other treatments also available in the primary care sector. 
Many GPs did not have the knowledge to select an appropriate care pathway. 
... there was an assumption that patients needed a 
high level of expert input and to 
have a needle stuck in them, and fancy drugs, but they didn't. There were some people, 
no matter how many needles and drugs you are going to pump into them, mentally 
they could not cope with their pain, and that is when the clinical psychologist was 
really important. (Manager A) 
Dominance of the bio-medical view of pain 
The predominant view of pain management taken in the service was bio-medical and under- 
emphasised the psychological dimension of pain. The general operation of the service involved the 
referral of patients to consultants who maintain control of the decision-making about patients' care 
plans. Nurses, GPs and other community-based staff rarely lead the development of care plans. The 
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specialist area of the consultants involved in the pain service tended to emphasise medical or 
surgical interventions. This resulted in patients' treatment often being skewed towards drug 
treatment or surgery. The centralisation of the service on specialist departments in the hospital 
tended to exclude community-based services such as physiotherapist, psychologists and 
pharmacists. 
Little emphasis on collaborative case management 
The service lacked an emphasis on collaborative case management and underemphasised the role 
of the carers and patient in management of pain. In particular, little emphasis was based on how to 
support patient's self-management of their pain. 
Pain management services given low priority 
Pain management was not a government priority and so little resource was put into it. There was an 
absence of effective management systems put in place to monitor and manage outcomes from the 
PMS. 
8.4.2 Innovation in the PMS 
In response to the issues raised above a fundamental change was made to the PMS. These changes 
were related to the soft technology of organising pain management for patients rather than a 
specific hard technology. The change was analogous to a shift from consultant centred "jobbing 
shop", to a process that facilitated the mass customisation of a range of services for each patient 
using clearly defined care pathways. The process change prompted fundamental changes in social 
aspects of the service delivery. Changes to levels of autonomy and job roles were central to the 
innovation, for example, the role of nursing staff was modified to emphasise higher level skills. 
The starting point 
The initial situation in the PMS that existed before the innovation was chaotic, ineffective and 
unsustainable. The general process of referring and treating patients is shown in Figure 8.4. 
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Figure 8.4: Initial process layout for Pain Management Service 
Patients would initially present to GPs with pain problems relating to a range of conditions such as 
hack pain, post operative pain. Patients with chronic pain in particular would often recurrently 
return to (ills for treatment. In many cases, GI's had very little knowledge of'how to manage 
patients with chronic pain and so referral of patients to the I'MS was frequent and often based on 
poor referral criteria. It was common fOr patients with chronic pain to he referred simply as a last 
resort for the patient as the GP had run out of ideas on how to treat the patient. Referral letters to 
the PMS would often he lacking in detail. Once referred patients would have to wait for 
appointments to see consultants working in the PMS. Waiting line was considerable and it would 
he common for patients to be referred in parallel to more than one consultant. In some situations, 
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patients were referred to some consultants on the basis that waiting times were low, despite the 
consultant's speciality being inappropriate for the patient. Overall, the referral process was 
inconsistent and did not assure patients the correct route to effective treatment. In addition, the 
quantity of referrals, poor referral information and referral to the wrong specialist, overloaded the 
PMS system. This in turn created longer waiting list, waiting times and in effective use of 
specialists' clinic time, further exacerbating the situation. 
Once referred to consultants patients would be assessed and treatment planned for them. 
Unfortunately, the lack of care guidelines created a number of further problems. The expectation of 
the likely outcome of a course of treatment was rarely discussed with patients. Treatment such as 
physiotherapy was often planned without clear end dates or criteria for exiting the service. This 
resulted in patients often staying within the service for many years either continuing with treatment 
that had previously failed or migrating from consultant to consultant, never achieving a satisfactory 
treatment outcome. The result of this was that the PMS would tend to become filled with patients 
whom were never discharged. This clogged the service and eventually resulted in the periodic 
closure of the service to new patients. 
The solution 
The result of the innovation has been the restructuring of the PMS. The new design of the service is 
shown in Figure 8.5. The central principle underlying the innovation was the implementation of the 
bi-psychosocial perspective on the PMS. This was achieved by the explicit definition of care 
pathways, with clear referral and discharge criteria. To implement these pathways effectively a 
multi-disciplinary triage system was implemented. The development of the care pathways and 
triage system facilitated secondary changes that resulted in the implementation of a collaborative 
care model. Through these changes, the PMS was able to manage patients effectively based on 
stepped-care principles. The innovation in the PMS was the result of applying and merging a 
combination of new and existing approaches to healthcare service design. This has involved 
translating ideas from within the area of pain management and the wider healthcare sector. The 
innovation represents the implementation of a whole systems approach to pain management. 
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Figure 8.5: Re-designed process layout for Pain Management Service 
The main outcomes of the innovation have been a significant improvement in both efficiency and 
effectiveness ofthe PMS. Some of the main outcomes included: 
" Waiting time for accessing the service was reduced from up to two year to less than six 
weeks. 
" The numbers of inappropriate referrals to the service was reduced by 30%. 
  'Flic number of medical follow-ups reduced. 
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  Significant numbers of patients being referred back to GPs for care; less than 50% of 
patients being treated in the secondary sector 
  Greater and emphasis and use of coping and self-management skills. 
  Secondary care budget for pain management reduced. The amount of invasive management 
carried out on patients was reduced, with 50% fewer operations being carried out. 
  Greater emphasis placed on psychological services, with 25% of patients now being 
recognised as needing a mental health assessment in relation to their pain. 
  Greater emphasis placed on community-based pharmacy support. 
  For the 25% of cases classed as highly complex, service was structured better to give 
complex individual case management. 
  Service restructured around a local service framework with treatment based outside 
hospital where possible. 
  Improved relationship between primary and secondary trusts. 
An important outcome of the innovation has been the impact on high level performance indicators, 
such as waiting times. A critical factor in this was that the discharge rate from the PMS was greatly 
increased. This change was for a number of reasons. First of all, more patients with treated 
successfully by GPs and in other PCT settings. Secondly, the pathways chosen for individual 
patients were more appropriate and successful for the patient, Third, GPs over time became more 
confident about treating pain, and therefore referrals into the system were reduced, Finally, 
discharge rates increased due to the effective implementation of discrete exit points from the 
service. 
8.5 Innovation process 
The nature of the innovation in this project required a major step change in the operation of the 
PMS. For this reason, the process followed was relatively linear. Figure 8.6 shows the overall 
process followed. 
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Figure 8.6: The PMS innovation process 
8.5.1 Initial actions 
The innovation process was triggered by the chaotic state of the PMS in 2002. The long waiting 
times for patients accessing the service and the subsequent complaints created a period where the 
organisation was not able to cope. It was at this point that the I'M Consultant and Manager A 
proposed a solution to the problems and pursued a process of innovation. 
'Ehe first step in this process was the negotiation of the closure of the PMS to new patients. The 
rational for this was that the PMS delivered a poor level of service; that had several structural 
limitations in its current configuration; and that to solve the root problems ofthe service, time was 
needed for decision-making and the subsequent reconfiguration of the service. The closure of the 
service was seen by many as an emotive issue and needed to be handled carefully. Manager A felt 
there was no alternative as in the face of continuing pressure to reduce waiting times, it was only 
through a radical restructuring that the PMS could become successful. 
After an initial meeting with the Chief Executive ofthe acute trust. It was agreed that the service 
should close, with the exception of provision for paediatric and cancer pain services. The decision 
was then communicated to the I)oH and the PCTs involved with the service. The decision was 
initially met with dismay by the I'C'l'Ss, however, the stakeholders had I'cw illusions about tlºe 
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quality of the existing pain service and ultimately the PCTs were extremely supportive of the 
project. At this stage Manager A was clear that while the problem had been identified, no specific 
solution had been chosen. She reflected that closure of the service would allow the team to: 
... get their 
heads around the problem... we made it very clear to all commissioners 
and the trust that we would not open the service until it was different, we didn't know 
what different was going to look like but we knew we could not open it in the same 
configuration. (Manager A) 
8.5.2 Agreeing solution 
The next stage of the process consultation with all the major stakeholders of the PMS. Though the 
PM Consultant and Manager B had developed a view on the possible solutions to be adopted, they 
recognised that there needed to be a consensus amongst senior management and the PMS 
stakeholders. 
Two preliminary meetings with PCT senior staff and the medical director of the acute trust were 
held prior to the workshop. These were crucial in gaining high level support for the project. Once 
the initial problem had been defined, the potential solution based on a triage system feeding 
patients to well defined care pathways, was agreed with senior trust management. 
Following these meeting the PM Consultant and the Manager A set up a workshop for all the 
service stakeholders, believing that without early engagement of all of the PMS stakeholders it was 
unlikely that any significant change could be achieved. This was important, as there was a wide 
range of staff involved, with very broad ranging attitudes to how much change was acceptable. 
Some staff were very keen to support change, while others were resistant to change. 
Staff were invited to the workshop on the basis that it was a meeting to improve the way the PMS 
operated, for "... anyone who wanted to sort this thing out" (PM Consultant). Manager A was very 
concerned that the event needed to maximise the attendance of as many of the key stakeholders 
responsible for decisions in the local PCTs. 
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The workshop was sponsored by a pharmaceuticals company and held at a hotel venue. Waiting 
lists were suspended for the day to allow staff the opportunity to attend. As an incentive to GPs, the 
event was officially approved as professional development. 
The workshop was well attended by a wide range of staff including: consultants; GPs; 
rehabilitation professionals; staff from the Expert Patient Programme; mental health staff; Trust 
managers, commissioners from the PCTs; and GP leads from the PCT. The PM Consultant 
considered this a representative mix of staff, with all key groups represented. She was pleased that 
"jobbing" GPs attended and not just those linked with committees. Several senior members of staff 
from the acute and primary trusts also attended. 
The aim of the workshop was to clarify the problems underlying the PMS and identify a way 
forward for the service. The workshop was facilitated by the Manager A and had several aims 
based around introduction of care pathways and a triage system: 
  identify current care pathways; 
" identify patient groups served by the service; 
" assess the practicality of a triage system; 
  make an initial attempt to define a set of clear care pathways; 
  clarify what the end-points for care pathways should be. 
Two keynote speakers were chosen for the workshop. The first was a clinician responsible for the 
PMS. They talked about the way the services were structured at the time. The second speaker was 
the director of modernisation at the acute trust, whose commercial background provided a different 
time perspective on the service and how it could develop. 
Two initial group activities involved the attendees first, mapping the current problems in the PMS 
and then developing view of how the service should look like in the future. Manager A saw these 
activities as successful because all groups mapped the same problems; and also mapped the same 
possible solutions. She felt that the result of the activities was a united view of the way the PMS 
should develop: 
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that was great because everyone in the room felt the same about the service, 
frustrated with the problems and sees the solution. (Manager A) 
Despite gaining agreement on the problems within the service, gaining consensus from the 
workshop attendees on a solution was more problematic. Manager A and the PM Consultant 
proposed key principles for restructuring the service. These were: 
  discrete pathways needed to be defined for treating patients; 
  patients treatment should be prompt, to avoid their problems becoming worse over time, 
especially from a psychological perspective; 
  care should be customised to the patient, with the patient's care plan agreed at an early 
stage, incorporating one or more treatment pathway; 
  the care plan would clearly define the exit strategy from the service and on completion of 
the care plan, patients would be discharged from the service; 
  patients' expectations of the service should be managed carefully, especially in terms of 
what treatment they were to be given and at what stage they would be discharged from the 
service; 
" patients that failed to respond to treatment should be discharged at the end of their course 
of treatment. 
The most contentious of these principles was that all patients should have an exit strategy from the 
service. Several staff including hospital consultants felt strongly that they had a duty to provide 
unlimited courses of care to patients. 
Manager B felt after the workshop the mood amongst staff in both the acute and primary trusts, was 
that there was no option but to do something. Some staff were enthusiastic about the suggested path 
of the project, however, even those with reservations, took the position that it was better to do 
something that nothing. 
... they were in crisis, and they had to do something, they were coming up with this 
idea that looked as though it was going to work, it was not costing massive amounts of 
money, and were not asking for massive investment, I think the people who were 
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working within the service, some of them thought it was a great idea, others probably 
had their reservations, but they all wanted things to change because it was so dire. So 
in a way it helped because it was so dire. (Manager B) 
The workshop successfully generated support and agreement for the subsequent change. The 
formal consensus of the stakeholders was that multiple care pathways existed, with multiple points 
of access to the service, leading to inconsistent and inefficient use of the services. It was 
highlighted that both referrers and patients were unclear about the potential outcomes of various 
pathways. Three important issues were agreed at the workshop. First, it was accepted that the end 
point to treatment should be when the patient was adapted to their pain. Without this acceptance, it 
would have been problematic to develop care pathways. Secondly, it was accepted that GPs could 
be much more proactive in referring patients directly to specific services, when given appropriate 
support from the PMS. Finally, there was a need to manage the patient expectation of what to 
expect from the service and when they would leave it. 
The impact of the workshop on the attendees' attitudes to triage teams was important because it: 
... sowed the seeds in people's minds about the assessment [triage] teams. (Manager B) 
The financial case for the proposal were also well received. The chair of the Professional Executive 
Committee (an important budget allocating committee in the PCT) was very interested. His interest 
directly resulted in the team being able to get some financial backing for the project. 
Manager A reflected that an important function of the workshop was that it allowed a short 
deadline to be placed on agreeing the next steps. By the end of the workshop, agreement had been 
achieved on the next set of stages in the restructuring. 
8.5.3 Pilot 
The outcome of the workshop was to run a pilot of a revised PMS system, based on a triage system 
and clearly defined care pathways. To oversee the operation of the pilot a Pain Steering Group was 
set up with two sub-groups: a clinical group and an operational group. The clinical group was 
responsible for clinical governance and referral criteria. The operational group was responsible for 
implementing the new service. The operational group was headed by a project manager. Support 
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and funding from the acute trust and one of the PCTs was gained for the pilot, along with 
agreement on the use of a site owned by the PCT. The PCT had previously run a small pain 
management programme on the site. 
The most significant change to the service made when setting up the pilot scheme was the creation 
of a triage team. The pain assessment and triage team (PAT team) was a multidisciplinary team. It 
was made up of a group of experts. It comprised of a consultant in pain management, a clinical 
psychologist and a physiotherapist. Patients were referred to the team by GPs. A patient would then 
be assessed by the team and the programme of care developed for the individual, Using one or a 
combination of defined pathways. The pilot also involved the development of psychology as an 
explicit pathway within the service; 
Besides, the setting up of the PAT team, a large amount of work was done educating GPs in the 
management of chronic pain. The PM Consultant took a key role in educating GPs and producing 
documentation to support them. An important part of this work during the pilot was to improve the 
communication between GPs and the PAT team. At the start of the pilot, many of the referral 
letters received from GPs were inadequate in terms of providing background information on the 
patient. In these cases, the PAT team had to refer back to the GP to gain more information. Much 
of the work done by the PM Consultant was in improving the standard of communication from GP 
to PAT team. As a result of the efforts of the PM Consultant the relationships with the GPs 
improved greatly. This allowed patients to be referred back to the GPs for further care; the PAT 
team providing the GP with specific advice on how treatment should proceed. 
The pilot was set up initially for three months but was extended to six months. This was a 
consequence of the recognition that the measurement of the service outcomes had to take place 
over a longer timeframe. The evaluation of the service changes became an important part of the 
pilot and the PM Consultant was active in evaluating the changes that were made. 
The evaluation of the pilot was driven by three concerns. The first was the scrutiny by the project's 
operational group. The second was the recognition that in the future the PM Consultant may be 
expected to defend the changes made and prove why the success of the triage system. Third, it was 
important to gain information that would inform the ongoing development of the service. 
235 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
Provision of evaluation data to the operations group was initially difficulty. Data was not always 
available from existing information systems; where data was held it was often spread across several 
systems. Over the first few months of the project, data was presented to the group but it took 
several iterations for the operations group to agree on the amount and specific sets of data required. 
The main concerns of the group were: 
  waiting times; 
" patient access; 
" discharge rate; 
  effect of the triage team. 
The audit data was eventually produced by the consultant by integrating data from several sources 
onto a spreadsheet. This was done mainly in her own time for the first year, though later the 
spreadsheets have been maintained by administrative staff. 
Some of the data such as waiting times and discharge rates were maintained by existing hospital 
tracking systems, developed for government reports. However, these did not provide the level of 
detail needed to evaluate the triage system. Additional systems were developed to monitor the case- 
mix handled by the service. This was a detailed system that allowed them to monitor the 
distribution of users in the service, especially in terms how severe cases were then referred to 
secondary care. 
Modification to existing information systems were initially made a priority by the Trust's IS 
department and were carried out relatively quickly and without delay. The PM Consultant believed 
that this was due to the PMS being treated as a problem area and so requests for changes were 
backed by the Chief Executive and the Medical Director. Later in the project, she felt that as the 
PMS improved its performance, it became more difficult to request system modifications. 
8.5.4 Consolidation of the local Implementation 
The successful outcome of the pilot meant that other PCTs served by the acute trust were gradually 
recruited to the newly configured PMS. During this phase of the project, the service underwent a 
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period of continuous improvement. Changes were made to address emergent issues that had 
developed because of the reconfiguration of the service. 
It was recognized that in addition to the development of the triage systems and care pathways other 
process and structure changes were required. Many of these issues required fundamental change 
and included: 
recognizing that the nursing model was no longer appropriate and service needed to 
employ advanced practitioners; 
  due to increased care by the primary sector. It was recognized that 50% of the capacity in 
the acute sector was no longer needed; 
" the traditional staffing model was seen as in inadequate, and it was recognized that more 
multidisciplinary staff were required for example physiotherapists with acupuncture skills; 
 a higher level of pharmacy input was required to review medication provided to patients. 
The new service design has essentially highlighted the need for the whole workforce to change. 
8.5.5 Wider diffusion of the innovation 
The final phase of the project was the transfer of the innovation to pain management services in 
other trusts. This was achieved through a range of activities; however, the lack of any exploitable 
IP in the innovation, such as software meant that diffusion could not occur through conventional 
technology transfer mechanisms. 
This activity involved members of the innovation team communicating the service principles to 
staff from other trusts. This was done through two main mechanisms. The first was through 
diffusion activities that allowed the knowledge gained about organising the PMS to be transferred 
to staff from other services. The primary method for doing this was through codifying aspects of 
the system, producing diffusion artefacts such as: 
  articles in professional journals; 
" information packs that included useful documentation such as clinical guidelines that have 
been developed, patient assessment questionnaires and standard letters. 
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Diffusion of the knowledge was also carried out through personal contact between the PMS staff 
and visitors. The team worked hard to host visits and present information about their project at 
conferences and workshops. This method of diffusion can be seen as closer to "apprenticeship" 
than simple codification, so addressing the transfer of more tacit aspects of the service. 
The second mechanism was through abstracting knowledge of pain management created in the 
PMS to a more general level. The primary example of this was in informing national policy and 
care guidelines developed by professional bodies. 
The wider diffusion of the PMS model received significant support from drug companies. 
Manager B suggested that drug companies played an important role in diffusion activities, First of 
all the networks of relationships associated with drug companies were very useful when setting up 
workshops and identifying appropriate groups of NHS staff to invite. This saved the NHS staff time 
in setting up meetings with relevant people in other trusts. Second, drug companies also provided 
project management experience and expertise for trusts, who tried to set up services using specific 
pathways. Manager B believed that the relationship between the NHS and these drug companies 
was mutually beneficial. A pharmaceutical company had funded the PM Consultant to give talks 
and produce the resource packs. It has also funded a cost-benefit analysis of the service. The 
motive for the pharmaceutical company may have been that the triage system created opportunities 
for marketing products to GPs, however, overall it was a symbiotic relationship. 
8.6 Time dynamics of the innovation process 
The PMS project was instigated in 2002 when service problems reached a hiatus; circumstances 
essentially forced the start of the project. As a result of this urgency, the initial stages involving 
problem recognition and development of a planned solution took a period of a few months. The 
subsequent stages involving implementing the project through a pilot and then expansion of the 
service took place over an extended period of time. The planned three-month pilot scheme was 
extended to six months. This extra time was required for the project team to identify and collect 
relevant evaluation data. It is likely that the pilot would have taken significantly longer without the 
PM Consultant and Service Manager A contributing a significant amount of their own time at 
evening and weekends. The expansion of the service to cover five PCTs and then diffusion of the 
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innovation to other pain management services in the NHS took place over a period of several years 
and is on-going. 
8.7 Organisational Context 
8.7.1 Team experience 
The experience of project members prior to the project was relevant to the development of the 
innovation. The knowledge gained through these experiences informed both the solution achieved 
but also the process followed. 
The PM Consultant brought significant experience to the project. Her work experience in North- 
American healthcare systems had given her insights into alternative models of structuring 
healthcare services. Her work as a specialist in pain management had highlighted to her the need 
for a holistic view of pain, encompassing bi-psychosocial perspectives. Based on this she was a 
strong advocate for recognising the involvement of clinical psychologists in treating chronic pain. 
During her experience of working as a consultant at SUHT she had recognised several operational 
problems with the service: 
patients referred to her could often have been referred directly to services in the primary 
care sector; 
  there was a lack of ownership of the PMS; 
no overall strategy for the development fo the PMS; 
  low levels of funding risked the service stagnating; 
  locally developed improvement initiatives were fragmented and lacked co-ordination. 
Manager A's experience bf working within the NHS had made her confident in dealing with other 
staff, especially clinicians: 
... because I have been in the NHS a long time, I know the best ways to get clinical 
engagement. (Manager A) 
She had worked on process change in other areas of the NITS and had visited America to look at 
different models of healthcare processes, for example, 23 hour clinics. This had been important in 
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her previous job, when she had been setting up a day surgery unit. When she attended a seminar on 
acute pain, she had been made aware of principles that could be applied in chronic pain services: 
  the service could not keep patients forever; 
  patients were not in the service to be cured of their pain; 
  the service was to help people live with their pain. 
Similarly, Manager B had experience that made her question existing NHS practice. Prior to the 
project, she had spent a year working for a BUPA hospital. This experience had made her more 
conscious of how the NHS could improve service levels, budgetary management and emphasise 
discrete care pathways. She was particularly interested in how pathways could be managed 
between primary and secondary sectors and the assumption that: 
... you keep all patients 
in the PCT or in the acute trust and that you never managed 
them in and out. (Manager B) 
Overall, the experiences gained by staff involved in the project influenced the framing of the 
problem and potential solutions that could be adopted. From an early stage of the project both the 
PM Consultant and Manager A had a conviction that the solution to problems in the PMS lay in 
implementation of a triage system that allocated patients systematically to well defined care 
pathways that integrated services across the primary and secondary sectors. 
8.7.2 Learning culture 
The culture in the acute trust was generally conducive to learning. While part of this culture was 
attributable to the teaching activities in the hospital providing a mechanism for reflection on 
practice in the hospital: 
... we have to deliver a lot of lectures and so have to be able to justify it [the service 
changes] to many students. (PM Consultant) 
The PM Consultant believed the culture encouraged staff to question what they did and lead to 
some flexibility and openness to innovation. However, the emphasis was still on the individual to 
be reflective, identify problems and then seek solutions: 
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... if you are not inquisitive and want to change things there is no point in being 
flexible and what happens then is you cannot see why you want to do it because you 
are not identifying the problems, thinking what you might do about them. 
(PM Consultant). 
The flexibility given to individuals to take action was central to the project, even the service 
closure decision was made bottom-up, that in a less de-centralised organisation might have been 
opposed: 
... I strongly feel that if we 
had not closed the service, if the chief executive had said, 
you close that service, you are losing your job, if I was put under pressure, we would 
not have moved forward. (Manager A) 
Similarly, in the PCT there was a culture of trust that supported innovation. Manager B felt that 
both managers and health care staff in the primary trust, where they could see its rationale, were 
adaptable and supportive of change. This was in contrast to her experience of BUPA that was far 
less flexible or innovative. 
The relationship between the acute and the primary trust was not typical of the NHS at that time. 
Manager B characterised the relationship between many NHS organisations as more competitive 
than co-operative. She felt that the close working relationship and the focus on the patient journey 
was very new: 
... I tell you what was new at the time, you 
don't think of it now, but then it was really 
new to be working, a PCT with an acute trust, on a project like that because it was so 
much ` us and them' then, I don't think it is like that now, but then it was really 
competitive, almost... people in charge of this project put the patient first... whatever 
we did, whichever trust it is we have to look at this patient and look at their journey. I 
think we had started to look at patient journeys and I think it was quite a new thing at 
the time, but people do it now. (Manager II) 
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8.8 Enablers and barriers to the innovation 
Figure 8.7 depicts the enablers and barriers to innovation that acted on the PMS and the 
reconfiguration of its services. Several issues affected the progress of the project from a user-led 
innovation perspective including: the initial crisis situation; institutional factors that had a 
modernising influence on the PMS; professional resistance to the changes; organisational inertia 
and structural barriers to change; motivation of the innovation team; and evaluation processes. 
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Figure 8.7: Enablers and barriers PMS innovation 
8.8.1 Service in crisis 
The "cinderella" status of the PMS was a root cause of the crisis that overtook the service. Unlike 
other service areas, pain management was not the focus of any specific government performance 
indicators. For this reason, it had little strategic visibility in the trust and in turn attracted little 
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interest from senior management. The crisis was manifested in an increase in waiting times, 
increased complaints, lowering of staff morale and a general perception by the PCTs that the 
service represented poor value. Staff in the service were aware that many patients were having 
either ineffective or inappropriate treatments. 
The crisis that ensued in the service was however critical in setting a context for innovation. 
Manager A noted that it took a crisis in the service before the change could be achieved: 
... it is a shame that something so radical 
had to happen in the NHS to make change 
happen and why we can't be a bit more predictive, more forward thinking. 
(Manager A) 
The conditions created by the crisis legitimised the closure of the service to new patients, raised 
awareness of the problems with senior managers and provided an opportunity for an innovation 
project to be instigated. 
8.8.2 Modernising institutional factors 
Once problems revealed by the crisis had triggered an innovation project, several institutional 
factors conditioned the project's subsequent development. Besides the increased influence of 
government performance indicators within the NILS, increased emphasis on PCT-based 
commissioning shifted the balance of power from secondary to primary trusts. This meant that a 
viable solution had to recognise the shift in responsibility for commissioning services from the 
PMS. Other institutional changes were occurring with respect to importance of care pathways, 
especially when crossing primary and secondary boundaries. Finally, the development of new 
perspectives on medicine and care were impacting on the underlying values and expectations 
underpinning healthcare; in particular, the acceptance of the bio-psychosocial model of pain and 
collaborative models of care. 
8.8.3 Professional resistance to change 
The fundamental shift in perspective embedded in the innovation was not welcomed by all of the 
consultants and staff within the PMS. Two issues in particular represented the difference in 
perspective: the PMS no longer emphasised drug or surgery based treatments, putting greater 
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emphasis on community-based treatments; and the new service design emphasised care pathways 
with explicit exit points from the service. The team experienced a significant level of resistance to 
the innovation. The PM Consultant reflected that many people resisted the need to shift their values 
and ideas about their role in the service, not least other consultants in the PMS. She reflected: 
... I had not really appreciated what brickbats we were going to get.. . were they being 
threatened? ... did they think that they would be asked to make changes, I think that 
was what was going on... we had gone out on a limb really.. . were we dumbing down 
the service by taking it into the primary sector? ... by creating the threshold, were we 
denying patients the treatment they should have? ... I had not realised how 
controversial we were going to be until I presented at a local pain management 
meeting about four months into what we were doing, and I got a real `what do you 
think you are doing! ' (PM Consultant) 
The reaction of some staff to the service redesign was varied. Manager A believed that it was a 
shock to staff when the service was redesigned. She felt that many people thought they were doing 
a good job and were comfortable that they were carrying out their roles. The implementation of the 
innovation created a range of negative reactions. Some staff, including some consultants, withdrew 
from working in the PMS or continued resisting the change by remaining in post but ignoring the 
wider systemic problems that they were causing to the service. 
The re-structuring of the service has resulted in changes in the roles of staff in the PMS at two 
levels. First, at the level of an individual, different mixes of skills are required to carry out existing 
roles. For example, the role of nurses in the PMS and the set of skills they are expected to use, has 
undergone a significant shift. Second, the mix of skills across the whole PMS has shifted as a 
change in emphasis of the type and location of treatment has Changed. 
Nurses working in the PMS were required to change their roles significantly in response to the 
wider changes in the service. The role of nurses became a key strategic issue. 
... we were talking very openly at the monthly team meetings and we had very open 
and frank discussions about the sort of expertise that we needed and it was very 
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obvious that the traditional nursing model was no longer effective for a patients and 
good for the efficiency of the service. (Manager A) 
For some of the existing staff in the service the change in skill set was too great and resulted in 
them leaving. 
... there were a couple of very good nurses, 
but some did very basic nursing, and it 
became clear that there was no place for that sort of nursing. Some nurses would have 
come to chronic pain because they thought it an easy way to finish off their career. 
The service had changed and you could not carry people. If you're going to have a 
service that is efficient, value for money, good quality for the patients, the sort of 
people that you needed were people that knew exactly what they were doing, that 
could offer a variety of service... (Manager A) 
The nature of the nursing role within the PMS had shifted dramatically with nurses being expected 
to have more specialist knowledge and to take on more decision-making: 
... changing the 
front end of the service so that the patients that were coming into the 
hospital pathway with a patient that really needed expertise, because the basic nursing 
they could get in primary care with their GP. So, these patients needed very close 
monitoring, good nursing input, nurses that knew chronic pain, that could see patients, 
take a history, make decisions... and nurses would probably have their own caseload. 
(Manager A) 
The change in role was not an easy transition and a central concern of many staff, including nurses 
was that in changing role they were overstepping professional boundaries. 
One proposal was that nurses would run their own clinics and no longer simply accompany patients 
in clinics run by consultants. The PM Consultant reflected that nurses were reluctant to take on 
these new roles as in the past they has not been empowered to make decisions. This anxiety was 
rooted in the professional expectations of what decisions nurses should make. By running their own 
clinic, they were crossing a perceived professional boundary over the types of decisions for which 
they were responsible. A typical concern expressed by nurses to the PM Consultant was: 
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if I say it, I could get prosecuted because my professional society will not support 
me... am I safe? (PM Consultant) 
In response to this concern a skills analysis by the HR department of the trust was carried out. This 
concluded that nurses could, and had always been able to carry out the work legitimately, if 
provided with appropriate supervision. The result of the change was that nurses were empowered to 
run their own clinics. The consultant feels the crucial action was to 
... create the environment where they [nurses] think it 
is the right thing to do; and that 
they should be doing it. (PM Consultant) 
Role change was not restricted to nursing staff. There was an increased expectation that staff in all 
roles, especially those based in PCTs, would act more independently. They were encouraged to 
make decisions about patients rather than simply referring them back to the GP or consultant: 
in the past, if you're worried about what was wrong with the patient you sent them 
straight back to the GP. Where as now you're expected to be more proactive about 
their treatment plan. (Manager B) 
As a result of the service redesign, the clinics remained consultant-led, with the consultant having 
ultimate responsibility, but an expectation to act proactively was explicitly placed on other staff. 
8.8.4 Entrepreneurship and motivation 
The motivation to develop an innovative solution to the problems with the PMS were based 
predominantly in a concern to improve patient care, NHS systems and the working environment of 
staff. The PM Consultant reflected that the state of the service was so poor that change was crucial: 
... it has got to be something you really badly want to fix because I could not have 
carried on working in the environment much longer.. .1 would have left. 
(PM Consultant) 
Similarly, Manager A was motivated to solve a problem that she knew would recur in the future. 
She felt that it was easier to solve a problem than simply have to fire fight problems into the future. 
The PMS was only a small part of her responsibility, but she felt that it took up a disproportionate 
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amount of her time and was a major source of stress. The service was small compared to her other 
services that she was responsible for. She reflected that it 
... drives me nuts, giving me more of a 
headache and taking more of my time than 
three intensive care units. (Manager A) 
Manager A felt that her motivation to change the service also increased as she came to understand 
the importance of the PMS. During the project, she became increasingly aware of how big a 
problem. chronic pain is within the population and the importance of treating it. She felt strongly 
that the few patients who had been accepted into the system were blocking services for other 
equally well deserving patients; she saw the situation as: "... not benefiting the greater good" 
(Manager A) prompting her to adopt a utilitarian view towards PMS and felt that she had a 
... passion 
for all patients with pain to benefit from it [the PMS] and not just the select 
few that got in to it when they are desperate and keep swirling around forever and a 
day... hundreds of other people are desperate. (Manager A) 
8.8.5 Organisational inertia 
In contrast to the energetic and proactive actions of the PM Consultant and Manager A, the NHS 
trusts with which the PMS had to operate presented a two significant structural constraints on the 
project. First of these was the lack of a single strategic vision for pain management services that 
was consistent across the secondary and primary care trusts. The absence of government 
performance indicators for pain management contributed to this lack of vision. Second, clinical 
governance structures varied between each trust varied. This made coordination of pain 
management services problematic in terms of interaction between community-based and secondary 
care teams. The differences in governance arrangements also led to difficulties in managing finance 
flows between trusts. 
Overall, the organisational inertia preventing the development of the project was based around the 
difficulties in managing care services across primary and secondary care organisations. These 
structural problems prevented integration of processes, information flows, inter-trust 
communication and overall management control of the service. 
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8.8.6 Evaluation as enabler and barrier 
Evaluation processes played an important role in the PMS case both in enabling and inhibiting the 
innovation project. Central themes in these evaluation activities were the purposes that they served, 
for whom they were carried out and the basis for judging evaluation data as valid and legitimate. 
Evaluation within the project served several purposes including the need to: 
" meet government requirements for data on key performance indicators; 
  provide high-level evaluation data to the project steering group; 
  allow the team to evaluate on-going changes they made to the service; 
" provide data supporting the planning of future service-changes; 
  establish costs and benefits of the service changes; 
" and provide evidence that service changes were legitimate and defensible. 
The emphasis of evaluation activity early in the project was to provide data to the project's 
operational group and to address government performance indicators. The evaluation processes 
however evolved to serve the project team enabling them to assess the changes that they made. 
Unfortunately, the data requirements of government, the steering group and the team itself were 
very different. 
Government defined key performance indicators 
Much of the evaluation workload in the early part of the project was oriented towards the 
requirement to measure performance of the PMS, based on key performance indicators. 
... well, it is government led, we have to give them the statistics they ask for, so we 
have to look at our waiting lists, we have to keep our waiting lists down, we have to 
look at our budgets, and they have been the main drivers over the past few years. 
(Manager B) 
These tended to be emphasise highly aggregated data such as waiting times, access rates and 
discharge rates from the service, with little emphasis on measuring patient outcomes from 
treatment in the PMS. These therefore provided only a relatively crude measure of the effectiveness 
of the innovation in the PMS. 
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Evaluation processes for the steering group and project teant 
The lack of granularity in government defined key performance indicators meant that they were 
unsuitable for evaluating change in the PMS. This problem was exacerbated by the difference in 
the unit of analysis used by government compared to the PMS. For evaluating the PMS, the unit of 
analysis for evaluation needed to be the complete care pathway and its performance in terms of 
outcome achieved for individual patients. Government indicators lacked the sophistication to cope 
with multiple-factors and the outcomes achieved by the whole system: 
... the other thing about gaining the evidence over something 
like this, is that it is 
difficult because it is a pathway you are looking at, you are not looking at something 
like the effects of this drug on this patient, you were looking at a whole pathway and 
so there are so many different factors that affect it, not least of which are the types of 
patient that come to the service, but as time goes on, and you change the system is the 
type of patient coming through is different, because it is not just part of the service 
which is changing, it is the whole service which that we looked at and the types of 
patient coming through are different, therefore, the results you are getting are skewed 
because of that.... you can't really do a research project on it because there are so 
many variables. (Manager B) 
The team believed the main emphasis of evaluation of the re-organisation of the PMS should be 
clinically driven, with a focus on patient outcomes. Typical indicators to support evaluation of the 
service-changes included: average waiting times; patient satisfaction ratings; follow-up ratios; and 
patient referral rates to specific acute and primary-based services. Much of this data was already 
held on systems in the primary and secondary care trusts, however, it was often hidden due to lack 
of system integration. 
The dominance of government sponsored information systems, oriented towards collecting 
performance management data, meant that the systems were not optimised for tracking patients 
through the PMS. This meant that measuring treatment outcomes for specific patients required the 
development of new or parallel information systems. 
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The PM Consultant and the managers had great difficulty in aggregating data across disparate 
systems. This was made more difficult due to the inconsistencies in record keeping between trusts: 
... as 
far as referrals to things like orthopaedics, it is very tricky for us to keep tabs on. 
I think because we are working across more than one trust, that is one of the problems, 
in that perhaps one trust keeps detailed records about one thing and the other trust 
keeps details of another type of data. It is difficult to marry them up. (Manager B) 
In addition, the PMS lacked a culture in which detailed data necessary to support evaluation was 
maintained. 
The benefit of focusing on treatment outcomes over specific high-level performance measures was 
that the project team had a greater opportunity to understand the story beneath the data in order to 
identify problems and inform their solution. One example of this was when a PCT served by the 
service, experienced a rise in waiting times. The underlying cause was that GPs, attracted to the 
one-stop shop concept, were switching patients to the service from other hospitals. It was only the 
availability of detailed evaluation data that enabled PMS team to understand the cause of the rise in 
waiting times. Detailed evaluation was crucial to understanding the underlying mechanisms 
affecting the PMS. 
A further role of the detailed evaluation data was to provide evidence that the changes made by the 
PM Consultant and Manager A were appropriate and defensible. In this respect, evaluation data 
took on a political role. 
... if you don't have the audit 
data you are continually challenged about why things are 
the way they are. Five years down the line, I may be asked by a new Chief Executive 
to explain why... (Consultant) 
Validity of evaluation data 
Overall, the PMS project used a range of types of data to evaluate the innovation. These were based 
on varied assumptions about data validity, each creating a different perspective on the innovation's 
performance. The government defined performance indicators relied on highly aggregated 
measures relating to specific process points such as referral waiting times. In contrast, the 
250 
Pain Management Service Case Study 
operations group and the innovation team recognised the need to develop evaluation data based on 
patients outcomes, This data was more problematic to produce requiring more detailed data 
collection, across several NHS trusts. However, outcome based data provided a clearer insight into 
the effectiveness of the overall care pathways. It also was more useful for understanding dynamics 
of the PMS system. 
The project team were aware however, that the benefits realised by the innovation were difficult 
and complex to describe in purely quantitative terms. The team recognised that chronic pain had 
potential to be an "NHS resource eater" but many benefits were difficult to quantify in financial 
terms. 
You know that you are taking a group of patients that would have been bouncing 
around the NHS for years and you are managing them, and almost putting them back 
into society a different person, because they can cope with their pain, they have 
adapted their lifestyle to live and that pain. You stop them from being a burden on the 
NHS, but it is very difficult to quantify. (Manager A) 
... what you can 
do quite easily is look at patient flows, but what you can't look at is 
the amount of money you have saved on drugs, it is more difficult to do that because 
you have to take quite a large sample of patients to be to do that. It is tricky, like all 
long-term conditions, such as diabetes, it is very difficult to quantify ... we almost 
need a full time research person to help us with this really, to do a research project on, 
this is the sort of thing we are looking for. (Manager B) 
Evidence-based approaches to re-designing the service had been used, for example in assessing the 
success of acupuncture treatments in the service. However, the nature of the PMS was such that it 
could take several months to monitor the results of a change and to develop an evidence-base of its 
effectiveness. The need for rapid change meant that professional judgements, rather than evidence- 
based methods, often guided service-redesign. 
We are always doing new things, trying out new things and we don't always measure it 
as we are going along, it is a kind of hunch that if we do this... sometimes we think 
this is not working and we are the looking at the evidence we have got from past 
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experience, that is not always data, we have not got six months to collect data if we 
know something is not working, we have to do something about it here and now, 
especially with waiting times. (Manager B) 
In several cases, bottlenecks in the system were clearly visible to all the main stakeholders and 
clinicians in the service so the need for comprehensive data to support a change was often avoided. 
However, in some cases, demands for evidence to support change were based on political ploys to 
block change. The team had experienced projects where clinicians who were antipathetic to a 
change would demand high levels of supporting evidence: 
... some of the things I managed to get changed without 
the need to present data, 
because in their heart of hearts, they know it is true. Sometimes they asked for data as 
a staller. (Manager A) 
8.9 Summary 
This case has reinforced the understanding of user-led innovation as a bottom-up activity. 
However, in contrast to other examples of user-led innovation, this project was sanctioned and 
supported by senior management. It is important to note that this support was based on the crisis 
situation faced by the NHS trust at the time and the absence of any other plan. The high-level 
support for the project was however critical to implementing major changes to the PMS 
successfully. 
The PMS case study is distinctive in that it is predominantly about the innovation of soft 
technology. Though at the level of patient treatment hard technologies are important, the PMS was 
predominantly concerned with soft technology. As such, the innovation process created a number 
of important soft technologies: care pathways, triage systems and many processes that were 
concerned with managing expert knowledge within the service. Therefore, unlike other case studies 
in this thesis, the innovation process reported was concerned with the knowledge-based dimension 
of NHS organisations. 
The process changes described in the case reflect fundamental shifts in the management of pain 
services. The changes represented shifts from bio-medical to bio-psychosocial models of pain 
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resulting in significant role change for service staff, for example the need for a new model of 
nursing care. The implementation of collaborative care models triggered the creation of triage 
teams. Consequently, the overall product of the innovation process has been a proto-institution of 
pain management, established across several primary and secondary care organisations. It is the 
institutionalisation of this proto-institution that represents the biggest challenge in gaining the 
widespread diffusion of the innovation. 
Finally, the case exemplifies the limitation of the evidence-based model of evaluation in the 
context of NHS services. The innovation process has illustrated the use of PDSA as a critical basis 
for evaluating service change, but also the need for critical reflection and application of 
professional judgement. The case has shown that though the EBM model has a role in guiding 
service change and its evaluation, it can also represent a considerable draw on resources. The 
problems of aggregating data from disparate information systems and ensuring effective data 
collection across the whole of the PMS was in itself shown to be a significant task. 
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Chapter 9: Research Questions Revisited 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have presented four detailed examples of user-led innovation in the Ti11S. 
The exploratory study and the four cases have presented varying accounts of the purpose and 
means by which user-led innovation occur. This chapter will review the case findings in relation to 
the research questions set out in Chapter 1. The cross-case review of each question includes three 
streams of analysis. First, it identifies emergent themes raised by the cases. Second, it assesses the 
relevance of the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, where appropriate, it 
presents and develops refined theoretical explanations, synthesised from both the case studies and 
the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. 
The review of the research findings in the four cases studies is based around each of the research 
questions identified in Chapter 1. 
0 What are the characteristics of user-led innovation projects in the NHS in terms of: their 
purpose, the people involved and the criteria used for judging success? This question is 
addressed in section 9.2. 
  How do user-innovators in the NHS manage and structure the innovation process? This 
question is addressed in section 9.3 
  What is the nature of the technology created through user-led innovation in the NTIS? This 
question is addressed in section 9.4. 
  How and for what purpose do user-innovators evaluate their innovations as they are 
developed? This question is addressed in section 9.5. 
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9.1.1 Emergent themes 
The exploratory study and then the four case studies have highlighted a range of themes that impact 
on the progress of user-led innovation in the NHS. Figure 9.1 aggregates issues from specific cases 
and categorises them into four groupings: purpose, team characteristics, process factors and 
institutional factors. The subsequent sections of this chapter build on the themes developed in 
Figure 9.1. Section 9.2 considers the characteristics of user-led innovation and draws on the themes 
affecting project purpose and team characteristics. Section 9.3 considers the process of user-led 
innovation and develops the themes affecting the user-led innovation process. The themes relating 
to the institutional themes within the cases is considered and extended in Section 9.4. The inter- 
relationships between factors does mean that certain themes inform answers to several of the 
research questions. 
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Figure 9.1: Aggregate of enabling and inhibiting factors affecting user-led innovation 
9.2 Characteristics of user-led innovation projects In the NHS 
This section addresses the research question: 
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What are the characteristics of user-led innovation projects in the NHS in terms of: 
their purpose, the people involved and key success criteria? 
User-led innovation in the NHS represents a gap in the research literature, with no clear definition 
or description having been made of what constitutes a user-led innovation project. Other 
researchers have taken a macro view of innovation networks over an extended period of time, often 
based around innovative users of technology, for example, the role of "hero surgeons" in the 
innovation of cataract surgery (Metcalfe, James, and Mina 2005; Metcalfe and Pickstone 2006). 
Unfortunately, there are no accounts of how the micro-processes of user-led innovation in the NHS 
have occurred. 
The four case studies, of course, do not represent a comprehensive survey nor do they provide a 
statistically significant set of findings. They do however suggest that user-led innovations in the 
NHS might be characterised in certain ways, based on common and distinguishing characteristics 
of the cases. It is useful to consider not just how the cases are similar but also how they differ. This 
can be considered in terms of the purpose of the projects, the characteristics of the people involved 
in the projects, the mechanisms through which they become involved and the criteria that might be 
used for assessing their success. 
9.2.1 Multiple-purposes of user-led innovation projects 
The stated purposes attributed to the user-led innovations in the cases studied were complex and 
often changed over the course of the project. The cases illustrate that user-led innovation projects in 
the NITS are distinct from innovation projects in other sectors. The purpose of the specific projects 
ranged from well defined, focused, project charters, as in the PMS case study; to projects in which 
the purposes of the innovation developed and evolved over time. This implied that user-led 
innovation projects may not always fit into conventional innovation management processes, such 
as stage-gate processes. This makes recognising the potential of a specific user-led innovation 
project very hard to evaluate, due to the evolving purposes that it will serve. 
A critical factor that may have contributed to modification to the purpose and aims of individual 
projects, was the lack of independent critical review at an early stage. The informal nature of three 
of the projects in the case studies meant that the plans underwent less critical review than might be 
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expected in a formal innovation project. As noted in the exploratory study, a potential trap for user- 
innovators in the NHS is that their understanding of the wider NHS and its processes can be 
flawed, leading to incorrect assumptions about how an innovation would be adopted and 
implemented. Though none of the case studies illustrated this explicitly, it is clear that the teams 
had to work hard to ensure that the goals of their projects were not just consistent to their local 
context but also to the wider NHS or external healthcare organisations. The LUTM project 
illustrates how the perceived goal of the project was specifically based in the context of NHS 
vascular care units. While this focus ensured a close fit between the innovation and the NHS 
context, it is clear the perceived market for the LUTM was the UK NHS, a perception that would 
undoubtedly set limits on the project scope and goals. A further factor is related to the emergent 
nature of the project goals. This is illustrated in the CLP case where the organic growth of the 
project created a divergence between high and low level objectives. 
Overall, the cases suggest that user-led innovation projects commonly serve multiple purposes 
including: 
a to translate or apply existing knowledge to solve a specific problem encountered by NHS 
staff; 
  to address a root problem related to a clinical or service delivery issue; 
  to create solutions that fit into existing NHS structures and processes; 
  to address professional and philanthropic motives, rather than purely commercial purposes; 
  subject to limited independent critical review during the early stages of the project. 
Focus on applying and translating existing knowledge 
All four of the cases, in common with many of the innovations managed by NI IS innovation hubs, 
were projects triggered by problems perceived by user-innovators in the course of their work. The 
purpose of all four cases was to address practical issues. None of the cases however would be 
described as concerned with carrying out, or even applying, "blue sky" thinking or forms of 
fundamental research. Instead, the projects were concerned with translating knowledge gained from 
other contexts to a specific problem encountered by the user-innovators. This placed them into a 
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category of innovation project concerned with combining technologies or "bricolage" (Garud and 
Karn, e 2001: 23). 
Addressing clinical and service delivery issues 
In the PMS case, the root problem was a critical service failure that created a situation in which 
there was no alternative but to produce an innovative solution to a service design problem. In 
contrast, the LUTM and ePAQ cases were in response to the user-innovators recognising clinical 
and service delivery problems. The underlying problems were complex, combining purely clinical 
problems with issues relating to service delivery and the design of NHS processes. In these cases, 
the full purpose of the innovation was not always clearly understood from the start. 
The ePAQ project was rooted in a relatively narrow field, medical research questionnaires, with 
little relationship to the broader area of ISIS service design. However, the development of ePAQ 
created opportunities for service re-design that cut across acute and primary care. Similarly, the 
LUTM was developed initially as a communication tool but its purpose diversified to enable 
treatment audit and radical service re-design. Finally, the CLP case illustrates how innovation of a 
relatively minor process, producing individual plaster study models, became relevant to the higher- 
level purpose of improving cross-centre evaluation of CLP surgery. This suggests that user-led 
innovations predominantly address complex problems, combining both clinical and service design 
issues. 
Fit existing NHS structures and processes 
The case studies demonstrated a concern to improve and complement existing NHS technology. 
Though the resulting innovations may have had applicability outside the NHS, for example ePAQ's 
potential use in other healthcare systems, it was evident that the user-innovator's primary intent 
was to develop technology to benefit specifically MIS patients. All the user-innovators were 
motivated to improve care of their NHS patients and so the ultimate design of the innovations was 
predicated on a requirement to be fit for NHS use. The development of the LUTM, ePAQ or PMS 
innovations were created with close reference to specific MIS processes and structures. User-led 
innovation in the NHS can therefore be seen as a form of innovation concerned with improving and 
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evolving legacy systems within the NHS, rather than creation of radical innovations that disregard 
or abandon existing structures and processes. This focus on legacy is advantageous in that it may 
improve the potential rates of innovation adoption across the NHS. Conversely, the emphasis on 
legacy may also constrain the degree of change enabled by an innovation, constraining the creation 
of optimal solutions. 
Evolution of project goals 
The cases suggest that user-led innovation projects in the NHS are distinct from innovation projects 
in other sectors. The purpose and goals of specific user-led innovation projects ranged from well 
defined, focused, project charters, as in the PMS case study; to projects in which the purposes of 
the innovation developed and evolved over time. This implied that user-led innovation projects 
may not always fit into conventional innovation management processes, such as stage-gate 
processes. This makes recognising the potential of a specific user-led innovation project very hard 
to evaluate, due to the evolving purposes that it will serve. 
Addressing professional and philanthropic motives 
The user-led innovations studied primarily sought to address clinical or service problems, but it 
was evident that secondary reasons existed for the projects. The user-innovators were often drawn 
to the problem out of curiosity or desire to improve a situation. For all of the cases studies there 
was a sense that the projects served the purpose of allowing professionals to enact their 
professional role. The purpose of the projects can therefore be seen in terms of user-innovators 
pursuing projects because they fitted their own professional identities. For example, the expectation 
to engage in research activity is embodied in the contracts of hospital consultants. None of the user- 
innovators who participated in the research described themselves as motivated by the opportunity 
to make money out of their innovations. In fact, the investment in time and personal risk associated 
with pursuing an innovation was based around philanthropic values. It was common for the user- 
innovators' preferred reward to be professional recognition. This is in stark contrast to business 
entrepreneurs where the investment in innovation is predominantly focused on financial reward. 
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The purposes of the projects are also closely aligned with the professional identities of the user- 
innovators. This has implications for the incentives given to NHS staff for engaging in innovation 
activity. There are now clear guidelines in the NHS on attributing ownership of IP and subsequent 
payment of royalties. It must however be recognised that, though important, financial reward may 
not be the critical motivating factor for staff to engage in innovation activity. MIS innovation 
policy needs to recognise that in addition to financial remuneration, philanthropic actions must be 
rewarded through recognition and practical support. 
9.2.2 Team Characteristics 
The user-led innovation studies in this research were created by user-innovators working with 
teams that they formed to support their projects. The cases studied suggest a number of team 
characteristics were important to the progress of the innovations: 
  leadership characteristics; 
  organic growth of project team; 
  team roles; 
  willingness to build internal and external partnerships; 
  team members engage in policy development processes. 
Leadership characteristics 
Leadership has long been recognised as an important variable in studies of innovation, 
entrepreneurial activity, and change management. Various schools of thought have developed, such 
as trait (Stogdill 1974), contingency theories (Fiedler and University of Illinois at Urbana- 
Champaign. Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory. 1963) and transactional approaches (Bass 
and Avolio 1993). Key leadership 'characteristic's, such as charisma, the ability to communicate, 
and risk taking, have been identified (Bryman 1996). There is not the space to delve more fully into 
this subject here, however. Consequently, the discussion that follows focuses on those aspects of 
leadership that were of particular significance in the context of the four case studies. 
The user-innovators who participated in the research exhibited a number of characteristics that 
underpinned the development of the projects. Three of the projects were led by hospital 
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consultants. This discussion will look specifically at the characteristics of consultants in relation to 
the user-led innovation. 
User-innovators as charismatic leaders: One of the most important factors affecting the teams in 
the cases was the personality of the consultants. The nature of the medical profession in the UK 
means that consultants are generally regarded as highly intelligent, and that they address problems 
in a creative, imaginative and self-confident manner. This meant that for the staff working within 
teams the consultants were perceived as strong and charismatic leaders. They were able to 
communicate and gain support for their own view of a solution and where necessary, successfully 
persuade other stakeholders. This was illustrated in the LUTM case where the Vascular Surgeon 
was able to negotiate for significant change to support the LUTM. It was clear that for the LUTM, 
ePAQ and PMS projects the consultants were able to gain considerable loyalty and commitment 
from other staff. 
User-innovators as entrepreneurs: In addition to distinctive leadership characteristics, the user- 
innovators were often very entrepreneurial in their approach to the projects. In both the ePAQ and 
PMS cases, the consultants negotiated considerable resources both from within their hospitals and 
from external organisations such as pharmaceutical companies. Much of this entrepreneurial 
activity stemmed from the consultants' professional networks. 
User-innovators and power: It would be too simplistic to assume that the success of the user- 
innovators was based on good leadership and resourceful entrepreneurship. It was clear that a 
significant root of their success was the power that they were able to use. The consultants were in a 
considerable position of power with respect to developing and implementing innovation. By 
applying Lukes' analysis of three-dimensional power (Lukes 1974), it is possible to see that 
hospital consultants utilise significant power resources when progressing their innovations: At a 
basic level, the power of a consultant stems both from their organisational position and their 
specialist knowledge. This enables them to exercise significant power in decision making 
processes, by influencing agendas and the decisions chosen for discussion, as well as affecting the 
formal outcome of decisions. Within the LUTM case, the Vascular Surgeon exerted significant 
power in decisions such as whether the LUTM software should be run on the hospital IT systems. 
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At a second level, the consultants also had significant authority in the setting of agendas. This was 
shown starkly in the PMS case study where the consultant, in collaboration with Manager A, set the 
agenda for the hospital trust's management in terms of how the service should be re-structured 
before re-opening the service. Finally, the most subtle dimension of power exerted by the user- 
innovators was in terms of their ability to shape the values, norms and underlying mental models 
that underpinned their specific specialist area. Within the PMS case, the innovation was based on 
the acceptance and adoption of the bio-psychosocial model of pain. Though resisted by some staff, 
gaining widespread adoption of this new model changed many assumptions and values within the 
service further allowing the innovation to be accepted. The PM Consultant employed this power 
further when engaging in the policy development and the setting of clinical guidelines. The role of 
power within user-led innovation is discussed further in section 9.5. 
User-innovators as lone inventors: The ability of consultants to drive innovation was substantial, 
though several characteristics may have had less beneficial effects. NHS consultants have 
significant workloads and calls on their time; for many of the consultants in this research, 
innovation activities were often slowed by the lack of available time. They often had to restrict 
work on innovations to evenings and weekends. Similarly, as new projects developed the attention 
that the consultant could give to existing projects was also compromised. 
The approach to development taken by consultants was also subject to the risk of "not invented 
here" syndrome, in which technological solutions were seen as better developed in-house than 
bought in. Examples of this would be in the case of questionnaire software in the ePAQ project and 
process simulation software in the LUTM case. Though decisions to embark on in-house 
development may well have been taken for good reasons, it is unclear how rigorously these 
decisions were tested. 
A common comment from consultants was that they became very aware of their lack of business 
skills as their projects developed. This was often cited as a major challenge, when clinicians tried to 
balance effectively both clinical and commercial views of their projects. 
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Organic growth of project teams 
The four case studies illustrate a range of ways that projects develop and especially how staff are 
drawn to become members of the project team. Though the CLP project team remained small, the 
three other cases all exhibited a progressive growth and evolution of the project teams. 
The most stark example of this was the ePAQ project, in which after working mainly on his own, 
Consultant A drew in members of staff to provide complementary skills. This was initially to gain 
access to specific technical skills but over time progressed to include management skills from 
Medipex and commercial perspectives from Illuminaries. 
The cases suggest that the enrolment of staff to a project team is initially based on opportunity and 
availability, but is critical to the development of the project. For example in the LUTM case it was 
to some extent serendipity that resulted in the project enrolling nursing staff with research interests 
that could support development. Conversely, it is important to note that the user-innovators have a 
strong influence on the how the team changed. For example, in the ePAQ project the recruitment of 
industrial partners was mediated by the wish of Consultant A to maintain a local group of team 
members. In the PMS case it was evident that one role of the user-innovators was to progressively 
facilitate the shift of project ownership from secondary-care staff to staff in primary-care 
organisations. 
More fundamentally, the change in project team makeup allowed the augmentation of the user- 
innovator's primarily clinically oriented perspective, with technical and commercial perspectives. 
Thus for the ePAQ project the partnership between clinician, technology transfer company and 
software house allowed an effective balance of perspectives. 
The dynamic makeup of the teams involved in user-led innovation projects benefits the project in 
several ways. First, enrolment of appropriate staff to the project improves the absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zahra and George 2002) of the project, allowing it to access and apply 
knowledge from outside the user-innovator's normal context. Second, the evolution of the project 
team can improve coordination between clinical, technical and commercial perspectives. Finally, 
the increased number of perspectives applied to the project improves the capability of the team to 
translate and apply knowledge. 
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The dynamic makeup of project teams highlights the bottom-up nature of user-led innovation and 
the need to facilitate organic growth of the team. In the cases studied, three factors were crucial to 
this organic growth. First, it was important for the user-innovator to have knowledge of where they 
could access staff with suitable skills and have the opportunity to recruit them to projects. A second 
factor was the point at which the user-innovator recognised, or was advised, to change the make up 
of the development team. This was shown clearly in the ePAQ project where the development of 
the software was shifted to an external software house. Finally, though not illustrated in any of the 
case studies, it seems likely that user-innovators may need support in deciding at what point they 
relinquish control of their projects. For example, the question remains whether the vascular surgeon 
should have passed the LUTM project onto a commercial software developer, allowing it to be 
developed further. 
Team Roles 
The bottom-up nature of the projects meant that at no point was a project team explicitly selected 
and structured. Instead, the team tended to grow organically with members joining and leaving of 
the course of the project. It is useful to note however that the project teams would typically 
comprise several categories of staff, shown in Table 9.1. 
Central to the team was the original user-innovator. For all of the cases the user-innovator role was 
taken by one or two individuals. The user-innovators were crucial in driving the project and 
negotiating change. The second category of team member was members of staff who normally 
worked with the user-innovator. These were often key team members who played an important role 
in implementing the innovation, often also contributing to its development. A critical category of 
staff in the project teams were the early adopters of the innovation. These team members were 
crucial, as they were willing to take up the innovation and provide important feedback to the user- 
innovator. As projects progressed it was common for specialists to be recruited to the project, these 
were members of staff who could provide specialist skills to the development of the innovation. 
The final category of project member were the project champions, usually senior members of staff 
in the organization. These project members were important in adding legitimacy to the project, 
aiding the negotiation of resources and protecting resources allocated to the project. 
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Table 9.1: Team roles within user led innovation projects 
Member Description LUTM EPAQ CLP PMS 
category 
User- Devises initial Vascular Consultant A Maxillofacial PM consultant 
innovator idea for surgeon technologists Service 
innovation and Manager 
drives protect 
Team Supports user- Specialist nurse Medical student Plastic surgeon Service 
member innovator in research nurse Clinic nurse managers 
developing and 
implementing 
project 
Early Staff willing to GPs Clinic staff GPs 
adopters adopt the District nurses research nurse PCT service 
implementation PCT staff managers 
and provide specially staff 
feedback to user- e. g. 
innovator psychologists 
physiotherapists 
etc. 
Specialist Provide critical Software Project manager 
specialties development Researcher 
knowledge to the staff 
project team social scientist 
NHS innovation 
hub 
Project Provide senior Consultant B Plastic Surgeon Senior trust 
Champion management level managers 
s support to the 
project 
LUTM. " This project was conceived predominantly by the vascular surgeon and the progress of the 
project remained predominantly under his control throughout the course of the project. Staff from 
within the hospital and associated PCTs, were enrolled to the team but the project remained under 
the vascular surgeons control throughout. 
EPAQ: The ePAQ was a project with very clear and distinctive phases, with each phase was 
characterised by a different project team. Phase 1 was predominately based around Consultant A. 
Phase 2 used a multidisciplinary project team enrolled from within the hospital. During the final 
stage, the project team was based on members from across several organizations. 
CLP: This project was conceived by maxillofacial technologist and subsequently only a small 
number of people enrolled to the project. 
PMS: This project exhibited a gradual enrolment of staff from across several organisations. It is 
notable that as the project progressed the balance of ownership of the PMS shifted from the 
hospital to the PCTs. 
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Willingness to build internal and external partnerships 
A critical success factor for the teams was their willingness to engage in building internal and 
external partnerships. Some relationship building illustrated in the cases was routine, for example 
the relationship between the SCT in the CLP case with the engineering workshop. Other 
relationships were however critical to the project and were not necessarily routine. For example 
within the ePAQ project, the internal relationship with the Scientific Computing Department was 
fundamental to the success of the project. It was evident that external relationships had potential to 
effect the most leverage on projects. In the PMS case, the PM Consultant and the Manager A were 
very active in engaging with staff based in the PCTs. Similarly, in the LUTM project the 
relationships forged by the Research Nurse underpinned the LUTM's successful adoption by 
community-based staff. It is useful to note that in the CLP case, a possible cause for the lack of 
diffusion of the innovation were the limited external partnerships that were developed. 
Team members engage in policy development processes 
Part of the process in building external partnerships has been active engagement in policy 
formation. Many of the staff involved in the cases, particularly consultants, were active in policy 
formation processes. For example, the PM Consultant was active within her professional body in 
setting new care guidelines. In addition, many staff involved in the projects produced publications 
for professional and academic journals that would have the potential to affect policy debate in 
specific fields. 
9.2.3 Dimensions of user-led innovation success 
By definition, all of the cases reported in this research represent projects that have achieved some 
measure of success. This is because the projects were selected as-a result of their success in 
innovation competitions; therefore, the research was oriented to looking at successful projects. To 
assume however, that the cases studied in this research were complete successes would be wrong. 
The success of an innovation in any particular competition is only an approximate proxy for more 
general project success. The purpose of innovation competitions in the NHS is generally to provide 
a showcase for innovation projects, with the prime intention of many entrants being to use the 
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competition for publicity purposes. The competitions are commonly seen as and structured to be 
mechanisms for building relationships with investors or industrial partners. In this context, success 
in winning a prize in such competitions is probably more a reflection of an innovation project's 
commercial potential than any absolute assessment of overall importance to the NHS or wider 
healthcare industry. It is also unlikely to reflect the extent to which the innovation project is well 
managed. The implication of this is that it is quite likely that some very successful projects, or 
conversely failed projects, are not entered into competitions. The motive for entering a competition 
may also be inwardly focused, rather than based on an intention of promoting a project to a wider 
audience. The PMS case is an example of an innovation that was entered into a competition 
primarily to prove the innovation's success to staff within the participating organisations. The 
PM Consultant's motive for entering the PMS project into the Medical Futures innovation 
competition was not as a way of promoting the project externally to other pain management 
services. Instead, it was to send a positive message about the project to the staff in the service and 
senior trust managers. She saw the award as potentially countering some of the resistance and 
internal criticism of the project. 
... we had had a hard time 
from colleagues and we were doing a good job and I 
actually thought, if we win it, there we go. We will have done alright ... you do not 
really know what drives them [other consultants] to be so critical sometimes... the 
award would say that we were doing alright. (PM Consultant) 
The cases selected should therefore be treated not as examples of excellent or exemplary projects, 
but simply as cases that achieved some level of competent achievement. 
The range of measures that could be used for measuring success are diverse. This research suggests 
that five dimensions of success provide ä useful framework for comparing cases: degree of local 
adoption; efficiency benefits; effectiveness benefits; diffusion within the NIlS; and the commercial 
vale of the intellectual property generated by the innovation. The relative performance of the 
projects along these dimensions is difficult to compare precisely, but there is scope in further 
research to consider how quantitative measures could be developed for project evaluation. The 
performance of the projects in the cases are compared and discussed below. 
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Local adoption 
The extent to which an innovation is actually adopted in its original context is an important 
outcome of a user-led innovation project, as if it is rejected locally then it stands little chance of 
further diffusion within the NHS or other healthcare settings. For ePAQ and the PMS case, it was 
evident that the innovation was very successfully embedded into the operation of the associated 
service. The CLP case showed a similar level of adoption, in fact it had become a normal routine. It 
did not however create the same level of service change as in the case of the ePAQ and PMS cases. 
The LUTM case was an innovation that was successfully implemented and generated significant 
service change. It however worth noting that the LUTM was widely accepted by nursing staff 
within the clinic and those working in the community; the system was however not used by any 
other consultants within the vascular department. 
Efficiency benefits 
In assessing the efficiency benefits of the innovations, it was not possible in the research to develop 
precise, comparable data on efficiency changes. The LUTM cases is the only one for which the 
efficiency of the associated service was precisely quantified, with the dramatic reduction in mean 
time for healing representing a significant improvement in efficiency of the leg ulcer treatment 
service. The PMS case however, also demonstrates that the innovation lad to some significant 
improvements in efficiency as indicated by reduction in waiting times, throughput of patients and 
the reduction in capacity required for back operations. In contrast, the ePAQ and CLP projects 
were not primarily focused on gaining service efficiencies. Both innovations provided marginal 
improvements in efficiency. For the ePAQ it would be difficult to assess whether the increased 
time and resources needed to guide a patient through the ePAQ has a consequential improvement in 
the efficiency of the clinical interview. Similarly, the CLP project has not directly increased the 
efficiency of producing a study model or carrying out a cross-centre evaluation of surgical 
procedures. These two cases however, illustrate that the use of efficiency benefits, when assessing 
either the potential or ultimate success of user-led innovations, provides only a partial view of 
overall project success. 
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Effectiveness benefits 
The assessment of the benefits in terms of improved effectiveness of the associated service is not a 
trivial problem. For the LUTM, ePAQ and PMS projects it was evident that they all led to 
significant improvements in service effectiveness. They all led to the improved patient care, but 
also to more appropriate use of staff; empowerment of staff, patients and carers; more effective 
knowledge management; and often delivery of more appropriate treatment. The assessment of the 
effectiveness benefits are however, very difficult to quantify, especially when faced with the 
pressure to demonstrate the innovations performance against government defined indicators, that 
were more oriented towards efficiency targets. In assessing innovation projects the robust 
assessment of potential improvements in service effectiveness remains a central challenge in 
evaluating user-led innovation. This issue is discussed further in section 9.5. 
Diffusion into the NHS and beyond 
Successful local adoption of an innovation indicates only a partial view of the success of an 
innovation. The wider adoption of the innovation, especially into the NHS, indicates the success of 
the innovation's utility or extent to which it is useful. Diffusion of the innovation also indicates that 
the efficiency and effectiveness benefits can potentially be reproduced in other settings. Assessing 
the project in this dimension is however not simple. For the LUTM and ePAQ projects, the 
innovations had been adopted by a relatively small number of all potential NHS sites. Over time 
however, the process of licensing or provision of a hosted service may increase the number of sites 
using the innovations. In contrast, the PMS case study represents an innovation in which it s 
unlikely that the service design developed by the team will be reproduced exactly. This does not 
mean that innovation is unlikely to impact on other NHS sites. Instead, the process of diffusion is 
likely to be based on abstraction of the service principles and then their translation into other 
services. The work of the team in the PMS case indicates that simple reproduction of the use of the 
innovation in other settings does not give a full picture of diffusion. The team's informal and 
formal diffusion actions, such as influencing national care guidelines, will have far reaching 
consequences for the effectiveness and efficiency of the N lS. This would suggest that while the 
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rate of adoption of hard technologies gives some indication of successful user-led innovation, the 
diffusion or translation of technological capability needs more subtle measures. 
Value of the IP 
The emphasis of NHS policy on technology transfer out of the NHS would suggest that a useful 
characteristic of success is the value of the IP that results from the project. The four case studies 
illustrate examples of innovation that produce varying levels of IP value. Two of the cases, PMS 
and CLP, had no IP produced that could benefit from either IP protection or commercial 
exploitation. In commercial terms their only potential value would have been based on the extent to 
which team members could commercially exploit their knowledge through consultancy, training, 
books etc. The LUTM and the ePAQ cases represent examples where user-led innovation has 
resulted in the creation of valuable IP. This was done respectively by creation of a licensed 
software package and creation of a business start-up. 
9.2.4 Section summary 
This section has discussed the characteristics of user-led innovation projects, based on the findings 
in the case studies. It has outlined the general characteristics of user-led innovation projects and the 
purposes that they serve. The teams that are involved in user-led innovation have been 
characterised in terms of their leadership, their patterns of development during the project, the role 
of internal and external partnerships and roles that team members assume external to the projects, 
particularly with respect to policy formation. Finally, the section has developed a potential 
framework for assessing the success of user-led innovation projects that augments financial 
valuation of IP. 
The nature of user-led innovation has been shown as distinct from other models of innovation that 
seek to involve technology users in development, While open (Chesbrough 2003) or lead-user 
models (Hippel 2005) of innovation recognise the value of user involvement, the balance of power 
in the development process still rests with the technology producer. In contrast, user-led innovation 
is distinct as users assume control of the innovation process, setting their own objectives and 
management controls for projects. This has the potential to enable creative solutions to be 
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developed that are not necessarily within the stated strategic plans of the host organisation. There is 
however, a risk that user-led innovation projects could be either: dominated by a user-innovator 
imposing a sub-optimal solution; or an isolated team might not have the resources or knowledge to 
develop solutions that have applicability outside their own context. 
The distinctive nature of user-led innovation suggests that the process through which they develop 
will also be distinctive. The next section considers the process through which the user-led 
innovation projects proceed. 
9.3 NHS Managing and structuring the user-led innovation 
process 
This section addresses the research question: 
How do user-innovators in the NHS manage and structure the innovation process? 
The research set out to identify the process followed in user-led innovation projects. Despite the 
attraction of being able to define a single generic process, the research findings suggest that across 
the four cases it would be wrong to assume such a model could reflect the diverse range of 
activities underpinning user-led innovation. The underlying reasons for this diversity are that the 
variation in the problem addressed by user-innovators, motivation of staff, makeup of the 
innovation team and other contextual factors that supports or inhibit user-led innovation. 
The four cases represent contrasting approaches to the development process, with the overall 
innovation process adjusting accordingly. The LUTM case was centred around an evolutionary 
prototyping approach to software development, in which a working prototype was modified and 
refined. The EPAQ project was based around three distinct phases, at the end of which a robust 
prototype had been developed. The CLP case study provides an example of user-innovator's 
experimenting with a process, gradually improving it on the basis of their experiences. Finally, the 
PMS case study illustrates how major service redesign was based around specifying a solution, 
implementing the solution through a radical re-organisation which was completed by a period of 
continuous improvement. 
271 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
While the cases do not represent all user-led innovation projects, they suggest that the user-led 
innovation process is contingent on the development context and the preferred methods of the user- 
innovators. 
Despite the process differences, the four cases do suggest that there are some common patterns of 
activity followed in user-led innovation. Table 9.2 presents a cross-case analysis of some of the 
distinctive activities followed by user-innovators and their teams. This analysis informs the 
development of a general activity model of user-led innovation. The lack of a normative model that 
fits all four cases suggests that it is more appropriate to represent the innovation process in terms of 
six interlinked areas of activity (see Figure 9.2). These activities occur sometimes in sequence but 
more often as parallel activities. The figure does indicate a sequence but that sequence is based on 
the order in which they started, not necessarily the order in which they end. 
This section discusses the activities that underpin this model and then discusses how the model 
relates to more general innovation models. 
9.3.1 Activity model of user-led innovation 
When reviewing the cases in the research it is evident that it is not possible to characterise the 
innovation process as a set of sequential activities. This is because the four user-led innovation 
projects all had an emergent quality and often involved periods of iteration or parallel activity. 
The project methodologies adopted within each project illustrate a process difference between other 
areas of technological innovation e. g. new product development and lead-user innovation. At the 
core of this difference, is that the projects are often pursued in the spare time of user-innovators, 
under the pretext of a heading such as "administration", or where available organisational slack 
time exists. The. projects were often pursued on an unofficial, "skunk works" basis, particularly 
during their early stages. This means that projects are often given little support or resource from the 
organisation. This is illustrated in the ePAQ project in which the NHS trust was seen as taking a 
very passive role with respect to the project, despite have a commercial interest in the IP developed 
in the project. The LUTM project provides an example of where the NHS trust had no ownership 
rights of the project IP, due to the software being written in the surgeon's spare time. The unofficial 
nature of the projects means that the methodology adopted for the project development was often 
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emergent and based on opportunism. Only the PMS project had a loimal project manager and 
reflected the need to make a large-scale change in service design, in order to implement the 
innovation. In contrast, the other three cases involved a process of piloting and gradual 
implementation. An important theme in the project methodologies of the user-led innovation 
projects was the diverse range of approaches to technology evaluation adopted. Despite this, the 
user-led processes often used distinct development methodologies, such as prototyping. 
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Table 9.2: Cross-case analysis of the activities supporting user-led innovation 
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A striking characteristic of all the cases was that the innovations had no clearly defined start point. 
In common with new product development projects, the front-end of projects were inherently fuzzy 
(Zhang and Doll 2001). This lack of a clear project purpose may have been partially due to a lack 
of formal project management processes. However, it was evident that the user-innovators spent a 
significant period of time assimilating and making sense of the problem situation; a process that 
continued throughout the projects. 
This set of activities were critical to how the user-innovators' cognitive frameworks developed 
when understanding the innovation context and was critical in mediating the development of the 
beliefs and assumptions that individuals and groups made about their working context. The 
activities extended over many years and encompassed the stakeholders' educational and 
professional lives. Four activities are of particular importance: education; professional experience; 
interests pursued in parallel to professional activities; and experiencing other healthcare systems. 
The education process for clinician has a fundamental impact on the way that they develop an 
understanding of their working context. In addition to developing clinical skills, their education 
will impact on the skills that they have for solving technological problems. The Vascular Surgeon 
in the LUTM case was clearly deeply influenced in the way that he approached and solved 
problems due to his dual skills in medicine and software development. Similarly, the development 
of ePAQ was rooted in the interest that Consultant A developed in applying QoL assessments into 
clinical practice, a research problem that he had worked on during his own medical training. 
The professional experience of staff within their working context is at the core of where user-led 
innovations develop. Through the process of making sense of the problems encountered on a day to 
day basis, staff developed a clear understanding of the problems they believe need to be solved and 
start to develop potential solutions. Their proximity to the problem gave them a unique insight, 
unavailable to other developers of healthcare technology. Often their experience of working in a 
particular field is complemented by views they have had of other healthcare systems. For all the 
cases in this research, the user-innovators have acted because they have seen contrasting 
approaches applied elsewhere. For example in the PMS case the experience of the PM Consultant, 
275 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
Manager A and Manager B brought together approaches to structuring healthcare systems from 
North America and the private sector. 
Probleni/Solution construction 
The problem/solution construction activities are concerned with formally articulating the problem 
situation and gaining agreement on a viable solution. The actual process through which this occurs 
varied between the cases. For ePAQ the problem was initially articulated and considered by 
Consultant A in isolation and it was only through the course of the project that the problem was 
gradually formalised, revised and a consensus to its solution achieved. In contrast, the PMS case 
illustrates that for radical service re-design significant political action was needed, including 
shutting down the service and lobbying of senior managers. The PMS case illustrated that an 
explicit consensus building process was required at the start of the project. The projects illustrated 
however that the construction of the problem/solution continued throughout the life of the projects. 
Development 
A broad range of development approaches are demonstrated within the four cases. This would 
suggest that the user-led innovation process adopts development approaches appropriate for the 
change and based on the personal preferences of the user-innovator. In the case of the LUTM case, 
use of a predominantly evolutionary-prototyping approach was probably adopted, not just because 
that suited the development task, but as it was an approach preferred by the Vascular Surgeon. The 
phased prototypes developed by the ePAQ team reflected the more team oriented approach of the 
development, in which development and use of the systems was more separate. The CLP case 
illustrated the gradual refinement of a technique over time. The PMS project in contrast was 
characterised more as large scale implementation followed by a period of continuous improvement. 
In addition to the overall development approach, the extent to which development is based around 
an individual, a team or inter-organisational is also illustrated in the cases. 
The implication of these cases for managing user-led innovation is that it is not realistic to assume 
a project will follow a specific development approach or methodology. This suggests that to 
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encourage user-led innovation care must be taken that any management controls on projects, such 
as innovator pipelines, do not mitigate against a particular mode of development. 
Proofing and Validation 
The evaluation of the technology developed by the user-led innovation projects was a crucial 
process. The evaluations, however, often served multiple purposes. Clinical trials were used to 
provide gold standard clinical evidence of the innovation's performance and served an evidence- 
based medicine agenda. In contrast, PDSA approaches to improvement were used to incrementally 
improve or refine innovations. The powerful organisational position held by the clinicians in the 
cases also allowed professional judgement to be used when evaluating solutions. Finally, routine 
use or operation of the innovation was often critical to demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
innovation to staff and hence facilitating implementation. Some of these themes are discussed 
further later in this chapter. 
Local Implementation and adoption 
One of the most impressive aspects of the four cases was the extent to which the innovations was 
the degree of adoption achieved within the user-innovators' organisations. The LUTM and PMS 
cases demonstrate significant levels of change at a technical and organisational level. Three 
activities were of particular importance in enabling successful acceptance and adoption: use of 
pilots, engagement of "early adopter" categories of staff and use of working prototypes. 
A typical pattern of implementation involved small-scale trials. These trials were based around 
either a relatively informal pilot study, or through a formal study such as a clinical trial. The impact 
of trials was to establish the use of the innovation within the working the environment giving staff 
an opportunity to apply the innovation in practice. An important outcome of this was that during 
the trial staff would adapt their own working practices to make use of the innovation. This was 
most starkly illustrated in the LUTM where at the end of the clinical trail when community-based 
staff complained at the withdrawal of the telemedicine system. 
Linked to the use of trials was the extent to which user-innovators were careful to recruit staff open 
to adopting innovative solutions, despite the risk of implementation problems. The Vascular 
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Surgeon reflected that he had unconsciously enrolled staff characterised as "early adopter" types 
(Rogers 2003: 283) to pilot studies. This was a pattern reflected in both the PMS and LUTM cases. 
The enthusiasm for the innovations expressed by the "early adopter" staff translated into the 
recruitment of further staff to the pilots, increasing the overall implementation and adoption of the 
innovation. 
The involvement of "early adopter" types of staff had a follow on impact on success of the 
prototype development, as these staff were comfortable with working with prototypes. This 
facilitated collaborative models of development, between staff and the user-innovators, improving 
the effectiveness of the iterative development of working prototypes. 
Wider Diffusion 
All the cases highlight how the wider diffusion of the innovations is a significant hurdle. It is made 
difficult for three reasons. First , the technical 
difficulty of protecting IPR, then subsequently 
gaining value from the IP through licensing or development of spin-out companies. This is 
particularly challenging, as it may be necessary for complementary capabilities to be accessed, for 
example software development capabilities. Second, the challenge of gaining the wider acceptance 
and adoption of the innovation by other groups in the NHS or wider healthcare industry. Finally, 
the process of gaining wider diffusion of the innovation requires intense effort and strong 
commercial skills. For clinicians who have developed user-led innovations, they may not wish to 
pursue a business career and so the decision to hand over control of the project becomes a critical 
decision point in a project. This is illustrated in the LUTM case, where control was never passed on 
from the Vascular Surgeon. In contrast, the ePAQ project reached a point where the decision was 
recognised by both Consultant A and other stakeholders in the project. 
The four cases do however suggest that several strategies are taken by user-innovators to gain a 
wider diffusion of their innovations. A critical process for enabling wider diffusion of the 
innovation was ensuring the wider adoption of novel institutional structures resulting from the 
innovation activity. This is discussed later in this chapter with respect to the role of proto- 
institutions in user-led innovation. 
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Strategic Action 
The coordination of user-led innovation project is an activity that required significant effort from 
the user-innovators. Typically, it was necessary for the user-innovators to lead the development of 
the project vision, recruit staff to the development team, carry out project management, negotiate 
funding and negotiate external partnerships. In addition, they were often involved in political 
negotiation that would allow the project from being impeded by organizational barriers. 
The coordination activities absorbed significant amounts of time and yet the user-innovators felt 
they were least prepared for this aspect of the projects. It was common for clinicians involved in 
the projects to experience a steep learning curve. The role of the NHS innovation hub in supporting 
the ePAQ project highlights that there is a critical point where user-innovators benefit from 
addition management support. 
9.3.2 Section summary 
The activity model emphasises three aspects of the nature of user-led innovation. First, the process 
of innovation shares characteristics with other models of innovation. In particular, there are 
parallels with Rothwell's third-generation innovation models. Second, the nature of user-led 
innovation is heavily influenced by the need to operate within "organised anarchies" such as 
public-sector healthcare organisations. Finally, user-led innovation is an example of sensemalcing 
on the part of user-innovators and their teams. 
User-led innovation as third-generation innovation process 
The four cases are all examples of where neither technology-push nor market pull are the primary 
drivers of innovation. It is therefore useful to compare user-led innovation against the process 
models suggested by Rothwell (Rothwell 1994). Most of the innovations were in response to a 
problem experienced within the user-innovator's own organisation, rather than to apply new 
knowledge created research projects. However, for all the cases it was not always clear to the 
innovators what "market" their innovation was aimed at. User-led innovation is not a linear, 
sequential process, following either first-generation or second-generation patterns. Instead, the 
process has been shown to much be more characteristic of Rothwell's third-generation model of 
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innovation, in which a range of activities are linked in a complex iterative set of relationships. The 
contrast however is that formal role of the organisation in instigating and managing innovation 
projects is substituted for a self-appointed, self-managed structure, controlled by the user- 
innovator. This has the advantage of enabling an innovation-accepting and entrepreneurial culture. 
Unfortunately, the key corporate level factors, identified by Rothwell as underpinning 
third-generation innovation, are not present. Thus, user-led innovation projects operate despite 
minimal: top management commitment or visible support; integration to high level corporate or 
technology strategies; or long term financial commitment. It is this lack of corporate level support 
that prevents the progress of user-led innovation mirroring either an integrated or parallel 
development model. 
Role of "organised anarchies" 
A distinctive feature of the organisational contexts for all of the cases was that the projects did not 
fit into any coherent set of shared organisational goals. Within the PMS case, though senior 
management provided support to the project, the innovation developed bottom-up, in response to a 
crisis for which senior management had few solutions. The decision making involved in the 
user-led projects was therefore done in a situation of goal ambiguity. This suggests that the case 
organisations shared decision-making characteristics with organisational anarchies. Cohen et al 
suggest the "Garbage Can" metaphor for decision-making in such organisations, where decisions 
emerge from the relationship between a flux of problems, solutions, decision-making participants 
and choice opportunities (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). The cases exhibit some of these 
characteristics and show how user-led innovation emerges from organisational context in which 
there is little strategic imperative for the projects. 
All the cases illustrated how user-innovators chose to exert energy solving a perceived problem. 
The choice of solution however was often linked to the existence of existing solutions or in the 
terms of Cohen et at "... an answer actively looking for a question" (Cohen, March, and Olsen 
1972: 3). User-innovators in the cases made choices to select familiar solutions and combine them: 
models of shared care, custom-written software, medical questionnaires etc. There is therefore a 
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sense that the activities supporting user-led innovation are based on the requirement to create a 
"brocolage" solution in situations where there is a degree of goal ambiguity. 
User-led innovation as sensemaking 
The activity model explicitly identifies a set of activities that support "assimilation and 
sensemaking" by user-innovators and their team. It would be a mistake however, to assume that 
this set of activities as a discrete stage of projects. Instead, it should be recognised that throughout 
in the cases studied, the user-innovators were continually making and revising their understanding 
of their projects. The other groups of activities can therefore be seen as all having a role in the on- 
going process of sensemaking (Weick 1995; Weick 2001). This was very well illustrated in the 
ePAQ case, where through each of the three development phases the user-innovator continued to 
make and revise the sense of the problem that he was addressing. Recognising the role of 
sensemaking in user-led innovation is important as user-innovators can both create valuable new 
knowledge, but could equally develop flawed cultural mindsets (Weick and Sutcliffe 2003). 
9.4 Scope of the healthcare technology system created through 
user-led innovation. 
This section addresses the research question: 
What is the nature of the technology created through user-led innovation in the NIlS? 
The cases discussed in this research are very distinct from innovation projects based on commercial 
new product development. A major distinction is that the cases demonstrate the complex mix of 
hard and soft technologies on which user-led innovation focuses; in contrast to the predominant 
hard technology focus in new product development. It was highlighted in Chapter 4 how the 
overarching model of innovation being applied to the NFIS is one based on technology transfer. 
The underlying assumption of the technology transfer perspective is that it emphasises the 
innovation of hard technology, such as new medical devices. Consequently, the support structure 
for NHS staff was oriented towards protection of IP and the subsequent commercial exploitation of 
associated IP. However, the four cases studies in this research emphasise how user-led innovation 
projects within the MIS are oriented towards the development of both hard and soft technologies. 
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The innovations created new soft technologies that complemented new or existing hard 
technologies. Two of the cases focused predominantly on innovation of soft technology: a pain 
management service design, and techniques for developing plaster study models. 
In order to understand the scope of technology developed by user-led innovation, the cases suggest 
that it is important to recognise the role of the complete technology system. Chapter 2 introduced 
Orlikowski's model of technology (Orlikowski 1992) and discussed four distinct elements of 
technology: hard and soft technology; institutional structures and human agency. This section 
builds on Orlikowski's work and introduces a synthesised model of healthcare technology systems 
(HTS). The model is important as it highlights that an HTS is not neutral in relation to innovation, 
but conditions the choices and actions taken by user-innovators. Modelling healthcare technology 
as a system provides an analytical lens on the relationships between institutions, human agency and 
embedded hard and soft technologies. This model provides a novel analysis of the relationship 
between healthcare technology and institutions, enabling a better understanding of the complex and 
dynamic nature of the cases. 
This section first sets out the model of an HTS. It then discusses the interactions that accompany a 
user-led innovation intervention. Finally, the section highlights the critical role of proto- 
institutions, both as a product of user-led innovation but also as a critical factor in the wider 
diffusion of innovations. 
9.4.1 Sub-systems within the HTS 
The model represents an HTS as comprising four significant sub-systems. These are hard 
technology, soft technology, the institutional framework associated with a technology and human 
agency related to the creation and use of technology. The model is shown in Figure 9.3. 
Hard technology 
Within the model, hard technology is a sub-system that includes the hardware and software relating 
to healthcare technology. Hardware includes machines, devices, pharmaceuticals and other 
physical artefact that that supports diagnosis, treatment, care, or operation of healthcare systems. 
As such, drugs, medical devices and healthcare facilities are all treated as hardware within the 
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model. Software relates to computer programs and any other mechanism in which logical processes 
are described in a form in which they can he implemented, independently ofdirect human actions. 
Examples of hard technologies in the case studies include the plaster study models, telcmedicine 
software and computer-based medical questionnaires. The PMS case study is perhaps distinctive as, 
at the level of analysis of the service, there were no significant hard technologies influenced by the 
innovation. 
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Soft technology, as defined in Chapter 2, relates to two distinct sub-systems: technological 
competence and technology capability. Soft technologies comprise both tacit and explicit forms of' 
knowledge. Technological competence is the ability held by an individual or organisation to use 
hard technology in practical situations. Competence is built-up through the use of hard technologies 
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over a period of time and can be understood in terms of single-loop organisational learning. In 
contrast, technological capability is concerned with how use of a hard technology is modified over 
time through double-loop learning processes. Technological capability is therefore concerned with 
the ability of individuals or groups to improve the level of competence achieved in using hard 
technologies. 
The case studies illustrate several examples of technological competences influenced by the 
user-led innovation process. Technological competence encompasses both tacit and explicit 
knowledge relating to skills, procedures or large-scale service designs. Examples of these from the 
cases are summarised in Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3: Examples of technological competences illustrated in the case studies 
Examples in the cases Tacit/explicit 
knowledge content 
Embodied Technique developed in the CLP case for producing plaster High tacit knowledge 
knowledge study models. content 
and skills 
Procedural Procedure allowing the clinical interview between consultant Mix of tacit and 
knowledge and patient to be supported by an additional source of explicitly held 
information gained from the ePAQ questionnaire. knowledge 
Service Service design that implements a collaborative care model of High explicit knowledge 
design pain management and the bio-psychosocial model of pain. content 
Redesigned service for the leg ulcer clinic that enables 
effective embedding of the telemedicine system. 
In contrast, technology capability relates to the technology of improvement and change with 
respect to both technological competence and the wider HTS. Within the cases, both dynamic 
capabilities and performance improvement capabilities were illustrated. Most importantly to this 
research, user-led innovation processes themselves can be regarded as part of a dynamic capability. 
Table 9.4 summarises examples from across the cases. 
Table 9.4: Examples of technological capabilities illustrated in the case studies 
Dynamic capabilities User-led innovation process 
System for the cross centre auditing of surgical outcomes on CLP 
patients 
Performance improvement Use of the PDSA cycle as a process of continuous improvement was 
capabilities evident in all of the cases 
Use of clinical trials in the LUTM and ePAQ. 
Evolutionary prototyping 
Evidence-based medicine 
Institutions 
The cases illustrated that a wide range of institutional structures affected, and in turn were affected 
by, the process of user-led innovation. Institutional structures were significant within the cases in 
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three ways. First, by conditioning the innovation process by creating enabling or retarding factors. 
Second, the institutional structures placed an inertia to change through retaining historical HTS 
elements. Finally, the institutional structures were critical in embodying learning gained over time 
within HTS, through processes of institutionalisation. This is critical in enabling knowledge gained, 
perhaps in a narrow localised setting, to be generalised, diffused and applied across the wider NHS. 
Scott's model of institution (Scott 2001: 77) is useful for analysing and differentiating between the 
various institutional structures within the HTS. The institutional context of the cases can be viewed 
in terms of the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars identified by Scott. The impact 
of these various pillars cut across formal organisation structures and reflects the impact of 
institutions ranging from "... the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the 
taken for granted" (Hoffman 1997: 36). The various institutions within the cases combined a range 
of regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive influences on the user-led innovation process. 
Table 9.5 illustrates the various institutional structures within the cases. 
Table 9.5: Institutions within the cases 
Institution Example within cases 
Formal NHS acute and primary care trusts 
organisations NHS as a federation Department of Health 
NHS innovation hubs 
Intra-organisational patients services 
Inter-organisational patients services 
Professional Formal professional bodies for clinicians and other professions allied to medicine 
organisations and Informal networks of staff specialists 
networks 
Institutionalised Evidence-based medicine 
technologies Collaborative care 
Bio-psychosocial medicine 
Software engineering 
The cases in this research emphasise three categories of institution of particular importance: formal 
organisations; professional organisations and networks; and institutionalised technologies. Formal 
organisations provided the context in which user-led innovation took place. These organisations 
had clear objectives and purposes and built up sets of rules, expectation and shared understandings 
that supported a specific purpose, such as providing acute acre services. The professional 
organisations and informal networks were however, more oriented towards professional practice 
and though possessing some regulatory powers, were predominantly concerned with setting norms 
of practice and establishing shared values and perspectives on healthcare practices. Finally, several 
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technologies themselves had corresponding institutions. These can be viewed as institutionalised 
technologies. Though often cutting across both formal organisations and professional networks, the 
institutional technologies had significant roles within user-led innovation projects. For example, 
evidence-based medicine, a soft technology for improving the practice of healthcare processes. It 
has become institutionalised through the development of regulative, normative and cultural- 
cognitive pillars, as illustrated in Figure 9.6. 
Table 9.6: EBM as an institutionalised technology 
Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Symbolic Requirement by Expectations of the vale 
systems government for use of 
evidence-based treatments 
Relational Role of National Institute Embedding of training in 
systems for Health Research in EBM within professional 
gathering and education 
disseminating research Recognition of advanced 
evidence on health and practitioners 
public health 
Routines Clinical trials Professional expectation on 
Systematic reviews and the following of EBM 
meta-analyses of healthcare principles and transfer into 
interventions evidence-based practice 
Artefacts Medical databases e. g. Systematic review Care guidelines 
Cochrane library documents 
The implication of including institutional structures within the HTS, is that it recognises the extent 
to which soft technology becomes deeply embedded within institutions. 
Human agency 
The final sub-system within the model is the agency of individuals to make choices and take action 
in relation to healthcare technologies. Human action is central to the HTS with both hard and soft 
technologies created through human action. As noted in Chapter 2 however, human action is 
conditioned by structural factors such as institutions and existing technologies. This suggests that 
individuals have limited freedom to act, constrained by regulatory, normative or social-cognitive 
institutional factors. 
Applying the three elements of agency suggested by Emirbayer and Mische of iterational, practical 
evaluation and projective (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), three modes of agency can be 
differentiated with respect to technology within the HTS. 
Within the iterational mode, the agency of individuals is manifest in their habitual use of a 
technology. This implies an unconscious application of existing competences to apply existing 
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technologies to routine tasks and solve routine problems. This suggests individuals make 
unconscious choices to use existing technology, in specific ways, within the constraints of 
prevailing values, assumptions and cognitive frames. An example of this in the cases was in the 
PMS case, where many staff were resistant to change due to their choice to continue with current 
ways of working, in particular based around assumptions rooted n the bio-medical perspective on 
pain management. A second example was in the CLP case where once implemented the innovation 
became part of routine practice, the innovation was then forgotten about. In both cases, the choice 
made to use technology remained essentially unconscious. 
The second mode of agency relates to the practical-evaluative mode. Within this mode, individuals 
make conscious choices about the use of technology to address evolving and novel situations. This 
includes conscious choices to improve existing competences, for example through continuous 
improvement. This mode of agency extends to the development and adjustment of existing hard 
technologies, but also the creation of new technologies. Three of the cases illustrate the practical- 
evaluative mode as central to the user-led innovation process. The LUTM, ePAQ and CLP cases all 
relate to actions taken by user-innovators faced by evolving situations, resulting in the adjustment 
of existing competences and also the creation and re-configuration of hard technologies. 
The third mode of agency related to the projective mode and is concerned with strategic action, 
implying actions informed by double-loop learning. In relation to technology, this mode of agency 
is concerned with radical change to the status quo and is supported dynamic capability. Within the 
cases, there were examples of where the actions of user-innovators transcended simply responses to 
current problems, within contemporary frames of reference. The PMS and LUTM cases both 
demonstrate the re-design of healthcare systems based on shifts in underlying paradigms. These 
resulted in creation of novel soft and hard technologies. 
9.4.2 Interactions between the sub-systems 
The strength of the HTS model is that it presents an integrated view of the relationship between 
hard and soft technologies, human agency and the institutional context. These build on the set of 
interactions suggested by Orlilowski's structurational model of technology (Orlikowski 1992), 
while incorporating the distinction between hard and soft technologies. 
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However, the HTS model is distinct from Orlikowski's model as it adopts an institutional view of 
technology, recognising the independent existence of institutional structures from human agency. 
In contrast to a structurational view, the model recognises that the institutional structures develop 
over time, through the ongoing interaction with both hard and soft technologies. Institutions 
therefore reflect not just current hard and soft technologies but also those in the past. This can lead 
to the institutional structures remaining out of step with both hard and soft technologies. 
The model incorporates seven interactions between the four sub-systems. 
  Structural influence on humans interacting with technology 
  Hard technology as a product of human action 
  Hard technology facilitating and constraining human action 
  Hard technology influencing institutional properties 
" Soft technology as a product of human action 
0 Soft technology as facilitating and constraining human action 
" Soft technology influencing institutional properties 
9.4.3 Proto-institutions as products of user-led innovation 
The model of HTS is useful as it suggests the challenge in managing innovation diffusion is not 
simply a technology transfer problem, but one based on institutional change processes. The model 
suggests that innovation diffusion is not simply a case of reproducing hard technology, but requires 
the reproduction on a wide scale of the institutional framework supporting associated technological 
capabilities. 
An important element of the user-led innovation process within the cases was localised change to 
the institutional structures. These supported implementation of both hard and soft technologies, The 
localised institutional change in the cases can be regarded as a resulting in development of proto- 
institutions. The findings of the research suggest that the resulting proto-institutions are significant 
elements in the innovation diffusion process. This raises the question of what constitutes a viable 
proto-institution and at what stage is it adequately mature to become more widely institutionalised? 
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The challenge for managing the institutionalisation process can be broken into three steps based on 
recognising the critical components of the proto-institution; recognising the point when the proto- 
institution has reached a level of stability and maturity; and identifying strategies to support the 
wider institutionalisation process. 
Critical carriers that underpin the proto-institution: the first challenge is to recognise the 
critical carriers that underpin the proto-institution that has been created during the innovation. 
Within the cases, there is evidence that several carriers were vital to the proto-institutions formed in 
the innovation projects. These are summarised in Table 9.7. The explicit identification of these 
carriers may not always be straightforward, as they may have become so routine that they are not 
even perceived as innovative any more. This is exemplified by the CLP case in which there was a 
sense that the innovation had become part of the normal routine of the operating theatre. 
Assessing maturity of the proto-institution: The second challenge is assess the extent to which 
the proto-institution has reached a sufficiently mature state. This is the point where carriers have 
stabilised and are effective in supporting the innovation. The carriers must also be capable of wider 
institutionalisation. This is concerned with their propensity to be codified and abstracted. 
Strategies for facilitating the broader institutionalisation: The third challenge is concerned with 
identifying strategies for facilitating the broader institutionalisation process. 
Maturity ofproto-institutions and innovation diffusion 
The point at which a proto-institution has formed is a critical stage in a user-led innovation project. 
It marks the point of the project when processes of codification and abstraction are needed to 
facilitate the diffusion process. The cases in this research suggest that there will be point where the 
emphasis of the project must change from development to diffusion activities. This is shown as 
point `A' in Figure 9.4. This represents the point at which the project has developed a mature and 
stable proto-institution. 
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Table 9.7: Institutional carriers within proto-institutions underpinning innovations In the cases 
LUTM ePAQ CLP PMS 
Symbolic . Commitment to a "Increased 'Better quality . Multidisciplinary 
Systems shared care model emphasis on QoL study models will triage 
for the whole assessment and underpin the " Exit strategy from 
service process incorporation into wider system of survive integral to 
across secondary clinical practice long term surgery care plans 
and primary care " Commitment to evaluation. " Service aim 
providers earlier triage of to: "adapt patients to 
patients their pain" 
" Bio-psychosocial 
view of pain integral 
o the service 
" Collaborative model 
of care central to 
service design 
Relational " Community-bas " Greater level of " Technologist " Definition of care 
systems staff given direct health empowered to plan made the 
access to clinic democratisation work in operating responsibility of the 
staff due to increased theatre context PAT 
. Nursing staff scope for patients . Recognition that . Nurses, 
encouraged to gaining non-clinicians physiotherapists 
emphasis skills in understanding of may have skills empowered to make 
research medical issues important within decisions about care 
" operating theatre plan with referral to 
" consultants 
" Ownership of PMS 
shifted closer to the 
PCTs and away from 
secondary care trust. 
"Decision-making 
delegated from 
secondary care 
specialists to PCT- 
based specialist staff 
" Consultants from 
secondary care work 
in primary contexts 
and educate PCT 
staff, resulting in 
replication of 
knowledge from 
secondary to PCTS 
Routines Direct Reliable system *Process of taking * Care pathways 
communication for gathering pre- the mould for the " GPs take on routine 
between clinical interview study model management of pain. 
community-based information from embedded into the . Patients and carers 
staff patient normal operation take a greater role in 
" Community-based of the operating pain management 
staff expected to theatre. 'Nursing staff are 
engage with required to be 
development of advanced 
care plans practitioners, rather 
than only carers 
Artefacts/ " Processing " Touch screen " Study model of 
objects capability of computers mouth, lips and 
wound " Web interface face 
photographs 
" Messaging system 
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Point at which the Innovation has 
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balance changes from an emphasis 
on organisational learning to diffusion 
through Institutionalisation 
Progress of project 
Time 
Figure 9.4: Proto-institutions and institutional maturity 
The four cases all reached the point of having developed viable proto-institutions, but the extent to 
which further institutionalisation developed varied between the cases. In the CLP case, it was 
apparent that no significant institutionalisation outside of the original setting occurred. The LUTM 
case was again successfully implemented into the original setting but though mechanisms were put 
in place to diffuse the software, less effort was put into the institutionalisation process. In contrast, 
the PMS cases demonstrated steps that enabled both the codification and abstraction of the proto- 
institutions. Point A can therefore be seen as a critical point as it represents the stage of the project 
where additional support and expertise may be needed by a user-led innovation project team. 
9.4.4 Development and diffusion of a proto-Institution 
One of the most significant themes raised in the PMS case was the process through which a proto- 
institution of pain management services was developed and then diffused. In contrast to the LUTM 
and CLP cases, the user-innovators were both proactive and successful in diffusing the proto- 
institution that they had developed around the PMS. 
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The creation of the proto-institution of pain management services was dependent on the 
establishment of several institutional carriers. These are shown in Table 9.8. Three categories of 
carriers were relevant to the case: symbolic, relational systems and routines. The proto-institution 
represented the essential institutional structures that had to be diffused in order to re-create the 
service in other contexts. 
Table 9.8: Institutional carriers underpinning the PMS 
Pillars Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Carrier 
Symbolic Rules, laws Values, expectations Categories, typifications, 
Systems All patients referred should Bio-psychosocial view of schema 
have an initial multi- pain management rather Purpose of the PMS is to 
disciplinary assessment of than a narrow bio-medical "adapt patients to their 
their condition, resulting in perspective pain" rather than seek to 
a care plan. Collaborative care by cure. 
All patients should have an specialists, GPs, carers and 
exit strategy from the patients 
service defined in their 
care plan 
Relational Governance, power Regimes, authority Structural isomorphism 
systems systems systems Consultants from 
Definition of care plan Ownership of PMS shifted secondary care work in 
made the responsibility of closer to the PCTs and primary contexts and 
the PAT away from secondary care educate PCT staff, 
Nurses, physiotherapists trust. resulting in replication of 
empowered to make Decision-making knowledge from secondary 
decisions about care plan delegated from secondary to PCTS 
with referral to consultants care specialists to PCT- 
based specialist staff 
Routines Protocols, operation Jobs, roles, duty 
procedures GPs take on routine 
Care pathways management of pain. 
Patients and carers take a 
greater role in pain 
management 
Nursing staff are required 
to be advanced 
practitioners, rather than 
only carers 
The strategy adopted for diffusing the proto-institution to other sites is an important part of the 
PMS case. While at the time of the research the PMS model was yet to become a "standard" for 
NHS pain management services, it was evident that the process of institutionalisation had started. 
Two strategies were used by the user-innovators to support the institutionalisation process. 
Formal measures taken to aid diffusion 
The most significant element of this was the active role that the PM Consultant adopted in 
professional bodies to standardise the care pathways established in the PMS as national care 
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guidelines. The PM Consultant's specialist society, the British Pain Society (BPS) was very 
supportive of the project. It saw the triage system as an important strategy for reducing waiting 
times and so fitted in with its own initiatives in improving patient care. The PM Consultant was an 
active member of the society and chaired the society's "Clinical Information Special Interest 
Group". The BPS has had a role in legitimising the care pathways as a "best practice". Her position 
in the BPS has also allowed her to influence DoH initiatives. The engagement of SUHT staff with 
professional and other institution has been an important diffusion strategy. 
The care pathways have been the key mechanism for diffusing the innovation. The PM Consultant 
reflected that they 
... disseminated to quite a few places [and] ... 
have been a really good thing as I have 
been able to influence policy. (Consultant) 
The development of generally applicable care pathways was difficult, requiring the abstraction of 
key service principles: 
... this is hard, as you have to pull out things that are very general and not specific to 
our service. (PM Consultant) 
In addition to the formal care pathways, the BPS commissioned information packs that support 
other trusts in contextualising the care pathways. The pack provides guidance on issues such as 
workforce planning and emphasising the inter-disciplinary working required between the pain 
service and other teams. It also contains useful specimen documentation such as standard letters. 
Informal measures taken to aid diffusion 
Project staff used informal mechanisms to support diffusion. The PM Consultant felt she had 
provided emotional support to other trusts looking to implement the pathways. The team had been 
active in providing support to other hospitals who have asked for advice. The support included 
hosting visits to the PMS by staff from other trusts and giving presentations about the service. 
Several other trusts have visited the service with a view to learning how a similar service could be 
set up. When people come to look at the service the PM Consultant stressed that they needed to 
think about how to implement the systems in their own context, rather than simply copying the 
293 
User-led Innovation in the UK National Health Service 
service exactly. These visits provide the opportunity for other trusts to understand process of 
implementation of the new system. This includes the need to: 
  educate staff in what networks of services and relationships are available; 
  include primary care staff, especially GPs, in the implementation; 
  recognise that the general principles encapsulated in the guidelines need to be careful 
contextualised. 
The strategy for diffusing the proto-institution can be seen as based on one of codification in terms 
of publishing care pathways and other guidelines. It can also be seen as an abstraction process, 
where the elements of the PMS are developed into more generalised principles. 
9.4.5 Section summary 
The model of an HTS presented in this section is a clarification of Orlikowski's structurational 
model of technology. The model has been developed specifically in the context of healthcare 
technology and reflects the close coupling between hard and soft technologies within the sector. 
This integrative view of healthcare technology is critical as all hard healthcare technologies are 
used in relation to soft technologies encompassing skills, knowledge, procedures and processes. 
The healthcare context is also one that is strongly influenced by institutions that impose regulatory, 
normative and cultural-cognitive influences on the use of technology and the actions of individuals 
in relation to it. 
This section has emphasised how the use of the model of FITS is useful in understanding the 
technological focus of user-led innovation in the NHS. First, it provides an integrated view of the 
technological innovation in terms of both hard and soft technology. Second, it emphasises the role 
of structure and agency in the innovation process and that the resulting innovative system is an 
emergent property of interactions between hard/soft technologies, institutional structures and 
human agency. Finally, the section highlights proto-institutions as significant products of user-led 
innovation. Proto-institutions are a product of the early stages of institutionalisation of soft 
technologies and so when attempting to diffuse technological innovations, the proto-institution is a 
critical element represent the set of institutional structures that support the implementation and use 
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of innovative hard/soft technologies. When considering how to diffuse user-led innovations the 
research suggests that attention should be paid to mechanisms that enable the proto-institution to 
become more widely established. For example, this may be done through codification and 
abstraction processes. 
The following section discusses the various ways in which evaluation is used by user-innovators. 
9.5 Strategies adopted by user-innovators to evaluate their 
innovations. 
This section addresses the research question: 
How and for what purpose do user-innovators evaluate their innovations as they are 
developed? 
One of the key characteristics of user-led innovation in the NHS is that it is a predominantly 
bottom-up process. This might suggest that selection of evaluation methods by user-innovators is 
based on a contingency. This section identifies that four generic approaches to evaluation were 
used in the cases. The discussion suggests that their selection and use is based on contingent 
factors. However, the approaches adopted can be viewed as relating to three distinct purposes: 
assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the innovation; build confidence, trust and 
reputation in the innovation with users and potential users of the innovation; and as means of 
promoting the power interests of user-innovators. However, the evaluation strategies are 
themselves institutionalised technologies that condition the choices made by user-innovators in 
following their projects. 
9.5.1 Evaluation within the cases 
The strategies adopted for evaluating health care technologies were distinct in each of the four case 
studies. One of the striking points about the cases is the variety of approaches that were used to 
evaluate technologies. 
In the LUTM and ePAQ cases clinical trials were used to evaluate aspects of the innovations. Use 
of clinical trials, providing a "gold standard" of evidence, are perhaps the most legitimate ways of 
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evaluating healthcare technologies as they fit within the EBM paradigm. In contrast several cases 
used applied a continuous improvement based on the PDSA cycle. Though commonly used as a 
legitimate approach in other sectors, PDSA could be seen as less rigorous, within a healthcare 
context than approaches based within the EBM paradigm. The PDSA cycle evaluation however 
enabled development of the innovations through prototyping. The cases illustrate that when it was 
impractical to test a range of solutions, either through clinical trial or be PDSA, evaluation was 
done on the basis of a professional judgment. The final mode of evaluation identified involved 
reflection on the clinical use of the innovation by the users who had adopted it. In this mode of 
evaluation, the technology is based on the personal assessment of the innovation by the team and 
early adopters, Through the use of the technology, an assessment was made about the the 
technology in context, often based substantially on tacit understanding of the technology developed 
by users. The evaluation of the technology in this way is not admissible as "scientific proof' of a 
technology's effectiveness; but its use seems to be a powerful factor in facilitating adoption of 
innovations. Users who have a positive view of a technology would often encourage the adoption 
of the innovation by other colleagues or staff from elsewhere, 
LUTM. " This case is perhaps one of the best examples of where multiple approaches to evaluation 
were taken. The solution to the clinic's problems was formed by selection of options based on the 
professional judgment of the vascular surgeon, using his clinical and software development 
experience. The use of an evolutionary, working prototype also represented the application of a 
PDSA approach to improvement. The primary use of the clinical trials in this context can be seen 
as to provide an objective account of the effectiveness of the LUTM. Secondary motives were to: 
support the political activities of the vascular surgeon in gaining wider acceptance of the 
technology; increase project credibility in order to gain additional funding; and to provide evidence 
to defend the professional decisions made by the vascular surgeon in pursuing the innovation. The 
LUTM provides the most stark example of how powerful use of the technology can be in 
evaluation. It was clear that by the end of the clinical trial both the clinic and community-based 
nursing staff had accepted and recognised the effectiveness of the LUTM, despite the analysis of 
the clinical trial being incomplete. 
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ePAQ: In common with the LUTM case, the ePAQ project included several clinical trials that 
evaluated the questionnaire and software interface. The results validated the reliability and 
repeatability of both the questionnaire and the interface. However, the clinical trials did not provide 
an assessment of the ePAQ's impact on the service redesign. Ironically, the legitimacy endowed by 
the clinical trial may have resulted in the further development of ePAQ being restrained. This 
restraint was rooted in the belief of consultant A that once validated by clinical trial certain aspects 
of the ePAQ, in particular the user interface, should not be modified. This was in contrast to the 
professional judgment of the SHD who believed the system software should be modified to 
conform to industry norms for software interface design. Consultant A demonstrated use of 
professional judgment when assessing the various options for ePAQ's design, his belief that the 
system needed to be suitable for the archetypal "old lady" is a prominent example of this. This use 
of professional judgment in assessing options however risks innovations becoming trapped within, 
sometimes implicitly stated, sets of assumptions. 
CLP: The CLP case is distinct from the other cases as it did not use clinical trials to evaluate the 
innovation. In contrast, the CLP innovation was concerned primarily with the innovation of the 
improvement system for CLP surgery, essentially denoting a change in how clinical trials are 
operated and analyzed. The evaluation of the CLP project is therefore more based around a PDSA 
cycle and professional judgment of the technology. The very low level diffusion of the innovation 
meant that there was no opportunity for other users of the technology to provide any use-based 
assessment of the innovation. 
PMS: The PMS case was complex as it was unrealistic to operate a clinical trial, due to the massive 
organisational change required. Instead a complex information gathering and analysis system was 
set up on an ad hoc manner to evaluate changes as they occurred and where necessary to plan 
further change. This resulted in a formal system of evaluation close to a conventional PDSA cycle. 
The use of PDSA, over the reliance on clinical trials, has been that the evaluation system was able 
to develop with the service through a series of continuous improvement cycles. However, as noted 
in the cases several changes to the service design were made on the basis of professional judgement 
with no other evaluation done prior to implementation. 
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9.5.2 Generic approaches to evaluation 
The range of approaches to evaluation illustrated in the cases, suggest that within user-led 
innovation projects, evaluation serves several purposes. This suggests evaluation is not just used in 
a purely instrumental manner to assess efficiency or effectiveness of an innovation in objective 
terms. Instead, evaluation can have other purposes. The four evaluation approaches identified in 
this research were used in very specific ways. 
EBM 
The adoption of the EBM paradigm and the use of controlled clinical trials is now the most widely 
accepted evaluation approach used in healthcare. Within a publicly funded service, such as the 
NHS, clinical trials form the core of the evidence-based approach to practicing medicine, that not 
only ensures treatment is effective but also that the services provide value for money. The use of 
clinical trials is therefore critical ensuring that any new technology has scientifically tested data to 
back up its use; clinical trials therefore lend scientific legitimacy to healthcare technology. 
The dominance of the EBM paradigm means that clinical trials are always likely to be central part 
of any user-led innovation project. Without a clinical trial, it is unlikely that a technological 
innovation will be viewed by clinicians or other stakeholders, as either effective or safe. The 
strength of using a clinical trial is that it lends credibility to a project, opening up sources of 
funding and lowering barriers to innovation diffusion. The clinical trial can also confer political 
legitimacy on a project, potentially adding the lobbying of stakeholders or even defending the 
actions of user-innovators against criticism. The clinical trial is however problematic in user-led 
innovation. First, it can be difficult to set up for some innovations, especially where radical service 
re-design takes place. Second, unlike clinical trials of a distinct device or drug, it is often difficult 
to reverse the process of trialling the innovation. As shown in the LUTM and PMS cases, there was 
a significant change in the expectations, attitudes and skill sets of staff and patients when 
implementing the innovation. The implementation of the LUTM and PMS innovations was non- 
reversible and so assuming the trial to be a "constrained experiment" that can be forgotten or its 
effect reversed is misguided. The LUTM and PMS projects showed how the implementation of the 
innovations invoked significant levels of organisational learning and so repeating the same trial 
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would not be possible in that organisational context. Finally, it seems likely that for many user-led 
innovations the availability of time to carry out a clinical trial is simply not available. The PMS 
case illustrates how the user-led innovation was in reaction to a crisis situation in which action had 
to be taken based on professional judgement, rather than "hard evidence". Overall, clinical trails 
have a role in both proving technologies developed through user-led innovation and providing them 
with some sort of legitimacy. The clinical trial is however, a blunt instrument that may hold back 
innovation by creating delays or blocking creativity. Especially for innovations impacting on 
service design the clinical trial may not adequately take into account the extent to which contextual 
differences e. g. between different NHS trusts, impact on the performance of an innovation. 
PDSA 
In contrast to clinical trials, the use of a PDSA improvement cycle offers several advantages for 
user-led innovation in the NHS. The first of these is that it provides a flexible and long term 
evaluation method. The use of PDSA may provide a quickly established approach that can evolve 
to fit the needs of the on-going project. This makes it particularly applicable to the evaluation of 
innovations that incorporate significant service re-design or where development depends on the 
evolution of a prototype. As illustrated in all four cases, operating within the PDSA approach 
means that incremental changes could be made quickly in response to problems to which the user- 
innovators became aware. Finally, the PDSA approach can probably aid the local implementation 
of innovations. The use of PDSA does present some problems for the user-innovator. First, in 
comparison to a clinical trial, the results of the innovation do not have the same legitimacy. 
Secondly, success will be dependent on the involvement of staff with an interest and ability to 
review critically the performance of an innovation. Finally, the PMS case illustrates the problems 
of creating appropriate information systems to collect and present information about the on-going 
progress of a project. Especially in the MIS, significant IS effort has been put into developing 
systems that measure against national performance targets. This means that there is little resource 
available for development of systems with a finer level of information granularity, as would be 
needed for measuring and monitoring the impact of service re-design on specific treatment 
outcomes. 
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Professional judgement 
Within the healthcare sector, there is a tension between the EBM paradigm and the power held by 
clinicians to exert their own professional judgement. A dilemma exists because though the EBM 
paradigm is widely advocated by NHS clinicians, managers and policy makers, the definition of 
what constitutes evidence is still contested. For clinicians in particular it is possible that the 
evidence presented to support a specific procedure or technology, will be subject to their own 
cognitive filters. Professional judgement is therefore an important mechanism when evaluating a 
technology. The advantage of professional judgement is that clinicians can see the potential of a 
technology, when due to its immaturity it still has a relatively low performance level compared to 
an existing technology. Clinicians may also be able to see beyond a specific context in which a 
clinical trial was done, or see a specific application within their own practice. Professional 
judgement can be powerful evaluation mode within a user-led innovation project, as the judgment 
can be made faster than relying on evidence-based methods or operation of a PDSA cycle. Reliance 
on the professional judgement of a clinician also recognises the intellectual qualities of clinicians as 
well educated and intelligent people; making them well placed to arbitrate on the efficacy of a 
technology. The reliability of professional judgement in evaluation is however subject to problems 
of the judgement being constrained by a clinician's own cognition. 
Reflection on use 
The fourth mode of evaluation is the reflection on the clinical use of a technology the individuals or 
groups who have adopted the innovation. The cases illustrate how staff modified their own working 
practices and assessed the effectiveness of a technology through using it. This mode of evaluation 
has great potential as it assesses the technology in a real setting and is an integral part of the 
implementation process. The reaction of staff to using the technology will also represent their tacit 
understanding of the technology's usefulness. The cases reflect the scope for building these 
assessments into user-led innovation project in a systematic manner, for example by implementing 
an action research framework on the project. This mode of evaluation emphasises the relationship 
between the technology and the context and so can be seen as complementary to evaluation done 
using a clinical trial. 
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9.5.3 Who was the evaluation for? 
A reason for the range of evaluation approaches adopted within user-led innovation projects is 
partly due to the range of stakeholders requiring judgements on efficiency or effectiveness. The 
cases suggest that evaluation serves three groups of stakeholder: the user-innovator themselves; 
users and other stakeholders of the innovation within the organisation; and stakeholders based 
outside the user-innovators' organisations. 
Evaluation was often based on the need for user-innovators to prove to themselves that the 
technologies that they had created were effective. In addition, due to the bottom-up characteristics 
of the projects, there were few formal management demands for evaluation data, or imposition of a 
specific evaluation methodology. User-innovators therefore had a broad choice in how they chose 
to evaluate their innovations. 
A second group for whom the evaluation of innovations was aimed are stakeholders within user- 
innovators' own organisations. The function of evaluation from their perspective was to gain their 
acceptance of the innovation by validating the novel technology. This was to ensure that the 
stakeholders trusted the technology in order to either adopt it or to invest in its further 
development. Such investment taking the form of financial backing or availability of the necessary 
resources required for further development. 
The role of evaluation in relation to external stakeholders was primarily to either gain legitimacy 
e. g. from the healthcare community, or to secure external investment in the innovation. Evaluation 
was critical in ensuring that the user-innovators' peers within professional networks accepted the 
innovations. Peer-reviewed publications and presentations at conferences were often the main 
conduit for evaluation results and so evaluation methods were often prescribed by the user- 
innovators' peers. 
9.5.4 Three functions of evaluation 
The range of approaches used in the cases was contingent on the nature of the innovation, the 
stakeholders for whom evaluation data was required and the purpose of evaluating the innovation 
itself. The cases demonstrate that the function of evaluation was not just to provide an objective 
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measure of the efficiency or effectiveness of the innovation. Instead, evaluation was also to aid the 
development and understanding of the innovative technology and to act a political tool to reduce 
resistance to adoption and other barriers to the progress of the innovation project. In short, 
evaluation as suggested by the classic clinical trial is not a neutral process within user-led 
innovation projects. The function of evaluation in user-led innovation in the NHS is therefore 
threefold. First, as an instrumental and objective attempt to assess whether a technology achieves a 
satisfactory level of efficiency or effectiveness. Second, to facilitate the ongoing development of 
the meanings and purposes attributed to a technology by users and other stakeholders of the 
innovation. Thus, evaluation is part of the process through which the innovation is socially 
constructed. Finally, evaluation processes provide user-innovators with a level of power in relation 
to innovation and is a means of enabling the user-innovator to achieve specific goals. Control over 
the evaluation process is a substantial power resource for the user-innovator. 
Instrumentality 
Evaluation is carried out to demonstrate to the user-innovator themselves and other stakeholders 
that an innovation has achieved improvement in efficiency or effectiveness. This is primarily to 
inform on the progress of the innovation process and to guide future development. To this end, 
user-innovators were selective in the performance indicators that they measured. 
A recurring problem in the cases was the difficulty in gaining appropriate evaluation data. This was 
particularly acute with respect to the effectiveness of service re-design. At the core of this problem 
is that high-level performance indicators are an emergent property of the whole healthcare system 
and so creating an unequivocal link between system-level process improvement and development 
of a specific technological innovation is problematic. 
Choice of indicators used in evaluation is also problematic for user-innovators. As noted by 
Christenson (Christensen 2000), the performance measures for radical technologies differ 
significantly from current technologies. The basis for evaluating service-level performance will 
therefore be difficult where measures of performance differ. This may be important in cases of 
radical innovation on which the measures of performance differ from those used for judging current 
technologies. 
302 
Research Questions Revisited 
Social construction of technology 
The evaluation process can be an important activity in supporting how the adopters' understanding 
of technological innovations develops over time. To this end, evaluation can be seen as central to 
the social construction of the technologies that result from user-led innovation (Bijker 1995). The 
evaluation process has a role in identifying and engaging with the specific relevant groups using a 
technology. Through reflection on the use of the innovation, evaluation influences the process of 
interpretive flexibility and ultimately the rhetorical closure on a technology. This is illustrated in 
the cases where the purpose of innovations developed during their development. For example, in 
the ePAQ case the final understanding of ePAQ as a web-based service was very different from its 
original concept of a narrowly based clinical questionnaire. 
The role of evaluation in the social construction of user-led innovations highlights the scope for 
interpretive evaluation. This mirrors similar calls for interpretive evaluation more generally in 
information systems field and highlights that the purpose of evaluation is not simply to generate 
performance indicators but also to "... deepen understanding and to generate motivation and 
commitment (Walsham 1999: 374). The evaluation process is therefore not a distant, objective 
process but one that should be seen as an active intervention within a healthcare technology system. 
Power resource 
The third function of evaluation is as a tool to enable user-innovators to pursue their own interests. 
Evaluation is a political process and a scientific rational view of evaluation provides an incomplete 
picture. As noted within evaluation processes within information systems development: 
The rational elements are tools used by participants to gain new ground or to protect 
ground already won. They also serve as "facades" to mask political motives and 
legitimise self-interest. (Franz and Robey 1984) 
Within a healthcare context EBM provides an example of where evaluation is a rational objective 
process however, the power to choose how the clinical trial is conducted and its results published is 
significant. Control over the evaluation process represents a potential resource that enables user- 
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innovators to pursue their own interests. This is illustrated in Table 9.9 in which Lukes' three 
dimensions of power are considered in relation to evaluation strategies illustrated within the cases. 
Table 9.9: Role of evaluation in enabling user-innovators to achieve their purposes 
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All four of the approaches to evaluation illustrated in the cases show political dimensions and 
illustrate that the process of evaluation is not politically neutral and in all the cases there was use of 
evaluation techniques to enable user-innovators to development and implement their projects. 
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9.5.5 Section summary 
This section has identified four generic approaches to evaluation in user-led innovation projects. 
The cases suggest that the choice and use of these approaches is based on a need to address the 
needs of specific stakeholders. However, the process of evaluation is not a neutral process or one 
based only on rational scientific approaches. Evaluation was also used by user-innovators to 
support the on-going social-construction of the purposes and meaning of new technologies, by staff 
adopting the innovation. Finally, evaluation was shown to serve a political purpose that enabled 
user-innovators to legitimise their innovations, exert control on decision-making around the 
innovation, and to remove potential conflict over the innovation. 
9.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has made several important contributions to the development of a theory of user-led 
innovation. The contributions are the: 
" distinct characteristics of user-led innovation within the NHS; 
  development of an activity model underpinning the user-led innovation process; 
  development of a model of healthcare technology systems that underpins an understanding 
of the process of user-led innovation; 
  identification of the role of proto-institutions in the user-led innovation process. 
  and, an analysis of the multiple roles of evaluation within user-led innovation. 
These contributions are important as they suggest a shift in thinking from supplier-led innovation, 
in which the balance of power resides with technology suppliers, to one based on innovation 
conceived, lead, developed and controlled by technology users. The implication of this is that the 
facilitation of user-led innovation needs to be re-assessed, especially where support is oriented to 
technology transfer models of innovation. This research has highlighted that user-led innovation 
requires careful facilitation to ensure that benefits of user-led development based in technological 
competence, capability and institutional development are not lost in a rush to the relative narrow 
benefits of commercial exploitation of I?. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes this thesis. It reviews how the research has achieved the aims and objectives 
set out in Chapter land summarises the main contribution to knowledge that has been made. 
Finally, further areas of research arising from the work are suggested. 
10.1 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis has set out an account of research carried out into user-led innovation of healthcare 
technology in the UK National Health Service (NHS) and presented the results of that research. 
The research has made a contribution to a better understanding of the phenomenon. In particular, it 
has made progress in relation to the research aim of correcting the imbalance within the existing 
literature towards industrial contexts. 
The research problem generated from this aim was the production of a reliable and valid 
perspective on patterns of user-led innovation within the NHS, and the drivers and constraints that 
predispose them to be successful or to fail. The research was conducted using an interpretive, 
multiple case-study methodology. Each of the chapters within the thesis reflects specific research 
objectives. Figure 10.1 illustrates how each chapter of the thesis contributed to the achievement of 
the research objectives. A short summary of how the research objectives were achieved is provided 
below. 
To review the literature that underpins an understanding of the phenomenon of user-led 
innovation the NHS 
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth discussion of the literature that underpins an understanding of 
user-led innovation. It first reviewed the literature regarding the nature of technology and 
considered the role of institutions and institutional change in relation to hard and soft technologies. 
It then looked at literature relating to user-led innovation and its relationship with other modes of 
innovation. A third theme was the knowledge management processes that underpin user-led 
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innovation particularly with respect to the process of absorbing and trmnslating knowledge. Finally, 
the review assessed the NHS as a context for innovation and considered how its culture, structure 
and policy frameworks might support user-led innovation. The review recognised that the NI IS 
represents a complex context for innovation and though provision was trade fier implementing 
technology transfer processes, doubts existed, as to whether this was an appropriate model of 
innovation for the NHS. 
Set out an appropriate methodology that will enable rigorous investigation of user-lc d 
innovation in the . NHS. 
Chapter 3 sets out the rationale for the choice of methodology used in this research. It discusses the 
methodological framework adopted for this research and sets out the research design used in the 
research. The multiple-case study approach that was adopted is discussed, along with reflections on 
the process followed. 
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Carry out an exploratory study into the innovation support provided by NIIS innovation hubs. 
Prior to selecting the case study sites, an exploratory study was carried out. An overview of the 
findings of this study is given in Chapter 4. The study involved the interviewing of staff working 
within the NHS with the role of supporting NHS innovation. A major finding of this study was that 
support was available for user-innovators within the NHS, from both NHS trusts and external 
organisations. A major potential source of support was from the NHS innovation hubs. 
Unfortunately, the exploratory study highlighted that much support for user-led innovation was 
focused predominantly on commercial exploitation of IP, with technology transfer processes, 
similar to those found in universities, becoming the norm for this support. The study raised the 
question of whether the prevailing technology transfer models of innovation support were 
appropriate for user-led innovation projects within the NHS. 
Identify and investigate four NHS sites, in order to develop distinctive case studies of user-led 
innovation based on the perspectives of user-innovators. 
The result of applying the methodology described in Chapter 3 was the development of four 
interpretive case studies. The cases are presented in Chapters 5,6,7 and 8. All four cases use a 
common structure to describe the purpose, process, events and context in which each innovation 
project took place. Each case report includes a descriptive element of the case and some analysis at 
the level of the individual project. 
Use the case study findings to establish the enabling and inhibiting factors affecting user-led 
innovation. 
Within Chapters 5,6,7 and 8a range of issues were raised that illustrate the enabling and 
inhibiting factors affecting user-led innovation in the ICHS. While many of these factors are 
directly related to the research questions, many were emergent from the research and are therefore 
included at the start of Chapter 9 as they inform a discussion of each of the research questions. 
308 
Conclusion 
Based on the case study findings and theory within the existing literature, synthesise models that 
aid understanding of the nature and process of user-led innovation. 
Chapter 9 reviews and draws general conclusions about each of the research questions. Several 
theoretical models are developed that underpin an improved understanding of user-led innovation. 
The models developed constitute some of the major contributions of this research and are 
summarised in the next section. 
10.2 Major contributions made by the thesis 
The research was guided by questions identified with the aim of gaining a better understanding of 
the phenomenon of user-led innovation with the UK NHS. Despite existence of anecdotal evidence 
that user-led innovation occurred, little was understood of the processes that underpinned it and 
whether the available support was effective. Furthermore, the modernisation agenda within the 
NHS had placed significant value on the exploitation of NHS-developed innovations, resulting in a 
raft of government policies. In answering the research questions this thesis has made a significant 
theoretical contribution in establishing user-led innovation as a distinct mode of innovation and 
creating a foundation for further research. In this conclusion, it is useful to reiterate how the thesis 
adds to current knowledge and potentially informs future innovation policy and practice in the 
NHS. 
This research has established user-led innovation as a theoretically useful and coherently defined 
mode of innovation. The distinction drawn between supplier-led and user-led innovation made in 
Chapter 2, has been extended by identifying specific factors that characterise user-led innovation. It 
has been shown that user-led innovation in comparison with other generic models of supplier-led 
innovation, such as Rothwell's third-generation model of innovation (Rothwell 1994), share some 
common features especially with respect to the interaction between research-push and demand-pull. 
However, the organic process of user-led innovation does not exhibit the close coupling or 
sophisticated innovation management of the fourth and fifth generation models. However, the lack 
of sophistication exhibited by user-led innovation processes, in comparison to these models, needs 
to be balanced by its emergent nature and the differences in its ascribed purposes. The cases 
illustrate how the broadly-based purposes of user-led innovation extended to include innovation of 
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both hard and soft technology, and the institutional structures around their use. This is a very 
different focus to Rothwell's models that focused primarily on science and technology applied to 
the creation of commercial products; providing little insight into the institutional change required 
for successful innovation. 
The diverse activities and interests of users was shown to be a distinguishing feature of user-led 
innovation, especially when compared to users within the lead-user (Nippel 2005) or open 
innovation (Chesbrough 2003) paradigms. The most significant difference being that within user- 
led innovation, user-innovators maintain significant power and control over the innovation process. 
This is not the case with lead-users or customers involved in open innovation where technology 
suppliers maintain overall control. This altered balance of power gives user-innovators much 
greater scope in defining the purpose and trajectory of their innovations. This is a significant step in 
democratising innovation and shifting power from technology suppliers to users. However, this 
simultaneously creates a risk that user-led innovation projects address sub-optimal goals or fail to 
recognise potential opportunities; user-led innovation projects are potentially limited by the 
cognitive limits of user-innovators working in isolation and the core rigidities of their organisations 
(Leonard-Barton 1992). 
Despite the centrality of technology users within user-led innovation, the research suggests that it 
represents only a partially democratic or participative approach to technological innovation. This 
research has illustrated that user-innovators are often strong minded and maintained significant 
control of the development and evaluation of their innovations, though supported by their teams, 
This illustrates a distinct contrast with participative approaches to design and development. For 
example, within the information system literature, much emphasis has been placed on the 
importance of user participation in development (Lyytinen and Klein 1985; Stowell 1994). On the 
surface there is an illusion that user-innovators and their teams operate in a participative fashion, 
however the question remains as to the extent to which individuals are free to participate. In 
common with other disciplines such as development studies, the participation of users, aside from 
the roles taken by user-innovators, within user-led innovation is not immune from the power 
relationships and the "tyranny of participation" (Cooke and Kothari 2001). The power base of 
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clinicians in the cases exemplifies the risk that other members of the innovation team have limited 
influence on how the project develops. 
The most significant and novel contribution to the understanding of healthcare technology 
innovation presented in this thesis is the development of an analysis of the relationship between 
healthcare technology and institutions, resulting in the development of the model of healthcare 
technology system. The model was necessary to explain the complex and dynamic nature of the 
user-led innovation cases but has significant implications for the wider study and management of 
healthcare technology. 
The development of an institutional perspective is based around the application of Scott's 
analytical framework for institutions (2001: 77) to healthcare technology. This has complemented 
and extended Orlikowski's model of technology (1992). Two benefits are gained from combining 
these two models. First, the synthesised model is more explicit about the nature of the institutional 
structures influencing healthcare technology. Second, the institutional perspective emphasises the 
independent existence of institutions from human agency and their trajectories of development over 
time. Thus, the synthesised model of a healthcare technology system proposed in this thesis 
integrates not just soft and hard technology, but also the interaction between structure and agency. 
Overall, this model provides a lens through which healthcare technologies can be specifically 
understood in terms of their institutional components. This is important as the healthcare sector, as 
illustrated by the cases, is one dominated by formal organisations, professional networks and 
institutionalised technologies. 
The distinctive application of institutional theory to innovation in this thesis has focused on the 
organisational and sub-organisational levels of analysis, as compared to more macro levels of 
analysis, such as the organisationäl field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2001: 83). This 
contrasts with institutional analyses of technological change that have been approached at other 
levels of analysis, for example in the electricity sector (Kunneke 2008). The resulting analysis has 
illustrated the role of proto-institutions in enabling locally developed skills to become 
institutionalised organisational capabilities, as an integral part of the user-led innovation process. 
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The implication of this analysis for user-led innovation is that when managing the diffusion of 
healthcare technology innovations it is imperative that action is taken to re-create any proto- 
institution formed during the innovation process. Hence, the successful diffusion of hard 
technologies created by user-led innovation is contingent on the wider institutionalisation of 
associated proto-institutions, in parallel to the codification and abstraction of the soft technologies. 
Further research should look specifically at how proto-institutions are recognised and where 
appropriate efforts made to diffuse them more widely. 
The institutional view of a healthcare technology proposed here suggests that when evaluating 
user-led innovation projects, consideration should be given to the extent and maturity of any 
supporting proto-institutions that have developed. If sufficiently mature, consideration can then be 
given to how to achieve its widespread institutionalisation. The implication of this for management 
of user-led innovation in the NHS is that evaluation must be extended beyond simply valuing 
innovations in commercial terms. Where an effective user-led innovation is implemented 
effectively in part of the NHS, then its associated proto-institution has potential value to the wider 
NHS. The value of user-led innovations should therefore be viewed in terms of the: commercial 
value of IP associated with hard technology; intellectual capital associated with soft technology; 
and the revised institutional structures that support improved performance. 
In summarising the conclusions of this research, the significance of proto-institutions within the 
phenomenon of user-led innovation cannot be understated. Proto-institutions should be recognised 
as distinctive and integral components of the healthcare technology systems created through user- 
led innovation. This research has shown how user-led innovation creates an environment that is 
conducive to the development and emergence of the sophisticated institutional frameworks 
required for implementation of novel technologies, by enabling mutual adjustment, accommodation 
and consensus building between stakeholders. These findings however, contrast with the NIlS's IN 
led approach to innovation management described in Chapter 4. The IP-led approach was criticised 
for placing IP exploitation and commercial technology transfer processes at the centre of NUS 
innovation policy. By focusing only on hard technology, the less easily codified products of 
innovation such as capability and proto-institutions were ignored, This research has shown that it is 
as important to manage the diffusion of proto-institutions, as much as it is to protect and exploit IP. 
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This in turn suggests that innovation policy in the NHS should be re-aligned to take account, not 
only of the hard and soft technologies developed by user-innovators, but also the institutional 
innovations that they create. Policy needs to recognise the systemic change that user-innovators are 
able to effect. Comprehensive support is still needed for nurturing and supporting the development 
of proto-institutions and their effective diffusion. Unfortunately, in the past the support structures 
within the NHS for innovation have been organised in a reductionist manner, with individual 
agencies taking responsibility for single pieces of the "innovation jigsaw". This has made it 
difficult to achieve an integrated and co-ordinated approach to managing user-led innovation. The 
policy changes stemming from the Darzi review (Reid 2009), that refocus innovation policy around 
clinician-led change and patient-centred service re-design, create an opportunity for improving the 
integration of services for supporting user-led innovation in the NHS. It is however still too early to 
assess how successful this policy change will be, 
Chapter 4 highlighted the historical importance of technology transfer in both user-led innovation 
policy in the NHS and the operational processes through which it was managed by trusts. This 
represents a positive contribution to the management of user-led innovation and suggests that 
development of the triple-helix model of technology transfer (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) to 
one with a fourth thread representing the role of technology users could be explored. The cases in 
this research however, have demonstrated the limitations of a technology transfer approach. A 
significant characteristic of the cases was the attention given to the successful implementation of 
the innovations. The most valuable products of the user-led innovation projects were often new 
ways of working and organising, rather than commercially exploitable IP. Technology transfer 
approaches provide only a partial solution to improving the management of innovations created 
within the NHS. 
Finally, the major benefit of adopting this institutional view of healthcare technology is that it 
provides a lens on both the overall process of user-led innovation and sub-activities that support it, 
such as evaluation and diffusion of innovations. The research highlights the need to recognise the 
impact of user-led innovation projects on the whole healthcare technology system. This suggests 
that innovation policy needs to shift away from one that focuses only on the exploitable IP related 
to hard technology. A shift that needs to be reflected in the evaluation of user-led innovation 
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projects through their life-cycle. Similarly, the performance of agencies tasked with supporting 
innovation in the NHS needs to be based on wider range of parameters. Coarse indicators such as 
numbers of patents, licence agreements and business start-ups, provide very little indication of the 
extent to which agencies actually support user-led innovation projects. Especially when a potential 
benefit of NHS-developed innovations, is improvement of performance across the NHS, rather than 
just producing commercial products. Industrial partnerships are required to develop hard 
technologies so that they can be used within the NHS. However, the process of commercialising 
hard technology risks ignoring the challenge of diffusing associated soft technologies. Even more 
challenging is the extent to which localised institutional innovations are diffused to other parts of 
the NHS. This research has suggested a range of dimensions that have potential to provide a more 
holistic view of the success, both potential and achieved, of user-led innovation projects. 
10.3 Changes to NHS innovation services as a result of the Darzi 
Review 
Since this research was completed, the innovation support in the NHS has changed, with various 
priorities evolving. There is a significant contrast between the landscape in which the LUTM 
innovation started in 1999 and that experienced by innovators in 2009. The intervening years 
between the articulation of a vision for the reformed NHS (UK Government 2000) and Lord 
Darzi's review (Darzi 2008) have seen significant changes in assumptions about the NHS. Central 
to these changes has been a shift in belief about what services should be provided and how they 
should be delivered. This has lead to evolution in many areas of healthcare policy impacting on 
innovation. Some policies have been constructive in supporting user-led innovation. Other policies, 
such as the Payment By Results (PbR) introduced in 2003/4, have had unintended negative 
consequences for innovation in the NHS (Audit Commision 2008: 66). It is therefore worth 
reviewing some of the most recent policy changes and assessing them in relation to the findings in 
this thesis. 
This thesis mirrors many of the themes articulated in the Darzi review, especially with respect to 
how NHS clinicians and managers can lead innovation in the NTIS. (This is a central tenet of Lord 
Darzi's strategy for change in the NHS. ) A direct result of the Darzi review has been a range of 
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policy initiatives that aim to promote user-led innovation the NHS (Reid 2009; NSR 
Implementation Team 2009). These initiatives include creation of regional innovation funds; 
establishing a legal duty on strategic health authorities (SHA) to promote innovation; creating a 
system of innovation "challenge" prizes; and creation of a central database for evidence to support 
decision-making around innovation. 
Establishing a legal obligation on SHAs to encourage and lead innovation is clearly a great step 
forward. On a practical level however, it still remains to be seen how SHAs will develop suitable 
capabilities to support innovation. Development of the necessary organisational capability is a 
significant challenge, requiring new structures and skilled staff. In the face of cuts in public-sector 
spending, the worst case will be that SHAs will carry out their obligations to the minimum 
acceptable level. It may transpire that SHA are too distant from emergent user-led innovation 
projects and the complex innovations to healthcare technology systems that they generate. 
Development of regional innovation funds is also a long-needed development. In the past, 
innovation projects in trusts have been halted because it was not possible to spend money in one 
financial year in order to save money in subsequent years. The establishment of a £220m NHS 
innovation fund has potential to reverse this situation, enabling critical strategic investment in 
innovations. However, the relatively small value of the fund will mean that some worthwhile 
projects will still not be funded. A further risk is that funding will go to innovators with the 
necessary knowledge, power and influence to gain funding; groups who have always been 
relatively well placed to gain innovation funding. As discussed in this thesis, the process of 
evaluation relating to innovations has a significant political dimension and so in managing the 
payments from the innovation funds the danger is that money will be allocated to those capable of 
mastering the system rather than those with the truly significant innovation. 
The political rhetoric towards innovation in the NHS certainly shifted during 2008-2009 with the 
emphasis shifting from IP exploitation to whole-system innovation of healthcare services. Both the 
Secretary of State for Health and the MIS Chief Executive were unequivocal about the need for 
healthcare innovation and its direct relevant to service quality and productivity. While in the past 
the raison d'etre for managing NHS innovation was to exploit IP, focus has now changed to how 
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innovation can create systemic improvement across the health system (HSJ 2009: 1). This is an 
important shift as it recognises that challenge to innovation is not purely technical but is also about 
social and institutional innovation. 
The range of new policies and the accompanying change in political rhetoric have pushed user-led 
innovation up the political agenda. The complexity of managing innovation in the NHS means it is 
unlikely to be solved by a few "silver bullet" policies. The complex interconnected system of 
organisations, professions and other stakeholders means that identifying the relevant levers for 
change is undoubtedly challenging. Any "solution" to the innovation problem in the NHS must 
have the necessary requisite variety (Ashby 1958; De Raadt 1987) to cope with this complexity. 
The post-Darzi response has seen the further development and multiplication of agencies 
responsible for innovation (NSR Implementation Team 2009). Thus existing agencies, such as the 
NHS innovation hubs, have now been augmented with other agencies such as the NHS Technology 
Adoption Centre to manage technology adoption. Similarly, establishment of Academic Health 
Science Centres (AHSCs), Health Education and Innovation Centres (HIECs) and biomedical 
research centres seek to increase the extent to which knowledge translation is improved in the 
NHS; increasing the speed at which research knowledge is embedded in clinical practice. The 
result has been that agencies relevant to a range of innovation activities do now exist and the 
criticism that that the NHS overemphasised commercial technology transfer processes (Savory 
2006) may have been addressed. However, the creation of separate agencies, each with a specific 
focus, does not fully address the problem of how best to diffuse user-led innovations. In the UK, 
spending on the adoption and spread of innovations in the INAS has historically been very small, in 
comparison to spending on innovation creation (Barlow and Burn 2008: 40). 
10.4Pötential areas of future research 
This research, in common with most other research projects, has raised further issues and 
questions. As such, this research creates a foundation for future research in this area, both with 
respect to practical application of this research, but also new opportunities for development of 
theory. The case studies raised several additional issues and questions relating to user-led 
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innovation that could not be addressed within the thesis. Future research could focus on these 
important themes. Six areas in particular would benefit from further investigation. 
Applying the theory of user-led innovation in practice 
This thesis has established user-led innovation as a distinctive form of innovation activity. Further 
work is now required to apply this new understanding to the support of user-led innovation within 
NHS trusts. The problem faced by the NHS has been that it is very difficult to identify projects, 
making it impossible to provide support, adjust them to meet more strategic objectives, or possibly 
even halt them to avoid waste of resource. In addition, work is needed that is oriented to building a 
pragmatic and relevant set of tools and techniques to allow NHS trust R&D departments, 
innovation hubs and other stakeholders of NHS innovation to identify and support user-led 
innovation projects. The activity model presented in this thesis has a potential to form the basis for 
an organisational audit tool, that builds on existing tools (Chiesa, Coughlan, and Voss 1996). This 
could be used to ensure that relevant, tailored, support is available for user-innovators in all six 
sub-systems of the model. Development of an audit tool lends itself to development through a 
programme of action research carried out jointly between academics and NHS innovation 
managers. 
What role does the organisation play in supporting the knowledge management processes 
underpinning user-led innovation? 
It was apparent that for all the cases in this research, a crucial process is the translation of 
knowledge from outside the user-innovators immediate working context. This was a complex 
process relying on a range of mechanisms including the formal education system, professional 
networks, and multi-disciplinary teams. Overall, the cases suggest that for organisations to be 
effective in supporting user-led innovation activity they will need a need to possess a suitable 
organisational capability in relation to knowledge translation (Savory 2006,2009). Further research 
could be directed at building a better understanding of the organisational capabilities that might 
support knowledge translation processes within user-led innovation. 
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How do user-innovators act to diffuse their innovations beyond the initial context of 
development to other parts of the NHS or outside organisations? 
It was apparent in the LUTM, ePAQ and PMS cases that significant efforts were needed by user- 
innovators to ensure that their innovations diffused beyond the initial development context. Several 
strategies were identified in the cases that illustrate how user-innovators used formal and informal 
mechanism for diffusing their ideas. Further research could consider how user-innovators act to 
codify and abstract their innovations in order to support their wider diffusion. 
What entrepreneurial qualities do user-innovators in the NHS possess? 
A major attribute of many of the user-innovators in the cases were their entrepreneurial qualities. 
Further research is needed to examine how the entrepreneurial qualities of user-innovators compare 
with other categories of entrepreneur e. g. business entrepreneurs, social entrepreneurs and 
intrapreneurs. This would be of particular importance to NHS agencies responsible for supporting 
and encouraging user-led innovation within the NHS. However, one of the potential pitfalls for 
projects lead by enthusiastic clinical staff is that as the project develops, the skill and knowledge 
requirements for leading the project will change. Typically, this may mean a shift from a clinical 
focus to a more technical or business focus. Many of the user-innovators in the case studies 
expressed concern that gaining the necessary business skills was challenging for them. This raises 
the question for projects as to when it is most appropriate for the original user-innovators in a 
project to hand over the project to staff with different skill sets. Further research is needed to 
examine the extent to which the leadership of entrepreneurial clinicians continues to benefit 
projects, once development moves away from its original context. 
What factors affect the relationship between user-innovators and their industrial partners? 
For a large proportion of user-led innovation projects, it is likely that at some point a private sector 
partnership will be needed. The creation of such partnerships is fraught with problems and their 
success may well be critical to the ultimate success of the innovation. User-innovators face a 
similar set of challenges to those of small hi-tech start-up firms when forming partnerships (Fraser, 
Minshall, and Probert 2005). Central to this problem are the respective perspectives of the user- 
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innovator and industrial partner, on the purpose and expectations enrolled in the partnership. 
Further research is needed into how these partnerships develop and what factors support or inhibit 
their success. This research would be relevant to agencies, such as NHS innovation hubs, for which 
building partnerships is a critical activity. 
How successful is the wider adoption of user-led innovations and do they have any advantage 
over innovations produced through other processes? 
It is tempting to assume that user-led innovations created within the NHS have significant 
advantages, over innovations developed outside the NHS, when implementing them within the 
wider NHS. It is possible that the close relationship between development and context of use will 
lead to healthcare technologies that have a strong match with the needs of the NHS. Research is 
however needed to assess whether user-led innovations from the NHS are any more effective in 
being adopted into the NHS. The question is therefore raised as to whether user-led innovations 
perform better than those developed through conventional routes. It may be that user-led 
innovations developed in the NHS have inherent strengths, due to their strong relationship with the 
NHS. In particular, user-led innovations from the NHS may be better in terms of: 
  their fit with the culture, values and processes of the NHS; 
  facilitating process re-design across primary and secondary care organizations; 
  being more acceptable to NHS staff due to their NHS "brand"; 
Conversely, it is possible NHS user-led innovations may exhibit relative weaknesses, as compared 
to those developed through other mechanisms. For example: 
" competition between specialist centres within the MIS may inhibit adoption; 
  not being backed up by an established healthcare brand; 
  user-led innovations may be overly specific in their application and lack the flexibility to 
be used across several contexts; lack of fit with overarching MIS strategy or policy. 
Significant topics for current NHS policy are the problems associated with adopting new 
technologies into the NHS (Greenhalgh et at. 2004; Darzi 2008). Further research is needed to 
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assess whether user-led innovations have any significant advantage when being adopted into the 
NHS. 
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11.1 Appendix 1: Interview Schedule for NHS Staff 
Managing Technological Innovation in the NHS 
,0 
C7) 
NHS Staff sem i-structured Interview schedule 
During the interview, the development of the technological innovation will be referred to as "the 
project". 
Short personal introduction by interviewet and reiteration of the purpose of the interview 
and the basis on which the interview is carried out. Time should be allowed for daifying 
any points not understood by the participant. It is important that the inherent limits to 
confidentiality of the research are made clear to the participant. This should also stress the 
participant's: 
" Right to withdraw without prejudice 
" Right to review summary of the interview notes 
" Right to decline audio recordi of the interview 
Q1 At the time of your involvement in the project, what was your job title and what did your 
work involve? 
Q2 Tell me why the project was important to pursue? 
How were people initially convinced that it was a good idea? 
How did this view change during the course of the project? 
How formal was the initial feasibility assessment of the Project? 
Q3 Tell me about your involvement in the project? 
Over what period were you involved? 
What was your involvement? 
To what extent was the project part of your no nal work role? 
Q4 To what extent did the project follow a set of formal stages 
Who defined the stages? 
What were the stages? 
How was the project monitored and controlled? 
Now helpful did you find this process? 
S If there was no formal process what were the main stages that it followed? 
Q6 What were the significant events during the project? 
What were the high/lowpoints? 
How did you feel at these high/low points? 
How do you feel these events affected the team? 
Q7 What were the important relationships that affected the project? 
Within the project team? 
Strong supportive relationships to other parts of the NHS? 
Relationships outside the NHS? 
Were an or organisational relationsMa unhelpful? 
Q8 To what extent was the organisation (NI-IS) supportive of the project? 
What organisation initiatives/structures really helped 
What organisation initiatives/structures actually held back the EICI ect? 
Q9 What could be done to improve the support of future projects of this type? 
At the level of the organisation? 
At the level of the individual? 
Closing remarks and thanks for the interview 
Interview Schedule for NHS Stair 
Page 1 of 1 
Short personal introduction by interviewet and reiteration of the purpose of the interview 
and the basis on which the interview is carried out. Time should be allowed for clarifying 
any points not understood by the participant. It is important that the inherent limits to 
confidentiality of the research are made clear to the participant. This should also stress the 
participant's: 
" Right to withdraw without prejudice 
" Right to review summary of the interview notes 
" Ri t to decline audio recordi of the interview 
Ql At the time of your involvement in the project, what was your job title and what did your 
work involve? 
Q2 Tell me why the project was important to pursue? 
How were people initially convinced that it was a good idea? 
How did this view change during the course of the prof ect? 
How formal was the initial feasibility assessment of the project? 
Q3 Tell me about your involvement in the project? 
Over what period were you involved? 
What was your involvement? 
To what extent was the project pwt of your normal work role? 
Q4 To what extent did the project follow a set of formal stages 
Who defined the stages? 
What were the stages? 
How was the project monitored and controlled? 
How helpful did you find this process? 
S If there was no formal process what were the main stages that it followed? 
Q6 What were the significant events during the project? 
What were the high/lowpoints? 
How did you feel at these high/low points? 
How do you feel these events affected the team? 
Q7 What were the important relationships that affected the project? 
Within the project team? 
Strong supportive relationships to other parts of the NHS? 
Relationships outside the NHS? 
Were an or organisational relationsMa unhelpful? 
Q8 To what extent was the organisation (NI-IS) supportive of the project? 
What organisation initiatives/structures really helped 
What organisation initiatives/structures actually held back the EICI ect? 
Q9 What could be done to improve the support of future projects of this type? 
At the level of the organisation? 
At the level of the individual? 
Closing remarks and thanks for the interview 
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11.2Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet and Consent form 
(PIS/CF) 
;0 
Depardnent of Technology Management 
Faculty of Technology 
The opal university 
Welton Hall 
Mllton Keynes 
\\\ MK16AA 
Telephone (Direct) (01908) 652105 
Fax (01908) 653718 
E-mail: Tech-ttnquedes@opemec. uk 
Participant Information and Consent Form: 
Managing Technological Innovation In the NHS 
You are invited to participate in a research project into technological innovation in the NHS. The chief 
investigator for the research is Clive Savory, Lecturer in Technology Management at the Open University 
basedin Milton Keynes. The project will contribute to his PhD research into technological innovation in 
the NHS. He is not being paid for carrying out the research Insights from this research may inform course 
development in the area of technology management at the Open University. 
Project Aims 
The research is focused on the way that innovations are managed from their initial invention to protection 
and commercialisation The research will compare the intention and impact of formal processes and 
initiatives in the NHS with the experiences of inventors and innovators working in and withthe NHS. By 
reviewing examples of successful innovations the research will develop case material on the actual 
innovation processes at work in the NHS. In reviewing the experience of NHS staff it will be possible to 
assess the impact of formal processes and initiatives. In addition the cases will also have potential to feed 
into a grounded model of good practice. This model could then in turn inform the organisation of future 
innovation processes. 
The project will investigate the following questions: 
" Do NHS organisations have strategies that support new internally generated technology projects based 
on inventions? 
" Is there a formal technology project process that supports either individuals or teams to develop their 
inventions and if so what is it? 
" How in practice are new technological innovations initially identified, evaluated, implemented and 
integrated into the organisation's existing processes? 
" How effective is the use of existing knowledge and competences in building new technological 
innovations? 
" What activities and processes support the effective use of the organisation's knowledge in building 
technological innovations? 
Why have you been asked to take part in this research study? 
The key questions which this research addresses are how innovation in the NITS comes about and the role 
which management has in supporting it? Though the main purpose of the NHS is care of patients, 
effective management of technological innovation has the potential long term benefits of both improving 
patient care and providing additional income streams for the NITS. 
You have been approached to be included in this research study as you have either had a direct 
involvement in the successful development of a technological innovation oryou are involved with an 
aspect of the innovation process in the NHS. You were initially identified as a potential participant by 
staff in the R&D department of the NHS trust in which you work. It is hoped that you will be able to 
provide a personal view of the way the innovations develop. 
NHS Staff information sheet. doc 
Page i of 3 
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Potential Risks & Benefits 
There are no significant risks associated with taking part in this study. In fact, the benefit of taking part in 
the study is that you will have the chance to review the way an innovation project has developed and 
express your own views on what helped or hindered its progress. The perspective on technological 
innovation that you contribute to the research will also be represented in published findings. 
Research Procedures 
Should you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to sign this consent form, once 
all your questions have been answered to your satisfaction. 
This study consists of interviews with individual participants working for or with the NITS. The 
innovation projects in the study are based in several NHS centres in the UK. As part of the study you will 
be asked to take part in a face to face semi structured interview lasting approximately 45 minutes. It is 
intended that the interview will be recorded as this will allow a more conversational style of interview. 
The main purpose of the interview will be to allow you recall your involvement in the innovation project 
and discuss key events and issues that affected it. Within a few weeks of your interview you will have the 
opportunity to sea a summary of the interview. You will have the opportunity to clarify, amend or 
withdraw any statements that you have made. You will also be given the chance to participate in a short 
workshop in which the case study of the project is reviewed by all the people contributing to the case. 
Confidentiality 
The nature of this research project is such that there are inherent limits to the level of confidentiality that 
can be maintained for research participants. The case studies are to be based on specific innovations that 
are by definition distinctive. It is likely that other members of the NHS and wider healthcare sector will be 
able to identify the project and associated staff. Subsequently it is unrealistic for the researcher to be able 
to offer a guarantee of anonymity for any participants in the research. 
The innovation projects in the study have been selected because they have been successful. For this 
reason it is hoped that participants will be happy to participate without remaining anonymous. You may 
however choose not to be either quoted verbatim or named in any published work based on the research. 
It is also unlikely that specific innovations can be the subject of a case study without providing some 
detail of the innovation and its underlying technology. It is therefore important that participants are certain 
that any intellectual property associated with the innovation have been properly protected commercially 
and its details are free to be placed into the public domain. Should you be in any doubt about the extent to 
which details can be made public, you should consult with staff in the R&D department of the NI IS trust 
in which you work. 
Data collected in the interviews will be handled in compliance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
Access to the raw data will be limited to the chief investigator and his PhD supervisor. As a member of 
staff at the Open University Clive Savory is covered by professional indemnity insurance while carrying 
out research.. 
Participation 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to choose not to participate. Should you choose to 
participate, you can withdraw at any time. 
Complaints 
If you have cause to complain about any aspects of the research you should contact: 
Dr Joyce Fortune 
Head of Department 
at the address on the head of this letter. 
NHS Staff information slieet. doc 
Page 2 of 3 
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Participant Consent Form 
Research Project: Managing Technological Innovation in the NHS 
Please tick the appropriate boxes and sign at the bottom of both copies of the form. Then send both 
copies to the chief investigator at the address given below. You will then receive back one countersigned 
copy of the form. 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation 
I understand that I can withdraw at any time without prejudice 
Should I withdraw from the research early, I am happy for any data collected 
prior to my withdrawal to continue to be used in the research. 
1 am happy for any interview I give to be recorded 
I am happy for verbatim quotations to be used in published work 
I am happy to be named in any published work 
I understand that the chief investigator cannot guarantee that participants in the 
research will remain anonymous 
I understand that insights and examples gathered during the research may be 
used in any teaching that the chief investigator undertakes 
Q (please tick if agree) 
Q (please tick if agree) 
Q (please tick if agree) 
Q (please tick if agree) 
Q (please tick (agree) 
Q (please tick if agree) 
Q (please tick if agree) 
Q (please tick if agree) 
I have read this consent form and I understand what is being requested of me as a participant in this study. 
I freely consent to participate. I have been given satisfactory answers to my questions. The investigator 
provided me with a copy of this form. 
Name of Participant (Printed) 
Name of Participant (Signed) 
Date .............................................. ............... 
Name of Researcher (Printed) 
Clive Savory 
Name of Researcher (Signed) 
Date 
...................................................................... 
Should you have questions or concerns before, during or after your participation in this study please 
contact the chief investigator using the contact details below. 
Clive Savory Phone: 01908 653435 
Department of Technology Management Mobile: 07855 553310 
Faculty of Technology Email: c. savory@open. ac. uk 
Open University 
Walton Hall 
Milton Keynes 
MK7 6AA 
NILS Staff' information sheet. doc 
Page 3 of 3 
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11.3Appendix 3: Participant Interview Summary Approval Form 
r Yi 
Interview Summary 
p Participant: ..... ................... 
Referred to as: ................................ Interview date: ................................ 
I confirm that the following notes of the interview with Clive Savory are accurate and 
I am happy for them to be used within any subsequent published work. 
Signed:... 
If there are any additional points, you would like to make, please include them in the 
box below or on a separate sheet 
Please countersign each individual page of the summary and then return this page and 
the summary to: 
Clive Savory 
Department of Technology Management 
Technology Faculty 
The Open University 
Walton Hall 
Milton Keynes 
MK7 6AA 
Page I of I 
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11.4Appendix 4: NHS Technology Transfer Manager 
Questionnaire 
l 
0 r 
Managing Technological Innovation In the NHS 
NHS Innovation Hub Director semi-structured Interview schedule 
Short personal introduction by interviewer and reiteration of the purpose of the interview 
and the basis on which the interview is curried out. Time should be allowed for clarifying 
any points not understood by the interviewee. This should also stress the interviewee's: 
" Right of anonymity 
" Right to withdraw 
" Right to review summary of the interview notes 
" Ri t to decline audio recording of the interview 
Q1 What is the role of the hub in relation to the NHS 
To what extent is the hub organisationally "part" of the NHS 
flow does this affect the relationship with trusts and MIS employees 
How does this affect the relationship with other organisations such as university 
technology transfer companies 
2 How is the hub funded and how does this affect the hub? 
Q3 What types of innovation does the hub deal with and wtuit are the rough proportions: 
Practise based innovation vs formal R&D 
Diagnostic vs therapeutic technologies 
Service delivery 
Q4 What is the core process used for protecting and commercialising technologies and how 
does this differ for various technological innovations 
For service delivery innovations 
For practise based innovations 
Q5 How are innovation initially screened and evaluated prior and during their development? 
How are innovations summatively assessed in terms of 
Quality 
Relevance and potential for patient benefit? 
Effectiveness in gain benefitluou translating into service? 
Q6 To what extent is the work of the hub characterised as: 
Searching forpeads 
Growl pearls 
Q7 To what extent is NHS culture; 
Consistent with the work of the hub? 
Antagonistic with the work of the hub 
8 What are the weaknesses of the NHS in developing innovations 
Q9 What processes would you hope to develop to support MIS innovation in the hub and in 
the NHS? 
10 now effective is the NHS in mana' knowledge to support its innovations? 
Ql i To what extent do internal relationships between dcpa tmentWanctions support 
innovation 
Is it possible to follow up on any points that arise after the interview? 
Closin remarks and thanks for the interview 
Interview Schedule for Hub Managets 
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